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BETTER CITY, BETTER LIFE?

The 'Fate' of the Displacees from the Shanghai World Expo 2010

By
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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, for any other degree or professional qualification.

Yunpeng Zhang

November 2014

For millions of Shanghainese who lost their homes to the great urban transformation and the victims of the Expo-induced domicide who have so generously shared their time and knowledge with me.

Abstract

With the ascendency of neoliberal ideology, mega-events have been increasingly used by ruling elites as part of a narrative of competitive progress in order to attract investment capital. Unfortunately, the dark side of mega-events has not received enough attention in existing literature, especially the critically important question of displacement and forced eviction because of such events.

This thesis contributes to the literature by debunking the myths of mega-events and examining the domicide effects through an in-depth case study of the Shanghai World Expo. Theoretically, the thesis develops the notion of domicide by incorporating the literature on domination and subordination. It attempts to negotiate the tension between the subjective experience of victimhood and the objective process of victimisation in domcide. In analysing the domicide experiences, this thesis proposes to look into both the temporalities and spatialities of domicide, and to examine the variegated ways the displaced appropriate them. It questions how the morally, legally and politically problematic act of domicide is committed without effective forms of resistance. Empirically, this thesis offers a *post hoc* impact assessment of the 'best ever' World Expo and voices the suppressed outcries from those on the receiving end. It supplies a detailed account of the social production of domicide with a case from the Global South, and in doing so; it explores 'actually existing neoliberalism' in the Chinese context, expanding the geographical horizon in existing literature and enhancing our understanding of the articulation of neoliberalism in different localities. Although contextualised through the lens of mega-events, the conditions, mechanisms, process and tactics that provide the fertile soil for domicide as identified in this thesis can teach us a great deal about urban spatial practices elsewhere.

The thesis draws upon the data collected through site-intensive ethnographic fieldwork, mixing the use of interviews, (non-)participatory observation, survey, unorthodox focus groups and media content. It argues that the exceptionality of the World Expo revokes political, moral and legal boundaries in causing pain to affected citizens in order to facilitate the accumulation of capital. Such exceptionality is constructed through various normative discourses. Those discourses and values

naturalise and legitimatise the process of domicide, produce symbolic violence, and undermine the solidarity of the powerlessness. The submission of the displaced to the dominant power enables the production and reproduction of a repressive social and spatial structure. These are vitally important questions given the international focus on China's economic growth and urbanisation.

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As a person who constantly loses places, I easily become emotionally involved with those stories I have been writing about. I penned many heartbreaking stories about people losing their homes with anger, frustration and fear. The intellectual journey I embarked on in Edinburgh is as much about understanding the loss and suffering of others as a discovery and resolution of my own grief and pain. Fortunately, I was never alone when I was working on this project. I am very much blessed to have received so much support from so many people who helped me get through those difficult moments and finally complete this thesis on time. First of all, I wish to thank my supervisors, Dr Tom Slater and Professor Jamie Pearce, for their unremitting intellectual guidance, encouragement and inspiration. Tom has been more than a principal supervisor who introduced me to the vast literature on urban geography. He contributed more than I know in steering me through the theoretical world. He is a comrade in the battle against neoliberal capitalism, state violence and merciless annihilation of beloved places. His passion for social justice and his political intervention for democratic politics set an example for me as to what institutional responsibility means to an intellectual and what it takes to be a proper, politically-engaged researcher who aims to change the world. I also appreciate all the time, efforts and ideas Jamie invested in my project. He set a high standard for me to write politically, clearly and coherently and this has been motivating me since our first meeting. His numerous insightful comments on the draft of this thesis pushed me to think more critically and thoroughly. I would also like to thank Dr Yiping Fang who has been offering intellectual and career guidance to me since I was studying in the Netherlands. She provided so many sharp comments on many pieces of my writing and the survey design for this project. I cannot forget the support from my advisor, Professor Emily Brady, for organising the first year review panel and taking care of the progress reports. I am deeply indebted to the efforts from all of them, without whom, the completion of this thesis would be impossible.

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List of Abbreviations

BIE	Bureau International des Expositions
COHRE	Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
CPC	Communist Party of China
DRP	Displacement and Resettlement Plan
ERD	Regulation on Expo-Induced Residential Displacement
IOC	International Olympic Committee
LUR	Land Use Right
NRT	Non-Representational Theory
SOE	State Owned Enterprises

Glossary of Chinese Words and Tentative Translations

bixu	必须	must
buchong xieyi	补充协议	supplement agreement
chaiqian	拆迁	displacement and resettlement
chengzhongcun	城中村	villages in the city due to land appropriation
danwei	单位	work units
dangshiren	当事人	relevant party
doufuzha gongcheng	豆腐渣工程	projects with extremely poor quality
fanshen	翻身	turn over the body
guanxi	关系	interpersonal relations
guodu fang	过渡房	transitory housing before moving into resettlement housing
hukou	户口	household registration
jia	家	home
jiapo renwang	家破人亡	family breakdowns and members dead
jiefang	解放	emancipation, liberation
jidi	基地	bastion
junshi	军师	military commanders or military strategists
koujing	口径	fine-grained regulations, coordinated political speech
lianzuo	连坐	collective responsibility, a method of punishment
lilong	里弄	lane housing
mianzi	面子	face
min buy u guan dou	民不与官斗	ordinary people would not fight against the officials

nangao	难搞	someone who is difficult and tough to deal with
penghuqu	棚户区	simple shacks settlement
qiangqian	强迁	forcible eviction
qifang	期房	presold housing
quanli	权力	power
quanli	权利	rights
quanyi	权益	interests
sixiang gongzuo	思想工作	thought work
shangpinfang	商品房	commercial housing
shangshan xiaxiang	上山下乡	up to the mountains and down to the countryside
shangzhijiao	上只角	upper quarter
shu rentou	数人头	compensation counting numbers of registered people
shu zhuantou	数砖头	compensation counting floor size
shui zhi qing ze wu yu	水至清则无鱼	No fish can survive the cleanest water
subei	苏北	roughly refers to people from Northern Jiangsu Province
suku	诉苦	speaking bitterness (CPC's political tactic)
suzhi	素质	human quality
waidi ren	外地人	migrants, non-locals
weiwen	维稳	maintaining social stability
xiafang	下放	sent down to the countryside
xiazhijiao	下只角	lower quarter
xian chaiqian tengdi hou chuli jiufen	先拆迁腾地，后处理纠纷	eviction first and resolve conflicts later
xiangxia	乡下	the countryside, the rural area

xietiaohui	协调会	coordination meetings
xinfang	信访	letters and visits, a permissible petitioning tactic
xinfang zhongjie	信访终结	closing a petition case
yangbanfang	样板房	showcase apartment
yangguang dongqian	阳光动迁	displacement that is transparent, fair and just
yingdang	应当	should
zao zou zao de yi	早走早得益	the sooner one moves out, the more benefits one receives
zhibian	支边	displaced youths and workers to frontiers
zhihuibu	指挥部	command centres
zhinei	支内	displaced to support the development of inland region
zhiqing	知青	educated youth forced to leave the city
zhufang kunan	住房困难	housing difficulty

Chapter 1 : Introduction

> 'If only the city could speak, what would it say to us? Would it tell of its moral angst over racial inequalities and ethnic discrimination? Would it talk of crumbling infrastructure and fiscal strains? Would we hear of vibrant neighbourhoods, myriad cultural activities, dedicated school teachers, and dynamic industrial districts? Would a rich public life be claimed, one characterised by widespread democratic debate? What would we be told?'
>
> Robert Beauregard, *If only the city could speak*

On a windy afternoon in early April 2012, a thin woman intercepted me in a resettlement neighbourhood and asked me if I wanted to hear her family's story of being displaced. 'I am now *ren bu xiang ren, gui bu xiang gui* (half human, half ghost)', she bitterly commented on her stigmatised self, 'when I was displaced, I was a little overweight. Neighbours called me Miss Big. Look at me now'. Her eyes soon filled with tears when she related her suicide attempt during eviction day. Without consultation or offered any compensation package, her three-story house built from scratch by her parents over the years was bulldozed to pieces. On eviction day, she jumped off the roof of her house in a desperate act of protest. She was rescued but with permanent scars: broken ribs, dental implants, clinical depression. 'I feel so unfairly treated. Are they government officers?' she asked me, 'they are thugs. No, they are worse than thugs, far worse'. After saying this, she had a sudden emotional breakdown, hysterically crying aloud in a public space. With the help from her neighbours, she finally calmed down a bit but wept constantly while I was there listening to her story. She then recalled her long journey in seeking justice, and narrated her pain, 'At night, my eyes are always wide open. I have this knot in my heart. It is so aching that I could not fall asleep. My mother passed away last month. I keep dreaming about her. I am angry that she did not take me with her'. I felt it an insult to comfort her and help her during such enormous amount of loss and grief. But, that was what I did on that day. I kept telling her that there was still hope in her life and justice would be served, eventually. I walked her to her apartment. Her son was at home that day but refused to come out and look after her. 'Like his father, he thinks I am insane. I am not. I just cannot accept this eviction. I cannot move on', she bitterly explained her son's coldness and estrangement, and went on; 'my family

perished a long time ago. I tried to kill myself three times now. I just see no point to live.' [1]

The story I am relaying above is from a woman who lost her home and her family to the 'best ever' Shanghai World Expo. She however was only one of many victims I had the great opportunity to work with and learn from during my fieldwork in Shanghai. To pave the way for this six-month temporary mega-event, more than 18,000 households, according to official statistics, lost their homes and communities. For the ruling elites, those families are inevitable sacrifices to make way for urban development and national fame. At the time of my fieldwork, apart from the road names and the renovated factories, there is no indication of the history of the people who lay down their roots deeply in this soil and the violent process that severed those roots. The violent prelude to Shanghai's 'glorious' expo is rapidly fading in time.

It is the intent that by the contribution of this thesis to give voice to those victimised, marginalised and silenced, and to reconstruct the history of the Expo-induced displacement. I wish to bring to the front the suffering and the pain of those families and to tell their side of the story about the 'best ever' Expo. I hasten to argue that such socio-psychological costs should be placed at the centre of intellectual inquiry to any development programmes that involve the annihilation of people's homes and communities because it powerfully questions the moral and political limits of abusive power. Much of my thesis is written with this in mind to show the ways people were mercilessly displaced and victimised by concerted efforts from the political, economic and cultural elites for the sake of a transitory event and to question the morality and politics of *chaiqian* (literally translates as displacement and resettlement) in contemporary Chinese cities. Although the focus of this thesis is on the Expo, these stories can shed light on the human lives caught up in Shanghai's, as well as China's neoliberal urban transformation. The ultimate goal is to problematise China's 'miraculous' urban revolution and reveal the real costs in the pursuit of a land-centred accumulation regime. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I shall first justify the significance of studying mega-events induced displacement and forcible eviction. I then introduce the theoretical approach before moving to provide a short background of mega-events in China and the geography of Shanghai. This is

[1] An earlier version of this story was published online. See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/fieldresearch/2014/04/04/the-vulnerable-observer/ To protect the anonymity of many displacees, I removed the dates of some formal or informal interviews, small talks, or conversations in the thesis.

followed by an outline of the research questions and a road map to the thesis in later chapters.

The Myths: Global Mega-events Fetishism and Events-induced Displacement

Mega-events, in Ritchie's words (1984: 2) are 'major one time or recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term'. Over the past three decades, enthusiasm for constructing such transient spectacles has grown in cities from both developed and developing countries. The narratives underlying their motivations are strikingly similar everywhere: to attract ever footloose capital investment, to stimulate economic growth and/or to distinguish them out from their competitors (Cochrane et al., 1996, Essex and Chalkley, 1998, 2004, Chalkley and Essex, 1999, Roche, 2000, Burbank et al., 2001, Gold and Gold, 2010). It is widely believed by the elites in the bidding cities that those events are cash cows in generating tourism revenues, upgrading local infrastructures, creating new business opportunities and increasing job positions.

Amongst much irrationality of mega-events (e.g. cost overruns, marginalisation, etc.) (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, Horne, 2007), event-induced displacement has been a long neglected dark side. The brutal destruction of people's homes makes the rationale for hosting mega-events rather dubious. Event-led home annihilation is a global epidemic. Let me first quote some numbers from the report by the Centre of Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE) (2007) to show the sheer scale of people who lost their homes to these mega-events. For hosting the Seoul Olympics in 1988, 720,000 people were evicted from their homes and approximately 90 per cent of the displacees did not receive replacement housing within the redevelopment site. For the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the number of families who lost their homes to event-related development soared to 1.25 million. However, we should remain mindful of the underestimation of the real scale of displacement due to the conceptual challenges in defining displacement. There is a tendency to narrow the statistical scope to the last residents whereas residents who are prohibited from entering into the housing market or who are pressured to move out due to the gentrification effect surrounding the event facilities are very likely to be excluded[2].

[2] Those latter two types of displacement are what Peter Marcuse (1985) calls exclusionary displacement and displacement by pressure.

Those conservative numbers are capable of painting the long history of horrible violations of basic human rights to adequate housing on such an extraordinary scale by those mega-events across the globe. Despite the astonishing scale, there are only a handful of studies to this day that look into the heartbreaking effects of event-induced displacement upon the residents who sacrificed their homes (Olds, 1998, Lenskyj, 2002, Greene, 2003, Porter, 2009, Shin and Li, 2013). This is perhaps partly due to the methodological difficulty to track down the displacees, as 'by definition, displaced residents have disappeared from the very places where researchers and census-takers go to look for them' (Newman and Wyly, 2006: 27). This however should not prevent us from taking our institutional responsibility and constantly trying to uncover the real human costs in hosting mega-events. Displacement matters because those displaced are equal human beings in our polity, rather than members of an impersonal political category comprised of the impacted population in political calculation. They are who 'deserve[s] respect for their homes, livelihoods and well-being, and treated with dignity and care' (Porter, 2009: 398-399). It matters because of the vital importance of home for human survival. It seems to me unnecessary here to reiterate the import of home. We all need a home to dwell, to reproduce and to feel secure. As the most basic social and spatial unit, home is the first and most essential place in the development of our attachment structure and our identities since our early childhood. Home gives us an anchor. From here, we build our mazeway in the interaction with the external environment. This is the protective bubble that offers us familiarity, assurance and comfort (Fullilove, 2005). Losing it against our will is a threat to our ontological security in the world. It is likely to cause frustration, anger and grief as it is in our human nature to resist overly drastic change of familiar and meaningful environment (Marris, 1974). Although the acute pain may slowly ebb over time, the wounds stays with us and may never heal. Fullilove (2005) explains that this is because we keep retelling and reliving those past stories in our life. The human costs from displacement then put an even greater challenge to the political and moral legitimacy of hosting mega-events given that place annihilation is frequently justified by a cost-benefit calculus: how is it possible to put a price tag on people's suffering and pain? How is it possible to legitimatise such suffering as necessary or inevitable for a transient spectacle?

The thesis aims to question the underlying rationalities and interests in hosting mega-events. It does so through an original and in-depth study of displacement caused by the Shanghai World Expo 2010 upon the families on the receiving end. The selection of Shanghai was practical because two giant sites called the Expo Homeland were purposely planned and built to rehouse eligible families from the Expo site and the

resettlement sites. I take displacement at the heart of my inquiry because first, this is a hugely under-explored dark side of mega-events. By taking displacement seriously, I wish to debunk the myths surrounding mega-events and attack their legitimacy. The second reason in studying event-induced displacement comes from my disappointment in the theoretical and empirical impasse in researching displacement in general. Political economic theories in urban geography, especially Harvey's thesis (1978, 1985a, 1985b) on urban process under capitalism, teach us a great deal about why displacement occurs. Yet, we know so little about how displacement is practised and contested; how it feels and what the consequences are.

Although China's astonishing scale of *chaiqian* in the past several decades offers us a great opportunity to examine the process sysmetically and advance our knowledge of the social and affective dimensions of displacement, only a handful of studies have considered this direction and interrogated the politics and morality of *chaiqian* in Chinese cities. Qin's (2013) recent work on domicide in Shanghai, a timely critical intervention, stands out. Her ethnography, with rich details and numerous heartbreaking accounts of the pain of the evicted, suggests compellingly questions as to the human costs of Shanghai's rapid neoliberal urbanism. I am deeply inspired by her courage to document state violence in Shanghai and to speak truth to power. A substantial critique of this outstanding study is hardly possible and frankly dishonest. However, I wish to suggest where critical scholarship could push further in order to enrich and sharpen our critiques of domicide in China and to dismiss compeletely those apathetic writing and violent ideas in the academic world. These points are also the contributions this thesis wishes to make. Firstly, seen from a Bourdieusin perspective, I refuse to make any concession to the rhetoric that *chaiqian* is not always a bad thing or that not all affected by demolition are victims of domicide because resettlement housing may improve the living conditions of many families or welcomed by some families. Under current accumulation regime, no displacees affected by demolition can escape from being vicitmised. To make a concession here is at significant risk of losing the edge of critical scholarship. It softens our critique of the systemic problems of the current land-centred accumulation regime. My focus on symbolic violence complicates the picture Qin critically examined. This is based on my theoretical commitment to reconcile objective and subjective truths of *chaiqian*. Second, one analytical thread of my thesis focuses on the infusion of material and symbolic violence rather than questions the legitimacy of abusive material violence alone as in Qin's work. The focus on the symbolic dimension of violence relates to the third difference in our approach. Instead of treating the displacees as a unified group, I seek to show how symbolic violence exercised

through dominant values and discourses divides the displacees and prevents them from effective resistance. This is another major contribution of this thesis.

Domination, Domicide and Exceptionality

In pursuing this line of reasoning, this thesis picked up several theoretical notions from existing literature. Chapter 2 offers a synthesis of the conceptual tools that assisted my understanding. Here, I shall summarise how those tools are used to advance the theoretical and empirical studies on displacement in this thesis.

Following Bourdieu, the thesis follows the conflict tradition in social theories dating back to Karl Marx. Society is highly stratified to different social groups and their interests are always in conflict. Both dominated and dominant groups attempt to improve or maintain their respective positions in society. The contestation for power therefore is constant. Yet, it may take diverse forms, both material and symbolic. Given the uneven distribution of valued resources in society, the outcome of such struggles is likely to reproduce the existing social order, albeit sporadic resistance. Displacement is an expression of such conflicts. It is about the contestation in defining the meaning of lived spaces and reconfiguring urban spaces between the everyday users, the technocrats and the dominant elites. The repertories for the dominated are many, such as ideological indoctrination shaping the wants and desires of the displaced or abusive exercise of centralised, legitimate violence by the state terrorising them. Mega-events complicate the struggle by creating temporal and spatial exceptionality through association with nationalist sentiments. The pressure to deliver an event on time may be used as a powerful weapon to justify the exceptional circumstance of their plans and defend the transgression of political and moral norms in the event zones (Burbank et al., 2001, Shin, 2014). It increases the likelihood to resort to state violence to raze the planned area for the events. For those facing the threat of displacement, this means that they may not have enough time to mobilise political support and exhaust all potential channels before they are uprooted.

The murder of homes by external forces is what Porteous and Smith (2001) call domicide, a moral evil as the authors claim. The reactions from the loss of home are compared to the loss of a beloved person (Fried, 1966, Marris, 1974). The domicide effects have been taken up in my thesis (see chapters 5 and 8), as I attempted to capture and represent grief throughout the thesis, as well as shared my concerns raised by a burgeoning literature on emotion and affect in human geography (Valentine, 1989, Pain, 2000, 2009, Bondi, 2005, Horton and Kraftl, 2009, Pile,

2010). The 'emotional turn' (Bondi, 2005: 9) in geography is a critical intervention to the obsession with technological reason in literature, rendering the discipline 'an emotionally barren terrain', 'devoid of passion'. Exclusion of emotions is a denial of them as 'ways of knowing, being and doing'(Anderson and Smith, 2001: 7), an integrated part of our experience of the world. By quickly dismissing emotions, we are not only eschewing away a crucial source of knowledge but also missing the opportunity to understand places and events as lived, meaning-making processes (after Tyler, 2013: 4). Furthermore, an emotional register may shed light on lay normativity, allowing us to understand why things matter to people (Sayer, 2011). Emotions are not simply informative but also evaluative, conveying critical messages of values: 'our emotions are about something: we are proud or ashamed of *something*, angry about *something*, grateful to someone for doing *something*, and so on' (Sayer, 2011: 36). Sayer (2005: 948) suggests that '[s]entiments such as pride, shame, envy, resentment, compassion and contempt are not just forms of "affect" but are evaluative judgements of how people are being treated as regards what they value, that is things they consider to affect their well-being'. Grief syndrome as the thesis attempts to capture therefore is more than an overdue account of painful experiences of displacement. It is an additional access to the lay normativity of the displacees.

In documenting the domicide experience, my approach is more in line with humanistic and feminist approaches to study emotion and affect and dismisses the approach that splits emotion and affect and pursues pre-cognitive, inhuman or transhuman, ungraspable affect under the influence of non-representation theory (NRT) (see Bondi, 2005, Pile, 2010). The hypocritical contradictions of NRT are forcefully outlined by Pile (2010). Affectual geography – if it exists as such – pursuing non-representation theory is inherently contradictory for 'first, that it is fundamentally a representational practise…second, that is not a theory, but a chain gang of metaphors (or resources, or assumptions)' (Pile, 2010: 16). What also makes me rather doubtful of NRT approach lies in its emphasis on transhuman and the impersonal 'things'(Thien, 2005). It strangely turns away from capturing human subjectivity: feelings, emotions and lived experiences (Lees and Baxter, 2011). This also exposes a major weakness of NRT's political project – the unreal and apolitical basis (Thien, 2005). Moreover, NRT's narrow focus on the assembled undifferentiated subject, as Cresswell (2012) rightly points out, is unable to attend to a group subject marked by class, gender and race. Furthermore, affect as manipulation mediated by infrastructure of public space brings greater troubles rather than opportunities for the lack of engagement with explicit reason in politics and the self-defeating political strategy and questionable ethics of mobilising affective

register and reflexive disclosure of such strategies (Barnett, 2008: 395). Its political focus on the 'emerging' and 'eruption' of creative possibility further reveals the limits of NRT - the incapacity of explaining the production and reproduction of some of the more durable structures and categories in shaping human life, experience and political agency (Cresswell, 2012); a central theme in Bourdieusian theory of practice which this thesis subscribes to.

With humanistic geographers, I look into individual/collective subjective experience, the meaning-making process and the emotional qualities of places, a long standing theme in geography (Tuan, 1974, 1979, Relph, 1976). Particularly, I focus on the social and political construction of fear, uncertainties, anxieties, terror and suffering (Shirlow and Pain, 2003, Pain, 2009). The interplay between a dying and abandoned place inside the zone of domicide and the emotional life of the displacees constitute a major theme of my dissection of layered experience of displacement and eviction. This is done through a relational understanding of emotions in the exchange between the participants and myself (England, 1994, Rose, 1997), juxtaposing my feelings and observations with translated narratives from the displacees.

My interests, however, have never rested on supplying a full list of emotions. Nor have I intended to entrap my work on individual subjective experiences. I wish to keep a balanced (maybe more) analysis of the concrete and the material, in contrast to the literature on emotions (also see Lees, 2002, Lees and Baxter, 2011). I also wish to highlight the political register in my thesis. The lived experiences of domicide is an entry point for me to explore more disturbing issues around morality, ethics and human conditions. This is done with Bourdieu's radical intervention in 'ordinary suffering' in my mind, locating the structural causes for personal pain (Bourdieu, 1999d). There, I borrowed vocabularies from feminist contributions to emotions, and medical anthropological and sociological literature on suffering and pain (Scarry, 1985, Valentine, 1989, Pain, 2009, Kleiman and Kleinman, 1985, Kleinman, 2011, Kleinman et al., 1997, Sayad, 2004). The psychiatric notion of somatization underpins most of my analysis. Individual subjective experiences registered in the psychological bodies are reflective of and influenced by wider social relations. They can only be understood through critical engagement with social and cultural forces. By doing so, I wish to problematise and question the limits of abusive power and the enabling conditions for domicide. I wish to reveal the hidden power dynamics that facilitates domicide and paralyse progressive imagination. Three unsettling questions are of great significance to me. First, how abusive state power is exercised and experienced. Second, under what conditions morally and cognitively

competent bulldozer agents not only become indifferent to the suffering of others but also actively inflict pain on others. Third, why strong emotions of and energy from anger, distrust, frustration and resentment, failed to - but should have - translate into effective political actions. These analytical questions mark the difference between my project from emotional and affectual geographies. Emotion is only a dimension of my ethnographic account, a point of departure from which I explore more deeply problematic issues on human nature, morality, politics and collective (in)actions.

Dwelling on the notion of domicide, this thesis explores the mechanism, the process and the consequences of domicide. Influenced by Bourdieu, a major theoretical contribution of this thesis is to reconcile the subjective victimhood with objective victimisation in domicide. I argue that, by narrowing the lens to subjective experience of victimhood as in the original conceptualisation, we are missing the opportunity to interrogate the injustice produced by the urban process under capitalism. In taking the approach I am proposing in this thesis, an important step is to investigate the cycle of disinvestment and reinvestment in relentlessly shaping the built environment in the historical and geographical context. This then needs to be reconciled with the variegated subjective experiences of the inhabitants to understand the conditions that engender political opportunities of domicide, which sometimes occurs with consent from those who are about to lose their homes. In doing so, we can also dismiss the rhetoric of 'happy' movers or that displacement is not a bad thing. Moreover, it allows us to tease out the mechanisms that reproduce an alienating and oppressive socio-spatial order.

Mega-events in late Socialist China: 'City makes life better'[3]

Between 2008 and 2010, two global mega-events and one regional sporting event were hosted in China's three regional centres, namely the Beijing Olympics, the Shanghai World Expo and the Guangzhou Asian Games. As Horne (2007) legitimately comments, for cities from developing countries, hosting mega-events is rather contentious given much more acute problems of poverty and inequality confronted by much of the population. To understand the event fetish of Chinese cities, we need first to have an overview of the urban conditions of late socialist China. The most prominent feature is privatisation and commodification (Zhang and Ong, 2008, Wu et al., 2007). Ranging from labour, land, housing, socialist welfare to state-owned enterprises, the reform championed by the architect of the socialist

[3] This is a literal translation of the Chinese version of the Expo slogan. The official English translation is the title of this thesis, 'Better City, Better Life'.

market economy, Deng Xiaoping, has systematically put a price tag on everything and manufactured a whole nation of consumer subjects to compete and fight against each other in securing resources for their own well-being. Meanwhile, substantial public wealth has been transferred to the ruling elites to complete the process of primitive accumulation and exacerbate social inequalities created under the socialist regime in contemporary Chinese cities. These processes facilitate the production of class dominance of the former political elites married to the private entrepreneurs over the dispossessed (Harvey, 2005a). It reflects in urban geography and popular consciousness. Former socialist cities of production undergo rapid gentrification and property-led development to become cities of consumption. This is a product of the sweet love triangle between lawyers, the state and developers. Their coalition constantly (re)constructs political institutions and regulatory frameworks to lubricate the flow of capital and to discipline the new consumer subjects by the ethics of private property ownership.

The rapid changes in Chinese cities are legitimatised by nationalism, developmentalism and socialism (Lin, 2006). It is the dynamic and constant competition, conflicts and negotiation between them that distinguish urban process in Chinese cities and it is also perhaps because of this, observers tend to emphasise the Chinese characteristics in describing actually existing neoliberalism in China (Kipnis, 2007, He and Wu, 2009). The overriding strength of nationalism derives from China's colonial history and the strand under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) paints the party as the only agent capable of leading the whole nation to prosperity. Developmental state actively identified with nationalist objectives and values. City-building as a nation-building project therefore is widely celebrated, as epitome by the slogan of the Shanghai Expo, 'city makes life better'. But the developmentalist pathway is checked by the withering influence of socialism in however limited way, either to pacify social unrest or to deal with the destructive forces of the market. Displacement as the prelude to development therefore is inherently contradictory in ideology in China. It requires the state to negotiate the tension between developmentalist goals and socialist values. The structural equilibrium between these three ideological discourses effectively decides the fate of the displacees.

Figure 1.1: Geographical Location of Shanghai
Source: National Geographic (2010)

Like cities in advanced capitalist economies, mega-events are a tool for speculative construction of urban space in Chinese cities. Broudehoux (2007, 2010) argues that those events are to legitimatise further large-scale urban transformation and centralise the power and wealth in the hands of the dominant class. In nature, the event-led development demonstrates China's full commitment to capitalist economy under the authoritarian regime. But such an agenda is concealed through identification with the nationalist dream for cutting off the humiliating colonial past and re-rising as the centre of the kingdoms. This apparent disequilibrium of ideological forces foreshadows the doomed loss of the displacees in event-induced displacement.

To my knowledge, there was no strategic intent in distributing three events exactly in three regional centres of China. Shanghai was chosen as the Chinese candidate city for hosting an Expo in the early 1980s. The city of Shanghai is the most populated in China. The territory is 6,340 square kilometres and inhabited by more than 23 million inhabitants according to the 6th National Census (2011), of which more than one-third are migrants from other cities. In fact, most of the first generation dwellers in Shanghai are migrants. The city is socially and spatially hierarchised owing to its colonial past, reinforced under state socialism and solidified by the neoliberal transition. Four dichotomies may capture the urban social geography of Shanghai,

including the hierarchy between *xiazhijiao* (lower quarter) and *shangzhijiao* (upper quarter), between Pudong and Puxi, between the city proper (Shanghai) and the countryside (*xiangxia*), and between Shanghainese and *waidi ren* (migrants). The hierarchy of the first bears the imprint of colonial land regime, segregating the city into relatively well-developed international settlements and deprived 'informal' settlements under the Chinese government. The second and the third are closely associated. The city is cut through by the Huangpu River and the east bank of the river (Pudong) was largely vast farmland (*xiangxia*) until the property-led development since the 1990s rapidly transformed the landscape and slowly levelled up the west bank of the river (Puxi). This spatial hierarchy is reflected in popular consciousness and is reinforced by place identity. As the old saying in Shanghai goes, 'one would rather have a bed in Puxi than a flat in Pudong'. Back then, Pudong was synonymous with *xiangxia*. *Xiangxia* is inferior to urban living and in everyday usage amongst the locals; Shanghai is a restricted spatial reference to Puxi. The last category is a product of China's *hukou* institution, which ties citizenship rights to one's personal institutional identity registered at birth. Migrants are excluded from access to citizenship benefits for their lack of local *hukou* status. Both *xiangxia ren* and *waidi ren* are pejorative terms in local dialect. The siting of the Expo exploits the tropes associated with all four categories. The Expo Park is situated on both banks of the river, although it eats up more land in Pudong. In dominant discourse, this is known as Shanghai's *xiazhijiao*. Owing to the cheap rent there, it is also the foothold for many migrants. To clear the land, more than 18,000 households (official account) were displaced to resettlement sites in Shanghai's suburbia. This is of course an under-report of the actual scale of displacement. Migrants without legal titles to either the land or the properties were unlikely to be counted.

Thesis Structure and Outline

This section provides a road map to the thesis ahead. First, let me put forth more explicitly the simple overarching questions that guide my inquiry throughout the thesis: how were people displaced by the Expo regime, and what are the consequences? My answer to these questions dissects the mechanics of power in destroying people's homes and addresses the moral implications for urban politics. The remainder of this thesis is divided into seven substantial chapters, followed by a short conclusion chapter.

I dismiss the false intellectual rupture between theories, methodology and empirical studies. I compromised by writing two separate chapters on theory or methodology.

Yet, in my writing of these two chapters, I mix theoretical inspiration and methodological guidance in resistance to the rules on writing. Chapter 2 serves as a mysterious beginning of this academic journey but many parts were written in retrospection. It reviews existing theoretical approaches to event-induced *chaiqian*. It contextualises the thesis in the academic debate and distinguishes the thesis from existing studies by its focus on power, domination, violence and suffering. Anchoring on Bourdieu's work on capital, field, habitus, symbolic power and symbolic violence, it dialogues with different theoretical strands in understanding the operation of power and the mechanism that simultaneously obscures and secures domination in modern society. Building on this work, it then expands the notion of domicide and engages with Marxist literature on urban process. Chapter 3 defends the use of mixed methods for investigating Expo-induced *chaiqian* in Shanghai. It outlines my theoretical, political and ethical commitments in mixing methods pragmatically. Much of this chapter is invested in my reporting on the fieldwork dynamics in affecting the construction of knowledge for this thesis.

Chapters 4 to 8 provide an in-depth description and critique of the violent process and the injustice people suffered from the Expo-induced displacement. They are organised in the typical temporal sequence: before, during and after displacement. I wish I had the opportunity to write in real time so that I could document the process of displacement without creating this temporal rupture. To compensate for this limitation, I stretched the 'during displacement' to three individual chapters, each focusing on a different facet of displacement. All empirical chapters are guided by an independent sub-question in support of the overarching research question. Chapter 4 challenges the legitimating discourses on the choice for the Expo site. It reconstructs the history of the lived place on the Expo site as a process of long-term under-investment, and examines the ambivalent experiences and attitudes toward a wholesale demolition amongst the dwellers, which has been hijacked by the ruling elites in legitimating the siting choice and undermining the social solidarity between the dispossessed. Chapter 5 is an original contribution, which examines the oppressive experiences of displacement as a result of temporal and spatial domination in a zone of domicide. It points out the variegated ways of the displacees in appropriating the domicide time and space, and highlights the dividing and disciplinary effects upon the political agency of the displacees. Building on the domicide experiences as documented in chapter 5, chapter 6 questions the moral corruption of different agents and organisations in inflicting excessive and unnecessary pain on the displacees. Specifically, it looks into the exceptionality created by the Expo in speeding up political process and revoking moral and political

limits to naturalise violent tactics in evicting people out of their homes. Chapter 7 slightly turns the analytical angle and examines the interaction between the displacees and the displacers in deciding the fate of the displacees. It discusses diverse repressive tactics in dividing and atomising the displacees, and forcing them to carefully deploy resisting strategies without overly transcending the political boundary. An important observation on the breakdown of families as a result of manufactured conflicts over compensation is discussed to question further the moral limits of displacement and underscores the contradictions of China's accumulation regime. The final chapter reports the economic, social, emotional, physical and political impacts of displacement upon the displacees. It shows how planning and governing of the resettlement neighbourhoods create an even more alienating and oppressive structure and perpetuate the injustice the displacees had already unfairly endured.

The overall argument of this thesis contends that the Shanghai World Expo, through the association with normative nationalist discourses, created important conditions to revoke political, moral and legal boundaries in the process of legitimatising and naturalising the violence against the displacees, and undermining the displacees' capacity to defend their own homes more effectively. The submission of the displacees to the dominant power enables the production and reproduction of a repressive social and spatial structure in contemporary Shanghai. I hope those findings and arguments from this thesis can offer a fresh perspective on the meaning of domicide, the importance of academic research on domicide and possible ways that we can change the oppressive structure that produces domicide.

Chapter 2 : Domicide, Domination and Resistance: Conceptual Tools for Analysis

> 'How artificial the ordinary oppositions between theory and research, between qualitative and quantitative methods, between statistical recording and ethnographic observation, between the grasping of structures and the construction of individual can be. These alternatives have no function other than to provide a justification for the vacuous and resounding abstractions of theoreticism and for the falsely rigorous observations of positivism, or, as the divisions between economists, anthropologists, historians and sociologists, to legitimatise the limits of competency: that is to say that they function in the manner of a social censorship, liable to forbid us to grasp a truth which resides precisely in the relations between realms of practice thus arbitrarily separated .'
>
> Bourdieu and de Saint Martin in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*

Introduction

This chapter introduces the concepts and theories that have informed the construction of the object of this study, the methodology I adopted to grapple with the complicated social reality and the interpretation of the experiences of the people I worked with. Locating this chapter at this juncture is misleading for at least two reasons. First, it creates a false logical rupture and subordinates to the false separation of theories, epistemologies, methodologies and empirical case studies that structure academic writing (Wacquant, 1992: 26-35, Auyero, 2000: 18). This leads to a second problem—the conflation of *opus operatum* and *modus operandi* in research practices (Bourdieu, 1990b: 52, Beauregard, 2012). It does not map out how the conceptual tools I use in later sections come to assist me at different moments in problematising 'legitimate' approaches, pursuing a certain analytical direction and shaping my understanding. Nor does it show how my (re)reading in the course of the project and more importantly my fieldwork experiences on mega-events, *chaiqian* and domicide led me to think with/about many theoretical tools in a different light. In fact, speaking from my own experiences as a disciplinary and cultural outsider, most of my understanding of theories and concepts, especially the 'Western' ones, is derived from actual doing and wrestling with them in the field, instead of inter-textual reading. This is not to say I approached my fieldwork with no theories in

mind but instead, to caution against the view of the relationship between theory and practice as a simple two-way traffic. Instead, as Wacquant interprets Bourdieu's approach to social reality, theory and practice should 'interpenetrate each other entirely' (1992: 35). Therefore, what is presented in the remainder of this chapter is less a product of logical cognitive process of reading, synthesising, critiquing existing scholarship and proposing a research agenda. It is also less an appropriate *a priori* theoretical frame that threads neatly separate lines of analysis later. It is more an ongoing retrospective reflection upon my engagement with theoretical notions and fieldwork experiences in understanding the existence, prevalence, persistence and consequence of *chaiqian* or a more favoured term, domicide, in contemporary Chinese cities. Despite my 'revolting' impulse, I felt it necessary and practical to write a chapter as such. It is necessary in that it contextualises my work and locates the common theoretical groundwork to invite intellectual inspiration and reflexivity. It is practical because I rarely dwell on theories in later chapters, and this chapter could lay down the roots of my thoughts.

In what follows, I shall first discuss my stance on theories and situate my work in the theoretical debates. Based in human geography, I however take 'human' more seriously than 'geography' in defining my project considering the blurred disciplinary boundaries. By 'human', I pursue my normative inquiry through the lens of power, domination, violence and injustice, in the field of both my project and the academia in general. This discussion is followed by an introduction of the key conceptual tools I borrowed from existing scholarship to develop my thoughts on mega-events, *chaiqian* and domicide in Shanghai. It is organised around the mechanisms and processes of urban struggle for controlling time and space. These conceptual tools are then used to stretch the notion of domicide in a neoliberalising China. Following most critical scholarship (Porteous and Smith, 2001, Slater, 2006, 2009, Manzo et al., 2008), a similar argument is made to appreciate the full dimension of the meaning of home in order to stop domicide.

Situating the Debate on Mega-events Induced Domicide

In *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, an extraordinary pedagogical piece combined with Wacquant's dissection of Bourdieu's theoretical notions and the transcriptions of 'toe-to-toe' discussions between Bourdieu and his readers in Chicago and Paris, Bourdieu and Wacquant patiently teach a method to think deliberately, responsibly, reflexively and politically about the social reality. I take many important lessons from this work, but for the purpose of this section, I shall narrow to three interrelated

points on research practices. First, the social world should be treated as a whole or a system rather than fragmented bits and pieces under the purview of hierarchised minute division of academic labour (ibid, 27). Bourdieu invests much of his theoretical energy in reconciling (sometimes quite contradictorily) the ontological and epistemological binaries (e.g. subject/object, materiality/symbolic representation, structure/agency, constructivists/objectivists, etc.) that prevent us from uncovering the hidden pattern of social structure and the mechanisms of its (re)production and transformation (ibid, 7). In practising his own sociological studies, he transcends the dualisms and theorises the social world as a total science of social practice (ibid, 27). His approach focuses on both the social actors and the social structure via a genetic and relational approach. This is most aptly exemplified by his notion of habitus, which is defined as 'the dialectic of the internalisation of externality and the externalisation of internality' (Bourdieu, 1977: 72). This conceptualisation eschews away 'the choice between a structuralism without subject and the philosophy of the subject' (Bourdieu, 1990a: 10). To treat practice as a whole, as Bourdieu encourages us, is to glue the 'fragmented' life artificially produced by the division of academic labour and to recover the logics in relation to the actors and the structure.

Second, it is important to treat theories and methods in an integrated, pragmatic and critical way in the process of constructing and solving analytical problems rather than the other way around. Theories occupy a pivotal role in Bourdieu's (1992a: 248) work, without which he contends that a researcher becomes 'little more than an amateur, an autodidactic, self-taught, spontaneous sociologist'. But he holds theories accountable to social reality, structuring and being structured by the research practice. According to Wacquant (1992: 31), theories to Bourdieu are heuristic tool kits to wrestle with analytical puzzles. Bourdieu treats his own theorisation effort in the same way that is to develop 'a sociological method consisting essentially in a manner of posing problems, in a parsimonious set of conceptual tools and procedures for constructing objects and for transferring knowledge gleaned in one area of inquiry into another' (ibid, 5). His attempt is to resuscitate the practical value of social sciences, 'preventing people from being able to utter all kinds of nonsense about the social world' (Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1992: 51). This may have been influenced by his own political engagement and sense of intellectual responsibility, although largely through his writing rather than direct action. Bourdieu's oeuvre has always been concerned with social problems, especially social stratification and political struggle. He refuses to label himself as a political scientist but always thinks politically (Swartz, 2013: 4). The political and moral dimension of academic research

alerts us to material and symbolic forms of domination, inflicting sufferings on individual and collective bodies.

Third, to treat theories and research critically, as Bourdieu alerts us, we need to break with common sense concepts in order to avoid subordinating to the *doxa* of both folk discourses and analytical constructs (Bourdieu, 1992a: 248, Wacquant, 2008: 8). Bourdieu is sensitive to symbolic practices in producing social stratification and imposing symbolic violence. For him, the academic field is not an exception. Rigorous research in his eyes must reflect upon both the objects of inquiry (the 'legitimate' and 'authoritative' voices, the structure of the academic field) and the philosophical positionality of inquirers throughout the knowledge-producing process. He wants us to be aware of the symbolic domination and symbolic violence in the academic field as well and encourages us to think about the construction of social problems, the classification systems and the censorships in academic practice.

If we take Bourdieu seriously, we should not read Bourdieu's theories as closed thoughts, either. His theoretical notions are for us to think with, to improvise and to challenge. To think with him, the first question that must be addressed is the triad relationship between mega-events, China and *chaiqian*. Each operates as a distinctive academic field, requires a particular set of knowledge and possesses its own logic. My project locates in this overlapping area, and I take this overlap with great caution. This may be partly due to my academic training in Event Management and Psychology as an undergraduate, my conversion to urban studies thus far, and my personal experience losing my home three times in two countries within six months in the formative year of this study. My personal background and my fieldwork experience slowly led to my distance from existing studies on similar topics. First, existing studies on mega-events rarely explore the global event industry in structuring how this game is played. With their temporalities and spatialities, modern mega-events have established their own organisations, rules, values and politics, which structure the event-led development in different localities (Roche, 2000, Lenskyj, 2000, Close et al., 2006, Liao and Pitts, 2006, Gold and Gold, 2010). The global structure of mega-events industry is at best sidestepped to the background or worse conveniently forgotten in analysis. Academic discourses along the line of urban restructuring, urban regime theory or urban growth machine theory might have some merit in explaining the underlying motivations of city authorities for bidding and hosting a mega-event (Cochrane et al., 1996, Burbank et al., 2001, Essex and Chalkley, 2004, Shin, 2014), but fail to examine the internal cultural, geopolitical and economic logics of the mega-events industry in structuring the articulation of

event-led development (including event-induced displacement) in different places and times.[1] There is a necessity to relink the global and the local and put the local articulation back into the global mega-event industry in time and place. Particularly, the role of the 'event circus', such as the global event producers, the global elites, the industry insiders (e.g. IOC, BIE), and the logic of the event industry (e.g. the ecology, temporalities and spatialities of mega-events) must be comprehended to avoid premature judgement and construction of analytical problems. One example here would be the discrepancy in the English translation of the Shanghai Expo slogan (i.e. Better city, Better life versus city makes life better). Observers have given too much credit to the Chinese state, citing it as more evidence of the Chinese state's ideological pedagogy. Indeed, urbanisation in China is legitimatised by many ideological myths. But, if we probe into the production of this slogan, especially the role of global event producers in pushing Expo organisers in Shanghai to theorise in this direction, we probably would question, like Bourdieu, about the imperialist reason for 'urbanisation' and 'city' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999) and the translation of these ideas in contributing and legitimising Chinese ideological artifice[2] (Bourdieu, 1999b).

Second, I keep a vigilant eye to the economic and legal construction of the *chaiqian* problem, which dominates the analytical, media and popular discourses. Both lines of reasoning are constructed with good intention with a shared interest to protect the rights of the displaced, but the danger in ready subscription to them is far greater. They run the risk of blinding us to see *chaiqian* as a system, a process, and a complete destruction of the displacees' life world (Hsing, 2010b), and both are

[1] To the best of my knowledge, there is only one book that examines the politics and power struggle of the Olympic industry and questions the legitimacy of the Olympics in hijacking local political priorities (Lenskyj, 2000). Most research on mega-events was conducted after a city was awarded with an event and focuses on the politics on local level. Research rarely looks into the rule of game of those events and the politics within the mega-event industry itself in structuring urban politics in bidding and hosting cities, and in facilitating the flow of knowledge and imperialist reason. This is perhaps due to the difficulty in accessing global political, economic and cultural elites, especially those diplomats, global corporation managers and personnel at BIE or IOC, and in tracking such complex flow of people and knowledge. It may also because most political dealings, especially during bidding process, are conducted through diplomatic lobbying visits with restricted access to outside observers. Let me use an example here to clarify further my point. In order to bid on hosting an Expo or vote for a city to host an Expo, nations have to pay a membership fee to BIE. As long as the membership fee is paid, there are no screening criteria for inclusion or exclusion of a nation from becoming a member state of BIE. Many bidding cities took advantage of this, and recruited other countries to join BIE and vote for them, including Shanghai, through economic or extra-economic means. The legitimacy and the implication of such activities for local politics have rarely been explored in existing literature.

[2] Unfortunately, I had to cut out my discussion on the circulation of ideas and the Expo as a Trojan horse for global business elites during the bidding process owing to the word count limit. I only retained a small portion of the role of global event producers concerning the Expo's siting choice in this thesis (see chapter 6).

capable of exercising symbolic domination and perpetuating social injustice. The economic reasoning centres on compensation (Wu, 2004, Phan, 2005, Zhang, 2005, Chen, 2007, Weinstein and Ren, 2009, Ho, 2013b, Wang et al., 2013), either considering compensation as the root of many social conflicts or pursuing just compensation as a solution. It fails to question the social meaning and the form of compensation (Zelizer, 1994). As Hartman (2002: 109) rightly points out, 'displacement at heart is a political process, having to do with operant values and power in the society'. To compensate, we need to find a common measurement to value the loss. Given the power structure in the process of *chaiqian*, it is at great danger to subordinate to the bourgeoisie value system and to the dictatorship of money. The problem is that *chaiqian* or displacement must be seen as an erasure of people's past, a destruction of their present and an engineering of their future. The very idea to put a price tag on this process therefore is morally and politically problematic. Many forms of suffering and implication are impossible to quantify and monetize. Even if we concede to accept compensation for the sake of finding a common ground with the perpetrators who want people's land and homes, we still need to question the definition and the supply of compensatory options. Existing studies are overly restrictive on this point, narrowing their vision to either in-kind compensation or monetary compensation as in official categorisation without wrestling with the symbolic domination from reduced choice and without uncovering the many 'accents', if I may borrow from Bakhtin (1981: 293), in speaking about either of them. Words are neither neutral nor empty but are appropriated by people with diverse biographical backgrounds in different styles and genres. Compensation is one euphemism many displacees I talked to recognised astutely (see chapter 7).

The economic claim in intellectual and popular discussion is frequently backed up implicitly by the legal reasoning premised on the violation of legal rights to demolished properties, to legal recourse and to the bodies of the displaced. It is rigorously pursued by human rights organisations, such as COHRE (2007, 2008) and legal professionals (Wilhelm, 2004, Erie, 2012, Mertha, 2009b, Pils, 2005, 2009a, 2009b), joined by scholars interested in the legal and institutional construction of property rights regime in Chinese society (Zhu, 2002, Deng, 2009, He et al., 2009). Central to their concern is the underlying ideological agenda in constructing the 'rule of law' project in Chinese society whilst in practice the state disrespects the very legal project it seeks to construct. A typical narrative will trace the roots of *chaiqian* conflicts to the ambiguities in Chinese land system (Ho, 2001), the weak enforcement of legal protection (Shih, 2010a, 2010b), the rampant corruption and coercion in Chinese politics (Qin, 2013, Lin, 2009) and the growing legal and rights

consciousness of the masses (Erie, 2012, Shin, 2013: 1067, 1083). As a legal problem, solutions are frequently found in legal and institutional channels, either through strict enforcement of human rights declaration or a clearer demarcation of property rights (He et al., 2009). Or, in a more concerted way, through tackling, amongst others, the fiscal arrangement, the inconsistency in Chinese regulatory systems, cadre evaluation system, *chaiqian* regulation and *hukou* institution (Zhou, 2013, Yep, 2013).

As one of Maoist legacies, *hukou* system is decisive in reproducing social hierarchies in Chinese society and a driving force in China's rapid growth (Wang, 2005, Chan, 2009, Li et al., 2010). People are born unequal foremost because of institutionally prescribed identities, tying one's life chance with one's birthplace and family membership. Legally, all Chinese citizens must register their *hukou* with local police within a month after their birth providing that the parents meet all requirements specified by the one-child policy and obtained all the necessary approvals. *Hukou* first functions as a system in monitoring population mobility. But more importantly, it creates and maintains the graduated citizenship through the creation of various *hukou* categories. It first splits the population into agricultural *hukou* and non-agricultural *hukou* holders regardless of actual division of labour and confines each group to differentiated access to social welfares. Agricultural *hukou* holders, most farmers and rural dwellers, have always been discriminated against. They are deprived of universal coverage of social securities. Within a given locality, population are further categorised into permanent *hukou* holders and temporary *hukou* holders. The former include collective *hukou* holders who register with their institutions and can access territorially-funded social welfares like local permanent *hukou* holders with restrictions, especially in terms of public housing access. Temporary *hukou* holders on the other hand are denied access to public-funded welfare within a given city. The importance of *hukou* in *chaiqian* is expressed by the 'head count' compensation method, the dividing effect on the solidarity of the displacees and the grievances strategising on *hukou*-induced exclusions.

I am on the same page with many diagnoses here yet I do not agree with their treatment. The prescription on property rights is simply a poison, whilst the others are pain relief. Here, the debates on *Right to the City* offer some pointers for a cautious critique of their limitations. As in Lefebvre's (1996) vision, the right to dwell in the city transcends legal rights. It is a *moral* right to use and to inhabit the city (Marcuse, 2009), and to participate in the decision-making that produces urban spaces (Purcell, 2002, 2003). By reducing a moral right to a legal right, in the context

of Chinese legal culture where rights are defined as interests in a utilitarian and majoritarian way[3] (Peerenboom, 1995), it not only narrows the politics and morality of *chaiqian* to a distributive politics about 'who gets what, how and when' (Lasswell, 1950), but also concedes to the domination of the state in weighing what and whose rights count in the bureaucratic field. The bureaucratisation of social justice, as Young (1990: 75) contends, 'makes it difficult to see the institutional rules, practices and social relations that support domination and oppression, much less to challenge them'. The other problem of legal reasoning lies in the privatisation of rights. Legal rights, especially on *chaiqian*, is primarily conceptualised as individual rights and encourages possessive individualism. The right to the city is a collective right, as Harvey (2008) argues, a democratic control of the production of urban space. The risk of subscribing to legal doctrine is to undermine the political solidarity and further depoliticise public life (Young, 1990).

Despite my appreciation for the transformative vision of *Right to the City*, I kept my reservation on using this slogan as a normative frame to understand and envisage *chaiqian* politics in China. My concerns are two-fold. First, we need to be more sensitive to the conceptual and linguistic ambuiguities of rights, teasing out what is in a right in the Chinese context. For instance, regardless of strikingly differnet approaches and perspectives, both Wallerstein and Ren's (2009) and Shin's (2013) papers in identifying with the dedate on *Right to the City* in the Western intellectual discourses failed to engage with a most obvious yet most critically important issue that power (权力) and right (权利) pronounce in the same way in Chinese Mandarin and require considerable deliberation to differentiate them when penning down as well. Many people also use *quan* (权), which can be interpreted as as power and/or rights. In everyday usage, they are also conflated with interests (权益, *quanyi*) and rites or moral principles (理, *li*)(Wang, 1980, Li, 2010). An absence of discussion on this issue not only missed the opportunity to provide us with a nuanced understanding of the political agency of the marginalised in Chinese cities but also run great risk of misinterpretation or distortion of political grienvances in lay normative discourses. It then leads to further concern over the validity and ethics underlying the rallying call for *Right to the City* to China. Second, it seems to me critically important to factor into the political context – both the political opportunity structure and microphysics of power - and such ambiguities in structuring and

[3] 'Rights' is an imported vocabulary in Chinese language and translated as *quan li*. *Quan* can be used as a noun referring to power or authority, or as a verb referring to weighing or calculating, while *li* means interests, frequently associated with private and individual interests. The legal construct of *quan li* in Chinese invites the power of the state to weigh in on whose rights and what rights count.

complicating the power dynamics, the articulation of political claims and the repertoire of protesting actions. Authors mentioned above were insensitive to the disparities between 'public transcripts' and 'hidden transcripts' of contentious actions in power-laden contexts[4] (Scott, 1990).

My critique on this latter point is also relevant to the debate on the meaning and significance of contentious actions from a large segement of marginalised population in China. Academic discussion here has been trenched by the debates on rule consciousness versus rights consciousness in contentious claim making. On the rule consciousness side, stands Perry (2008), who contends that contentious framing is entrapped in Confucius ethics and struggles are largely confined to subsistence without radically challenging the authority and the power of the state (also Shin, 2013). On the right consciousness side, we find O'Brian and Li (2006) and Goldman (2005, 2007) who sense more progressive potential of grassroots struggles for socio-economic security and political citizenship in challenging domination of the state and growing into a counter-hegemony project. The discrepancy is less a result of their different conceptualisation and interpretation of rights in political claims than of their different degrees of sensitivity to microphysics of power in shaping the political agency of the disenfranchised when putting forward their 'public transcripts' on the one hand and to the entanglement of power, interests, rights and rites in political claim-making on the other (Li, 2010). To understand political dissents in *chaiqian* politics, we need to put it back to the context of a decentralised, fragmented and authoritarian Leninist party-state (Nathan, 2003, Mertha, 2009a), especially the abusive use of violence in maintaining 'social harmony', which disciplines the articulation of political dissents from those dispossessed. Political risks associated with radical claims affect people's perception of political opportunities, of achievable political outcomes, and of tolerable and effective contentious repertoires (McAdam et al., 2001). More progressive claim is not absent in popular consciousness but is more frequently and likely to be repressed or restrained by the perceived risks of political repression, disciplined by their perceived position in the social space, or replaced by more effective contentious actions toward practical interests, as a political lesson learnt from their past memories of state violence or from their recent experience of revolting against the state. In many cases, progressive political claims, such as challenging land ownership structure, petitioning for democracy, or asserting greater control of the accumulation process, are intentionally framed through the

[4] Scott (1990: 2) uses 'public' in reference to 'action that is openly avowed to the other party in the power relationship' whilst 'transcript' refers to 'a complete record of what was said', including both speechacts and 'nonspeech acts such as gestures and expressions'.

language of socio-economic rights or redistributive politics, borrowing the vocabularies and grammar of official, legitimate discourses. Their individual or collective political actions may also be organised and confined to bureaucratic channels[5]. They do so however out of their feel of the game to minimise the risks and to legitimatise their contentious actions (see Shi, 2007, Hsing, 2010b). Even in making their seemingly tame political claims, if we read and listen carefully to their public transcripts, we may decipher much more complicated messages in their grievances and claims, which draw upon their life biographies, cultural memories and lingering socialist value system to construct a mixed sense of entitlement, capable of stretching the political system and growing to counter the dominant value system in the long run (Abramson, 2011). This is not a complete conversion to interpretivism, but a call for critical eye to the confusion and ambiguities in political framing laboured by the Chinese language and popular political culture. There is a great danger in separating rights, power, rites and interests to understand popular grievances and political claims, and arguing one is more politically promising than the other. The tamed means does not necessarily correspond to their ultimate ends (also see Scott, 1985). It is imperative to take into account the power structure of *chaiqian* field, the political situation of domicide, the history of life struggles and home-making practices, and the process of political actions before we fully appreciate the significance of their way of understanding the state-society relationship and of defending their interests and rights. To this agenda, we will need to treat those practices in making, structuring and transforming the life world as a system in order to understand the meaning of *chaiqian* to the displaced. In this vein, we will have to take into account not only the regulatory framework on land, housing and *hukou*, but also the demarcation of family boundary, arrangement of familial obligation, family inheritance, one-child policy, employment, education, marriage practices, social security, social relations, political embeddness, etc. It is important to look into how the displaced negotiate those seemingly disparate matters and how such negotiations affect their political agency in practice.

In short, my intent here is not to argue for China exceptionalism or methodological empiricism but warns about the risk of the 'creative destruction through Anglo-American hegemony'(Aalbers, 2004: 319), and the imperialist or elitist reasoning - roots of symbolic domination in the academic field. After all, as McCann (2002)

[5] According to the activists I worked with, their street demonstrations or sit-ins were always suppressed by police force. In such confrontational situations, the police or the security personnel employed by the state agencies were not conservative in physically assaulting them. Even in formal, institutionally tolerated and less confrontational petitioning, 'transgressions' frequently led to abusive physical violence.

points out, Lefebvre intentionally leaves his radical vision open and welcomes different possibilities. As such, we should be more sensitive to the local political and cultural context in structuring the pathways to democratise the production of space, which in turn structures and transforms the political life. I appreciate the benefits of the rule consciousness versus rights consciousness debate for either pointing out the mechanism of durable injustice or suggesting possible routes for more progressive actions. My point on the not so neat division of socio-economic rights and political rights in popular grievances only states my disagreement with existing debates, calling for more attention to the process of political actions. However, I wish to go beyond this critique as it does not go far enough to question the conditions that produce such grievances in the first place. Put it another way, what puts people in this precarious situation in the first place and forces them to fight against all the odds? This is not a tautological question whose answer simply repeats the legal and economic reasoning I have outlined. At issue in *chaiqian* politics are the questions: who has the right to take away other's history and identity, and what makes such callous decisions possible and so easy? Neither approach as far as I am concerned addresses adequately the limits of state power and the conditions that obscure as well as secure the illegitimate exercise of state power. The mechanics of power is the fundamental theme underlying this present study. It wishes to illuminate the mechanisms of power in the process of event-led accumulation that corrupt moral and political agencies in the wholesale destruction of people's homes on the one hand, and that work through those uprooted in complying with the destruction of their life-world on the other hand.

The Tool Kits[6]: Domination, Symbolic Power and Resistance

In resolving the analytical puzzle in ensuing chapters, I have picked up several appealing notions from existing scholarship in different theoretical traditions and research paradigms. This is not to concede to eclecticism but to accept the fragmented and contested nature of theories and their incapacity of explaining a historically and geographically dynamic social reality. In this section, I shall offer an overview of the notions as I understand and use them in my own writing.

Thus far, Bourdieu's political sociology has been most influential, not because his ideas are most compelling but that his conceptual tools are more coherent (politically

[6] I treat conceptual notions as tools in assisting the development of my analysis and argument. This term is borrowed from Wacquant's interpretation of Bourdieu's stance on theories (Wacquant, 1992: 31).

and morally) than Foucauldian scholarship and more structured than the industry of resistance studies following James C. Scott. His writing touched upon a wide range of topics, covering housing, education, state, law, culture, etc. But as Wacquant (2005) points out, the central theme underlying Bourdieu's work is his exploration of asymmetrical power relations in producing and reproducing social injustice. Despite the centrality of power in Bourdieu's work, as Swartz (2013: 33) remarks, Bourdieu did not explicitly offer any clear definition, typology and analytical maps of power as typically found in theories of power (Clegg, 1989, Lukes, 2005). Perhaps for this implicitness, Bourdieu is not as frequently consulted for theoretical inspiration on power as his close friend, Foucault is. In comparison, both Swartz (2013: 41) and Ortner (2006: 6) agree that Bourdieu and Foucault share their view on the pervasiveness and the depth of power. For both Bourdieu and Foucault, power is immanent in social relations and affects the individuals corporally and cognitively. Both of them see the production of knowledge as a crucial mechanism of power in modern society. However, Bourdieu avoids the 'exercise fallacy' (Lukes, 2005: 109) as in Foucault's post-structuralist conceptualisation. This important difference leads to their divergent normative frames and analytical assessment of power. Bourdieu's conceptualisation of power is practical, moral and evaluative (Morriss, 2002: 37). Unlike Foucault who refuses to see power as something that can be possessed or centralised outside the moment of its excise[7], Bourdieu assigns a depositional quality to power as capacity or ability through his notion of capital in objectified and embodied states (Bourdieu, 1986b, Swartz, 2013). This allows us to locate power. The associated notion 'field', as the social arena of struggles for the distribution and definition of legitimate form of capital (Bourdieu, 1992b: 97), acknowledges the concentration of power in individuals or institutions, for instance, the state (Bourdieu, 1994). Also different from Foucault's normative ambiguities in assessing power[8], Bourdieu sees his mission, as a sociologist, to uncover and delegitimise the myths and the mechanism that conceal and perpetuate the asymmetrical power relations — roots of structural inequalities and social injustice. His democratic view also stands

[7] In the words of Foucault (1977: 194), 'power exists only when it is put into action', and 'something called power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist'. He (1978: 93) argues that 'power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society'. For this reason, he eschews away from the view of the sovereignty-state and the law as important institutions in the functioning of power in modern society.

[8] Refusing to make any clear and coherent normative frame of power and freedom (Taylor, 1984), Foucault's localised power analysis on the productive side of power seeks to unravel the proliferation of knowledge and regimes of truths on human life in producing docile subjects (Foucault, 1977, 1978), whilst fails to illuminate 'what is wrong with modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it' (Fraser, 1989: 29).

in contrast to Iris Young (1990) whose five faces of oppression strike a similar chord. But, they differ in the most important condition of justice: *a priori* just distribution of various forms and combination of capitals. Bourdieu's priority to the dynamics of the macrostructure (i.e. the distribution of capitals and the power structures), combined with his insight on the exercise of power through cognitive structure supplies us with more analytical weapons including Foucauldian discourse analysis to challenge social inequalities.

Capital, Field and Habitus

For this study, the field of struggle and the related notion of symbolic violence are of most utility to explicate the most hidden forms of power whose exercise relies less on external control than internalised acceptance. But, Bourdieu's concepts ought to be taken as whole as they 'are designed to be *put to work empirically in a systemic fashion* [emphasis original]'(Bourdieu, 1992b: 97). It does not do justice to take out only two of his complicated thoughts. Let me try to outline a skeleton of his thoughts here. For Bourdieu, society is full of conflicts and struggles. These conflicts and struggles take place in many interconnected fields such as artistic field, literary field, judicial field, housing field, economic field and political field. Bourdieu (1992b: 97) defines a field

> as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situations (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relations to other positions (domination, subordination or homology, etc.).

For him, each field is an arena where social agents with different capitals compete to define the most legitimate form of capital and to acquire such capital in order to differentiate their positions in this field. Although Bourdieu retains the Marxist term, capital, his concept of field ascribes new meanings to capital, avoiding the economic determinism. Bourdieu (1986b) classifies four types of capital: economic capital (material goods, money), cultural capital (art works, books, knowledge), social capital (social connections) and symbolic capital (legitimated and recognised capital). Symbolic capital is the most fascinating yet challenging notion in this typology. Any types of capital once recognised as legitimate and valued can be deemed as symbolic capital, which is simultaneously an effect of presupposed belief shared by the social

agents as well as an outcome of power struggles over the distribution of valued resources in the field (Jenkins, 1992: 85). Through certain mechanisms, the labour market for instance, different forms of capital can be converted into each other under certain conversion rates. The legitimate form of capital, the distribution of capital and the conversion rates are all at the centre of power struggles in the field, rendering each field a distinctive logic without being dictated by any singular one, economic for example. Such struggles structure the agnostic relations between social agents in the field—the dominated and the subordinated—depending on the volume and the composition of different types of capital possessed by the social agents. As a dynamic process, the struggle is constant. Social agents struggle to improve or maintain their positions in this field under the constraints of shared view of the rule of game. In Bourdieu's (1998b: 40-41) words:

> a field is a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains people who dominate and others who are dominated. Constant, permanent relations of inequality operate inside this space, which at the same time becomes a space in which the various actors struggle for transformation or preservation of the field. All the individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) power at their disposal. It is this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, their strategies.

To understand how a social game is played, we need another key and somewhat opaque concept in Bourdieu's theory of social practice—habitus. Habitus mediates the social and the individual, engendering a sense of place for the social agents. According to Bourdieu (1990b: 53), habitus is

> a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practice, and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.

In a less obscure way, he (1990b: 54) defines habitus as

> a product of history, produces individual and collective practices - more history - in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the "correctness" of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms.

The key words here are ‘structured’ and ‘structuring’. It is structured, as habitus is the embodiment of individual and collective histories since the social agents’ childhood, and constantly structured by ongoing experiences of social practices. It is structuring, because the generative quality of this mental structure orients the social agents to see, think and act in a practical way instead of calculating all the time (Bourdieu, 1990b:62). The durability of habitus gives certain regularity of social practices yet it can undergo slow adaptations as social agents enter into new social situations or environment. In such cases, however, habitus adapts within the limits of initial structure acquired in formative years and maintain certain continuity with original structure (Bourdieu, 2002: 31). In relation to the struggle in a field, habitus predisposes social actors to act based on their perceived positions, chances and consequences and in doing so, those social agents invent shared beliefs on the legitimate rule of game in this field, or what Bourdieu calls *doxa*. Bourdieu (1994: 15) defines *doxa* as ‘a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, where it presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view’. Since habitus is rather enduring and stable, social agents may occupy quite similar positions across different fields. Those different fields, with relative autonomy from each other, consist of the society. For Bourdieu, although different fields have their own logic, they are all subject to the influence of the dominant field, which he calls the field of power. The field of power is the social space where those actors with command of enormous capital in different fields compete to define the legitimate form of capital that can transcend different fields and allow the legitimate form of capital in each field to be exchanged. As Swartz (2013: 65-66) noted, it overlaps with political field, referring to the social space where social agents and institutions compete for the control of political power. Political field is the social space where the participants in this social game compete to construct social problems, to propose public policies and to articulate different visions of the social reality (ibid, 68-69). Struggles in the political field end in the state, which with monopoly control of power and violence, imposes the legitimate values, ideas and views of the social order (ibid, 135-137).

Roots of Domination

Society in Bourdieu’s vision is highly differentiated and hierarchised. In each field, there are the dominant and the dominated social groups. Bourdieu is frequently charged as being pessimistic as he sees this stratified structure once established tends to reproduce itself through the mechanism of symbolic violence, or the paradox of *doxa* as he calls it (Bourdieu, 2001: 1). Symbolic violence is the most important contribution of Bourdieu’s sociology to the functioning of power in modern society,

yet it is also the most controversial one (Elster, 1983, Scott, 1990, Ortner, 2006, Burawoy, 2012, Swartz, 2013). Bourdieu shares with Foucault that the exercise of power in modern society relies less on raw violence or coercion than on legitimation. He calls this symbolic power whose exercise finds expression in imposing 'legitimate' categories, classification, codification, regulation and boundaries. Symbolic violence occurs when the arbitrariness of those practices is naturalised or misrecognised. It is an invisible but heinous form of violence 'which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity' (Bourdieu, 1992b: 167). This is to say that those victimised by the symbolic violence may not even recognise it. In this sense, the victims participated in the covert violence against themselves. But, how does this happen? Bourdieu (1977: 164) explains,

> Every established order tends to produce…the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness. Of all the mechanisms tending to produce this effect, the most important and the best concealed in undoubtedly the dialectic of the objective chances and the agents' aspiration out of which arises the sense of limits, commonly the sense of reality.

For Bourdieu, the struggle in the field is incessant. Once a social order is created, the dominant group would strive to maintain their position by concealing the asymmetrical social relation, naturalising the arbitrariness, and shaping the desires and wants of the dominated in a deep psychological manner. On this point, Bourdieu is similar to Lukes (2005) and aims to unveil the third face of power—the most insidious but most effective form of power that prevents social conflicts and perpetuates the social orders. Whilst Lukes leaves it rather open how this third dimension of power might work in practice, Bourdieu (2001: 23) proposes an answer in habitus, the 'somatisation of social relations of domination'. In *Masculine Domination*, Bourdieu (2001: 38) refers to symbolic power as 'magic, without any physical constraints'. He (2001: 38) elaborates that,

> it finds its conditions of possibility and its economic equivalent…in the immerse preliminary labour that is needed to bring about a durable transformation of bodies and to reproduce the permanent dispositions that it triggers and awakens. This transformative action is all the more powerful because it is for the most part exerted invisibly and insidiously through insensible familiarization with a symbolically structured physical world and early, prolonged experience of interaction informed by the structures of domination .

Now, recall the definition of habitus, in Bourdieu's theory of practice, habitus is the embodiment of the social structure. It gives the social agents a pre-reflexive practical sense of their positions in the social world and orients them to act in a way knowing their chances and limits in the social game without conscious thinking (Bourdieu, 2000: 184). The taken-for-grantedness of the social agents therefore enables the production of the established social order and misrecognition of the arbitrariness of such order. Once the dominant view is reinforced, naturalised, universalised and internalised by the social agents, says Bourdieu (2001: 139), 'this can lead to a kind of systematic self-depreciation, even self-denigration'. Bourdieu's diagnosis of the effect of symbolic violence converges with Goffman's (1974) study of stigma and inspires numerous critical scholarship on the political production of urban marginalisation in advanced capitalist societies (Wacquant, 2007, Garbin and Millington, 2012, Slater and Anderson, 2012). Bourdieu's focus on the disposition in habitus also marks a difference from Marxist analysis of ideological mystification (as in explaining the workers' self-exploitation) as Loveman (2005: 1056) and Swartz (2013: 100-101) both rightly observed. For Bourdieu, pre-existing cognitive structure of the social agents is the precondition for the ideology to work in the first place.

Bourdieu's reasoning here is rooted in his deep suspicion of rational choice theory (RAT) (Jenkins, 1992: 73) or as Bridge (2001a: 209) charges, his misinterpretation of the RAT as only about *economic* utility maximisation. His explanation of the acquiescence of the dominated leaves little room for conscious, rational and reflexive actions. Pursuing different lines, both Burawoy and Scott take issue with Bourdieu. Following the pathway of Gramsci, Burawoy (2012) in a journal paper and also in a co-authored book with von Holdt (2012) acknowledges Bourdieu's contribution of symbolic violence, a missing piece in Gramsci's notion of hegemony, which fails to capture the mystification of arbitrary power relations. This is based on his re-engagement with his early research experience in a factory in Chicago, applying Gramsci's theory to understand labour relations on a factory shop floor (Burawoy, 1979). He (2012) argues that the workers' active consent to their own exploitation was secured by the internal hierarchical division of labour and the piecemeal payment, which gives the workers a false sense of control, satisfaction and freedom. Bourdieu takes such subjective experience (also called subjective truth in his terminology) as misrecognition failing to recognise the arbitrariness of power and thereby perpetuating objective unequal relations (or objective truth in Bourdieu's term). Burawoy differs from Bourdieu in the view on the roots of domination. He sees a bigger part of the ideological apparatus and the dual consciousness of the dominated in securing the active compliance of the dominated (Burawoy, 2012).

Bourdieu's explanation retreats to the unconsciousness and practical sense of limits of the dominated whereas Burawoy sees the acquiescence of the subordinates as a more contingent process and involves certain level of rational decision. Although Bourdieu steps away from the discussion on false consciousness, his many breaks with 'common sense' or folk concepts, abundant in his writing, maintains an elitist position of social science practitioners and leaves limited room to see the 'good sense'[9] of the subordinated. Although it is analytically helpful to take certain distance from the research object, it conjures up all the problems of real interest in discussing false consciousness (Swartz, 2013: 120-121). For Bourdieu (2000: 189), 'social agents are in any case very difficult to describe in their two-fold truth. Those who are caught up in them have little interest in seeing the game objectified'. His focus on habitus and misrecognition could not adequately capture the ambivalence or the duality of the consciousness of the subordinated. Based on his ethnographic study on labour relations in Hungary before the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, Burawoy (1985, 2012) however observed good sense in the workers who were resistant to prevailing socialist ideology and pursued practical transformation of the social order. The established myths not only laboured their own dissents but also were vulnerable to penetration by the subordinates' discourses. There, Bourdieu's theory on habitus as a universal psychological mechanism has limited purchase.

Whilst Burawoy still bears the imprint of Gramsci in making such critique, James Scott stretched his critique even further (Scott, 1985, 1990, 2013), in a total break with Gramscian's theorisation of hegemony and in total opposite position to Bourdieu. Social agents including the subordinates in his view are much more reflexive, knowing at least something of what is going on in the world and the sources of their predicament, therefore, both lines of reasoning are untenable to explain involuntary submission. In reviewing Scott's book on *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, Charles Tilly (1991: 598) comments that, 'compliance, under Scott's microscope turns out to be sort of constant rebellion'. Whilst Scott acknowledges the pervasiveness of power in society, he believes that social actors

[9] Gramsci contrasts good sense with common sense. According to Gramsci (1998: 416), common sense refers to 'the philosophy of the non-philosophers', 'the conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average men *[sic]* is developed. Common sense is not a single unique conception which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is'. For Gramsci (1998: 325-326), good sense is equivalent to philosophy, a critical inquiry of the social reality; while, 'common sense is a collective noun, like religion: there is not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the historical process. Philosophy is criticism and the superseding of religion and "common sense". In this sense it coincides with 'good' as opposed to "common" sense'.

are more strategic in thinking and acting in power-laden situations (Ortner, 2006). For him (1990: 82-83), complete subordination and labouring on one's own domination are only possible under two strict social conditions: a completely atomized subordinate group and a shared stable belief in upward mobility from the subordinated. Both conditions are nearly impossible for any dominant group to achieve given the historical evidence thus far. First, the subordinates are capable of penetrating the established beliefs and values through their everyday practices, which differ from the prescribed dominant view. Here, he seems to converge with Burawoy's critique of Bourdieu. He argues that prevailing ideology, as any ideology, involves certain degree of idealisation of the social reality, which inevitably deviates from social reality, thereby offering the raw material for ideological delegitimation (Scott, 1985: 336-340). The values, beliefs and cultures promoted by the dominant class in maintaining social structure gives the subordinated the discursive resources to challenge the ruling class to live up to the promises when open defiance is costly. This can be also quite strategic, as Scott (1990: 106) argues, 'not only is such an attack a legitimate critique by definition, but it always threatens to appeal to sincere members of the elite in a way that an attack from outside their values could not'.[10] Whilst Bourdieu rejects the ontological binaries in his theorisation, Scott treats the separation between action and consciousness more seriously, partly because his intellectual career largely deals with the social group with a long tradition of orality and of elitist-mediated textual products. He argues against Gramsci and claims that radicalism is to be found in the beliefs rather than acts of the subordinated (Scott, 1985: 322). This leads to his second critique. He is discontent with the conflation of pragmatic resignation with inevitability, naturalisation or even legitimation of a prevailing order. Bourdieu's habitus may find some purchase here but Scott's argument is in fact very different. He begs for careful dissection of the sense of powerlessness that leads to submission as compared to the naturalisation captured by Bourdieu's (1977: 77) diagnosis, 'to refuse what is anyway refused and to love the inevitable'. As Scott (1990: 103) writes,

> for any particular form of domination one may specify the claims to legitimacy it makes, the discursive affirmations it stages for the public transcript, the aspects of power relations that it will seek to hide (its dirty linen), the acts and gestures that will undermine its claims to legitimacy, the critiques that are possible to frame within its frame of reference, and finally,

[10] The notion of 'rightful resistance' (O'Brien and Li, 2006) follows the same line. Also see Thorton (2002a), Ku (2003) and Steinmuller (2011) on resistance through discursive practices in resisting the established order.

> the ideas and actions that will present a repudiation or profanation of the form of domination in this entirety.

For Scott, there is little evidence supporting the misrecognition of the arbitrariness of power and injustice. It is also implausible to claim that the subordinated are incapable of imagining a different social order (e.g. negate existing order or total reverse of the social order)(Scott, 1990: 80-82). Submission to the established order may be because of the sense that there is no way out of the social game or due to the obstacles in open defiance (Scott, 1985: 323-335). In such circumstances, as Scott alerts us, submission might simply be appearances, a public transcript of the subordinated in such a power-laden situation, which does not reflect their consciousness in hidden transcripts. This point is epically represented by his quote of an Ethiopian proverb on the preface of his book on domination (1990), 'when the great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts'.

I concur with Lukes (2005: 132-134) that Scott's analysis overly emphasises the political awareness of the subordinated and fails to see the influences of more durable values and beliefs in shaping the desires and preferences of the subordinates and cultivating their sense of place in the social space. However, Lukes does not advance his critique further in defending his third dimension of power, which converges with Bourdieu's symbolic violence. On this point, I agree with Swartz (2013: 60) that the participation in the political struggle in the first place is also a misrecognition of the power relationships. When Scott's Southeast Asian farmers put up everyday form of resistance or strategized their resistance by finding cracks in the established order, they already subscribed to the logic of the political field. In making this critique, however, I am not defending any theorists I have just mentioned. I agree with Burawoy, Scott and Lukes that Bourdieu's misrecognition through habitus is too deep and overly deterministic. But, I do not subscribe completely to their approaches either. Empirically, in the Expo-induced displacement as well as in existing scholarship (Gaventa, 1980, Havel, 1991, Tilly, 1998, Ying, 2001, Pun, 2005, Lee, 2007, Qin, 2013), the mechanisms of power in securing the complicity of the subordinates as in the tradition of Bourdieusian, Gramscian and Scottian all make sense in different situations (see chapters 4, 7 and 8). Is the offer of resettlement housing and some bonus, beyond the reach of most families in dire living conditions, not a compensatory offering in Gramscian sense? Is such euphoria of private property ownership and associated bourgeois values of freedom not a symbolic violence in Bourdieusian terminology? Is discrediting the land use and the strategic use of *hukou* by staging fake marriages not a Scottian rebellion? In my analysis, I

shall keep an open mind to these different theorists. After all, Charles Tilly (1991: 594) identified at least six singular mechanisms—numerous combinations at different moments—on how voluntary or involuntary compliance can be secured through various non-exclusive mechanisms, which is the best warning to keep in mind the variegated ways of the exercise of power in modern society.

1. The premise is incorrect: subordinates are actually rebelling continuously, but in covert ways.
2. Subordinates actually get something in return for their subordination, something that is sufficient to make them acquiesce most of the time.
3. Through the pursuit of other valued ends such as esteem or identity, subordinates become implicated in systems that exploit or oppress them (in some versions, no. 3 becomes identical to no. 2).
4. As a result of mystification, repression, or the sheer unavailability of alternative ideological frames, subordinates remain unaware of their true interests.
5. Force and inertia hold subordinates in place.
6. Resistance and rebellion are costly; most subordinates lack of necessary means.
7. All of above.

If we return to Bourdieu's field analysis and view the social agents with certain level of awareness—in fact, Bourdieu has a thin assumption of social agents as *homo ludens* (Burawoy, 2012: 190) —which is conceivable and highly likely, especially in the case of *chaiqian* where the political game revolves around issues of basic human needs, we might have more fruitful insight on the politics and morality of *chaiqian*. Bourdieu's field is largely a social concept, but as Painter (1997, 2002) convincingly suggests, we may add a spatial dimension as well. *Chaiqian* can be seen as a social field intersecting with the cultural, housing and political fields, as well as a spatial field confined to the Expo site. Given the state-led nature of the Expo-induced displacement, it seems straightforward to conceive the state-led bulldozer team as the dominant whereas those displacees on the receiving end as dominated. Those actors (photographers, planners, state bureaucrats, business elites, judges, etc.) possess different sets of habitus knowledge—rational and irrational, professional and mundane, individual and collective—which is evolving as the process of the *chaiqian* unfolds in time and space. They contest the meaning, the process and the arrangement of *chaiqian*, or simply put, the rule of game in this field. The focus on reflexive social agents allows me to deal with the issue of responsibility in a much

more straightforward way. By responsibility, I am using it as in liability and guilt in the narrow and backward-looking judicial model as well as in political and moral responsibility in a more broad and forward-looking conceptualisation (Young, 2004). Here, I depart from Bourdieu[11] (1999d) and Burawoy (2012) who prefer to hold the social structure responsible for durable domination, and ally with Lukes (2005: 53-58) who insist on holding agents responsible for actions or inactions that affect others in a significant, negative way. I concur with his view that 'although social agents operate within structurally determined limits, they none the less have a certain relative autonomy and could have acted differently' (2005: 57). This charge goes to an individual agent as a person or as a member of an organisation or a collective including the state[12]in performing certain roles. In a debate with Clarissa Hayward, Lukes (2008: 12, 14) defends his argument and maintains that such perspective 'enables us to keep in focus the very question of the difference that agents can make to outcomes and to cast a critical eye on attempts by the powerful agents to escape their own responsibility by "blaming the system"...this allows us to keep alive the critical question of the moral and the political responsibility of powerful for what they do and what they fail to do in the past and in the future". Following Lukes, I take issue with both the structure and the social agents for labouring on the suffering of those displacees (see chapter 6). I also wish to separate physical violence from Bourdieu's symbolic violence to highlight that the former remains a powerful weapon of the ruling elites in securing their interests and maintaining domination. Bourdieu (2000: 102-106) refuses to separate physical violence from symbolic violence as he shares the view with Arendt (1970) that physical violence requires justification and contains a symbolic dimension. My decision here is not to deny the symbolic dimension but to underscore the rampant physical violence against the displaced with or without convincing justification. Symbolic violence for me is simply a too soft term to capture this. By making this separation, we can also see how different forms in a concerted way inflicted enormous pain on the social and individual bodies, obscured the alienating power relations and secured their submission to the dominant power.

[11] Bourdieu's Spinoza mission as a sociologist is to 'necessitate conducts, to tear them away from arbitrariness by reconstructing the universe of constraints which determines them, without justifying them', rather than 'a kind of terrorist inquisitor, available for all operations of symbolic policing' (quoted in Wacquant, 1992: 50).

[12] Following Bourdieu (1994) and Auyero (2012), I use 'state' as an imagined community, abstract structure, bureaucratic institutions and their practices.

Domination in Time and Space

Domination and symbolic power (violence) find expressions in temporal and spatial practices. Our engagement with time and space defines our existence in the social world. The control of the meaning and practices of time and space therefore is the most effective strategy in maintaining an arbitrary social order. Again, Bourdieu is amongst many theorists on time and space (Sorokin and Merton, 1937, Lefebvre, 1991, Harvey, 1985a, 1989a, Ortner, 2006) and the remarkable coherency of his thinking is of great utility in shaping my thoughts over time. Both time and space occupy a critical place in Bourdieu's theories as seen in his conceptualisation of habitus, his simple example of gift exchange, and more philosophical deliberation on Kafka's trial (1990b, 2000). In his early study of the Kebyle, Bourdieu (1990b: 164) writes that,

> the reason why submission to the collective rhythms is so rigorously demanded is that the temporal forms or the spatial structure not only structure the group's representation of the world but the group itself, which orders itself in accordance with this representation….All the divisions of the group are projected at every moment into the spatio-temporal organisation which assigns each category its place and time.

Whilst *chaiqian* of course is about the annihilation of lived space and a valuation of such loss, I wish to join recent intellectual attempts to give time, if not priority (Bourdieu, 1990b: 8), then at least the same weight as we give to space or place, in discussing displacement and eviction (see Auyero and Swistun, 2009, Harms, 2013, Sakizlioğlu, 2014). This however is more than a question of when (as in waiting and timing) but a whole array of issues regarding the duration, intensity, sequence, structure of times (calendar time, working hours, the time of Expo, etc.). Bourdieu's field analysis - social agents with different volume and combination of various capitals occupy different positions in the intersecting fields - can enrich our understanding of the social production of domicide and the complex temporal and spatial experiences of those on the receiving end.

Same as Harvey (1989a: 203), Bourdieu (2000: 224) holds that time is a social construction and experienced differently. However, he (2000: 225) differs from Harvey's reductionist view on economic capital in mediating the everyday experience of time and space and contends that 'capital in its various forms is a set of pre-emptive rights over the future'. Social agents appropriate these capitals in diverse ways according to their practical sense of place in the social space; thereby have different degree of control of time and their future. The most insidious exercise of

power is to engender a sense of lack of future. In a stratified field where the social game is played, the dominant group may exercise their power over time in two ways to maintain their position: an absolute power that makes a social process beyond reasonable predication, and a more subtle form of power that aims at maintaining the rule of game as in how the capital is distributed in this field (ibid, 229-230). Since all social games are located and evolving in time, the dominated in participating in this social game misrecognise the arbitrariness of the power relations and hence partake in their own subordination. Such mechanisms lead to the paradox of time as explained by his (2000: 227) example on overworking,

> the more economic and cultural capital increases, the greater the chances of succeeding in the social games and, consequently, the more the propensity to invest time and energy in this also increases, and the harder it becomes to contain all the possibilities of material or symbolic production or consumption within the limits of a biologically non-extensible time.

In a quite similar logic, Bourdieu theorises domination in the physical space. He (1999a: 124) suggests that 'social space translates into physical space', meaning that 'there is no space in a hierarchies society that is not itself hierarchised, and that does not express hierarchies and social distances'. Bourdieu (1999a: 127) explains this as a result of the uneven distribution of various species of capitals among different social agents, and hence their variegated capacity in appropriating the physical space. Because of the homology of different fields, Bourdieu (1999a: 125) argues that rarest capitals and goods may concentrate on certain places. The double inscription of social space exists in both the spatial structure and the cognitive structure in a mutually reinforcing way. According to Bourdieu (1999a: 126), this makes the physical space the arena where symbolic power exercises most intensely and misrecognition of the arbitrariness of power relations is most likely to happen (see chapter 8).

> Architectural spaces address mute injustices directly to the body and, just as surely as court etiquette, obtain from it the reverence and respect born of distance, or better yet, from being far away, at a respective distance.

Because of the durability of the social structure, the physical space is also rather stable and cannot be modified 'except for a work of transplantation, a moving of things and an uprooting or deporting people' (1999a: 124). Bourdieu here shares the view of Lefebvre (1991) that social struggles are inscribed in space. Such struggles can take individual or collective forms in material or symbolic practices, such as voting with feet or politics of the meaning of place.

The separation of time and space here is only for analytical clarity. For Bourdieu, understanding of social practices cannot be disembedded from specific time-space. Following Bourdieu, my analysis of *chaiqian* practice tries to bring temporalities and spatialities of domination and resistance to the fore. Specifically, I shall explore the structure of temporalities and the absolute command of space by the bulldozer regime in shaping the displacees' experiences (see chapter 5) and their political agency (see chapter 7) in the process of losing their homes, communities and workplaces. I will also look into the appropriation of the symbolic meaning of place and historical past in (de)legitimating the *chaiqian* process (see chapter 4) and the absolute control of physical space in regulating the future of those displaced (see chapter 8).

Resistance

The final link in my argument in this thesis, which is quite implicit in Bourdieu's work, is resistance, the moment when reproduction of social space is threatened. Here, my understanding is mostly derived from James Scott and existing scholarship on grassroots resistance in shaping state-society relations in Contemporary China (O'Brien and Li, 2006, Lee, 2007, Hsing, 2010a). If the dominant have variegated ways in exercising their power to maintain their positions in the social space, there is no reason not to expect the dominated to fight back in diverse, covert and overt ways. The predicament for political actions in China is legitimation given the monopoly control of symbolic power and force by the party-state, and the strict ban on mass protests and demonstrations. Even when protests or petitioning is confined to state-controlled channels, there are explicit rules on tolerable repertories such as the number of petitioners and the acceptable behaviours. Cross-class, cross-issue and cross-territory alliance are strictly banned under the national regulation[13]. With such severe constraints, the subordinated have to be strategic in performing their resistance. The values, policies and rules from past and present as propagated by the elites all become crucial resources to frame their grievances and justify their defiance, making the dominant 'the prisoners of their own rhetoric' (Thompson, 1975: 263). The contradictions within the bureaucratic field, between the daring and caring state agencies and agents on different levels, also gives them more opportunities to push the political boundaries. This pushes us to examine not only their framing and actions in public but also the backstage beliefs. As Bourdieu suggests, struggles in the field are constant. The question is how different forms of resistance were neutralised and the implications of the defeat for the displaced (see chapters 7 and 8).

[13] See Chinese National Regulation on *Xinfang* (Letters and Visits).

Event-led *chaiqian* (domicide) as a window to the neoliberal rule in China

I use *chaiqian*, displacement and domicide interchangeably not only in this chapter but also throughout the thesis for practical reasons (e.g. to locate a common ground for better communication, to avoid inventing many unrecognisable words such as *chaiqian*ees). It is crucial here to take a linguistic detour, teasing out their differences and warn against the symbolic violence exercised through language and translation. This section first conceptualises domicide and second contextualises event-led domicide in a neoliberalising China.

The Chinese word *chaiqian* has been quite liberally translated as an apolitical term for relocation, or a contentious one as in disputed relocation, or as displacement in existing literature. Literally, *chaiqian* entails two moments: *chai* means destruction and demolition, and *qian* means relocation and resettlement. The closest literal translation in English would be displacement and resettlement. Peter Marcuse (1985: 205), quoting from George and Eunice Grier, defines displacement as a process,

> when any household is forced to move from its residence by conditions that affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and that 1) are beyond the household's reasonable ability to control or prevent; 2) occur despite the household's having met all previously imposed conditions of occupancy; and 3) make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable.

Displacement in this definition captures the involuntary nature of *chaiqian* yet remains inadequate to convey the extent of violence as in the Chinese word. Resettlement on the other hand is overly value-neutral if not misleading, since the *anzhifang*, or the resettlement housing in English, are purchased by the displacees. Although I retain both English words in my analysis, it is more a practical compromise to the language game. When I use them as shorthand, I always have in mind those violent images of bulldozers destroying people's homes, of the powerful forcing people to leave their homes, and of the painful faces of people in putting down their roots in new places.

The most satisfactory translation for me is the neologism, domicide, coined by Douglas Porteneous and Sandra Smith (2001: 12), which is defined as 'the deliberate destruction of home by human agency in pursuit of specified goals, which causes suffering to the victims'. I do not use this term to replace displacement and resettlement entirely because first it cannot capture the process of *qian*, inseparable from the whole complete packaged process of losing and making homes in a short

time-span in the Chinese context; second, it is a new term that largely depends on the point of view and may lose purchase in wider discourses. The reason I bring in this term resides in its strength of focusing on the social agents and victimhood. The agent-centric view and the suffix of domicide are in line with my view of power and responsibility. As the authors forcefully argue, domicide are different from unplanned disasters because 'in domicide someone or some group is responsible for the suffering; we cannot blame nature, God or even the system' (Porteous and Smith, 2001: 19-20). The focus on victimhood here brings the sufferings of those uprooted to the centre of our inquiry, which is currently missing in the debates surrounding other terms. In using domicide, my intention is to call for greater attention on the socio-psychological costs and the moral problematic of *chaiqian* in the political discourses. However, I will not stick to the original definition provided by the authors here, which as I will argue is overly restrictive. Before moving to expand the notion, let me first offer a better overview of domicide.

Briefly, domicide refers to the killing of homes (Porteous and Smith, 2001: 12). The authors distinguish two types of domicide: extreme domicide as an outcome of war, colonial settlement, terrorism and ethnic cleansing, and everyday domicide as a result of development projects, such as dams, infrastructures and so on, framed in the name of 'public good'. Whilst the distinction is analytically useful, it does not seem to do justice to call the Expo-induced *chaiqian* as everyday domicide given the sheer scale and dazzling intensity of *chaiqian* and the infusion with the mentalities and logics underlying extreme domicide. I do not seek to make such distinction in my thesis. This is because not only were the displaced treated like enemies by the state-led bulldozer regime but also the spatial restructuring is a revanchist rationalisation of the urban land use in contemporary Shanghai (Smith, 1996b), which purifies the urban space based on the purchasing power of the users in no less extreme way than ethnic segregation.

Central to the notion of domicide is the meaning of home for human existence. We speak about home in many dialects, using it interchangeably with a house, a family, a household, a property, or simply any place we feel we belong to. As Somerville (1992) summarises, home may simultaneously connote the meaning of shelter (materiality), hearth (warmth), heart (belonging and love), paradise (imaginative ideals), abode (place), privacy (power and control), and roots (identity). In short, home is both a material and symbolic place. The materiality of home connects our 'memory and nostalgia for the past, everyday life in the present and future dreams and fears'(Blunt and Dowling, 2006: 3). It is also a layered value system whose

minimum components as Iris Young (1997) argues, include safety, individuation, privacy and preservation. Following Heidegger, Young contends that home is an extension of the human body. As human beings, we all need such a place that we can claim ownership, not in the sense of the private property ownership, but for meaningful use as a sanctuary, a location we can control and a site to construct our self-identity. Young (1997: 162) passionately argues that 'we should be ashamed of a world in which safety at home is a privilege, and express outrage at any stated or implied suggestion that such a need and liberty is too expensive for any society to meet'. For the authors of Domicide, they (2001: ix) share the humanistic interpretation of home, and seek to answer 'how and why the powerful people destroy the homes of the less powerful' . They point out that during domicide the multiple meanings and values of home are ruled out by the powerful or at best reduced to the singular meaning as an exchangeable material good, deprived of any historic and affective qualities. This brings about enormous sufferings for those who lost their home. Here, the authors join Marc Fried (1966) and Peter Marris (1961, 1974) and compare the grieving responses from the loss of homes to the reactions of bereavement over the death of a beloved person. They (2001: 63) elaborate that domicide may result in:

> the destruction of a place of attachment and refuge; loss of security and ownership; restrictions on freedom; partial loss of identity; and a radical de-centring from place, family, and community. There may be a loss of historical connection; a weakening of roots; and partial erasure of the sources of memory, dreams, nostalgia, and ideas.

None of those arguments is less true in the Chinese context. The Chinese word, 家, evolves from  and is explicitly spatial and evocative. The structure of this character emphasizes the import of roof (宀) in sheltering and defending the habitants and conveys the spatial order of activities inside a home 豕 (residence on top and economic activities on the bottom). However, the difference might be the pervasive control of the state in shaping the formation and dissolution of family through the *hukou* system, which arbitrarily recognises *de jure* registered members in the same booklet as a household unit regardless of actual living arrangement. In *chaiqian*, this is a source of family conflicts and may lead to family estrangement and breakdowns (see chapter 7).

Porteous and Smith's dissection of the underlying causes and the damages to the displaced as a continued process in the book *Domicide* have pushed me to rethink the

chaiqian problem in China. The psychological distress from uprooting rarely becomes a legitimate topic in intellectual discussion. Following them, I have put the pain, stress, suffering, anxiety, fear and a whole range of emotional distress at the very core of my research, trying to offer a counter-narrative of how *chaiqian* is actually lived by the powerless. The immediate problem for me is the restrictive notion of suffering. The authors (2001: 194) acknowledge that the ambivalent meanings of what has been lost and the post-domicide supportive networks are crucial in mediating the experience of domicide over time. The effects of domicide can be experienced in quite different ways: some might welcome and benefit from displacement; some might be rather indifferent. The question then is should we call those people victims even if they do not experience any emotional traumas? For the authors of *Domicide* (2001: 12), the destruction of homes welcomed by the home dwellers cannot be termed as domicide. The author of domicide in Shanghai seems also agree on this point: 'to be sure, not all those affected by demolition and relocation are its victims. As pointed out earlier, many residents have moved willingly and resettlement has improved their living conditions' (Qin, 2013: 26). I am not denying that a whole range of positive and negative experiences of displacement exists. However, I wish to argue that focusing on the subjective experiences, especially the positive ones, and failing to reconcile with the objective truth of victimisation by the capitalistic accumulation runs the risk of letting go of the symbolic violence of place annihilation. It can make us vulnerable to insensitive utterances from apathetic and offensive studies on displacement. The danger is exemplified by a recent offensive line from Kearns and Mason (2013) who 'warns' against *a priori* normative judgement of domicide because 'residents may like change more, or respond to it better, than many commentators expect' (p.21). Therefore, as the authors put, a robust research should be more 'balanced' (p.2), 'objective and considered' in assessing the spatial restructuring process in our time and avoid creating 'hegemonic discourse' (p.21) that obstructs the 'truth'. The task for critical scholarship fighting against displacement is to resolve the tension between subjective truth and objective truth so that we can use it more freely and powerfully to permanently mute and avoid conceding to those who wish to use 'happy movers' or 'voluntary movers' as 'evidence' to defend *chaiqian* and displacement as not necessarily a bad thing. To enrich our understanding of the objective victimhood, we need to borrow from fruitful thoughts on the urban process in Marxist political economy tradition (Harvey, 1978, Smith, 1982, King, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, Knox, 1991, Beauregard, 1994, Fainstein, 1994, Christophers, 2011) and Bourdieu's work on domination in physical space that I summarised earlier.

The notion of ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey, 2001) and ‘rent gap’ (Smith, 1987) are of great use here. Harvey conceptualises the urbanisation process as a constant search for a tempo-spatial fix to overcome the inherent crisis-tendency of over-accumulation under capitalism. His notion of ‘spatial fix’ (2001: 25) aims at capturing both meanings of ‘fix’: the fix of capital in the built environment and the fix to the problem of over-accumulation through cyclical investment in building, destroying and reconstructing the built landscape. The key link in his theorisation is capital switching, referring to the flow of economic capital from the primary circuit (industrial production) to the second circuit (the built environment) or to the tertiary circuit (science and technology, and social expenditures on the reproduction of labour power) at the moment when over-accumulation starts to disrupt the rhythm of accumulation in the primary circuit, or more frequently and smoothly with the mediation of financial institutions and the state (Harvey, 1978: 107). Such switches may also occur between sectors within any circuit or between different geographical regions. The problem with the switch of capital to the built environment arises from the fixity and durability of the built environment, meaning long turnover time of capital investment and frictions for new capital accumulation. Herein lies the contradiction:

> in order to overcome spatial barrier and to annihilate space with time, spatial structures are created which themselves act as barriers to further accumulation…capitalist development has therefore to negotiate a knife-edge path between preserving the exchange values of past capital investments in the built environment and destroying the values of these investments in order to open up fresh room for accumulation (Harvey, 1978: 124).

This cycle is a rather selective process, subject to the control of the real estate and financial complex (Aalbers, 2011). The role of the ground rent is pivotal in this process, as brilliantly explained by Neil Smith (1996b). The investment in the built environment allows the investors and owners to extract ground rent from the land parcel under their control, which is influenced by their improvement on the land and the competitive bidding for the land *in situ*. Unless continuous improvement is made, the devaluation cycle of the built structure in a given place starts and slowly reflects in the physical conditions of the structure. The surplus capital then flows and fixes space elsewhere, triggering further disinvestment and thereby worsening the conditions of the built structures. For financial institutions, the ‘sound’ rationale is to ‘restrict the effects of devalorization, economic decline and asset loss to clearly circumscribed neighbourhoods and thereby protect the integrity of mortgage loans in other areas’ (Smith, 1996b: 192). The systematic disinvestment causes the rent gap

between capitalised ground rent under present land use and the potential land use under highest and best use to emerge. Reinvestment through demolition and reconstruction follows to places where this gap is wide enough to generate enough economic profits. As Smith (1996b) rightly argues, neither disinvestment nor reinvestment is inevitable or natural. It is a deliberate product of conscious investors who prioritise the exchange value over the use value of the built environment and speculate on the conditions of the real estate market for private agendas. Although both authors theorise the process based on historical evidence in capitalist economies, Fulong Wu (1999) convincingly extends the thesis of capital switch and the rent gap in explaining rapid urban transformation after the rediscovery of the value of land in accumulation process in late socialist China. Bourdieu's work can add further complexity to this systematic process of investment, disinvestment and reinvestment in two ways. First, for Bourdieu, economic capital is only one peculiar kind of capital, although crucial in this process, it is a concerted effort of social agents with other species of capital, for instance, cultural and political capital, in many intersecting fields that differentiate one place from another, and reinforce the cycle in order to make their own 'profits'. This is most relevant in the Chinese context where land-centred accumulation is an important political project for the local administrative states to take over the power from the work units owing to the legacy of the socialist land regime within their jurisdiction (see chapters 4 and 8, and Hsing (2010a)). Second, symbolic violence is produced at the very moment when a lived space is treated as a commodity that devalues over time. In the case of housing, for instance, a house indeed is an economic investment but most crucially, it is a 'social reproduction project' (Bourdieu, 2005: 21) that produces and maintains a stable social group in the lineage of history.

For whatever reasons, the exploitive land development process has always disproportionately distributed the costs to those already disadvantaged by the market force, as Engels (1970 [1872]: 19, 70, 72) cogently points out to what happens to the working class neighbourhood more than a century ago.

> the expansion of the big modern cities give the land in certain sections...an artificial and often enormously increasing value; the buildings erected in these areas depress this value, instead of increasing, because they no longer correspond to the changed circumstances. They are pulled down and replaced by others…no matter how different the reasons may be, the result is everywhere the same; the scandalous lanes disappear to accompaniment of lavish self-glorification by the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again at once somewhere else and often in the

> immediate neighbourhood!....as long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist it is folly to hope for an isolated solution of the housing question or of any other social question affecting the fate of the workers.

In short, the underlying causes and values that sustain the land use in contemporary cities objectively victimise those on the receiving end of the development programmes. Whilst we all need to incorporate the subjective experiences of domicide in our research, however, this is not done to examine the variegated experiences of displacement in its own right but to unravel the hidden socio-psychological mechanism that enables the concealment and mystification of a violent accumulation process and misrecognises the arbitrariness of power. Autonomy, choice, freedom and monetary gains—those are the consolation prizes inducing temporary euphoria and concealing the exploitative nature of the accumulation practices. An investigation of the objective truth of victimisation is a precondition to study the subjective experience of victimhood. Only in doing so, we can have a full picture of the political and moral evil. It is for this reason that this thesis takes the position that all the displacees I worked with, and also those losing homes to the market force, are victims. It is also for this reason that I only perform simply descriptive analysis in the hope of painting a general picture instead of pursuing any advanced analysis in locating the 'happy' movers or the factors that make a 'happy' mover (see chapter 8).

The political evil of the Expo-induced domicide as I argue will allow us to peek into the neoliberal rule in Chinese cities. In the words of Ong (2006, 2007), this is neoliberalism with a small n—the local articulation of the neoliberal technology of governance in the production of a confined space. Yet I believe, this small n is embedded in Neoliberalism with a big N on other levels and is able to shed light on the pattern and the modality of ongoing neoliberalising process in Chinese cities. The nature of the rapid transformation in late socialist China, around the time of the ascendency of the neoliberalism in the Atlantic region, has been controversial in existing literature. Whilst most scholars maintain that China does not square well with the prototype of neoliberalism in the Atlantic regions (see Brenner and Theodore, 2002b, Harvey, 2005a, Steger and Roy, 2010), they generally agree China is experimenting with a hybrid variation and is a member of the big family of 'actually existing neoliberalism' (Yan, 2003a, Harvey, 2005a, Liew, 2005, Lee and Zhu, 2006, Rofel, 2007, Wu, 2008, He and Wu, 2009, Pow, 2009, Wu, 2010). For instance, David Harvey (2005a: 120) points out, what we witnessed in China thus far 'is the construction of a particular kind of market economy that increasingly

incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralised control'. Other scholars in Foucauldian tradition are more critical and refuse to see China through the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism as evidenced by the many contradictions and discrepancies in various regimes of governance (Nonini, 2008, Kipnis, 2007, 2008). The division in existing scholarship as far as I understand is helpful in grasping the context specificity of neoliberal practices, but it is misinformed and unhelpful as it seems to assume that there is an ideal type of neoliberalism—a literal translation of neoliberalism as ideology into political practice—which variegated political practices of neoliberal rule in diverse contexts elsewhere can be measured against (Peck, 2013, Jessop, 2013, Brenner et al., 2010). This is epistemologically problematic as neoliberalism is better understood as a process, incomplete and full of contradictions (Peck, 2013). It intersects with other processes, forces, and counter-movements in its materialisation and improvisation, which makes it difficult to follow the templates of Friedman or Hayek, and even more difficult to predicate the course (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a, Hackworth, 2007, Brenner et al., 2010). This also makes the temporal distinction of 'roll back' and 'roll out' of limited utility as the pathways and modalities are geographically and historically contingent. However, this is not to slip into poststructuralist obsession with those many small ns, incapable of generalising and seeing the common patterns and regularities. It is possible and crucial to see neoliberalisation with small n in the Neoliberalisation with a big N on larger scales (Peck, 2013).

This generic commonality and trend, as Brenner et al (2010: 184) points out, is that 'neoliberalisation denotes a politically guided intensification of market rule and commoditisation'. Active mobilisation of state power is crucial for this project (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102). Wacquant (2012: 66) shares the focus on the state power and maintains that neoliberalism is a statecraft —'the reengineering and redeployment of the state as the core agency that sets the rules and fabricates the subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to realising market'. He (2012: 71) holds that this is a process about the 'articulation of state, market and citizenship that harness the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third'. He built his thoughts on Bourdieu's (1994, 1998a) conceptualisation of the state as an arena of political struggles between different agents and institutions from various bureaucratic fields fighting over the legitimate classification and regulation of society. In line with Bourdieu's general thoughts, conflicts and struggles are constant here, as expressed in vertical struggles between agents on different hierarchies and horizontal struggles between the protective left hand and disciplinary and punitive right hand of the state. Based on his personal research experience on

marginality and penal state in advanced economies, Wacquant (2012: 73, 74) contends that 'neoliberalism entails a rightward tilting of the bureaucratic field and spawns a Centaur-state' and 'growth and glorification of the penal wing of the state are an integral component of the neoliberal Leviathan'. As Peck and Theodore (2012) note, both generalisations are helpful attempts to locate the similarities of actually existing neoliberalism yet they are not universally applicable in other cultural contexts, such as Africa or Asia.

I agree with Peck and Theodore's comment. Yet, I think Wacquant's focus on statecraft here offers us a practical heuristic device to dissect the articulation of neoliberalism in diverse political landscapes. It is my intention here to use this conceptual lens and carve out the logic underlying the process of reengineering of state in neoliberalising China, with a case from the Expo-induced domicide. My observation in general is in line with Wacquant's propositions, although the process is less straightforward as in Wacquant's analysis. The reengineering of state is more iterative and reflexive, an evidence of the intensive struggle in the bureaucratic field and the capacity of the neoliberal doctrine supporters in coping with challenges to its ruling. To start, the Chinese state is not monolithic and unified. It is decentralised, fragmented and contradictory, along with the ongoing construction of socialist market economy (Pei, 2006, Howell, 2006, Lee, 2007, Wu et al., 2007). This is first evidenced by the vertical conflicts along the administrative hierarchies, and between the high-end politicians and low-flying policy executioners. Second, it is seen in the horizontal conflicts between different factions (Fewsmith, 2001, 2013), between the left hand and the right hand of the state, between different local states, and between predatory and redistributive intention of a given policy programme.

Vertically, profound changes in the relations between the local state and the central state are provoked by the restructuring of power within the bureaucratic field (from work units to administrative authorities), the decentralisation of administrative and regulatory duties and power, and the establishment of a new tax-sharing system (Fu, 2002, He, 2007, He and Wu, 2009). Political agents on low-level administrative hierarchies now have greater control of resources within their jurisdictions, especially the land. This first benefits from the state-led project of constructing a land market, which constitutionally settles the controversy over land ownership and allows the territorial states to manage, regulate and speculate land use rights under their jurisdictions, becoming the *de facto* owners of land within their territory. This applies to the land in both the city and the countryside. Although the constitution stipulates that the rural collectives are *de jure* owners of the land in the countryside,

the deliberate ambiguity of 'rural collectives' in political and legal systems enables the local states to become the *de facto* owners in speculating land development(Ho, 2001, Lin, 2009). The construction of the land market caused tensions between various state agents. Hsing (2010a: 33-59) astutely depicts the tension between territorial states (administrative states) and the functional states (*danwei*/ military organisations) - legacy of the organisation of socialist planned economy - as a turf war between the socialist land masters on different administrative hierarchies (ibid: 34). She notes that local states are gradually winning in this turf war and reclaiming territorial power from the functional states by rationalising urban land use and by regulating the land/housing market (ibid). The former targets the land use inefficiency caused by socialist land accumulation regime and calls for greater respect of land as a commodity whose exchange value dictates land use (ibid). The latter eliminates the black market for land whose existence threatens the power of the territorial states, and in doing so, it consolidates the position of local states to monopolise the supply of land and to regulate the entry ticket to the field of land development (ibid, also Lin, 2009, Yeh and Wu, 1996). The position of the local states is continuously strengthened by administrative and financial decentralisation, delegating more responsibilities to the local level to encourage initiatives and accommodate local contexts. Whilst the central government may offer overarching, broad and ambiguous guidelines, policies or goals, and retains the power in approving or vetoing certain local decisions (land use for instance), most decisions are now made locally (such as planning, land use change, etc.) (Oi, 1995, Breslin, 1996, He and Wu, 2009) or translated by local state agents to attune to local contexts (e.g. chaiqian regulation). The power of the central government can be further circumvented by cunning political craft of the local state agents (see Tsai, 2004). For instance, to bypass central state's control on land appropriation of large parcels, some local states may cut a large parcel into smaller pieces to avoid administrative approval from the central government (Lin, 2009).

The decentralisation of the bureaucratic field, the fragmentation of interests and the changing central-local relations have been discussed through many conceptual lens, such as 'local state corporatism'(Oi, 1995: 1132), or entrepreneurial states (following Harvey's thesis (1989b)) (Zhu, 2002, Wu, 2003b), or 'local state capitalism'(Keith et al., 2013: 113-139), seeking to capture the activation of state power to engage or facilitate capitalistic accumulation. The changing central-local relations in China, according to Zheng (2014: 139-159), have evolved into de facto federalism. The decentralisation process also creates many tensions, which can be attributed to the economic and administrative system. Economically, the tax sharing system, a

product of bargaining between the central state and the local states, allows the local states to retain a significant portion of land related revenues on the local level, and encourages the pursuit of economic interests, personally or bureaucratically (Solinger, 1992, Wank, 1995, Duckett, 1998, Zhou, 2012). Politically, in post-Mao's China, regime of 'truth' is defined by hard facts, concrete images and statistical accounts (Liu, 2009). The performance of local state agents is evaluated by an index and consists of many quantifiable variables, of which economic growth weighs significantly. Such evaluation is goal-oriented and is insensitive to the process of achieving them (Zhang and Lee, 2012). It therefore gives much discretionary power for the local state agents to translate such evaluation index in their political practices in order to deliver a 'satisfactory' answer or to secure their political career. Enticed by both the system and personal economic interests, local states agents are prone to pursue GDPism and economic growth (Peck and Zhang, 2013). Flagship projects, mega-events and urban spatial restructuring, for their high visibility and the prospects of large inflow of footloose capital investment thus become popular choices amongst the local states. One consequence is the focus on short-term, rapid and concrete programmes that are able to demonstrate the achievement of political elites within their terms in order to advance their careers (Keith et al., 2013: 125-126). The other consequence is that, some local states are becoming less financially dependent on the central government. This may translate into further tensions in scalar politics. The policies and practices of the local state agents may deviate from the intent of the central government, triggering or escalating social unrests. Corruption on the local level may also undermine the legitimacy and popular trust of the party and the central government. Yet, for the central government, there remains lack of effective tools to monitor and discipline local state agents (Chen, 2012a). On the other hand, sustaining economic growth and containing social grievances - threats to the legitimacy of the central government - are both dependent on the local states. This adds additional bargaining chips to the hands of the local states. A further consequence of decentralisation, which may complicate the power struggle, is the intensive rivalry competition between different localities (Howell, 2006, Shin, 2014). This scalar politics begs for a nuanced understanding of ideological cement for the Chinese state. Whilst the central party-state may attempt to create a unified, harmonious China through constant labour on nationalist and patriotic discourses, the local state agents are more inclined to pursue practically economic development and personal interests rather than abstract nationalist notions (Howell, 2006: 284).

Horizontally, the power struggle amongst former president Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) and his protégé, the princelings (political elites acquire power through nepotism), and

the populists (elites without strong family political background) shapes the course of China's reform. Their power struggles reflect in their political ideologies and policy preferences. An example here would be China's accession to the WTO. It was negotiated behind closed doors under the leadership of Jiang and the economic tsar, Zhu Rongji, leaving many party elites clueless to the key terms (Nonini, 2008: 166). This was a major victory for the liberal reformers. The succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao also witnessed a small shift to social spending and social justice, seeking to address glaring inequalities caused by the reform in the 1990s (Chan et al., 2008, Zheng, 2014). Under Jiang-Zhu's leadership, China underwent most intensive privatisation and commodification, such as land, housing, education, health care, state assets, etc. The shift of political focus is as much a power struggle as a practical response to growing social discontent from previous round of economy restructuring. Regardless of the intention, the policy programmes put a tiny brake on the ruthless pursuit of GDP growth as in the previous decade. However, these programmes have been rather ineffective owing to first, the brutal onslaught on socialist welfare in the 1990s, deepening reform in creating a market economy and second, and the obstructions from the beneficiaries of the market reform in the initial round. The protective hand of Mao's paternalist socialist has been severely injured in the reform era, stripping most Chinese down to bare life with significant uncertainty and risks. In short, social welfare system taking shape in the reform era closely links life chances and protective benefits with employment and *hukou* status, which creates and exacerbates old and new social inequalities (Chan et al., 2008, Zheng, 2014). The minimal social protection follows the neoliberal means test and workfare model, fostering greater dependency between family members; while the invitation to market values such as possessive individualism encourages the opposite impulse. This contradiction has become a major source of family conflicts (Whyte and Parish, 1984, Yan, 2003b, Yan, 2009b). The right hand of the state prevails in society, bolstering the creation of the market system, which only allows the upper rung of society to access and benefit from the nascent market system. This is not to suggest neoliberalisation in China features an amputation of the left hand of the state. The feminine hand of the state is weak and instrumental. In response to popular grievances, it occasionally reaches out, temporarily restraining the predatory right hand and relieving social tension. The tightened control of speculative land development, land appropriation approval procedures, financial loans to purchase housing in the last a few years and the selective inclusion of migrants in local citizenship can all be seen as reflexive attempt to tame predatory accumulation practices. However, it does not change the underlying logic that state power is

activated to deal with the repercussions of marketization and privatisation and to lubricate future capitalistic accumulation.

The feminine/masculine classification may overly simplify the power struggles on horizontal level. The struggle between territorial states and functional states as discussed earlier may also be seen in this light. For each local state agency, they are subject to dual leadership as a result of the complex grid-like organisation of the Chinese bureaucracy (Blecher, 2003, Hsing, 2010a). Functionally, each state agency is ruled by ministries and departments along the vertical line. Territorially, each state agency is subject to the rule of the municipal or regional government to coordinate the functions and interests between different agencies. Some government agencies may be prescribed with overlapping responsibilities (e.g. the merger of planning agency and land use management agency can be seen an example to rationalise the bureaucratic structure). The overlapping of administrative responsibilities, different organisational goals, and dual leadership in Chinese bureaucracy structure are prone to create conflicts between different agencies. However, it is also conductive to create the conditions of floating responsibility, fertile ground for moral corruption and political unaccountability (Bauman, 1989).

The fusion of the Leninist Communist Party and the state further complicates the power struggle in the bureaucratic field (Walder, 1995). For Blecher (2003), despite the withering power of party ideology, the Communist Party remains dominant in the bureaucratic field, profoundly affecting every aspects of Chinese politics. This is effectively done through stringent but selective control of party membership (filing formal applications, pledging political loyalty, political vetting process, selecting loyal or co-opting indispensable political subjects, etc.) and of the opening for participating in decision-making process. Although the party advocates democratic decision-making, the actual power resides in the hands of a few party members of the standing committees of the party, instead of the party congresses or committees and the power only flows downward (ibid). Most state agents are Communist Party members and their political career largely hinges on the evaluation from the party organs (e.g. through the secretive writing of personal dossier)(Lee, 1991). Their ranks in the party and their political connections with influential party members play decisive role in their political prospects. Moreover, as Pieke (2009) shows, the Communist Party is re-inventing itself through various educational programmes tailored to government officials and party members to reinforce ideological and political commitment to the party. The organisation, structure and politics of the Communist Party as a top-down organisation demanding loyalty and commitment in

various public and private institutions can become major forces in social mobilisation, overcoming administrative differences. But the infusion also creates tension within the bureaucratic field in post-Mao era. Deng's pragmatic philosophy puts technical competency and professionalism of state agents ahead of ideological commitment and mobilisation of and connectedness with the masses. Experts and talents in economics, technology, administration and other subjects are recruited to create a professional, efficient and sophisticated modern bureaucracy. Today, a huge number of college graduates are recruited into the bureaucratic system each year through stringent examination of intellectual merits and political background (Guo, 2005). However, party membership and party ranking as screening criteria for selecting and promoting bureaucrats undermines such initiatives in creating an efficient and technocratic grid of modern bureaucracy. In keeping the fusion of party-state, it however also labours tensions between the party boss and technocratic state agents (particularly, those in lower ranks) (Howell, 2006). In the context of decentralisation, it can also undermine the legitimacy of the central party-state. Corruption of lower ranking of bureaucrats reflects and undermines the legitimacy of the party state (Howell, 2006).

The process of state reengineering unfolded in China is fraught with contradictions, conflicts and tensions. The underlying neoliberal growth logic - the activation of state power to serve the interests of capitalist accumulation - does not show significant differences from its western counterparts. The difference might reside in the depth and the reach of the party-state in intervening, facilitating or directly involvement in capitalist accumulation. However, the discrepancies and conflicts between different agencies on different levels, between political ideals and political practices, between central plans and local implementation, on the other hand also become political opportunities for popular protests (O'Brien and Li, 2006, Shi and Cai, 2006). The resisting movement may have challenged the power and the legitimacy of the state. Yet, the Chinese state demonstrates strong capacity and flexibility in coping with and containing popular grievances and preventing large scale collective actions from rising (Lee, 2007). This must first be attributed to the shared goal in maintaining social stability within the ruling elites and the state apparatus. Social stability and peaceful order have become central pillars for the Communist Party's legitimacy in ruling over society and finding wide resonation with the populace (Shue, 2004). The central state now makes social stability, as reflected in the number of petitioning cases or collective actions, a decisive variable in evaluating the performances of the local state agents (Yu, 2009, Chen, 2012a). This has increased the political stake of the local state agents in pursuing predatory

accumulation practices and abusively deploying material violence to protestors. It also draws local states agents closer to the central government's ideological artifice of maintaining social stability. Second, this might benefit from co-option of diverse social groups in the political establishment, sustaining the hegemony of the party state. In response to changing circumstances (e.g. the rise of private entrepreneurs, the popularity of college education, easier access to internet, etc.), the Communist Party on the one hand has recruited economic and cultural elites and the middle class into the Communist Party (Dickson, 2003, 2010). On the other hand, it has strengthened the ideological apparatus on grassroots level through setting up party-organs in private companies and other organisations and reinforcing ideological propaganda (Xu, 2008, Zhu, 2010). The monopoly over the media also allows the party to define the 'truth' and censor agnostic social discontent from mass consumption (Brady, 2008). Third and most importantly, it must also be registered in the growth of the penal wing of the state. The rule of law project, along with the construction of the socialist market system, has been pivotal in selectively removing or constructing legal barriers and regulating economic activities of different social actors (Peerenboom, 2002, Lee, 2007). For instance, in constructing the housing market, cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen strategically grants some wealthy migrants conditional access to local citizenship if they purchase commercial properties from the local housing market. The well-celebrated Property Law, although it offers legitimate weapons for the populace, under-protects the people in cases where the state is the violator of the sacredness of private property rights (Pils, 2009a). The rise of the legal field however also contains popular protest actions, for one, legal right is individualised and for the other, it requires the petitioning social agent to play the rule of game in the legal field (i.e. legitimate language, legal representation, etc.), exposing them to symbolic violence in the legal field (Bourdieu, 1986a, Lee, 2007). The weak position of the legal apparatus in the bureaucratic field may bend the principle of rule of law to the politics (Blecher, 2003). A most indispensable player in the penal wing of the state is the *weiwen* (maintaining social stability) apparatus(Yu, 2009). Spending on *weiwen* occupies a huge portion of local government expenditures.[14]They flex their muscles and show their teeth over time as a benefit of numerous exercises in obstructing legal justice and suppressing popular grievances. As contentious actions may reflect in the political career of local state

[14] There is no available data on this issue due to the secretive nature of this sector. According to the petitioners I worked with, it does not seem cheap at all. During those politically sensitive occasions such as People's Congress, Mao Zedong's birthday, or June 4th of each year, they will be put under close surveillance by the security guards or local officials, incurring additional spending, on condition that those who work in the *weiwen* sector will not embezzle this budget. One petitioner witnessed a security guard forging a receipt whose value was ten times higher than the actual expenditure.

agents and the complaint system tends to encourage grievances to be resolved locally, the local states are held accountable for mediating and resolving complaints against them. Their tactics are diverse. Abusive violence violating the bodies of the protestors, as pedagogical events, occurs more often than not (Qin, 2013). On other occasions, the sophistication of Chinese state bureaucracy supplies the local states with a powerful weapon to paralyse protesting actions by kicking the protestors between different agencies and teach them to become patients of the state (Auyero, 2012). On some other occasions, the local states may negotiate with the protestors and concede on economic terms. Such concession, as Zhang and Lee (2012) acutely point out, symbolises a commodification of citizenship and state power. In righting the wrongs and exchanging money for social stability, the local states further undermine the legitimacy of the party-state in ruling society. All these tactics in undermining, containing and suppressing social grievances are based on cunning manipulation of citizenship, denying access to justice, conceding to socio-economic benefits, or suspending human rights. But in general, the penal wing of the state is less aggressive than in Latin America or the western post-industrial cities (Wacquant, 2012). Yet, their role is critical for neoliberal rule in Chinese cities.

Neoliberal growth logic has now been increasingly relying on the construction of a state of emergency or political exception (Ong, 2006, Gray and Porter, 2014). The Expo-induced *chaiqian* offers a case to examine further the underlying logics of neoliberal rule in Chinese cities. Expo-induced *chaiqian* as an episode of Shanghai's *chaiqian* history and crucial component of primitive accumulation, must be seen simultaneously as an economic process of land-centred accumulation, a political process in producing and consolidating asymmetrical power structure and class differences, and an ideological process of promoting individual responsibility, freedom and private property ownership and repudiating socialist residue in a piecemeal fashion. The rolling-out on all fronts is pervasively controlled by the party-state in tandem with constant challenges to its political legitimacy and intersects with rapid changes in other spheres of Chinese society. The decision to host an Expo may have benefited from a changing political and economic context. Shanghai's strategic importance in regional and national economy was 'rediscovered' after the rise of Jiang-Zhu leadership in the party and the state from their Shanghai base. The siting choice of the Expo in Shanghai's city centre allows the local state to reclaim the land from two major functional states (i.e. the Shanghai No.3 Steel Company and the Jiangnan Shipyard) whose occupation of primary land in the city centre obstructed the rationalisation and modernisation of urban land use from Shanghai governments since the 1990s. The conflicts perhaps would not have been

as easily resolved without the endorsement and coordination of the central government, through the political construction of the Expo as a project of national significance and the importance of the Expo as a concrete display of the achievement of the Communist Party. Backed by the central government, the significance of the Expo also temporarily suspended or suppressed the tensions between different government agencies and between regional rivalries. Given the heavy involvement of the central state in the bidding process (waving international debts to other BIE member states, green lights to some foreign companies in China, etc.) (see Chen 2010), the central government, if not fully committed, may have been entrapped into its own promises made to the international community. It poured resources into Shanghai. Support from the central government also allowed the Shanghai government to bypass stringent control in appropriating farmland in the countryside for relocating the socialist land masters and for speculative land development. Also for such commitment, the Shanghai government was able to mobilise the entire state apparatus to pursue a single goal that is to construct an event space in a condensed time and in a most efficient way. Examples in this regard may include fast-track policies, decision-making or juridical practices in demolishing people's homes (see chapter 6). Mobilisation of social support also benefited from the party organs at the grassroots levels through intensive ideological propaganda campaigns and dispatching party members in lower ranks to join the domicide crews. In constructing the event space, the Expo-induced chaiqian forced the displacees to bend to the power struggles within the bureaucratic field, surrender their rights to decent housing to the market force and discipline them with both market and statist values, with the help from an iron fist that suppressed social discontent and from the caring hand that addressed partially the grievances from marginalisation and exclusion. The right hand of the state prevailed in this land battle and solidified a socio-spatial structure premised on the purchasing power in the market. It further privileged the upper rung of Shanghai in accessing the urban space where rarest goods and services are concentrated and locked the displacees at the bottom of the socio-spatial hierarchy.

Let me expand on this observation. The Expo land use continues the experiment of the self-praised Land Bank model to extract the utmost rent from the land. This project-based semi-public and semi-private institution was designed as a solution to the fragmented property regime. It coordinated different district governments and work units that have absolute control of the land within this Expo zone and imposed exceptional rules that selectively denied or conferred citizenship to individual land users. This relied on cunning exploitation of legal landscape and exercise of territorial power in a calculative rationality. First, the land bank dwelled on an

ambiguously defined Expo project (public/private interest, geographical boundaries and explicit construction projects) to bypass legal restrictions on land appropriation. Second, it benefited from the emerging market-based housing regime that crushed the dreams for a decent home of most ordinary families in Shanghai. This is due to the rollback of socialist welfare housing programmes, to the employment-based monetary housing benefits (Housing Provident Fund) and to the means-test provision of public housing under various names. It solidified the intra-generational and inter-generational inequities between winners and losers of the socialist housing regimes (Wang, 2004, Logan et al., 2010). Those 'losers' include the late-comers, the excluded and those on the waiting list to the welfare housing provision. Individual responsibility now is the buzzword of socialist market economy. Like in other spheres of social policy, individuals can only rely on themselves under these new urban conditions (Thelle, 2004). *Chaiqian* has become the only way for most families to acquire a better place to live. The ruling elites also mix predatory logic with redistributive logic in *chaiqian* practice by regulating the minimum floor size of discounted resettlement housing[15] and ensuring it is materialistically better in size and quality than the displacees' previous housing. Through several rounds of trial and error, the city-builders in Shanghai developed a model of compensation that allowed both floor-size based valuation and *hukou*-based valuation to solicit cooperation from the displaced families by allowing them to choose a higher one as the base for monetary compensation. Additional compensation was offered at the discretion of *chaiqian* companies in the form of preferential policies of education and health care for displaced families, additional compensation for families in extreme material poverty, and bonus for cooperating with the *chaiqian* deadlines. Third, the effectiveness of this compensatory measure rests on the selective use of *hukou* institution. Exclusion and inclusion to neoliberal rule are both at work. It does so by excluding non-local *hukou* holders with no legally recognised foothold in Shanghai (migrants from other provinces) and throwing them back to the alienating housing regime on the one hand whilst on the other hand accelerating the *hukou* acquisition for some residents and granting them access to *hukou* associated citizenship benefits, which partially relieved their pain from land-centred accumulation. Those residents cared for by the left hand of the state are usually victims of social engineering programmes under Mao's dictatorship (the urban youth sent to the frontiers or the countryside, the late comers to welfare housing programme, etc.), or of the *hukou* institution (e.g. non-local *hukou* holders married to local *hukou* holders, collective *hukou* holders, agricultural *hukou* holders). The mixture of carrots and sticks in

[15] This is a response to increasing political contention amongst the displacees in the early 1990s.

compensation are to minimise the social, political and economic costs of *chaiqian* and accumulation.

The land acquisition for hosting the Expo relied heavily on the penal apparatus of the state for maintaining the gray zone with blurred legal and moral boundaries. First and foremost, due to the exceptionality of the Expo, the political opportunities for protesting actions created by intra- and inter-states are significantly diminished. Second, it benefits from the legal construction of property rights regime, which overly protects the rights of the state. In practice of *chaiqian*, it counts on the tacit condonation of the justice departments for legitimating the exploitation of the legal ambiguities and for injuring the displacees physically and psychologically (Sargeson, 2013). It also relies on their cooperation to deny the rights of the displaced to seek legal justice by clandestine tactics of delays and selective interpretation of law or by upfront discrediting the legal merits and rejecting the case altogether. It is also in need of the police to suppress popular activism from arising and maintain social order and harmony for the accumulation of capital. House arrests, detention facilities and black jails awaited the displacees who sought to defend their own legal rights (Qin, 2013). It could not be successful without the support from a massive *weiwen* army in surveilling the society, atomising the disgruntled displacees and permanently destroying their capacity to fight. The uprising of the penal apparatus is crucial in legitimating and securing accumulation in a neoliberalising China (see chapters 5, 6 and 8).

Furthermore, the Expo-induced *chaiqian* exemplifies the triumph of market values and the power of the legitimating discourses of developmentalism and nationalism. They are the cement of China's 'miraculous' urban revolution in past decades. The privatisation and commoditisation of housing promotes the ideology of private homeownership. This is underpinned by the rhetoric of greater personal responsibility, individual freedom, upward mobility and assets' liquidity. The market force, following the logic of economic capital, takes over the real estate development and housing provision for most Chinese families. This is a total betrayal of the socialist contract that guarantees minimum housing benefits. It manufactures huge numbers of consumer subjects who are now disciplined by the juggle law of the housing market. This housing market is a product of collusion between local states and real estate developers through *guanxi* (interpersonal relationship) networks and corruption. The conspiracy is sugarcoated by the development discourses calling for individual sacrifices for public and national interests. Those discourses are particularly important for the Expo-induced *chaiqian*, which is portrayed as a

showcase for China's rise in the new century, of national significance. Consequentially, the burden has been shifted to consumer subjects. The offer of resettlement housing at discounted rate in remote suburbia allows for fast-track opportunity for victims of long-term disinvestment to become a member of the propertied class, to exercise their control from private ownership, and to capitalise on the liquidity of their resettlement housing, but constrains their access to inner city space. By manufacturing these new homeowners, the regime encourages greater dependence on the private property relations, fosters political conservatism and locks them into the market value system that prioritises the exchange value of housing (Harvey, 1989c, Ronald, 2008). It is those combined forces, values and logic that enable *chaiqian* of largest scale in Shanghai's history and contributes to the formation of the Chinese Leviathan.

Conclusion

This chapter first discusses the shift of research focus to domination and its reproduction in the production of event space, which parts with existing scholarship that is preoccupied with property rights violations and just compensation. Through this cursory statement of my discontent with existing literature, this chapter also puts forward my epistemological and methodological approach to studying the phenomenon of *chaiqian* or displacement. It calls for a holistic study of place annihilation, taking the economic, social, political and affective aspects as a whole to understand the meaning and the significance of *chaiqian* to those on the receiving end. This can only be done when we carefully unlock the process of displacement. This signifies another break with current research paradigm on displacement, treating it as two disparate moments (pre/post-displacement). In taking this approach, this chapter suggests the necessity to focus on the involvement of various agents and the exercise of power in labouring on the pain for the displaced. Bourdieu's political sociology, especially his work on field, symbolic power, symbolic violence and a thin view of social agents are introduced and compared with other scholarship on the mechanisms of power in (re)producing a repressive social order. These notions are used as conceptual tools in controlling and structuring the analysis in this thesis. A first attempt in using Bourdieu's conceptual tools is made in this chapter to develop the notion of domicide further by reconciling the objective truth of exploitative capitalist land development and warning against examination of subjective experience of victimhood without an assessment of the objective truth. For this reason, this thesis completely rejects the rhetoric of 'happy' movers. Later chapters on the process of production of domicide and reproduction of asymmetrical power

relations will also reaffirm this theoretical development. A second attempt is made to paint the process of state reengineering in the neoliberal time with the case of the Expo-induced domicide, which serves as an overall context as well as a synthesis of later chapters.

Chapter 3 : Researching Domicide in a Culture of Fear and Distrust

> 'When I settle into a place, listening and watching, I don't try to fool myself that the stories of individuals are themselves arguments. I just believe that better arguments, maybe even better policies, get formulated when we know more about ordinary lives'.
>
> Katherine Boo, *Behind the Beautiful Forevers*
>
> 'It is the writer's duty to hate injustice, to defy the powerful, and to speak for the voiceless'.
>
> Edward Abbey in *Resist Much, Obey Little: Some Notes on Edward Abbey*

Introduction

This chapter details the methods I have chosen to collect, analyse and represent the mechanism and impacts of domicide. The design and the choice of those methods are informed by existing theories, driven by the analytical puzzles, shaped by my hybrid positionalities and complex emotional experiences, and influenced by the power relations in practising and producing this research project in the 'field'. I agree with Katz (1994) that 'field' as a site of research inquiry is an artificial scholastic construction, arbitrarily drawing geographical and temporal boundaries based on our research agendas. Subsequently, other artificial boundaries, between fieldwork and other stages of research practices, between our everyday life and professional pursuits, between our personal political life and our intellectual activism, are all blurred (also see Behar, 1996, Routledge, 1996). These crumbling boundaries call for greater reflexivity on the mechanics of our constant negotiation of political responsibilities, ethical conundrums and power relations in affecting the production and dissemination of knowledge. With this agenda in mind, this chapter sets out to reflect upon my journey in researching and writing on Expo-induced domicide. By doing this, I wish to sensitise and make transparent the power and value laden practice of knowledge production.

For this thesis, I adopted a multiple methods approach. Silverman (2010: 9) advises academic novices to 'take this path only if you seriously want to complicate your life'. The first section of this chapter shall justify my choice in complicating my life. Bourdieu's conceptual tools as I introduced in the previous chapter already supplied many powerful justifications for integrating methodological techniques. Here I wish to draw on the literature on situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988, Bourdieu, 1992a, Moss, 1995, Merrifield, 1995, Rose, 1997, Cloke et al., 2000, Sidaway, 2000) and on identified methodological issues in researching displacement and domicide to defend my choice further. The second part of this chapter will discuss my multiple roles and positionalities that are structured and structure my research practice as a student of contentious politics in China. Particularly, I shall review the compromises and improvisation I had to make in negotiating access, building trust, avoiding political censorship, and representing vulnerable others in this project. Those decisions might not square well with methodological cookbooks or published codes of ethical research practises. I do not think my situated decisions successfully resolved the ethical tension or complied with standard practices, yet I think an honest discussion of the ethics and politics of such decisions are imperative to unpack the messy black box of knowledge production. The issue of language and translation is singled out given the cross-cultural nature of this project. Silence on this matter in published academic products I believe implies submission to the hegemony of English (Smith, 1996a, Temple, 1997, Aalbers, 2004, Muller, 2007, Hassink, 2007) and is an expression of academic colonialism. There, I wish to discuss my stance on translation for this project. Building upon such contextualisation, the remainder of this chapter will outline the technicalities of methods I used to acquire and analyse the data.

Methodological Approach

It now seems popular to integrate a variety of methods in a research project. Yet, the underlying rationales for doing this are rarely explored explicitly. An open discussion of the motivations in mixing different methods is important to defend the rigor of mixed methods research. This is first because each method and approach implies a particular way of seeing and understanding the world (Graham, 2005). Such cognitive structures are not always in harmony. Differences, inconsistencies and even conflicts in epistemology or ontology underpinning various methods are frequently cited by paradigm purists and 'methodological watchdogs' (Bourdieu, 1992a: 227) to attack the validity of research project meshing methods and thereby mark off and defend their own intellectual territory. A case in point here is the

persisting divide between quantitative and qualitative methods, and the slow eviction of the former by the latter in research training and practice in human geography studies (Philip, 1998, Hamnett, 2003). Secondly, methods are sometimes chosen and mixed in an expedient and anarchist way to collect the data without careful deliberation of the appropriateness, necessities and purpose (Denscombe, 2008, Bryman, 2008). The approach that 'anything goes' seems to free us from being 'the prisoner of a particular method or technique' (Robson, 1993: 291). However, I agree with Feilzer (2010) that this is a misinterpretation and abuse of pragmatism, the philosophical partner of mixed methods, aiming to rationalise poor research design.

The use of mixed methods in this project rests upon my theoretical, political and ethical commitments. To start, I respect the well-established argument that all knowledge is socially constructed. Our research practices are situated in a social space structured by webs of uneven power relations. This is best summarised by Katz (1994: 69): 'the fields of power that connect the field researcher and participants, the participants to one another, scholars in the field, and research participants and audiences as historical subjects who confront various but specifiable conditions of oppression, deserve critical scrutiny in the conduct of field research'. The complicated power relations condition the production of knowledge at different sites and in various research encounters. The upshot is that all knowledge is situated, partial and limited, contingent on a range of social relations, forces and processes of research practices (Haraway, 1988). However, situated knowledge, as coined by Haraway (1988: 584), is not an open invitation to relativism that is 'a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally'. Rather, it is to accept 'partial, locatable, critical knowledges' that 'seek perspective from those points of view, which can never be known in advance' and that 'promise something quite extraordinary, that is, knowledge potent for constructing worlds less organized by axes of domination' (Haraway, 1988: 584, 585). Haraway's agenda here is to politicise intellectual inquiries further and to propose an alternative view of knowledge and objectivity that are mediated by the positionalities of the researchers and divergent ways of knowing. Both authors point out the complexity of social realities and the partiality of knowledge. It then raises a valid concern over the capacity of any method to capture a complicated and multifaceted object of research completely.

Qualitative methods (such as in-depth interviews, focus groups, observations and ethnographies) indeed have their strengths in attending the subtle interplay of power relations, democratising the research process, providing richer accounts of the lived

experiences of research participants, and exploring the construction of meanings in a fluid and emergent context (Creswell, 2007). Some practitioners of qualitative research certainly learn from other forms of knowledges to contextualise the bigger picture (Rose, 1997: 318). But, such consultation is usually symbolic and superficial with an agenda to supply a panoramic view of the research field (Nightingale, 2003: 79). It seems to bear the stamps of paradigm war between positivism and constructivism in the scientific community and endorse implicitly the incompatibility of different paradigms in a single research project (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). As a result, it upholds the dualist thinking and forces researchers to choose sides (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007) whilst ignoring the fact that such divisions are historically and socially constructed by academic pedagogical labour in the first place (Greene and Caracelli, 2003) and 'perpetuat[ing] an incomplete and disempowering caricature of a historically contingent alignment of philosophy, methodology, politics and practice' (Wyly, 2011: 891). Such dogmatism brings two more dangers that may paralyse our sociological imagination. First, as Mason (2006: 13) points out, it can lead to conservatism in framing research questions and 'repeatedly miss whole dimensions of social experience' because of restrained research horizon and the shortage of methodological tools. The forced choice may perpetuate an impoverished understanding of the social reality. Second, Schutz (1976: 88) teaches us that 'methodology is not the preceptor or the tutor of the scientist. It is always his *[sic]* pupil, and there is no great master in his *[sic]* scientific field who could not teach the methodologists how to proceed'. In a similar vein, Bourdieu (1992a: 227) encourages students of social sciences to 'mobilise all the techniques that are relevant and practically usable, given the definition of the object and the practical conditions of data collection'. Underlying their arguments is a practical treatment of methods as analytical tools to assist us in resolving research problems at hand in a most appropriate way rather than restraining our options. Yet, the *fit* between research object and the techniques sought must be taken seriously to provide a more robust analysis. Staeheli and Lawson (1994: 97) in commenting on feminist fieldwork techniques raise their concern over the dominance of qualitative methods and reminds the readers that methodological choice should be more reflexive and flexible because some questions are better answered by quantitative methods. The key message to take from here, as Wacquant (1992: 30) points out, is to be vigilant to the construction of research objects and the instruments used for such construction.

The pitfalls in adhering to methodological fetishism can be addressed by using different methods reflexively to produce a narrative that is capable of revealing a bigger picture and attending the contexts and the power relations in the politics of

knowledge at the same time. Herein rest the primary strengths of mixed methods—triangulation and complementarity (Jick, 1979, Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003a, 2003b, Bryman, 2006, Pearce, 2012b). Triangulation refers to the intentional utilisation of various methods, analysis and designs associated with diverse philosophical traditions to study the same phenomenon in order to neutralise the bias inherent in methods, data and the investigators and to improve the validity of research findings (Greene et al., 1989, Creswell, 2003). It is particularly helpful and promising by letting different forms of data speak with each other. In doing so, it not only offers us an opportunity to understand social realities from different vantage points of view and to gain a fuller picture of a complex social phenomenon; but also invites a critical examination of scientific practices and the mechanics of power in constructing and legitimating particular points of view. Whereas consistent findings generated by different methods are certainly welcomed as strong support for research conclusions yet inconsistencies, contradictions and silences are equally if not more valuable to illuminate the creative tensions between different ways of knowing, and to engage and problematise the partiality and situatedness of knowledge (Nightingale, 2003, Greene, 2008). Of course, this requires our awareness of such differences, and openly as well as purposely to maintain a dialogue with those differences in our analysis and writing (Ley, 1996: 26). By using most suitable techniques to answer a given research question and contribute to the overall development of social inquiry, mixed methods design also allows the researchers to benefit from the relative strengths of different methods, and to enhance and thicken our knowledge of multifaceted social phenomenon.

Chaiqian is one of those complex analytical problems. *Chaiqian* or domicide as a process of place annihilation decides the centrality of the notion of place in my study. The indispensable place for all human beings are their homes and bodies (Porteous, 1976, 1989). Geographers with different interests and training approach the meaning of place in divergent ways. Such minute division of academic labour leads to premature fragmented conceptualisation of place in geographical literature (Agnew and Duncan, 1989). Three fragmented elements of place are identified by Agnew and Duncan (1989: 2), including location, locale and sense of place. The first sees the place as a container with concrete geographical coordinates on the surface of the planet. This typically falls under the preview of geographers whose interests lie in the spatial distributions of resources and activities. The latter two are invested by humanistic geographers who are more concerned with the material settings, affective relations with place, and the construction of place identity. They lament that these inseparable aspects of place are rarely treated as a whole or worse, they are

frequently seen in competition in defining and controlling place. Relph's (1976) phenomenological study of place reveals one source of such conflicts. Insiders and outsiders may experience a place in strikingly different ways over time, and the mass culture and consumption in modern times has led to the rapid erosion of authentic sense of place, or existential outsideness in his term. Wacquant (2007) also notices spatial alienation of this kind in stigmatised neighbourhoods yet he traces the roots to the complex politics in the rationalisation of spatial configuration under capitalism. Place as a meaningful, humanised and stable location is frequently evoked by critical scholarship to counter the destructive effects of capitalistic spatial fixes (Slater, 2013). The call for emplacement is to reverse the shift from politics of space to politics of place.

This requires us to understand a place in its full dimensions—affective, material and symbolic—and explore the interplays of diverse forces and agents in shaping places in contemporary cities. Such a task first requires us to wrestle with the logics, forces and orders on the macro-level and their interplays with local conditions in (re)structuring space. This requires inputs on structural changes, elitists' perspectives and other 'hard' data (e.g. land use maps, census data). It also tasks us to take our institutional responsibility to facilitate and patiently listen to insiders' stories about their involvement with particular places and their experiences in losing those places. This may include the intimate stories of their families or their own in everyday situations, their understanding of the meanings of home and community, their witness of the evolution of their places over time, their sense of positions in society, and their political experience in wrestling with the powerful. Such accounts are of vital importance for two reasons. First, it fulfils the sociological imagination in Mills' (1959b: 6) vision: 'No social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey'. Only through sensitive and empathetic understanding of people's past can we start to appreciate their responses and experiences of displacement. Second, as Peter Marris (1974: x) points out, the intensity, development and resolution of loss and grief from place annihilation depends on four conditions: the attachment structure developed since early childhood, the understanding of the meaning of what has been lost, the capacity in controlling the destructive events and the post-event recovering process. Inquiry into those issues requires a more integrated research methodology, incorporating techniques such as oral history interviews, life history interviews, focus groups, observations, and collecting scattered official statistics and historical accounts. Mixed methods seem the most suitable approach to weave the fragmented pieces of place together under

this single study of place annihilation. Perhaps, it is the best way to avoid misrepresenting painful experiences of losing homes because the human species until this day lacked the vocabulary and tools to talk about emotional and physical distress, pain and suffering as a result of their inexpressibility (Scarry, 1985: 3-19).

In fact, classic studies on displacement all critically integrate different methods to understand its process and impacts (Fried, 1966, Western, 1981, Hart, 1988, Porteous, 1989). Marc Fried (1966) in his classic text relies on the strength of mixed methods in theoretical development and enhanced interpretation. He adopts a sequential design (survey followed by interviews) to assess the influence of pre-displacement attachment upon the grieving process and experiences. John Western (1981) goes further and masterfully shows us how methodological repertoire—including surveys, official statistics, historic accounts, literary products, marketing materials, photography and personal interviews—can be combined effectively to explore the manipulation of space in producing a divided society in South Africa. Those methods were used in complementation in his study to document in a most thorough way the painful lived experiences during and after displacement. Similarly, Douglas Porteous (1989) mixes both quantitative (mapping, statistics) and qualitative techniques (government reports, planning documents, interviews, participant observations) in developing a geoautobiography (mixing life histories, family histories and place histories) of a village where he lived during his formative years from his *inpert* position (articulated insiders with outsider skills) and juxtaposes the analysis of different sources of data in reporting on the cause and the impacts of the destruction of a meaningful place by powerful development companies. His personal involvement and intellectual responsibility also motivated him to decentre the site of critical engagement and write critically in plain language along with the bulldozing process. Those studies offer us superb and compelling examples of what bell hooks (1994: 54) calls ‘ethics of struggle’, seeing ourselves not as professional intellectuals but as people with knowledge in a privileged position who work with people with such knowledge to fight against domination and suppression in solidarity. Using different methods and analysis allows researchers to disseminate the knowledge in a more accessible and compelling way.

The last reason I opt for mixed methods in this study derives from my ambition and interest in producing some products that can be of practical use in the battle against displacement and eviction. A research tourist whose agenda is to collect juicy stories (Cloke et al., 2000) is the last kind of researcher I want to be. This draws me closer to pragmatism, which underpins most mixed methods research. Researchers pursuing

pragmatic philosophy have stepped out of paradigm wars (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005, Feilzer, 2010) and take seriously the value and utility of research as the guiding principle for research designs and methodological choices (Rorty, 1999: xvi-xxxii). Practitioners are called to reflect upon own interests, values and commitments, and answer the questions, who are we conducting our research for and who do we speak for, before setting out to design and perform academic research that tackles concrete social problems. The objective is to locate the democratic energies under practical constraints and uncertainties, and to push forward democratic actions (Bridge, 2013).

For a person who constantly loses homeplaces, these questions are quite straightforward for me. From the outset, I have no faith in the rhetoric of public interests or common good at all. I believe that no one has the right to destroy others' homes against their will and no one has the right to manipulate others' lives. The universal golden rule of ethics should guide all social interactions: do unto others as you would have them do unto you. I wish to debunk the myths legitimatised through different forms of knowledge saying that *chaiqian* is a good thing, *chaiqian* is an inevitable price to pay for development, or more viciously, *chaiqian* is in the interest of the poor for them to acquire upward mobility. I hope that my learning and engagement with the politics and moralities of *chaiqian* can be used to relay the voices of or speak for the victims and contribute to their struggles, however contentiously it might be (contra Spivak, 1988, Staeheli and Lawson, 1994), to interrogate and shame the powerful elites collectively and personally, and to neutralise the celebratory nonsense surrounding *chaiqian* in Shanghai and elsewhere. I want to produce a counter narrative of the Expo-induced displacement that serves as a mnemonic resistance and an intervention. With these agendas in mind, I draw the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods to answer different sets of questions and juxtapose my analysis generated from various sources to expose the interplay of power, knowledge, rationality and morality in inflicting pain on others and labouring on social injustice. Qualitative methods are used to democratise the research process. They allow me to collaborate closely with those silenced and marginalised displacees, hear the stories of their private intimate lives and their experiences of *chaiqian*, and explore their meaning-making process. By publicising those private and emotional accounts in this thesis, I wish to provoke discussions on the limits of power, and critical thinking on the possibilities and alternatives to prevent and end domicide and on democratic politics in general (Bridge, 2009). Quantitative data, especially a purposely-designed survey, was acquired to discredit the discourses legitimating *chaiqian* and the officially endorsed social studies that

use statistics as evidence. If numbers, counting and significance are the weapons the elites used against the displacees, it is my intention to use the same weapon to fight back. In coalition, those methods enable me to attend the uncertainties and emergencies in the field, and to learn from other knowledges without surrendering all my authority in writing up the text.

Working with Fear and Building Trust

The rejection of universal objectivity and value-neutrality in social sciences encourages greater awareness and recognition of the personal of the researchers in the research journey. A necessary step in any social research is to objectify the relationships between the researchers and the researched throughout the research process. This involves a critical examination of the roles played by the biography, the trajectory, and the positions of the researchers in the social space, in the 'field' and in the academic field, an exercise that Bourdieu (1992a) calls participant objectification. The purpose here as England (1994: 82) points out is not to induce 'a confession to salacious indiscretions' nor perform 'a narcissistic and egoistic' dissection, but 'a self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as the researcher'. One strategy to do so is to identify the 'key political aspects of the self' (Cloke et al., 2000: 137). Pre-existing categories in identity (such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, education, class, religion) here offer us convenient frames and many researchers have provided convincing examples on the mechanics as to how the position of the researchers on those categories mediate the insider/outsider relations, shape power dynamics in research encounters, and influence the choice of research methods and interpretation of research events (Moss, 1995, England, 1994, Hopkins, 2007, Zhang, 2010). Yet, this identity-based 'transparent reflexivity' (Rose, 1997: 311) remains inadequate to capture other facets of the self of the researchers (e.g. emotional involvement, personal experience, presentation of self, social skills, personality, embodied knowledge, etc.) (Behar, 1996, Cloke et al., 2000, Moser, 2008, Nagar and Geiger, 2007) and diverse forces and power (e.g. collective memory, structural and institutional constraints, etc.) that influence research relations and the overall research process. The reflective exercise I take here is to show how the interplay of fear and distrust problematise my hybrid identities, force me to improvise research methods, and inhibit or facilitate my access and understanding of the lived experience of *chaiqian*.

But before I start this exercise, let me first emphasise again the profound impacts of how my personal experience of *chaiqian* affected my subjective positions. A few

months before I commenced my PhD research in Edinburgh, the village and the home I lived in for most of my life were demolished for a new town project. My parents, like our neighbours, built our detached house with their life-long savings and loans from relatives under the circumstances of persistent institutional exclusion from universal citizenship rights due to our agricultural *hukou* status. I did not take an active part in this process as I was overly stretched to finish my second-degree dissertation. The amount of stress and the feeling of passivity and powerlessness pushed my emotional and ethical limits. On the day when the demolition team came, I stood afar with a neighbour whom I grew up with watching our familiar place fall to pieces. We were unable to convey the sadness we felt in words. My parents could not bear the thoughts of seeing our home destroyed and stayed in the rented apartment that day. For days after the demolition, my mum's eyes were suffused with tears whenever my sister and I shared our sentiments about childhood memories in *laofangzi* (old home). From the beginning of this project, I was puzzled at the human costs in exchange for so-called 'public interest' development. This however was only a start of my serial displacement experience over the past four years. Displacement haunts me everywhere and in every moment. Much time in my first year in Edinburgh was wasted in securing the lease to an apartment rented from a dishonest landlady who concealed critical information that the apartment had already been repossessed by the bank. The sheriffs were frequent visitors to my apartment. They knocked on my door three times to deliver eviction notices before I finally caved in. At the time when I was close to submitting my thesis, the School of GeoSciences evicted me, together with other students, from the office where I invested my entire PhD life for some cosmetic improvements on the room. Feelings of confusion, uncertainty, helplessness, submission and injustice from displacement were lived again and again whilst I was working on displacement. I take my personal experience of repeatedly losing my places as an asset. In numerous conversations with the displacees, it was easier for me to connect with them and empathise with their pain and suffering. When asked, I was not shy to share my own feelings as a displacee. In a way, this kind of mutual disclosure and discussion of the most personal part of our lives creates a communal language in a shared space to grieve and resolve our frustration together. It also reduces the psychological distances between us. On many occasions during the transcribing, analysing and writing, I felt that the stories I was listening and authoring were as much about others as they were about me. The imagined boundary between the researched, between me and others, and me as the researcher were constantly destabilised and blurred in this project. For this reason, I am aware that my understanding and interpretation are inevitably influenced by those

dreadful moments of *chaiqian* as I remembered and personally went through. My judgement and writing are coloured by my subjective position as a victim of *chaiqian* and my own feelings toward development, progress and change. However, I take any charges against this bias not as criticism or challenge but as recognition and praise for my effort in honestly and effectively reporting my own emotions as I heard and felt about the wounded lives as a vulnerable researcher, and perhaps more accurately, as a normal human being with emotions.

This kind of close contact and trust with the displacees were developed gradually through what Benjamin Read (2010) calls site-intensive methods, a thin version of ethnographic immersion that entails close and intensive engagement with a site (or several sites) and a group of participants for a relative short period as compared to standard ethnographical studies derived from deep immersion in a culture for years. From 19th February to 31st July 2012, I lived in a resettlement community in Sanlin and continually visited Pujiang Expo Homeland[1]. Negotiating access and building trust was difficult at first partly because the highrise buildings in the resettlement sites do not encourage socialisation (see chapter 8) but more importantly due to what I call 'structure of fear'. Mayfair Yang (1994: 14-25), an overseas Chinese anthropologist based in the United States, recounted many incidents on the fear of oppression from the Chinese state in shaping the research dynamics during her fieldwork on the practice of *guanxi* in China in the early 1980s. It is worth quoting the ramifications of her accidental entry to a military residential compound on her visit to see her friend as an example of the power of fear in shaping her conducts and raising ethical dilemmas. The father-in-law of her friend, for fear of political prosecution, made a full report of her visit whilst Yang spent several weeks in anxiety and fear, and eventually she decided to burn all her research materials that she considered as 'incriminating evidence'. With the protection of a U.S. passport, Yang however internalised the political culture of China at that time. Yang (1994: 22) aptly puts, 'fear was infectious'. She certainly made a good point. Her reported fear from an ethnographic episode almost twenty years ago crept into my mind and grew exponentially in me because I was about to do fieldwork on an even more contentious topic in my own country without any political protection. Having read so many articles on brutal state violence against the displacees and grassroots activists, I knew far too well the consequences of overly transgressing the political boundary.

[1] For financial reasons, I was based in Sanlin during the entire fieldwork. I only spent a few nights in Pujiang to observe the differences between daytime and nighttime, between weekdays and weekends, and between holidays and normal days, in terms of the use of space and the organisation of the social life of the displaced.

The paradox is, as Linda Green (1999: 67) reporting from Guatemala perceptively points out, 'one cannot be sure where the [political] line is, nor when one has crossed, until it is too late'. The ambiguity perhaps is more acute in China. Like regulations on *chaiqian*, the regulatory framework on conducting social sciences in China are notoriously obscure and confusing, and in many cases, it is politics instead of clearly written laws or regulations that rule society (Nojonen, 2004). This puts great challenges on social scientists to gauge political opportunity structure and manoeuvre cautiously in the field in order to avoid legal punishment. As such, my fear of state oppression locked me into Bentham's Panopticon, putting me on a constant alert for *weiwen* force. It also censored my choices of methods, the way I introduced my project, framed the questions, and the relationships I developed with many displacees.

Benefiting from my Chinese passport and my adequate skills in speaking local dialect, I was able to blend in with the social milieu and to mingle with people without raising too much unwanted attention or suspicions. Unlike western scholars, I did not have to seek administrative approval to carry out a social science study or to report my whereabouts to the local police station during my stay in Shanghai. In a sense, I had greater advantage to stay off the political radar as long as I remained cautious and refrained from getting overly involved in any contentious actions. To avoid unwanted surveillance, I decided to postpone the arrangements for interviews with state agents to later stages of my fieldwork in order not to tip off any insiders of the political establishment about my work in Shanghai. I also chose not to seek any assistance from local resident committees, a vital organ of the *weiwen* apparatus, for recruitment of research participants. I decided only to seek verbal consent in formal research encounters as I was worried that those written consent forms designed to avoid legal dramas are exactly the kind of 'incriminating' evidence for both the participants and me. In preparing for formal research contacts, topics that I believe were contentious, such as justice and views about the state, were reserved until I felt the right moment. To detect such moments, as Goffman (1989) commented on fieldwork, it involves work such as reading the hints and sensing the political openings as conveyed in words, tones and facial expressions. The demand put on my ability to read and judge subtle shifts foresaw that this was a trial and error process. I misread so many situations in the field and ruined many meetings with the displacees. On one occasion, I was scolded by a displacee and asked to leave his home immediately because I misread his kindness for inviting me in and his quite forwarding posture as his openness to discuss state violence.

This episode also reflects the biggest problem I had to deal with in building trust with the displacees. If fear of the Chinese state could grow in me because I am researching a contentious topic, there is no reason to expect that the displacees would not feel the same way, if not greater, for sharing with a stranger with foreign education background their contentious comments. For most displacees, they had learnt important lessons from their past interactions with the Chinese state, and the traumatic experience during the Expo-induced displacement was a most recent one. My education at a Scottish university increased the risk of confiding in me their political dissents and made it more difficult for me to develop trust with them. The consequence for the research dynamics is that political boundary was constantly negotiated by both the participants and me, rendering the process of research encounters unpredictable. In the middle of many conversations, many displacees asked me to stop recording the rest of our discussions or more dramatically, some displacees withdrew their verbal consent and requested that I cross out all the notes I had taken. Occasionally, when asked why reassurance of anonymity was not of any use, apart from their fear for political consequences, some displacees considered their actions as an attempt to save the *mianzi* (face) of the nation. As one displacee borrowed the Chinese idiom in reply, '*jiachou buke waiyang*'[2] (equivalent to 'do not wash the dirty linen in public' in English). It was quite perplexing for me to understand their effort to protect the reputation of the state considering the extent of injustice they endured as a result of abusive state power. However, I always respected such requests in the field out of my commitment to ethical research conducts. Yet, the ethical dilemma remains acute. Although I excluded those comments from my analysis and writing, I must confess that those events to some extent affected my understanding as to how the displacees perceive their relationship with the state and how profound the psychological trauma from state violence is.

The fear of state surveillance and violence is however only one obstacle to build mutual trust with the displacees. In later chapters, I shall provide a more detailed account about the acute sense of insecurity from the displacees. Part of that fear comes from their vulnerability to crime in the resettlement sites. As a young male, I was seen as a primary suspect in the eyes of many senior displacees for burglaries and scams. In the first couple of weeks, even people from the building where I lived refused to open their door when I tried to socialise and make contact. On one occasion in Pujiang, a female displacee in her 70s rejected me with an excuse before I fully introduced myself and came back to me a few minutes later with a friend of

[2] Interview, D29, 12/03/2012

hers and comfortably talked to me about her experience of *chaiqian*. When I asked her about the reason she came back, she told me that she was a little scared without the presence of another witness. The distrust of strangers from the displacees restricted my methodological choices. I had to seek opportunities to talk with people in public spaces, such as community gardens, hallways, parks, community centres, etc. This added greater flavour of opportunism and uncertainty to my fieldwork. Any typical methodology textbooks emphasise the import of space for research encounters, particularly when involving sensitive and private issues (King, 2010). Indeed, I concur with such views. I did find that the presence of others tended to moderate the displacees from sharing their family stories freely and kept their comments on many issues brief. It took me a while to find a solution to this situation. My agenda in such contact was limited to build trust. This was done in two ways. The first was more practical. I always brought some snacks with me (peanuts, melon seeds, energy bars, etc.) and shared with the participants while we spoke. Given the age difference between most displacees and me, I always addressed them respectfully such as *ayi* (aunts) and *yeye* (grandpa). This complies with the cultural norm yet I believe it also shortened the distance between the displacees and me in those encounters and developed *ganqing* (emotional connectedness) with them. The second was more strategic. On such meetings, I always started with the latest news or my 'interesting' observations about the community to warm up the conversation. Rarely did I ask any questions about their personal experience of *chaiqian*. I either waited for others to leave or arranged a formal follow-up interview at a discrete space for another day. Regardless of those procedures, the public nature of most encounters undermined my effort. A one-to-one interview started under informed verbal consent easily attracted the attention from passers-by and grew into group interviews, sometimes up to more than ten people. Initially I was quite frustrated by those interruptions for ruining my plan out of my concern that the displacees would retreat from sharing their personal thoughts and emotions. They presented me with ethical challenges as I did not fully inform them about my project and those 'voluntary' participants might not be aware that the conversation was recorded, because I did not wish to make frequent interruption to the flow of conversation. Sometimes, I was too occupied and forgot. Because those group interviews were unplanned, there was no social or moral contract to sustain the conversation. Those voluntary participants frequently came and left, making it difficult for me to seek their consent later. Only slowly, I began to see some positives out of those disruptions. Those occasions became the greatest opportunities to formally introduce myself to the community and inform them about my project. This allowed me to

build wider connections with the displacees through frequent contacts and saved me considerable time in arranging meetings. On some occasions, an exchange of greetings on the road was developed into a half-hour chat about their latest memories of their old place. On sunny afternoons, some displacees offered me a seat in their 'bike shack saloon' (see chapter 8). I slowly learnt the craft to use those group conversations more effectively. I focused instead on the history of their demolished neighbourhoods, which I could benefit from their collaboration in jotting the memories. I also used those occasions to verify some high-profile cases and collect 'insider' views. A further benefit is that I was able to meet some 'voluntary' participants and seek their verbal consent. For those who I was never able to meet again before I left, their comments were neither transcribed nor analysed but again I must admit the influence of their views on me.

Owing to those frequent contacts, the displacees seemed to be willing to be more open with me when they started to confide in me their family histories, and the *jiachou* (family dirty linen) as one might say, those familial conflicts and 'strife' during *chaiqian* (see chapter 7), and their bitter resentment against *chaiqian* agents. I started to question the irrationality of my fear back in Edinburgh. My knowledge learnt from the disgruntled displacees on the other hand also helped me to locate the political red lines and cope with my fear. I slowly got myself involved in some activist work after an epiphany moment when the woman I quoted at the beginning of this thesis knelt down behind me as an expression of her gratitude for spending a few of hours listening to her traumatic experience of losing her house and family. The anticipated political consequences did not follow immediately after my involvement in grassroots activism, which led me to believe that the political opportunity perhaps was greater than I thought. However, I did not realise that the Orwellian Big Brother, the National Security Office, has already gathered intelligence against me. On 4 June 2012, a police officer identified himself as an officer for national security called my research phone number and requested a 'chat over tea' about my research project at the local police station. I was extremely shocked. Regardless of my reluctance, their threat to drop by my place in Shanghai coerced me to agree to meet in a place of my choice on the following morning in order to buy some time to plan my exit strategy. I reacted in a more comic way than Yang as I quoted earlier. After urgent contacts with my supervisor and two local university professors, I encrypted and transferred all digital 'incriminating' evidence on my laptop to the network server back in Edinburgh with the help from a friend in the office, and downloaded many irrelevant government reports, pictures and videos to bury the trace. Photocopied documents were hidden at friends' homes. I also

prepared a mock interrogation with my flatmate in Shanghai and planned my answers to possible questions. The tea-chat later proved to be less brutal and dramatic as I had imagined, yet the officers did convey important political messages and delivered the desired outcome. I was instructed to write in the mainstream tone (*zhu xuanlv*) by which they meant a celebratory account with minimum critique of surface problems. But how to do this, as they refused to instruct me on the specifics, is a political skill that I must master by practice. Second, I became officially a contentious researcher on their political radar and they would follow up on my work constantly. They did not make any alarming threats yet it affected my later work profoundly. My later intervention on grassroots activism was rather tamed and strategic, avoiding triggering further alarms or implicating those displacees in the surveillance against me. Before I left Shanghai, I was 'invited' to report and update my work a couple of times. They later requested copies of my fieldwork notes and warned me about the legal ramifications for choosing the side of the displacees without the story from the state side. For the safety of the participants and myself, I provided them a few sample pages with all information that may reveal personal identity redacted. And hopefully, my reliance on the government reports and the literary products commissioned by the party-state in my critique as presented in this thesis could effectively defend my arguments and protect my safety.

Language and Translation

Before I start to discuss the technicalities of methods for this project, I wish to make a brief comment on the issue of language and translation in doing cross-cultural bilingual research. Temple (1997: 607) argues that, 'if language constructs as well describes a society, the figure of the interpreter/translator must come out from behind the shadows'. Similarly, Muller (2007: 208) maintains that 'uncritical translation naturalises the translated text in the target language as an objectivity which came into being in the course of a seemingly unpolitical act'. For critical bilingual research, Fiona Smith (1996a: 165) emphasises the importance of hybridity, which creates gaps between self and other, and between 'home' and 'foreign' language. Srivastava (2006) concurs with this view and sensitises us to the influence of constant travelling and translation between analytical language and fieldwork language, between official language and everyday language on research encounters. As the latter authors convincingly demonstrate, the issue of translation is no less acute for researchers who speak the local language than researchers who rely on the assistance of translators in mediating the construction of meanings. For this study, the analytical language is primarily English and the field language was either Chinese Mandarin or

Shanghai dialect. The process of data collection and analysis involved simultaneous translation of words, concepts and meanings and crossing of cultural borders. I take the position of an 'exile' and 'immigrant' (JanMohamed, 1992) in performing my role as a border-crossing researcher/translator. It gives me a new perspective in understanding China's political culture of *chaiqian* by maintaining physical and cultural distance from the 'West' without full immersion to either the local culture or the Western culture. To do this, I first kept reflexive eyes to theories developed in the western context. Also, I followed the suggestion by Srivastava (2006) that all raw data collected from the fieldwork were retained in Chinese Mandarin and was not translated until formal writing to minimise the linguistic impacts. I constructed the survey in Chinese (commented on by Dr Yiping Fang, based in Portland State University whose research interest lies in residential satisfaction surveys) and then translated the draft into English for comments from my supervisors rather than the other way around. In translating the secondary sources and the interview quotes, I sought meaning equivalence in most cases with help from native English speakers in Geography and Anthropology for particular words or sentences whose translatability I believe is in question. In the cases where I believe meanings are lost in translation, I retained the Chinese word or sentences and supplied a tentative English translation in similar meanings. In some cases, I elaborated on the subtle differences in meanings and values as conveyed by the Chinese language in footnotes. Those choices were made to avoid premature closure of meanings in translation (Smith, 1996a). Despite those efforts, I wish to emphasise the inherent problem in translation as Philip (1960: 291) points out almost half a century ago, that, 'almost any utterance in any language carries with it a set of presumptions, feelings and values', which no translation can accurately capture. My translation of those underpinning values, feelings and presumptions are quite contingent. The issue was most acute for my representation of the sufferings of the displaced as in chapter 5. Compared to English, Chinese spoken language lacks the vocabulary to describe emotional experiences let alone to nuance their intensity and subtleties. There, I relied on relaying the stories from the displacees in chunks and my observations of their emotional state to report their victimhood.

Sources of Data

In this section, I shall detail out the technicalities of the methods and sources of data I used in administering this research. Here, I put them under two broad categories: documentary method and site-intensive ethnography.

Documentary Source

Initially I had plans to interview government officials to get their standpoints on *chaiqian* problems and to acquire information on the demographic characteristics of the displaced. I also sought to arrange meetings with *chaiqian* companies regarding the technicalities of *chaiqian*. In making those requests, I chose to use *dongqian* (relocation) rather than *chaiqian* in order to conform to official representations. Although they are often used interchangeably, the former played down the violence as conveyed in *chaiqian*. I fully disclosed my interests in the institutional arrangement, the practices of *chaiqian* regulations and the impacts upon the displaced in such contacts. Unsurprisingly, most requests were denied including those requests made with the institutional support from Shanghai Normal University and the help of my acquaintances who have personal connections with government insiders. I once phoned the spokeswoman working at Pudong District Government and her response perhaps explains the underlying reason: '*dongqian* is a sensitive matter. Even we know or have some information; we cannot disclose it freely to the public'.[3] The cancellation of the Expo Bureau in April 2012[4] made it even more difficult to find a coordinating bureaucratic agency to negotiate access. Before I exited the field, I was only able to meet with a few planning officers through a mutual acquaintance. As a result, I had to rely more heavily on secondary official sources, such as government reports, officially endorsed propaganda materials, newspaper articles, statistical yearbooks and reports, local chorography and chronicles, and reportage literature. Those materials bear the imprint of the party ideology and elitist view of the society. Yet, they proved to be crucial sources of data to dissect the mystification of *chaiqian* and the exercise of symbolic power.

The most crucial source for this study was the reportage literature, e.g. *Pudong Shibo Da Dongqian* (The Grand Displacement in Pudong) (Shanghai Pudong New District Expo-Induced Chaiqian Command Centre et al., 2006) and *Fasheng zai Pudong Shibo Dadongqian de Baige Gushi* (One-Hundred Stories from the Expo-induced Displacement in Pudong) (Du, 2006). Such literary products were mostly authored by the journalists commissioned by the political establishment. The books I acquired were published by local authorities and written in celebratory tones. They provided

[3] Telephone Interview, 04/06/2012.

[4] The Expo Bureau was an *ad hoc* temporary organisation. The business of post-Expo land development was transferred to another Janus-faced corporation, the Expo Development Group. This is another example of manipulation of time and floating responsibility in the business of domicide. The displacees can no longer charge against the Expo Bureau and hold it responsible for their suffering. It is also unrealistic to expect the Expo Development Group to right the wrongs committed by another organisation.

important factual information on the organisation, the policy contexts and the bureaucratic infrastructure of the Expo-induced *chaiqian*, followed by many accounts collected from street-level *chaiqian* agents on their experiences in practising *chaiqian*. The problem with this source of data lies in that they are not a product of deliberate social study. Therefore, they do not provide any detailed account on research methods. Neither do they offer any references to check the validity of sources and accuracy of representation. To overcome the limitations in those products, I treated the 'factual' information in those texts more seriously than those representations on 'caring' *chaiqian* agents and 'happy' displacees. I read and analysed such accounts along with oral accounts from the displacees. I was fortunate to meet a few displacees who had direct experience with the state agents mentioned in the book. In these cases, I juxtaposed the displacees' experience with the representation in those texts to present a fuller picture of the mentality and conducts of street-level *chaiqian* agents (see chapter 6). In other cases, my analysis focused on the representations themselves and challenged the underlying moral and ethical tensions (see chapter 7). This entailed a close reading and deciphering of the hidden messages of words and sentences. I argue that if these 'public transcripts', published to promote and legitimatise the established order, can tell us all about the corrupted values of the ruling elites, the systematic problem of Expo-induced displacement is self-evident.

Like many researchers on Chinese media content, information overload was a primary challenge (Stockmann, 2010). For this thesis, I chose to narrow my lens to three local newspapers (i.e. Xinmin Nightnews, Wenhui News and Jiefang Daily). The first targets the mass consumers whilst the latter two are mouthpieces of the party-state usually subscribed by state apparatus and disseminated on community bulletin boards. But, considering the media censorship in China (Brady, 2008), perhaps it is more accurate to see all of them as the ideological claws of the state. The reason to choose those newspapers was based on their wide reach to both the ordinary citizens and the elites in Shanghai. In selecting articles, I only focused the news reports on residential displacement, particularly the representation of displaced families and the *chaiqian* process. Within my capacity, I collected and surveyed sixty-two articles from these three sources from the archives in Shanghai Municipal Library. Of however limited value, those articles familiarised me with the context of the Expo-induced *chaiqian*.

Moreover, I also accessed and reviewed several photo albums to get a more vivid impression of the Expo site before *chaiqian* and the *chaiqian* process. *Renmin Shibo*

(People's Expo) (People's Expo Editorial Committee, 2011) was explicitly commissioned by the local state and others are the products of local photographers (Wei, 2010, Lu, 2010, Chen, 2011). Those images offered me the raw material to show the exercise of symbolic power in stigmatising the Expo site, particularly the priority of aesthetic order over functioning order. Their photographs were also used in a few meetings with the displacees as prompts to elicit their memories of the lived place on the Expo site.

Local chronicles provide another important source of data on the political and economic historical construction of the Expo site. Here, I focused on the online chronicle on Housing Construction. It provides historical narratives of the housing conditions and housing development since Shanghai's opening to colonial settlement. The control of history writing is a primary tool for establishing ideological hegemony. For this reason, local chronicles are inherently limited by the political interests that they are designed to serve. To overcome this, I read them along with information from other sources especially from scholastic studies and oral accounts from the displaced.

Site-Intensive Ethnography

Primary data was acquired through site-intensive ethnographic methods, including participant and non-participant observation, semi-structured in-depth interviews and survey methods. The difference as I understand about participant and non-participant observation lies in my position in such situations, whether I was personally involved in the social activities of others whilst I was conducting the observation (Mason, 2002, Hume and Mulcock, 2004). I use observation because it allows me to be more sensitive and reflective to social relations and social processes. Most observations were conducted when I was a pure observer without deeper involvement in the activities of the observed. For instance, as chapter 8 will show, I relied on this method to observe the organisation of social activities and the use of public space in the resettlement sites. In those cases, I did not fully disclose myself as an observer as I had presented myself as a researcher on repeated visits to these neighbourhoods. I also used this method when I was under-cover in collective petitioning, observing the routine tactics of domination in victimising the displacees. On those occasions, the displacees were fully aware of my interest and consent to my under-cover observation. But the boundary between participant and non-participant was rather slippery. In some occasions, the raw anger inside me when I was doing non-participant observation pushed me to transgress the role as a pure observer and

actively involved in grassroots activism. My interactions with the displacees and the state agents turned my personal experiences as well as my observations into invaluable sources of information on the (re)production of domination.

The two major methods for this research are semi-structured formal and informal interviews and surveys. In terms of their *hukou* status, all displacees in this study are local Shanghaiese who were displaced either for the Expo or for the development of the resettlement housing in Sanlin and Pujiang. Migrants who used to rent properties on both sites unfortunately could not be recruited for this study. This may lead to two limitations. First, migrants in the land war are the most vulnerable due to their lack of legal titles to the land or properties (see Shin and Li, 2013). The official count of the scale of displacement is very unlikely to include those migrants. The suffering and the pain of the migrants from uprooting remain unnoticed. Second, the accounts from migrants would have enriched the empirical analysis on the construction of the destroyed place, the meaning of homes, the process of displacement, and the mechanics of power and resistance. However, this is not an oversight of this project. The fieldwork was conducted after the Expo-induced displacement. The opportunity to meet the migrants had been long gone. The difficulty to track them down was tremendous as there was no available census data. Contacts from displacees who used to be landlords or landladies were intentionally sought but did not work out. Some changed their phone numbers whilst many, I suspect, as a result of the insecurity of job and tenure in Shanghai were forced to move around and made it difficult for them to put down roots.

Following Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), I chose qualitative interviews to understand the views on *chaiqian* from the participants' standpoints in unfolding conversations. Cloke et al. (2004) points out three roles played by the interviewers in those encounters, namely actors, directors and choreographers, arguing for the merits of openness, reflexivity and flexibility in qualitative inquires. Knowledge therefore is coproduced by the linguistic exchange between the researcher and the researched in specific time-space. In total, I conducted 121 interviews with the displacees in both formal and informal settings such as street corners, food markets, streets, community gardens, community centres, hallways and their homes. The length of those interviews ranged from 20 minutes to 6 hours. For each interview, I prepared a guide with some generic topics and tentative questions as prompts (see appendix I to IV). This helped me to stay focused on my interests yet retains the flexibility and responsiveness to new themes and topics emerged in the conversation with the displacees (Weiss, 1994). The guides focus on pre-displacement life and place

history, the experience of *chaiqian*, and the post-displacement residential experiences. Specifically, my inquiry involves (1) the migration history; (2) the housing history (tenures, housing improvement, conditions, etc.); (3) the attachment structure; (4) experience of *chaiqian* (level of participation, understanding of *chaiqian* policies, views on justice and public interests, political tactics, etc.); (5) residential experience in the resettlement sites (social networks, housing conditions, place identity, resolution of grief, etc.).

Because of the aforementioned opportunistic and public nature of many research encounters, the inclusion of research participants was beyond my control as a researcher. My sampling strategy was frequently sabotaged by many 'voluntary' participants. This is also the reason that some interviews lasted much longer than my emotional and physical endurance. Many displacees learnt from their friends and neighbours and came to me to vent out their discontents and pain in the hope that I would do something or write something about it. I could have declined their requests on those situations yet I was worried that it might ruin the relationships with the displacees and I felt that what many displacees needed most was to find someone who patiently and empathetically would hear out their stories. Therefore, despite my declining cognitive effectiveness, I accepted those requests. Later stages of those overly long interviews often turned into the monologue of the displacees, narrating their life histories and personal experience of *chaiqian* with minimum prompts and engagement from me. Most interviews were recorded with verbal consent from the displacees. Due to the time constraints of my fieldwork, only some short ones were transcribed in the field and the majority were done after I returned to Edinburgh. I relied on my notes and research diaries primarily for generating new interview agendas and refining the questions.

I also conducted a survey on perceptions of the Expo-induced *chaiqian* and residential satisfaction (see appendix V). This was as much a methodological choice as a political decision. Methodologically, survey results are used to supplement or triangulate the findings from interviews, observations and official sources. Politically, given the doubts on interpretive paradigm from the political circle, survey results can delegitimise the myths of *chaiqian* in the favoured statistical language of the elites. McDougall and Munro (1994) proposes three approaches to develop a survey measurement: selecting from existing scales whose validity and reality has been well proved, developing a new survey scale by modifying existing scales and introducing new items, or developing a brand new scale whose validity and reliability requires testing. The survey used for this study was amended from existing measurements

(Fang, 2006, Li and Song, 2009) with the input from interviews, observations and other sources at an earlier stage. The initial survey was overly long, including eight sections on ten pages. Questions cover personal information, pre-/post-*chaiqian* household composition, experience of *chaiqian*, residential satisfaction, etc. After a pilot study with three displacees conveniently recruited (two male and one female, between 30 and 60 years old), a significant portion of the survey had to be cut out in order to avoid exhausting the patience of the respondents. The remainder of the survey focused more on the experience of displacement and living experiences at the resettlement sites. On average, it took 30 to 40 minutes to complete. The recruitment of survey participants were driven by practical concerns. In fact, the unavailability of the overall demographic characteristics of the displaced made it rather difficult to decide an appropriate, statistically representative sample size. Given the time and financial constraints, I ensured to collect 300 questionnaires from two resettlement sites (i.e. Sanlin Expo Homeland and Pujiang Expo Homeland) in Sanlin and Pujiang (see Figures 8.4 and 8.5 for maps) in less than 20 days[5]. This sample size is relatively larger than Fang's (2006) research on displaced households in Beijing but much smaller than Li and Song's (2009) similar study in Shanghai. As we can see from the table below, the sample may have over-represented the middle-aged and senior displacees. Three explanations are in order. First, the survey was administered during daytime when most young people were at work. The under-development of public transport made survey distribution in evenings and nights quite difficult. Second, the rejection rate was very high among younger generation. Many of them simply were not interested in social studies, seeing such study a useless act. Third, any social studies require considerable time and energy from the participants. The lack of interest from younger generations is understandable given the long commuting hours they had to put up with every day. Yet, I do not see this as a big limitation considering that the middle-aged and the senior displaces were most active in *chaiqian* negotiations in their families. Also, existing studies on displacement show that seniors are more vulnerable to domicide effects (Hartman, 1983).

[5] The police intimidated me at one tea talk session and they wanted to see me off at the airport. I had to cut short my research plan and make sure I had enough time to take photos of all survey questionnaires in case the questionnaires were confiscated at the airport. Thanks to the typhoon in Shanghai on the day of my leave, the flight was scheduled to depart several hours earlier. I somehow escaped the final meeting with the police.

Table 3.1: Demographic Characteristics of the Survey Respondents

Characteristics (N=300)		Frequency	Percentage	Census Data[1]
Location	Sanlin Expo Homeland	153	51%	NA
	Pujiang Expo Homeland	147	49%	
Gender	Male	132	44%	51.5%
	Female	168	56%	48.5%
Age	20-29 years old	4	1.3%	22.55%
	30-39 years old	6	2.0%	17.59%
	40-49 years old	10	3.3%	15.98
	50-59 years old	90	30.0%	15.32%
	60-69 years old	104	34.7%	7.84%
	70-79 years old	66	22.0%	4.68%
	80 years old and older	20	6.7%	2.28%
Household Head	Yes	184	61.3%	NA
	No	116	38.7%	
Highest Level of Education	Undergraduate	31	10.3%	22.8%
	Senior High School	77	25.7%	21.8%
	Junior High School	105	35%	38.1%
	Primary School	45	15%	17.3%
	Illiterate	42	14%	
Occupation	Government Agencies	7	2.3%	5.27%
	State owned enterprise employees	96	32%	NA
	Employed by enterprises of non-state nature	26	8.7%	NA
	Self-employed	22	7.3%	NA
	Retired	103	14.3%	NA
	Farmers	19	6.3%	NA
	Unemployed or Laid-off	14	4.7%	0.8%
	Others	13	4.3%	NA

Notes: [1] There is no published statistical data on the displaced population. Hence, the census data of the demographic characteristics of the whole city here can only be used as a reference.
Source: My own survey and the 6th National Census Report (2011).

To ensure the return of 300 questionnaires, four female college students were hired from local universities. The decision to choose females rather than males was a strategic use of the gender stereotype amongst the displacees and to save time in building trust with the displacees as I did while gaining access for interviews. Each surveyor received two-day training from me in assisting with the distribution and collection of surveys and each did several pilot studies under my observation to ensure that they fully understood the design and the requirement of each question in the survey. They were instructed to assist the willing respondents above 18 years old in filling the survey out on-site when requested or arrange for collection at a later

time.[6] In the first scenario, they were told to write down the comments followed up by a straightforward answer to a survey question as much as possible. They were also instructed to exclude all displacees that personally met me. Convenient sampling was adopted to recruit the survey respondents. Surveyors were instructed to make visits to displacees' homes[7], approach displacees coming out of their apartment buildings or recruit the displacees from public spaces inside the resettlement neighbourhoods. The rejection rate of recruiting participants from their homes was significantly higher than that of recruiting them from public spaces. Speaking from my own experiences in administering the survey, on average, one out of five recruiting attempts failed. Many people held strong distrust of social studies, especially survey studies. According to many displacees who I personally knew well, quite a few students of displacement conducted fieldwork in their neighbourhoods but they never heard back from them after they exited from the field. To democratise the research process and to fulfil the political commitment of this research, the last section of the survey asked the respondents if they want to receive the survey results after the completion of this study. A report based on chapter 8 was prepared in lay language in Chinese and mailed to those who expressed willingness to receive survey results in September 2014. In appreciation for the displacees' assistance, I also purchased some small gifts (e.g., soap bars, reusable bags) upon the return of the survey. Over meals and breaks, the surveyors and I also discussed the common problems in conducting the survey and the general patterns in the displaced views of *chaiqian* and their residential experiences. The collective effort of the surveyors and me made it possible to collect 300 surveys in one month. All survey data were coded and computerised with the SPSS 20.0 software by me after my return to Edinburgh.

Data analysis

In terms of the survey data, I chose to use simple descriptive analysis—frequency and percentage—throughout the thesis. This is a political decision based on three reasons. First, I wished to ensure the accessibility of research findings to people without any knowledge of statistics. If an argument can be substantiated by a simple numeric counting, I see no point in pursuing further advanced analysis (cross-category, or regression analysis), which from my point of view, was an act of defending the academic territory and obstructing the dissemination of knowledge. Second, by using simple descriptive analysis, I hoped that the data could speak for

[6] Only 28 questionnaires were filled out by the respondents themselves. Most were filled out with the assistance of the surveyors.
[7] Two surveyors turned out to be very successful at making such visits.

themselves and thereby, allow me to construct a qualitative narrative without delving into the technicalities in producing statistical representations and to weave it into my overall critique of the process and consequences of *chaiqian*. Third, I appreciated the value of statistical analysis that may yield results that some groups were more or less victimised than others, or that some factors influenced the displacees' perceptions of the impacts more than other factors did. However, I refused to pursue this direction of analysis. It departs from the objective of this research, which is to understand the prevalence and persistence of domicide. Moreover, it may further undermine the solidarity of the displacees, encourage mutual distanciation and prohibit collective actions for justice[8]. In chapter 7, I will show how comparison to other domicide victims undermined the potential of collective resistance.

Most but not all survey questions were analysed and reported in simple numeric counting in this final thesis. Practical constraint of word count certainly played a part. For instance, the issue of legal practices and trust of legal practitioners was critically important but I had to skip it for a discussion of the violence of law, which seemed more important (at least to me). This brings to light that research is an ongoing process and our perspectives may change and develop. Reflection over the course of analysis and writing also led me to rethink the design, relevance and validity of some questions. Some questions deemed relevant, sensible and important when this survey was designed either no longer fit the theoretical perspective and narrative or deemed as rather questionable in terms of the underlying logic. For instance, the benefit of hindsight makes me realise the problem in asking the displacees to quantify their emotional state (also F4a and F4b of the survey).

For interview data and my fieldwork notes, I mainly relied on the simple method of coding and categorising in order to find the general themes of the experiences of displacement and resettlement and to construct my argument (see an example in appendix VII). For instance, in chapter 5, I seek to understand the layered experiences of living inside the zone of *chaiqian*. I first read the transcripts on the process of *chaiqian* and coded the oral accounts from the displacees narrowly, such as panicking, alienation, crime, etc. The coding was content driven as well as theoretically driven, an interaction between my theoretical frame and the displacees' narratives. Later, those codes were categorised to identify the logic and the generic themes, such as temporal domination, geographies of fear, destabilising attachment structure, etc. In chapter 8, I also relied on this method to identify the general themes of displacees' experiences in the resettlement sites. In some cases, especially in terms

[8] My reluctance of conducting more advanced statistical analysis is further explained in chapter 8.

of policy documents, I also learnt from discourse analysis to understand the linguistic and discursive dimension in defining the 'truth' and (re)producing domination (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, Fairclough, 2010). Practically, I focused on the discursive strategies and the connections with broader contexts. For instance, in chapter 5, my analysis of the eviction notices benefited from this method to dissecting the argumentative strategies in facilitating the abusive exercise of state violence.

Conclusion

This chapter reflected upon the rationales in using a mixed methods approach for this project. Derived from my theoretical, ethical and political commitments, a wide range of quantitative and qualitative techniques were used in either complementation or triangulation to understand the multifaceted problem of *chaiqian* in contemporary Chinese cities. The design seeks to democratise the research practices, and gives voice to those silenced and marginalised in the *chaiqian* process, while at the same time debunks the myths surrounding *chaiqian*. I then moved to carve out the fieldwork dynamics in affecting the designs and choices of methods, and also my hybrid positionality and roles in doing the fieldwork. Particularly, I discussed the ethical and methodological problems due to the opportunistic and public nature of many encounters. I also singled out the politics of language and translation in doing this cross-cultural project. The remainder of this chapter outlined the technicalities of different methods used in collecting and analysing the data in the thesis.

Chapter 4 : 'This is My Wo'[1]: Making a Home in Shanghai's Lower Quarters

The poor rely on *chaiqian* to turn over their bodies (*fanshen*).

A local saying in Shanghai

Fanshen: 'To China's hundreds of millions of landless and land-poor peasants it meant to stand up, to throw off the landlord yoke, to gain land, stock, implements, and houses. But it meant much more than this…It meant to enter a new world'.

William Hinton, *Fanshen*

Introduction

When I was writing up the draft proposal for this project in 2009, the romance drama *Dwelling Like Snails* [2] aired on Shanghai Dragon TV channel and stirred up a nationwide controversy on housing, social values and morality.[3] Although the playwright deliberately invented a fictional place called Jiangzhou, the familiar scenes of *lilong* (alley) housing, the allegorical reference to major political scandals in Shanghai (i.e. the arson in evicting a family, the corruption of the former party secretary Chen Liangyu and his underlings) and the casual dialogue with geographical indications (i.e. the hosting of the Expo, proximity to Jiangsu Province) lent credence to the Chinese audience that the show was a satire of the violent and

[1] *Wo* (first tone) can be translated as home. There is a Chinese saying, *jinwo yinwo, buru ziji de caowo*, which can be literally translated as other people's mansions made of gold or silver are inferior to a hut of one's own. It is similar to the English saying 'there is no place like home' that encapsulates the emotional experiences of belonging, familiarity, comfort, rootedness and security. The Chinese saying, with an emphasis on the materiality of the dwelling space, additionally expresses strong sentiment of self-respect and dignity in precarious living conditions.

[2] The publisher translates the title as *Dwelling Narrowness*. But I favour the literal translation of *Dwelling like Snails* for the visual image the metaphor conjures up to capture the predicament of the majority of the Chinese people in this land-centred accumulation regime. The drama series can be found on YouTube. See Liang (2010) for a fuller discussion of this drama.

[3] Whilst the critics sharply attacked the show for 'complotting' representations of *xiaosan* (mistresses, mostly involved in sexual affairs with political elites. See Hung (2011) for a discussion of the political economy of *xiaosan*) and the objectification of female bodies, and frowned on the frequent vulgar language and a few sexual scenes. Yet, for the laypeople, the drama struck a responsive chord in their hearts for the perceptive, realistic, and critical representation of the violent and alienating realties of the emerging land-centred accumulation strategy in late socialist China.

alienating realties of the neoliberal order in contemporary Shanghai. The main storyline follows a young migrant couple with a college education who struggle to secure their own place to live in Shanghai, and in this process, the woman's younger sister who feels obliged to help with the down payment for a *shangpinfang* (a commodity apartment) capitalises on her body and becomes a sexual consort to a married politician. Despite such costly efforts in advancing their housing trajectory from renter to owner, their life path seems to be tied up with their neighbour on the second floor; a destitute local Shanghainese family that is lifted out from the crowded, inconvenient, and poorly maintained *lilong* housing and ends up in the same commodity housing estate as a result of *chaiqian*.

I revisit the drama series here for two unsettling issues that constitute the theme of this chapter. Firstly, the drama reproduced the hegemonic images of the character of *lilong* neighbourhood—an essential part of Shanghai's *xiazhijiao* (lower quarters)—that is featured by the over-crowded living space, inadequate utilities, noxious smells, lack of privacy, disorder, tension, and materialistically calculative lifestyle, recreating its myth as 'a living hell for the ordinary' (Wasserstrom, 2009: 5) dated back to Shanghai's opening to foreign settlement. Similar representations can be found in other literary products, including cautiously laboured academic literature. There, the 'notorious' (He, 2007: 183) lower quarters of Shanghai has been recklessly translated as or compared to ghettos (Ho, 2004), or slums/ slum-like/ shantytowns (Wu, 2002), or informal settlements (Wu et al., 2010), without teasing out the nuances between those terminologies and their historical meanings before a 'profit'[4] to be hastily made.

Secondly, I read the young couple's sense of loss and frustration for not being able to escape the fate of neighbouring with the same poor local Shanghainese family after all the economic costs and emotional ordeals they went through as an example of 'the lateral denigration and mutual distanciation' (Wacquant, 2007: 68). As more deserving consumer subjects, their sense of entitlement make them think that they are categorically different from the less deserving consumers, the poor *chaiqian* subjects in this case, who rest their hope and their fate purely on the last straw of *chaiqian* without making any personal effort. The lack of empathy toward the native poor residents reinforces the stigma against them as dependent, speculative, canny, money-fetishism and parasite of the public. Such character assassinations of the

[4] I use profit in a Bourdieusian sense but retain a greater extent of cynicism than Bourdieu. Bourdieu (1998c: 75-91) questions the existence of disinterested social actions. Seeing from a 'disenchanted gaze' (p.75), he argues that intellectual sites, contrasting to the mystifying thinking, are invested with different interests.

displacees find a wide purchase amongst the locals. When I introduced my research to my friends and ordinary citizens from other parts of the city, the first response I received was always a kind warning against my tendency to represent the displacees as victims. To them, the displacees must have made a great fortune selling their properties to the appropriators, and therefore *chaiqian* means *jiefang* (emancipation) instead of repression or suffering, in resonance with the hegemonic discourse on *chaiqian* as a life-changing event for the poor, the have-nots, and the marginalised. As a popular local saying goes, *qiongren fanshen kao dongqian* (the poor relies on *chaiqian* to turn over their restrained bodies).These mechanisms—distanciation, stigmatisation and misrecognition—effectively isolate the displacees as an undeserving social group that those marginalised by the same accumulation strategy are unwilling to offer their political support.

This chapter seeks to offer a counter narrative of the lived place—part of Shanghai's *xiazhijiao*—demolished for the 'non-place' Expo Park (Auge, 1995), and to present a portrait of the dwellers displaced by the World Expo. By the end of this chapter, I wish to deliver an answer to the following question: how did '*xiazhijiao*' and '*fanshen*' enter into the political discourses to legitimatise the displacement of such a huge scale and intensity, and to mould the political consciousness and the agency of those residents? To provide a short answer to the central question of this chapter, I argue that the infusion of structural and symbolic violence as expressed in the evolvement of the waterfront site chained these dwellers to a stigmatised place with multiple vulnerabilities (Bourdieu, 1999a) and made them extremely susceptible to subordinating to the dominant power in the land-centred accumulation in Shanghai. These vulnerabilities have been exploited by the Expo regime in reconfiguring urban spaces.

First emerged in revolutionary China, the discourse of *fanshen* revived in contemporary times is based on a radical change of residential environment, particularly home, and on the symbolic value of upward mobility. To expose the violent nature of *fanshen* discourse, we need to understand the elusive and complex notion of home. Following Bourdieu (2005: 19-22), I conceptualise home in both material and symbolic dimensions in a relational way. Materialistically, home is grounded in a place or physical structure. It is structured by and structures social relations and power dynamics within and beyond this material space (also Massey, 1992). Therefore, it can be experienced in diverse, ambivalent and even contradictory ways, even for the dwellers in the same space. As Blunt and Varley (2004: 3) write, home is simultaneously a 'space of belonging and alienation,

intimacy and violence, desire and fear'. The ambivalent meanings and lived experiences of home constitute a main theme in feminist critical study of home (see hooks, 1991). Despite so, critiques alerting us to the variegated experiences of home implies a subscription to an idealised imagination of home – what home should be – as a crucial source of comfort, security, ownership, or belonging, a sanctuary space (Young, 1997). This ideal home underpins the efforts of its dwellers to make, unmake and remake homes over time, usually as a collective endeavour, investing labour, money, time and emotions. As such, it acquires historical and affective qualities through the creation and maintenance of a social group in a stable relationship who are awarded with satisfaction through investment of different forms in the material space. Home therefore is both a biological and social reproduction project. Bourdieu's conceptualisation of home is existential (Allen, 2008). It 'expresses or betrays' the social being of the dwellers in the world, through the spatial practices of the dwellers surrounding their homes and the symbolic appropriation of various qualities of their homes by outsiders, which may in turn shape or affect the experiences of the dwellers about their homes and their being in the world. The violence of *fanshen* discourse lies in that it encourages and perpetuates such symbolic appropriation driven by dominant economic logics that first, home as an asset or a commodity is devoid of historical and affective qualities and its value depreciates over time (Bourdieu, 2005); second, social distinction in the housing field is determined by the exchange value; and third, the class boundary in this field can only be transcended through supporting *chaiqian* programmes. Its exercise diminishes, corrodes and betrays the dwellers' sense of social existence.

To build the argument of this chapter, I shall follow Wacquant's (2008) methodological advice[5] on researching advanced urban marginality and examine the historical and political construction of this section of Shanghai's *xiaozhijiao*, a tainted place, from waterfront rural settlements to '*penghuqu*' or 'shanty towns' until it was 'strategically'[6] chosen to host the Expo. Particularly, I will pay attention to how inside and outside actors interact and contest in constructing the place as 'shared spaces' (Massey, 1994: 137) under different regimes of accumulation. This however is not an easy task for three reasons. Firstly, the erasure of diverse physical structures and the erection of a unified Expo space removed the triggers of place memories that is crucial for the development and preservation of more colourful social memory

[5] Wacquant never directs his analytical attention to China, but I believe his analytical tools can be universally utilised.

[6] In chapter 6, I shall offer a rebuttal of intellectual rationalisation of this siting choice as 'strategic'. *Realpolitik* and the political ambition to secure the bid at no costs were more decisive in selecting the Expo site.

(Casey, 2000). Secondly, as Pan (2005b: 115) comments, the dwellers of the lower quarters are the 'disenfranchised people who had no culture, no traditions, no history' in Shanghai's modernisation, apart from the hegemonic pejorative narrative (re)produced to consolidate the ruling elites' political legitimacy. Thirdly, the first two problems was compounded by the difficulty of organising the displacees from a given locality to construct a shared past due to their scattered residence across more than thirty different resettlement compounds, which I could not afford to study. What is presented in this chapter is foremost based on a collage of oral accounts from the displacees I met either individually or collectively and who used to live in the same locality; enriched by available literary and artistic products and the official accounts. In this sense, it is as much an individualised memory of homes and communities as a collective memory of a place destroyed by the Expo and a struggle over the representational space (Lefebvre, 1991).

This reconstructed territorial history will tell us as much about the ongoing process of marginalisation of those dwellers through different logics since Shanghai's colonial past as about the characters, the ethos, and the way of life of those dwellers. In making their lived place, those dwellers were constantly negotiating their past to define their present and imagining what an ideal place ought to be in the future. Such spatial practices affected not only their sense of place, but also their experience of loss as examined in more depth in the following chapter. More critically, it shaped their political consciousness, agency and subjectivities, engendering ambivalent and even conflicting attitudes toward *chaiqian* on individual or collective level. The ambivalences and conflicts are intelligible if we bear in mind Harvey's (2000) insight on labourer's multiple positionalities and subjectivities in the circulation and accumulation of capital. In his words, 'the labourer as a person is a worker, consumer, saver, lover, and bearer of culture, and can even be an occasional employer and landed proprietor, whereas the labourer as an economic role—the category Marx analyses in *Capital*—is singular' (p. 102). An understanding of those multiple subjectivities, as Harvey points out, can explain the internal ambivalences, conflicts and contradictions of the labourer's political consciousness and agency of 'resistance, desire for reform, rebellion, and revolution' (p. 102) in contemporary time as Marx acutely captured in his time. Following Harvey, my analysis shall attend to the multiple subjectivities of the residents victimised by the Expo-induced spatial engineering (e.g. parents, socialist workers, the lost generation, landlords, etc.) instead of the singular legal/economic category as displacees under the land-centred accumulation regime.

The Place in Need of Surgery

The Expo Park sits on the waterfronts of the Huangpu River between two cross-river bridges, i.e. Nanpu Bridge and Lupu Bridge, covering a planned area of 6.68 square kilometres in the centre of Shanghai. The land use was rather mixed with obscure boundary between industrial production and social reproduction (see Figure 4.1). Before the invasion of the Expo, this place was the cradle of China's modern industrial capitalism and the heart of the communist regime's planned economy. It was the base to 272 public or private enterprises and more than 500 home-based small businesses, and was the workplace to more than 50,000 workers. Among those factories, two corporate giants stood out: the Jiangnan Shipyard Group on the west bank and the Shanghai No. 3 Steel company[7] on the east bank, occupying more than 40 per cent of the land together. These factories were neighbours to more than 18,000 households excluding the renters who disqualified as displacees under the published regulations so as to keep the official accounts of the scale of displacement relatively small, a typical example of what Hertzfeld (1984) terms politics of significance, playing down the actual scale of displacement. Their shelters with variegated tenures were largely densely constructed low-rise buildings without any impressive facades along narrow alleys.

Whilst most of the land close to the water was occupied by the industrial plants, docklands and warehouses, pushing the residents farther away from the water after several rounds of land appropriation, a few neighbourhoods were under siege from those industrial plants and the residents literally lived inside the factories, resembling a twisted version of the spatial pattern of a socialist *danwei* compound where life and work mixed in a place enclosed by a wall (see Bray, 2005). For this reason, dwellers inside these neighbourhoods, when locating the position of their place in the spatial hierarchy, frequently referred to their place as Shanghai's 'forgotten corners', invisible to the outsiders. Uncle Wang's experience is most germane here, 'guests to my home always complained to me that I was messing with them. They were right outside my neighbourhood but all they could see was a factory. They did not know that they had to walk through the factory workshops'.[8] Although other neighbourhoods seemed to be relatively luckier without the besiegement of those industrial factories, underdeveloped ground transport connections isolated their neighbourhoods like small islands from the rest of the city as well. The ferryboats were the most convenient tool to commute between two parts of the city.

[7] It now has become a part of the Baosteel Group after the Expo-induced industrial relocation.
[8] Interview, D85, 01/04/2012.



Figure 4.1: Land Use on the Expo Site before Chaiqian
Source: Shanghai Expo Affairs Coordination Office and Shanghai Committee of Urban-Rural Construction and Transportation (2010)

To outside 'place-making and place-understanding' specialists (Arkaraprasertkul, 2012: 169), the pre-expo site was 'urban badlands' as demonstrated by the physical land use pattern (Davis, 2006: 202) and seen as a malignant tissue requiring surgical removal. In praise of the Italian girl who inspired the Chinese planners to choose the Expo site, Gui Xinghua (2008), a poet reputed for his 'acute sense of political responsibility' (p. 255), dedicated a canto in his politicians-endorsed anthology to this plain-looking girl who had no intimate knowledge of China's history and the formation of the 'backward' place instead of a 'strategic', modernist and 'adventurous' vision.

你搜检石库门内的数据
你衔接累积的荣耀和远去的沮丧
你梳理一条漫长的江岸线
你想修补啊一段裂痕
江边的转弯处
每一寸土地都是还要升值的黄金啊
浦东的四月风成了你背后强劲的推手！
…
你从没进过手术室
没想到这场城市的"外科手术"
需要多少把特制的手术刀 (p.26-27)

You collected the data of *shikumen*[9]
You connected the accumulated glory and past sorrows
You mapped out the golden waterfront line
You wanted to patch up a fissure
The turning point of the Huangpu River
Each inch of the land there is gold to glitter
Your choice was firmly backed up by the warm wind from Pudong!
….
You have never been to an operation room
You did not realise the 'surgery' on the city
Would require how many tailor made scalpels

[9] Stone gate at the entry to *lilong* housing.

Despite my distaste for his celebratory tone in rationalising the site choice and aestheticising human suffering, I appreciate his honesty in revealing the truth that the Expo since its conceptualisation is more about the highest and best use of 'depreciated' land—an unexploited gold mine—than any other rationalistic storylines. The rhetoric of highest and best use in judicial and planning discourses, as Blomley's (2004) critical discussion shows, is to maximise the land rent and lubricate the never-ending successive development of the land in the grand narrative of progress and improvement. Dictated by the logic of the market, the moral imperative of highest and best use in capitalistic regime of accumulation subjugates the present use as a possible best use to the predicated use under market logic as highest therefore best use. It ignores that the present users are as capable developers as the corporate developers in improving the built environment where they reside, use and work (Blomley, 2004: 82-87). What I also appreciate here is his confession in Chicago School pedigree (although perhaps he has never intended to be interpreted in this way) that urban planning and the political governance is 'pseudo-science' (Goodman, 1971: 67) pretending to function as divisions of medical science but instead is a tool to serve the interests of private developers. Seeing the city as a human body that follows the natural process of growth and decline, inescapable from getting sick, the metaphor attempts to convince outside observers that radical removal of cancerous tissues from the body of the city is the right choice to return a functioning, healthy city. Moreover, it leads us to believe that this is the fate, unpredictable and non-controllable, an inevitable pain with no one or no force to blame but to get it over with.

The medical metaphor resonates with the hegemonic images, discourses, and feelings associated with this place under official classification as *xiazhijiao*—the armpit of Shanghai. Arjun Appadurai (1988) argues that certain ideas and images may become hegemonic metonyms for a place as a forceful shorthand capable of capturing both the internal complexities and external preoccupations of that place for intellectual intercourse. If hierarchy is a recurrent trope for India, *xiazhijiao* (lower quarter) and the synonym *penghuqu* (simple shack settlement) are the ones activated by the Expo regime to define the identity of the pre-expo site. *Jiao*, literally translating as corner in English, encapsulates both the social-spatial dialectics and the evocative feelings and thoughts (Pan, 2005b). The dichotomic political construction of *xiazhijiao* and *shangzhijiao* (upper quarter) shapes the locals' cognitive map of Shanghai's fragmented urban spaces. Marris (1979) once commented on the relational nature of a slum that it 'is only a slum in the eyes of someone for whom it is an anomaly'. *Xiazhijiao* like a slum is also relationally defined by its urban other *shangzhijiao.*

Situated inside the former concession areas, *shangzhijiao* as Pan (2005b: 113) notes in popular cognitive map is a symbol of 'modernity and civilisation'. These areas stigmatised as *xiazhijiao* on the borders of the concession areas and in the urban periphery by contrast are known as 'another of Shanghai's distinctive world' (Honig, 1986: 23) that is 'tantamount to hell' (Honig, 1989: 265).

I propose to understand *xiazhijiao* as objectified space of ethnic domination, resembling several features of ghetto but are categorically different, not for the absence of ethnic segregation as Lu (1995) and Wu (2009) have proposed, but for the distinctive trajectory of their formation, and for the different dynamics between ethnicity, class and the state in their (re)production in history (Wacquant, 2008). The arbitrary classification of the pre-expo site as *xiazhijiao* firstly perpetuates the century-long stigma and discrimination against the inhabitants as well as the place they dwell. By activating this classification and collective memory associated with it, the Expo regime also effectively appropriated the symbolic capital, negative (the derogatory images of *penghuqu* and *xiazhijiao*) and positive (*fanshen* experience), to materialise their greedy agenda in legitimating the siting choice and reducing grassroots resistance through the *chaiqian* programme.

The origin of *xiazhijiao* can hardly be traced to any book but to folk conversations (Pan, 2005b). But, since its birth, it is loaded with pejorative connotations manifested not only in the contrasting physical landscapes but also the characters and cultures of their dwellers as distinctive from that of the bourgeoisie in the *shangzhijiao*. Those dwellers, mostly first generation migrants, came to Shanghai as refugees of 'natural' disasters and World War II, or out of their desire for a better life promised by the growth of industrial capitalism (Honig, 1992: 45). To survive in a repressive land and housing regime in colonial Shanghai, they built settlements initially along the riverside outside the concession areas, which gradually developed around major industrial plants and further sprawled to the peripheries during war-time (Jiang and Zhao, 2006).



Figure 4.2: The Distribution of Penghu Settlement in Shanghai before 1949
Source: Adapted from Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (1962) and Zhang (2008b)

Tuan (1977) points out that people come to know and experience a place by engaging all their senses. Textual representations of those settlements usually effectively evoke negative emotions by mobilising all our senses through the description of the disordered spatial patterns, extreme poverty and unsanitary conditions. A journalist, quoted in Lu (1999: 124), recounted the sensations in walking into a shack settlement in 1935, 'on the little narrow paths there are always puddles of muddy water; here men, women, children, pigs, dogs, chickens, and ducks move and live. It is difficult to pick one's way through the dirt'. Walking closer, one would be haunted by poisonous smells from filthy industrial and solid waste mixed with faeces and by mosquitoes and flies. Hardly surprisingly, these neighbourhoods lack of electricity, running water, sanitary facilities, and waste collection (Lu, 1995). The shelters, for most practical intent, were built with straw, bamboo and mud to satisfy the need for survival. Built on low-lying areas of the city, these occupants' homes on rainy days became bathtubs for their belongings inside—if they had any—due to flooding. The interior of those shacks evoke further shocking responses: it was always overly crowded with five to six sharing a hut on average (Lu, 1999: 126), who might not even be related (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1962: 21). Their homes were usually without decent furniture, let alone an independent bathroom or a kitchen. As the journalist I quoted above observed, 'some [dwellers] have a few pieces of broken-down furniture coated with slimy dust so that one cannot tell the material of which it is made, some even without what could be called a chair, for the occupants not only sit on the ground but sleep on it as well!' (Lu, 1999: 124). Given such miserable conditions, there is little wonder that the dwellers were vulnerable to contagious diseases (Schwenning, 1927), a threat to public safety that must be surgically removed.

Roughly, *penghuqu* was home to more than one million inhabitants in Shanghai, close to one-fifth or one-sixth of the total population of Shanghai before the CPC took over the city (Lu, 1999). The dwellers were overwhelmingly poor, deprived of access to stable industrial employment. According to a survey of 402 dwellers in the 1930s, half of them were employed as rickshaw pullers and a quarter worked as coolies (Zhang, 2008c: 74). This non-representative sample under-estimated the precarious conditions of the *penghuqu* occupants. According to Lu (1999), beggars were another large group among *penghuqu* residents. In early 1930s, around 20,000 professional beggars in Shanghai all lived in *penghuqu* and some *penghuqu* became known as beggar villages (Lu, 1999: 136). Quite homogenously, those early dwellers were from *subei*. According to Honig (1992), *subei* is an obscure and contested geographical area with no coherent geographical boundaries, and it is not an

objective place but 'rather represents the belief in the geographical, cultural, linguistic and economic homogeneity of a particular area' (p. 20). In the most literal sense, it refers to the Northern part of Jiangsu province, but extends to people generally from the northern poverty-stricken provinces such as Anhui and Shandong. The ambiguity of *subei* sets *penghuqu* apart from *zhejiangcun* in contemporary landscape of Beijing where the residents share a clearly defined place of origin as in Zhang's ethnography (2001). Primarily detonating one's native place, *subei* as proposed by Honig (1992) is best understood as a marker of ethnicity in the context of Shanghai. It was historically and politically constructed to demarcate the social as well as spatial hierarchy in Shanghai, separating *subei* people as a distinctive social group from those rich migrants of Canton or Ningbo origins. *Subei* people, although officially categorised as Han ethnicity with no discernible differences in appearances from other Chinese social groups in Shanghai, became a derogatory generalised social category, akin to Negros or Appalachians, for the underclass defined by poverty, tastelessness, filth and crudeness regardless of the origin of place, and retained as a most demeaning curse in local dialect until this day, 'exoticising' (Wacquant, 1997: 347) people who deviate from the mainstream etiquette, culture and values of the ethnicity of a higher social status (Honig, 1990: 282). Such 'deviances' were quite expansive, including the behaviours, voices, dialects, dress codes and even their choice of food. The stigma attached to *subei* origin further excluded the *penghuqu* dwellers from stable industrial employment.

Figure 4.3: Penghu Housing: Gundilong (Rolling Earth Dragon)
Source: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (1962), *The Transformation of Penghuqu*

Figure 4.4: Penghu Housing: Shuishang Gelou (Lofts above the water)
Source: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (1962), *The Transformation of Penghuqu*

Lacking political and social capital, migrants of *subei* ethnicity developed strong solidarity with fellow ethnic migrants and relied on native-place-based formal and informal associations as a source of security (Perry, 1993). Such solidarity perhaps can explain the swift mobilisation of the hut dwellers in fighting against the republican government and colonial authority when they decided to demolish those huts and evict them (Honig, 1992). Their clientelistic relations with organised gangsters, under the protection of the police, further allowed them to obtain, however partially, social-economic citizenship benefits during colonial time (Perry, 1993). Yet, as a consequence of periodic collective violence and the connections with gangsters, *penghuqu* were further defamed as a place of evil and outlaws and the inhabitants were subject to blame for their personal defects and pathology, which not only perpetuated their own poverty but also engendered social order (Qin, 2010). The separation, stigma and discrimination of *penghuqu* and its inhabitants in a mutually reinforcing way established its reputation as no-go area for the *shangzhijiao* dwellers in colonial Shanghai. Associated with poverty, filth and crime, it became a forgotten corner of Shanghai (Honig, 1992). Discourses with ideological agendas typically portray *penghuqu*, as rightly summarised by Pan (2005b), through the vicious cycle of poverty, outlaws, deviances, and social disorganisation.

The historical stigma associated with *penghuqu* and *xiazhijiao* were activated to celebrate the benefits of the Expo-induced *chaiqian* and legitimatise the siting choice. In official accounts, a typical narrative would connect with the collective memory of *penghuqu* as eyesores and follows the same discursive themes, highlighting the disordered spatial organisation, the lack of modern conveniences, the poor living conditions, and the concentration of poverty and social problems across different neighbourhoods. A renowned journalist compared his impression of one

neighbourhood within the east side of the Expo site with one described by a French sociologist[10] about twenty years ago,

> Along the stagnant filthy river stood many small wooden shacks in cheap tilted roofing felt, weighed down by some bottles. The windows were broken. Smells of decomposed vegetables were everywhere around those shacks. This was the description of the miserable living conditions of Shanghainese twenty years ago written by a French sociologist. This was hardly any exaggeration. When I arrived in Pudong in April 2005, what I saw were rows of run-down houses, with many small simple shacks on the back. Five people lived inside this same room, dining, pooping, and sleeping, all inside this small room (in *The Grand Displacement in Pudong*, p.78).

The impressionist description is supplemented by the descriptive statistics of the population composition on the Expo site. Instead of a careful dissection of the causes of the uneven geographies, the statistics, 'utterly unfit to probe and scrutinize the life of the marginalised population' (Wacquant, 1997: 346), bluntly highlighted the place as a container concentrated with marginalised population, i.e. people with severe diseases and disabilities, unemployed and welfare dependants, and former convicted felons, activating the false, stigmatised image of *penghuqu* as a potential source of social conflicts, a paradise for the outlaws and a danger for social breakdown.[11] The status of their tenures also brought into rigid review and the legality of their tenures were questioned to remind the public that the disordered physical form of those neighbourhoods was the direct consequence of uncivilised crowd poaching state-owned land with no respect for law and order. Wacquant (2007: 69) rightly points out that, 'Once a place is publicly labelled as a lawless zone or outlaw estate outside the common norm, it is easy for the authorities to justify special measures, deviating from both law and custom, which can have the effect—if not the intention—of stabilising and further marginalising their occupants, subjecting them to the dictates of the reregulated labour market, and rendering them invisible or driving them out of a coveted space'. Through this statistical exercise, the Expo regime justified the ruthless *chaiqian* programme that disperses the 'inferior' and 'pathological' subjects to suburbia and under-compensates the buildings without legal titles. However, without a sincere social programme to alleviate poverty and unemployment and to assist people with multiple vulnerabilities, *chaiqian* programme with gestural monetary offers to those marginalised groups simply displaced the problem

[10] The author did not provide a reference to the original work. I cannot tell if the description and translation was accurate, and whether the comparison is appropriate.

[11] The Grand Displacement in Pudong (p.77, p.179). For example, according to this book, there were 4,163 households to be displaced in one neighbourhood, among which 1,700 households had members with severe diseases, disabilities, *zhiqing*, or released prisoners.

elsewhere, or worse, it further marginalised those groups because of the *hukou*-based welfare provision and the under-development of the resettlement site in suburbia[12].

A few photo albums were produced by the local artists either out of their personal sense of social responsibility or professional interest, or commissioned by the Expo regime (Chen, 2011, Lu, 2010, Wei, 2010). I accessed four photo collections during my fieldwork, among which, three were produced by a single photographer respectively[13] and the last one entitled *People's Expo* (2011) was a collection of photos from various sources. With extraordinary commitment, photographers followed the transformation of the Expo site from dense, intimate, and mixed-use neighbourhoods to the enclosed consumption space of spectacular postmodernist architecture. As Sontag (1990) reminds us, photos are not simply recorded transient moments like souvenirs that testify to the existence but an invented history that establishes a way of seeing the past and invites sentiments associated with the images, the narratives, and the symbolic meanings. Frequently, these photographers chose to contrast the past with the present through the choice of colours in their photos. Those extravagant pavilions were in original sensory colours while the demolished neighbourhoods and the vanished neighbourhood life were predominantly in black and white. In doing so, it effectively creates the experience of the passage of time and conveys a 'serious' attitude toward the past. The colour choice of black-and-white is a professional aesthetic one, as we would find in journalistic photography or documentaries in order to claim neutrality and authority to the represented reality. However, the absence of sensory colours filters the 'noisy' background of the images and forces the audience to concentrate on the objects, the themes and the allegory the photographers are attempting to convey. Repeated representations of those neighbourhoods uncritically centre on disordered physical space and lack of modern conveniences in those neighbourhoods.

This selective perspective is shaped by the dominant value and discourse on how a modern life and modern urban space ought to take form but cannot find in those deprived neighbourhoods. As an aesthetical practice, following Bourdieu (1990c, 2010), the production of photography expresses the class origin, the taste and the value of the spectators, and also sheds light on the wider power structure and class relations. Considering these photographers to be of middle-class background, it is hardly surprising that they perpetuate the fetish with space and advocate the dominant value as universal, even though Lu and Wei occasionally lament with

[12] Chapter 8 shall discuss the issue in more depth.
[13] Chen Yang is currently employed by the Police Bureau.

strong nostalgic sentiments on the destruction of a way of life in a wonderland. Lack of vigilance and reflexivity, they failed to resolve the tension between the lived space (of users) and conceived space (of technocrats) (Lefebvre, 1991). Their work is subjugated to political appropriation and contributes to the legitimatisation of the Expo-induced *chaiqian*.

Figure 4.5: Night Stool and Running Water Tap
Source: People's Expo Editorial Committee (2011)

Figure 4.6: Urination in Public Space
Source: Wei (2010)



Figure 4.7: Dining in the Alley
Source: Wei (2010)

Figure 4.8: Living and Playing with Garbage
Source: Lu (2010)

The reason to paint the 'revolting' picture of the displacees' life through diverse devices is to activate another piece of the collective memory with significant weight that associates the CPC as the saviour to the proletariat. This is embedded in the discourse of *fanshen* manufactured through the governing technology of *suku* (speaking bitterness), sponsored by the CPC to produce acquiescent, loyal and grateful class subjects to the nascent socialist state under the dictatorship of the CPC (Guo and Sun, 2002, Farquhar and Berry, 2004, Makley, 2005). As the most destitute class in Shanghai, *penghuqu* dwellers were the natural subjects of the party's *fanshen* project. Their *fanshen* experience is produced through a simultaneous process of arbitrary prescription of political identity and property redistribution. In line with political imperative to produce loyal subjects, class emerged as the legitimate and most powerful political category in defining personal identity and life chances, whilst identity as performed in ethnicity, civic associations or religious gradually lost purchase. As the proletariat, *penghuqu* dwellers acquired a higher social status under the communist regime as compared to the former bourgeoisie in *shangzhijiao*, most of them now became primary class enemies. The political experience of *fanshen* was further reinforced by relatively egalitarian redistribution of wealth as in salary and houses[14] and by the state sponsored redevelopment or improvement of the *penghuqu*, narrowing the gap between the *penghu* dwellers and former upper class[15](Chen, 2012b). Those fortunate enough to be rehoused in the working class residential compounds, purposely designed and built to modern standards, gained further euphoria by obtaining upward social mobility and shaking off the stigma. Through the ritualistic practice of *suku* on which occasion examples of moral education were

[14] Inequality was never eliminated in Mao's era. See Howe (1968), Lee (1988), Wang (2004) and Li and Wu (2006a, 2006b, 2010).
[15] The rehabilitation of *Yaoshuilong* is an example here.

set and source of personal oppression were publically articulated and denounced, personal sufferings were transformed into collective sufferings, and the positive images of the party-state were transmitted and perpetuated (Sun, 2012a). In *Huanle Renjian* (1971), written in the *suku* genre, the combined forces of the imperialists, the bourgeoisie, and feudalist residues were condemned as the source of oppression for the masses in the *penghuqu* (p. 2). An alleged folk song offered us a germane example of the evocation of class hatred and the legitimatisation of the party.

肇家浜啊肇家浜，从前是条臭水浜， 苍蝇蚊子满天飞，水上阁楼象牢房， 劳动人民苦难深，日日夜夜盼解放。	zhaojiabang zhaojiabang, it used to be a smelly water creek Flies and mosquitoes flew everywhere, hut built above the water were like cells, The sufferings of the working class were tremendous, they were anticipating emancipation all day and night
肇家浜啊肇家浜，如今面貌大变样， 铁马奔驰林荫道，棚户住进新工房， 幸福来自毛主席，翻身不忘共产党。 p. 36	Zhaojiabang zhaojiabang, the landscape now has been transformed enormously, Mercedes on the lane shadowed by tall trees, *penghu* residents now live in new working class compounds, Happiness were bestowed by Chairman Mao, the party must be remembered for our fanshen.

By those political performances, the CPC successfully achieved its political agenda. The political subjects acquired a set of political vocabulary to rationalise their suffering. Chen's (2006b) oral history project interviewed almost a hundred *penghu* families in 2003 and the senior generation in the final report frequently pays tribute to the CPC for lifting them out of misery and desperation. The discourse of *fanshen* has been recurrently activated in Shanghai's later urban development process to justify primitive accumulation as seen in the notorious 365 project.[16] It allows the entrepreneurial state to profit from people's suffering without losing political legitimacy. Conveniently, the cultural stock of *fanshen* discourses and the political technology of *suku* were once again mobilised to legitimatise the Expo-induced *chaiqian*. In this vein, *chaiqian* dictated by the logic of the land market was conflated with the logic of state welfare, continuously painting the state in a positive light and allowing the predatory state to derive legitimacy for participating in welfare provision. For this cultural background, *chaiqian* is normalised as a good thing, a long overdue attempt of redistributive justice, and a social intervention to structural inequalities.

[16] To boost the land development in the early 1990s, Shanghai government announced the 365 plan under which 3.65 million square metres of substandard housing in the city centre were scheduled to be completely demolished before the turn of the new century.

Yokes Chained the Body: The Real Legacy of History

The analysis above shows the genealogy of *xiazhijiao* and the production of *fanshen* discourse. Both were skilfully appropriated by the Expo regime through the technology of history writing. In this section, I shall refute the causal classification of the pre-Expo site as *penghuqu* and in doing so, I shall unravel the real causes of the predicaments of *penghu* dwellers and the persisting stigma attached to those neighbourhoods, rendering them vulnerable to the predatory accumulation regime in contemporary time.

Based on the early distribution patterns of *penghu* settlement (see Figure 4.2), I think the historians of the CPC are correct about the combined force of imperialism and industrial capitalism as reflected in land use control, discriminatory labour market and capitalistic exploitation in the formation of *penghuqu* as a concentrated settlement of ethnic migrants. I have no intention in refuting this kind of reasoning. My analysis shall focus on the governing practices under the dictatorship of the CPC, which intentionally or unexpectedly, reinforces the ethnic domination and perpetuates social and spatial injustice suffered by the *penghu* residents. This finding concurs with Szelenyi's (1996: 303) conclusion that socialist cities 'by restricting markets and by regulation regional processes, primarily through central planning, did produce and reproduce the asymmetrical allocation of social classes, occupational and ethnic groups in space'.

When the communist regime took over Shanghai, they inherited the neighbourhood organisation from the republican government. Despite their intention to address Shanghai's uneven geography, the party consolidated the material contrast between *shangzhijiao* and *xiazhijiao* through the demarcation of administrative boundaries on the grassroots level that was ironically sensitive to established residential patterns and housing structure in the past (Lu, 1999). Whilst accepting old patterns might be 'quick, comprehensive, efficient and smooth' to reduce 'the psychological impact often attendant on the imposition of a new system' and to increase 'the effectiveness of communist rule'(Lu, 1999: 317), the CPC missed the opportunity to transform the repressive spatial order fundamentally and allowed the durability of this dichotomy, as in materiality and in cognitive memory, in structuring urban space and social inequalities (Pan and Liu, 2011). To accumulate political capital rapidly, the CPC certainly improved the living conditions of the *penghu* dwellers through the offer of

stable employment in the industrial economy[17] and state-sponsored neighbourhood improvement in the formative years of the new regime. However, such effort was short-lived as a result of the defects in political ideology, economic organisation and social policies, particularly, the housing policy. Let me explain each in turn.

The fate of Shanghai has been tied up with its global connection (Wasserstrom, 2009). Shanghai quickly fell under Mao's regime for its 'shameful' past associated with bourgeoisie values (Zhang, 2000). The national focus on industrial development in inland 'key-point' cities further marginalised Shanghai's position in the national economy (Wu, 2000). It soon became a major industrial and tax base to finance national economic development programmes without receiving corresponding financial transfers and investments from the central government[18] (Howe, 1968). This in turn reflected in the financial strains of the local state in improving and upgrading local infrastructures and in investing in the construction of collective consumption facilities. As for housing, it was defined as non-productive sector. Understandably, investment impulse in building new housing for the working class was further restrained.[19] The consequence, still felt today, was severe housing shortage and structural inequalities (Howe, 1968).

In order to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism, the CPC committed to reducing, if not completely eliminating, exploitation and inequalities under its dictatorship. Shortly after it came into power, it launched a violent onslaught on private property ownership, during which time properties from arbitrarily classified landlord class and the bourgeoisie class (including sublessors[20]) were confiscated or collectivised and redistributed to those poor in need. However, the distribution was hardly an equal process but repeated the practice of dynastic succession where the new emperor, the CPC leadership, takes over monumental residences. Ordinary citizens without political connections were only able to take over whatever came along and it was not rare that they were rehoused in poorly maintained housing. This strengthened the roots of inequalities under actually

[17] According to Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (1962: 65), a survey of 1,223 *Yaoshuilong* residents revealed that employment rate in 1960 was more than 75 per cent, more than 20 per cent increase from the data of 1949.
[18] From 1949 to 1990, Shanghai collected fiscal revenues of 391 billion RMB in total, 84 per cent of which was transferred to the central government. In the same period, only 7.38 per cent were transferred back to Shanghai for urban development and 1.23 per cent to be used in non-productive sector. See Shanghai Finance and Tax Records at http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node4445/node57369/index.html
[19] This was only possible for the strict control of population growth through forcible eviction of beggars and penalisation of unauthorised migration. The severe housing shortage was temporarily relieved through the forcible campaign of sending urban youth to the countryside.
[20] See Zhang (2008c: chapter 3) on sublessors.

existing socialism. As part of the CPC's 'cradle to grave' welfare programme, housing provisions under the socialist accumulation regime later was organised through the *danwei* system (work units), tied the fate of the workers to the prosperity and the power of their employers and fostered great 'organised dependence' on their line managers and work units (Walder, 1986, Zhao and Bourassa, 2003). Access to public housing was decided by one's rank, family size, current housing conditions, housing history and connections. This created a stratified housing system under socialism (Wu, 1996) .

This new organised consumption however was out of reach to *penghu* dwellers given the shortage of housing on the one hand and their low rank and low skills amongst the industrial working class on the other. After all, they were still under a roof even though it was made of straws or cheap materials. This is not to say that the *penghuqu* dwellers were betrayed and abandoned by a new regime similar to their sufferings in the past. However sporadically, the CPC organised some efforts to renovate the *penghu* dwellings with partial financial support and *ad hoc* allocation of building materials, which were in severe shortage as well (Howe, 1968). Many were luckier [21] and relocated to working class compounds as a result of *chaiqian* for infrastructure development or the construction of public facilities. Most of the dwellers took on the renovation work on their own because they could now afford to do so with a stable employment in the state economy sector but perhaps most importantly their huts were no longer habitable. This renovation was a never-ending process but attended to the changes of their family structure and rising living standard in Shanghai in general. Let me offer the housing history of Grandma Wu (in her late seventies) as an example. She migrated to Shanghai during wartime and lived in a boat before moving to a hut built on the east bank of the Huangpu River. She renovated her house twice under the communist regime. The first time was a desperate decision in the 1960s. Their roof was blown away in a storm. She and her husband decided to build a small room with bricks. With no access to building materials, she scouted all over the city and collected discarded bricks and stones, and eventually built with their sweat and blood—her husband almost died because of exhaustion—their first 'decent' home. In the early 1980s, she started renovation again, because of her son's

[21] I use 'lucky' both deliberately and cautiously. Compared to current *chaiqian* regulations, they were lucky in that the ideological commitment to mass line disallowed the local state agencies from appropriating land arbitrarily and compensation was often enough to allow the dwellers to resettle elsewhere. Restrictions on public use of appropriated land also set it apart from the current *chaiqian* practices. But, with no available data on the *chaiqian* experience outside the official accounts, to what extent they were lucky is hard to judge.

persistent 'begging' to improve his marriageability. Once again, this renovation cost her family a fortune and they accrued a large debt from their relatives.[22]

Wu's housing history was representative of most families I worked with. Unanimously, when commenting on their attempts at making their homes a better place to live, they would concisely summarise their experience with a single word, *ku* (bitter), same to what Chen (2006b) found in her oral history project. As we see from Wu's experience, the dominance of pain in their memory was quite understandable. Each improvement in their housing was followed by material hardships and impoverishment. Their self-help efforts, as Chen (2012b) sharply remind us, must be seen as a hidden form of exploitation under the planned economy, in mockery of the egalitarian ideal upon which the regime claimed legitimacy. The low wage in socialist China was based on a calculation of low rent and living expenses as most consumption was organised by the work units. Since those dwellers were unable to access the state housing provision, their investment in their own housing with their own savings reduced their real wage and further exploited their labour value. Exhausting the resources of those dwellers, the hidden exploitation locked these dwellers into the lower stratum of the social hierarchy and chained them to the *penghuqu*, followed by continued prejudice and stigma of those residents for being poor.

This however was only the tip of a systematic exploitation and marginalisation of the *penghu* dwellers in the planned economy. The living conditions of the *penghu* dwellers were worsened by the repressive socialist urbanism. Although Chinese urbanism did not strictly conform to socialist city ideals, as Lu contends (2006), the urban form of Chinese cities by nature is socialist under Mao and was dictated by the prevailing accumulation strategy and political ideology of building a city of production as seen in the *danwei* urbanism. The idea was to situate the space of reproduction as close as possible to space of production. Influenced by this planning ideology, Shanghai in 1953 announced the first master plan with significant input from Soviet expertise. Under this master plan, Shanghai was turned into an industrial production site, divided into eight industrial districts within each factories were built close to residential neighbourhoods. As we can see from the distribution of industrial factories between 1959 and 1984 (see Figure 4.9), industrial development rapidly expanded in the pre-Expo site, eating up a large parcel of land. The rapid industrial growth intensified the competition for space in two ways: by appropriating land for industrial development and by attracting more workers to settle close to them. To

[22] Interview, D53, 21/03/2012.

control the sprawl of *penghuqu*, for the sake of political legitimacy and also for public safety, existing dwellers were encouraged to increase land use efficiency by adding additional stories rather than building more spacious ones or additional living space on the ground level (Chen, 2012b). This was effectively controlled by the nationalisation of land in the city and strict planning licensing. Against this backdrop, it is not difficult to understand the unique shapes, forms and styles of the renovated *penghu* dwellings and the mixed land use of the pre-Expo site—both were nightmares to modern planners and architects. The pain to existing users was conveniently forgotten. The rapid industrial development meant that residing near toxic industrial plants became an inevitable feature of their residential experience.



Figure 4.9: Shanghai Land Use Pattern (1959-1984)
Source: Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Resesarch Institute (2007)

The shortage of land and housing supply was aggravated by the return of *zhiqing*, (the urban youth) from inland regions, another stigmatised group. Under the social engineering programmes, *shangshan xiaxiang* (up to the mountains and down to the villages), millions of teenagers in Shanghai were forcibly uprooted to join the rusticity programme (Bernstein, 1977).[23] Only until later stage of the Cultural Revolution and then after Deng Xiaoping finally came into power, the 'lost generation' was officially allowed to move back, but under very stringent regulations[24] (Bonnin, 2009). It was easier to reacquire their lost Shanghai *hukou* status yet the *hukou*-associated benefits under the planned economy were never compensated. Returned as adults, married or single,[25] they were confronted with the challenge to meet their survival needs: shelter, employment, medical care, and intimacy. The under-investment in social reproduction during the planned economy, coupled with the market reform, paralysed the local states,[26] making them incapable of providing the essential material support to those *zhiqing*. Naturally, their natal families took the responsibility to assure their survival, but such mutual support came at a price. In many cases, it put strains on their family relations not because of 'uncivil individualism' as Yan (2003b: 16) might comment but because *zhiqing* families had already exhausted their resources and were unable to support unconditionally more members. Here again started a new round of the vicious cycle of incarceration: state abandonment, self-help housing improvement, exhausting family savings, impoverishment and imprisonment. Their spatial practices added

[23] The arbitrary prescribed class identity and the disciplinary technology of personal performance evaluation and documentation were crucial in determining the fate of the urban youth. Many urban youth from 'good' class or with good 'performance' (*biaoxian*) were exempted from being sent down and even obtained a job assignment in the city. For those forced into this uprooting programme, their class background also decided the destinations for their assignments, ranging from ranches in the border of the country to villages in nearby cities. In the fieldwork, I only encountered *zhiqing* from the poor or bad class background.

[24] Initially only those with severe health issues were allowed to return to their homes. Many *zhiqing* purposely risked their health and hurt themselves in order to be allowed to return. Later after their collective actions, regulations on their mobility were relaxed but they still had to prove that their natal family was willing to allow them register in the same *hukou* booklet. See Liu (2008) for more heartbreaking stories of returning home.

[25] According to Bonnin (2009), many Shanghai *zhiqing* delayed their marriage for fear of permanently staying in the countryside once they put their roots there.

[26] According to Shanghai Chronicle, 69,258 families fell into the category 'families with extreme housing poverty' (including families whose living space was less than 2 square metres per person, houseless families migrated to Shanghai from other cities, two couples shared the same room, mixed-gender teenagers (16 years old) shared the same room, families suffered from work injuries, married couples had no place to stay and their original families fell short of living space after supporting the newlyweds) at the beginning of 1980. By the end of that year, only 27,335 families in this category received in-kind housing benefits. By June 1981, 56,063 more families fell into this category. One reason as explained by the local authority was the return of 400,000 *zhiqing*; many of which joined the waiting list for public housing. The provision of housing was far behind the housing demand.

more pressure to land supply and changed the form of their neighbourhoods. To outsiders, 'disorder' or 'chaotic' perhaps are descriptions that are more accurate.

The revolution of neoliberalisation with Chinese characteristics (Harvey, 2005a) launched the last yet most destructive attack on those residents. Reflecting upon his disilluisonment of revolutionary zeals, James Scott (2013: 2) writes, 'virtually every major successful revolution ended by creating a state more powerful than the one it overthrew, a state that in turn was able to extract more resources from the very populations whom it was designed to serve'. The neoliberal accumulation regime supplied the dwellers with new images, ethics and values on which modern life built upon but permanently destroyed their hope to obtain such life through their own efforts. The process of dispossession was gradual, steady and sometimes retroactive (He and Wu, 2009). The gradualist approach supplied admirers of the Beijing Consensus, like Giovanni Arrighi (2008) with most convincing evidence to coddle with the Chinese leaders, as substantiated by the absence of social upheaval in traumatised countries that followed the shock therapy. However, what they failed to acknowledge is that slow poisoning is always much more painful than a sudden death. The instrumental rationality underpinning the transformation of the socialist welfare to a market-based system has strategised social policies to contain popular grievances (Piven and Cloward, 1971), and lubricated capital accumulation (Zheng, 2014). Under the new accumulation regime, *penghuqu* dwellers were further marginalised and their feelings toward the state became even more mixed.

To begin with, the dismantle of *danwei* system endangers the security of many *penghu* dwllers and blocks their access to housing benefits or their attempts to escape the site permanently. From the 1980s, the shifting labour regime and the restructuring of the state economy started to destroy the iron bowls of many workers and subjected them to the force of the market (Sykes, 2007). Although workers in Shanghai took the hit much later than those in central coastal regions and northern China (Peck and Zhang, 2013), job insecurity was widespread. Between 1997 to 1998, more than 26 per cent of workers at state-owned enterprises lost their permanent jobs with a 10 per cent increase in the following year (Peck and Zhang, 2013). This was followed by a systemic privatisation, from land and state-owned enterprises to medical care and education. Mostly employed as industrial workers in the state sector, *penghu* dwellers suffered severe loss from this restructuring. Whilst the retired seemed to have escaped from the onslaught from neoliberal reforms, the intergenerational transference of resources, disciplined by the lingering Confucius

ethics and family-based welfare provision[27] (Chen, 2012b), allowed the pain, insecurity, anxiety, and depression caused by one reform initiative to transcend generational gaps and permeate in the families. These reforms not only have stripped them bare but also effectively prevented them from voting with their feet.

> I had a job in a factory but it was too far from home. So I changed my job and worked in a shop. The shop was struggling financially and I was laid off. I soon was diagnosed with heart problems and depression. So I stayed at home. Not long, my husband was laid off, too. He was bought off with 40,000 RMB. We spent that money in roughly three years. I am too weak to work, we both were laid off, and our son was at high school, how could we feed ourselves?...My generation, born in the 1960s, suffered the most. We did not receive much education [due to the Cultural Revolution]. We have no money. We suffer from the laid-offs. Moreover, we have a child to support. We had to stay there (female, on early retirement due to severe medical conditions, displaced from Puxi, interview, X41, 16/05/2012).

Secondly, their recourse to public housing is obstructed by the housing reform. Through privatisation and commercialisation, the reform legitimatised, solidified and reinforced the structural inequalities among the socialist workers. The privatisation of existing housing stocks only benefited workers with higher ranks, wider political connections and more financial resources (Wang, 2004, Logan et al., 2010). Many tenants of public housing on the pre-Expo site lost out in this reform due to their financial predicament and grounded in the poorly maintained public housing. After 1998, all in-kind housing benefits formally cancelled out from the workers' entitlements, officially signalling the end of in-kind housing benefits. The route to have a place to live for late-comers and those on the 'waiting list' or formerly excluded relies on either the mean-test based affordable housing or from the emerging housing market through individual entrepreneurship.

The construction of this housing market is the biggest political fraud. It came with promises yet in the process of its construction, it deviated enormously from its original intent. When the economic tsar, Zhu Rongji, promoted the housing reform, his neoliberal approach came with a precondition. He was acutely aware that a housing market that blindly follows the dictatorship of the market would, if not collapse altogether, would soon lose popular support.[28] In parallel to a commercial housing market where ruthless pursuit of profit maximisation is the golden rule,

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[27] Chen Yingfang convincingly points out that family rather than individual is the basic unit of welfare provision in China, especially in terms of housing. Either under socialist regime or current neoliberal regime, the precondition to apply for public housing is to have a family.

[28] See Zhu's speech on housing reform on 24 January 1997, accessible at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/03/content_2645079.htm, last accessed 25/08/2013.

Zhu's housing programme prioritised a substantial supply of affordable housing under strict state regulations.

What he overlooked was the contradictory roles prescribed to the local states in the construction of neoliberal private property regime in China. On the one hand, the local states were required to protect a large segment of the society from being marginalised and victimised by the emerging housing market. On the other hand, the local states become the *de facto* owner of the land in the city and proxies of owners of the land in the countryside, with a strong motive to pursue ruthlessly its own interest in land centred accumulation. The incentives are enormous: land use right sales and taxes[29] (Zhou, 2012), direct involvement in land development[30] (Duckett, 1998), and the political career of the leaders[31] (Keith et al., 2013). Because of ineffective control of the power of the local states, Zhu's solution to the housing reform brought about disastrous ramifications as seen in the property bubbles in China (Haila, 1999). But most importantly, it further exacerbates existing housing inequalities. His vision for a large stock of affordable housing has never been taken seriously by the local states for obvious reasons of marginal profits, or even financial loss in some cases. As 'the blemished, defective, faulty and deficient consumers' (Bauman, 2005: 34), the *penghu* dwellers' low purchasing power foreshadowed their exclusion from entering the booming real estate market.

Rapid land development since the 1990s also intensified urban spatial transformation and created enormous pressure on the *penghu* dwellers. Within the horizon of many neighbourhoods on the pre-Expo site, occupiers could see modern apartment buildings with shining windows, spacious balconies and colourfully painted outer walls. Those new highrises worsened their living conditions by enclosing their neighbourhoods, blocking their light and putting growing pressure on the existing facilities.[32] Those new housing estates also slowly transformed the character of their place and created new spatial divisions. To *penghu* dwellers, those new apartments supplied them a referent of what life ought to be and what their life could have been.

[29] After the tax sharing system finally implemented in 1994, land use right sales and taxes from the real estate industry become the major source of local government revenues.
[30] When the real estate industry started to take off in the 1990s, most development companies were either associated with state functionaries or state-owned enterprises Owing to the close connections with the state apparatus, those developers vested with the financial interest of the state developed into the dominant companies in the housing sector. Major development companies based in Shanghai are connected with the government.
[31] The local politicians are evaluated by performance evaluation system, which emphasises the growth of GDP and the image of the city. A large scale of city building naturally becomes the most effective tool to pursue economic interests and political advancement at the same time.
[32] For example, the development of Shangnan Huacheng, a commercial housing estate damaged the water supply to one neighbourhood.

These concrete examples of decent life instilled them a desire to keep up with modern standards. As Hoggart (2009 [1957]: 150) writes, 'they wanted these goods and services not out of a greed for possession, a desire to lay their hands on the glittering products of a technical society, but because the lack of them made it very difficult to live what they called a "decent" life, because without them life was a hard and constant fight simply to keep your head above water spiritually as well economically'. Whenever their financial condition improved, many dwellers substantially improved their living conditions on their own. As my survey shows, many families were already equipped with modern conveniences, such as independent kitchens (60.3%), toilets (48.3%) and shower facilities (52%) before their displacement. Therefore, the causal classification of their neighbourhoods as a unified space of *xiazhijiao* or *penghuqu*—featured by the lack of modern facilities—overlooks the internal variation of different places and insults the initiatives of the dwellers in improving their own place against the social injustice and material hardships they suffered.[33] Uncle Wang repeatedly distinguished his neighbourhood from other neighbourhoods typically defined as *penghuqu*,

> Our place is definitely not *penghuqu*. Only the physical form looks different from the modern planned apartment. Our houses were built by ourselves. Self-built, they call it *penghuqu* (male, 50s, displaced from houtan[34], 01/04/2012).

Those self-help improvements, with a practical mind to accommodate their housing needs, created more physical structures that violated modern principles of planning or aesthetics; thereby, inviting more critiques for damaging Shanghai's ambitious global city project. The stigma of the place and the occupants was reinforced by the large inflow of 'floating population' (migrants) who seek residence here for the cheap rent and closeness to the employment in the informal economy. Through abnormalising their language, accent, dress codes, behaviours, akin to the governing practices to the first generation of *subei* people in the colonial Shanghai; these new migrants became a unified group as *waidiren* (non-local), the new victims of ethnic domination in contemporary Shanghai [35] (Zhang, 2001). In both official and popular discourse, this new generation of migrants are seen as a disruption to the social order and a latent threat to social stability and public safety. Their arrival in these neighbourhoods on the one hand offered the native residents an additional source of

[33] Gilbert (2007) made the same argument about the inflation of the language of slum.
[34] According to Chen Yingfang, the author of the oral history of *penghuqu* residents, Houtan fits the official category of *penghuqu* (personal communication, 03/2012).
[35] See Zhang's (2001) discussion of floating population in Beijing.

income but on the other hand intensified spatial conflicts, especially in terms of land use.

To outsiders, *penghuqu* became a durable container for the uncivilised, poor and deviant throughout the history of Shanghai. Such technocratic view ignored those structural forces that in a consistent way consolidated the position of these deprived neighbourhoods in the spatial hierarchy and deprived the residents of upward mobility, if not condemned them to race to the bottom. The interactions between the *penghu* residents with the forces of the state and the market in constructing their places on the other hand shaped the dwellers' thoughts, beliefs and characters, giving rise to complex experience of their neighbourhoods and ambivalent attitudes toward displacement. This is taken up in the following section.

'You Living Hell is My Wo': Serial Displacement, Home-Making and Ambivalence

In general, the displacees' attitude toward displacement is best described as ambivalent. This is confirmed by the survey result. Amongst 300 respondents, 177 displacees supported the idea of *chaiqian* as a solution to improve their housing conditions. My interviews with individual displacees returned with richer, complicated, mixed and even conflicting attitudes toward displacement that transcends the dichotomic choice as in the survey. How to understand such diverse impulses toward *chaiqian* then? To answer this question, we need to have a fuller view of their life, particularly, their survival strategies and their ambivalent bonds with their places.

Inspired by Kai Erikson's (1976) analysis of the ethos of the Appalachian Mountaineers, I here tentatively offer a snapshot of the displacees, the organisation of their life-world and their way of life.[36] In depicting their lives, I will narrow my focus to the most salient tension between the sense of independence and the need for dependence.[37] I suggest that the displacees' ambivalence toward *chaiqian* is a product of the displacees' position in this spectrum between dependency and

[36] This is of course a generalised description of the people I worked with, most of whom are more than forty-years old. Therefore, it may not necessarily capture the characters of the younger generation who are more immersed in the values and ethics of the market.

[37] This is only one of the five dimensions employed in Erikson's study of mountaineers (the rest are the tension between the love of tradition and respect for personal liberty, between self-assertion and resignation, between self-centred and group-centred, and between ability and disability), but I believe it is universally applicable to any culture and any social group. The reason to focus on this single axis, as Erikson acknowledged in his study, lies in that this dimension is so influential that it almost subsumes many other contrary tendencies.

independency. The independence they understand was manifested in their resilience in living through hardships therefore they gained the conservative impulse (Marris, 1974), wishing to be respected to live the way they prefer and to be free from continuous state oppression, especially in appropriating their space. By dependence, they withheld the hope for a caring state to live up to its name and promises, intervening in making their life better. The diverse, layered, ambivalent attitudes toward their place and the state also restrained political agency of the displacees and undermined their solidarity.[38]

In reviewing their personal trajectories and family histories, one would be surprised to find so many clear imprints of displacement on their lives. Here, we need to stretch the definition of displacement to accommodate their repeated experiences of upheavals. Feldman et al. (2011: 10) insightfully brings to our attention the widespread phenomenon of 'displacement in place' in capitalistic modernity that expands our research horizon from displacement as primarily a geographical concept of forcible migration (Marcuse, 1985) to the experience of 'the declined sense of economic and social security as labour', namely, the loss of one's place in the society while sitting in place. This broader definition allows us to probe into the experience of 'serial forced displacement' (Fullilove, 2014: 141) as went through by many displacees, which caused greater frustration, distress and insecurity. Those experiences encourage greater efforts to re-attach to places and cultivate strong dependence, reinforced by their place-making practices. They also evoke mixed feelings and beliefs of the state.

A majority of the displacees I spoke with had personal experiences or family history of forcible displacement in their formative years or early adulthood as a result of various political campaigns under the Maoist era: loss of homes under socialist transformation (1953-1956) and in Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), sent down to the countryside (*zhiqing*), and forced to relocate and support the development of inland regions *(zhinei*) or frontiers (*zhibian*). Each political campaign was powerful enough in destroying the displacees' attachment structure. But, as many displacees commented, most traumatic among these experiences were *zhiqing*, *zhinei* and *zhibian*. Lacking political capital, they were forcibly evicted to the most impoverished areas and *de facto* exiled and 'imprisoned' there due to strict control of population migration under the planned economy. This was not only a loss of place,

[38] To make it clear, their understanding of independence was remotely close to the neoliberal ethics of possessive individualism, as reflected in the acquisitive impulses, the individualistic calculation and maximisation of utilities, and the destruction and replacement of other forms of interpersonal bonds by contractual relations (Macpherson, 1962).

rupturing their identities, but also a loss of their status as Shanghainese, the opportunity to further their study in high school or obtain a university education and the privileges associated with Shanghai *hukou* and the working class. The upheaval made life extremely difficult for *zhiqing* who were forced to leave their homes as teenagers. With limited agricultural skills, they however had to compete with skilled farmers for subsistence resources in the countryside under the work point system (*gongfen*) that excluded one's capability from deciding one's access to collective consumption. Malnutrition, injuries and other health problems were commonly found amongst this lost generation (Liu, 2008). The negative experience of the countryside spurred their attempts to return to Shanghai as soon as the policy was relaxed. However, due to the interruption of their education and their inadequate work skills, most of them encountered enormous difficulty in surviving the shifting labour regime (Yang, 2003), in addition to the hassles to restore their *hukou*. Moreover, many of them especially those returned from Xinjiang, experienced a prolonged process of identity crisis. For these reasons, they treasure enormously the opportunity for stable employment in the collective enterprises or the state-owned enterprises. The desire for security discourages them from thinking of changing jobs despite the poor working conditions and career promises.

Mrs Zheng is one of the victims of *zhiqing* programme. She was fortunate in that she took over her father's position in a factory upon her return and worked there until her retirement. Her resentment of *zhiqing* programme was not expressed directly as a critique or a negation of the *zhiqing* experience but primarily articulated through her loss of status as the socialist industrial worker and the free welfare under Mao. Her bodily pain is registered as her experience of victimisation.

> There is no part of my body does not hurt after I came back from the countryside. Injuries are all over my body. There is no part does not hurt. I had a big fall when I was in the countryside and hurt my leg. Before the reform, I could still go see a doctor for all the pain, from head to the feet, without paying a penny…What do I have in the end? The pension could barely cover my medical bills. My leg injury is haunting me all the time and I cannot go see a doctor. It is not just one or two hundred RMB but SEVERAL hundred RMB per visit to the doctor. Last time, my daughter saw me in pain and asked me why I did not see a doctor. I told her that I did not want to begrudge spending money on medical bills. My daughter has not married yet. How am I going to pay for her dowry? (interview, D86, 01/04/2012)

To understand her narrative of pain, the notion of 'somatisation' from Arthur Kleinman and Joan Kleinman (1985: 430) is informative here, by which they use to explain 'the expression of personal and social distress in an idiom of bodily

complaints and medical help seeking'. Zheng's personal experience of alienation, uncertainty, loss and suffering from uprooting and returning was translated into not only the identifiable residual pain in her leg but also unidentifiable pain all over her body. As a socialist worker, her body was appropriated by the state through religion-like call for personal sacrifice and endurance of pain for the betterment of the large social body. Difference between gender, age and skill were blurred under Mao's socialist China and all were thought to have an able, healthy and sturdy body for the socialist cause (Uberoi, 1998). But this oppression came with the political promises of justice, egalitarianism, empowerment and lifelong livelihood security. Those promises established the moral relations between the state and the socialist workers and to some extent contained the grievances. Upon her return from the countryside, the residue welfare (especially the free medical care) was not only seen as a tool to heal her body but also an entitlement and a compensation for her loss, mending the tension with the state. However, the recourse to free medical help was soon denied and became increasingly out of reach due to the ongoing reform of the state economy and the privatisation of health services. Although she escaped from being sacked, the loss of working class status and entitlements caused her second experience of displacement. This alienation, loss and betrayal as a result of economic upheavals once again registered in her body and deepened her memory of social upheavals in the past and aggregated her felt pain. Her narrative of pain loaded with nostalgic sentiment of the good old days in Maoist China therefore must be seen as a form of resistance, contesting the body politic and negating the social reality (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1994, Thornton, 2002b) rather than a pure nostalgia, 'a kind of useless act' without the transgressive power to 'illuminate or transform the present' (hooks, 1991: 147).

Zheng's experiences reveal the common traumatic impacts of serial displacement. Her experience of being evicted to the countryside in her formative years might have reinforced her felt alienation and pain from the displacement in place in the reform era. But, her case should not be seen as exceptional. For those who fortunately escaped from political campaigns, they had a fair taste of physical displacement because of the rampant land-centred accumulation regime in the 1990s. Aunt Zhou was a victim of the land centred accumulation regime. Like *zhiqing*, losing her home the first time prompted her to develop stronger attachment to the new place. As she recalled, 'twenty years ago they took away my home. The money they offered was like the change you would give to beggars. I could not afford to buy any resettlement….In the end, I managed to buy this shack building from a farmer. It did

not look good but a place for my family to start all over again. We made great efforts in improving it, little by little'.[39]

For most displacees, more widely shared experience was the displacement in place as industrial workers. The new labour regime relegated the workers to the bottom of society and endangered their ontological securities. As I have shown in the last section, many were laid off in the reform of the state economy and lost their lifelong secure employment and welfare. The loss of working class pride, status and privilege is widely shared amongst the displacees. Many of them sought employment in the informal economy whilst others lost their jobs permanently due to their age, education, low skills or health issues. The experience of displacement in place also sensitises them to the problems, the scandals and the pitfalls of the new accumulation regime as it evolves. Corruption, inequality, decaying morality, and many other social ills spread under the new regime in a mutually reinforcing way aggravating their sense of injustice and sparking their disappointment in the ruling regime. Against this background of repeated displacement and a declining faith in the ruling regime, the displacees seek protection more inwardly, from their families, kinships and communities. They treasure their homes, which have been slowly improved and upgraded through several rounds of collective attempts. They have every reason to, because the way they did so were dishearteningly improvising yet ingenuous as we can see from the housing history of Jiang's family. Jiang (in his 60s), the father of two sons, purchased a small 20-square-metre room with a tiny balcony on the second floor of a self-built housing unit from a local farmer on the east side of the Expo Park. To accommodate his family of eight after his sons both got married; he modified the eave and converted it into a small loft inside his home, doubling the living space. Later, he modified the structure of the balcony, enclosing it as an extension and used it as an independent kitchen.[40] He certainly was not distinctive in 'squeezing' space inside their home. Most displacees made structural modifications to accommodate their housing needs or built numerous additions to their existing houses. As unforgiving and substandard as their homes appear to outsiders, 'this is my *wo'* as the displacees frequently commented. Few of them were shy to hide their pride in building up a decent home over the years.

> When I got married and moved in with his family. Looking up, there was only the tilt roof. Looking down, only earth. What could you possibly do with it? I have to rely on myself. I always think like this. When you were in bad situations, you need to find a way to get by. You have to think and work, earn money with your bare

[39] Interview, D13, 03/2012.
[40] Interview, D80, 28/03/2012.

> hands. No one dares to criticise you [your morals] if you work hard enough." (Interview, D2, 08/03/2012)

The above account highlights the symbolic meaning of the physical structure of a home. To most displacees, their sense of independence derives from building up a dwelling space that holds their family under a roof against the backdrop of systematic oppressions and material deprivations. The materiality of their homes witnessed their journey of striking roots, making the place a site of their sanctuaries, or reassociating with the place where they belong. Those buildings are evidence of their independent and tenacious characters. By keeping their family sheltered, their home-making practices also demonstrate their moral and social standings. As the most crucial component of their family wealth,[41] the demolished homes were a symbol of family legacy to be carefully preserved. The preservation, maintenance and accumulation of family assets through building decent homes established their moral positions in the lineage of their families and kinships running through their ancestors to the generations yet to come. Whilst not every member in the family line could contribute to the (re)production and the accumulation of familial wealth, glorifying the family name; it is the responsibility of each member to at least protect the family wealth and absolutely avoid frittering away family legacies. The loss of family property tends to induce guilt and devastating loss of standing in the family, especially to the senior generations. Commenting on the Expo-induced displacement, the third time of losing his family property under the CPC, Mr. Wang was furious but also regretted not being able to preserve his family legacy: 'my grandpa had a small shop. The party took it away and called us a bourgeoisie family…We claimed our allegiance to the party but it took our home again in the 1990s. This is our third time my family has been robbed by the Communist Party…I got nothing to pass down to my son now. He can expect nothing from us now'.[42]

There is a practical value of intergenerational wealth transfer. It stabilises family relations and reinforces mutual support and dependency between family members. This however is only a small part of a network that the displacees relied on in their

[41] It is quite interesting that both public housing tenants and private homeowners claim their absolute ownership of their properties. The public tenants frequently justify their claim based on their sense of entitlement as socialist workers. The regulatory practices *de facto* acknowledged them as the owners. Unless there are any disruptive events, such as *chaiqian*, their families can live in the property for as long as they like. Even in the event of *chaiqian*, they may receive a compensation package or be sheltered in public housing elsewhere. Private homeowners on the other hand rejected upfront the arbitrary separation of land use right from ownership as in the Land Act for the land underneath their properties. They strongly hold that the land was passed down from their ancestors and the party simply robbed them of it with its coercive power.

[42] Interview, D113, 18/06/2012.

everyday life. Similar to what Fried (1966) or Herbert Gans (1962) found in the context of the US, or to the literary representations of *penghu* residents (Wang, 2000, Cai, 2004), the significance of dense interpersonal relations in these neighbourhoods distinguish them from the middle-class neighbourhoods in Shanghai's highrises. In addition to their common ethnic origin and relatively low residential mobility over the years, the spatial patterns of their neighbourhoods certainly helped with the cultivation of those relations by encouraging greater tolerance of differences, empathetic understanding, and reciprocal relations. Because of the shortage of land supply, innovative solutions to accommodate family housing needs as I have described above frequently involve poaching on public space or posing minor troubles to their neighbours. These 'amoral' practices (Banfield, 1958), with an immediate interest toward one's own family; however, rarely cause drastic conflicts. There seemed to be a consensus between the residents, distinguishing understandable and tolerable spatial practices. According to displacees, the moral principles were simple and clear: no obvious threat to public safety and a severe shortage of housing in that family.

Precisely because of these 'amoral' practices and crowded living conditions, much of their everyday life took place on the narrow alleys shared with their neighbours next door (see Figures 4.5 and 4.7), such as cooking, dining, and laundry. Visiting their next-door neighbour's home or chatting by their doors was the most common leisure activity for the majority of the displacees. The domestication of the public space encourages face-to-face interactions in their everyday life. Mundane topics such as meal plans and domestic trifles were as much frequently exchanged in neighbourhood life as topics in the nature of gossip, rumours and moral judgement, such as divorce, impiety and criminal offense. Those frequent small talks as in the eyes of Wang Anyi (2003a), a reputed writer on Shanghai, are as intimate as our skin. The sounds overheard from the alleys, the busy life seen from the doorsteps and windows, and the smells of food from the alley are the power of *penghu* housing and make them an appealing and comfortable place to live. The intensive social contacts also encourage the development of supportive networks and altruistic behaviours. They looked out for each other, shared each other's joy and sorrow, and made themselves and their family a small tissue of their community as a big family. When I brought up the issue of community life, a woman could not stop telling me how grateful she was to her former neighbours.

> My old neighbours are great. If I was sick at home, they would come to check on me from time to time and even cook for me. There was this grandma next to our home. She was really nice to my family. She would look after my son whenever I

> needed…sometimes when I was working late on my shift, I did not even have to ask, she would pick up my son from the kindergarten. She would say, "don't worry. No rush from work. I will take care of him". She was really kind (D18, female, 03/2012).

Accounts of this kind are not only common in my fieldwork transcripts but also quite popular in literary products lamenting the 'community lost' in a globalising Shanghai (Cockain, 2012). In *Fuping* (Wang, 2000), we find a disabled child receiving warm support in his everyday life from all the neighbours, whereas in *Diceng* (Cai, 2004),we read of the money-lending practices amongst the housewives to help each other make ends meet. If those residents were different from the mainstream Shanghai society, it is their value of such intimate, supportive, and warm relationships—the spirit of *gemeinschaft*—that 'deviate' from the norms in a modern city populated with unrelated strangers. Through those everyday contracts, they also learned to negotiate, to compromise, to understand, and to resolve conflicts in their everyday life: cooking schedules were arranged; water tap were shared; public bathrooms were cleaned in rotation.

To modern standards, it seems that the crowded and dense space brings the issue of privacy. However, the displacees, like the West Enders in Gans' *Urban Village* (1962: 21) 'knew so much about each other that there is no need for prying'. Through everyday contacts over the years, they came to know not only each other's family but also their frequent visitors such as their relatives, their friends and their co-workers.[43] Nevertheless, they were never nosy about private matters behind the doors. But, they were also never willing to walk away from intervening in domestic conflicts in other's homes. They have a strong tendency to become a part of each other's life when they in need but they also tend to maintain a reasonable boundary toward their own families. This group experiences gave them a sense of belonging and security. Because of the relative stability of their group, social control was strong in the demolished neighbourhoods. The public gaze, organic and bottom-up, maintains social order and censors social morality when the state retreated from intervening private spheres.

> On my way to food market, if I bought a lot on that day, neighbours would ask what the occasion was. I would tell them that my brother-in-law and my sister-in-law were visiting their parents on that day. They would then know, the son and daughter of my parents-in-law were performing their filial obligations and caring about their aging parents. Otherwise, they would remind them to visit their parents more often next time (Interview, X41, 16/05/2013).

[43] One displacee referred to the senior woman living next door as one of his family because she knew every member of his family. She also attended the funeral of his grandfather.

The sense of community and the mutual support and trust compensated their loss from the ongoing reform. Direct compensation was also generated from their economic activities in the neighbourhoods. Many displacees had small businesses (grocery store, hardware store, food store) or offered petty services (such as hair-cutting, bicycle repair, etc.) in their neighbourhoods in order to supplement their family income. Many of those business owners were those laid-off industrial workers. In some neighbourhoods, many families also rented out the empty rooms or purposely built simple shacks for the newly arrived migrants in the city with the same hope as the first generation of their families in colonial Shanghai.[44]

Furthermore, the displacees were also compensated by the closeness to their workplace, reducing their cost of commuting. A majority of the displacees from Pudong were employed by the Shanghai No. 3 Steel Company. It is not uncommon that two or three generations from the same family worked there before the company went bankrupt in the reform era. The collective consumption facilities (inter alia, library, gym, basketball court, cinema, hot water supply) of this steel factory were accessible to every member of their families but were also extendable to neighbours of the factory, similar to Shell's community relations project in *Flammable* (Auyero and Swistun, 2009) but mixed with logic of socialist welfare. However minimally, those semi-public factory facilities and services, free of charge or with nominal fees, developed a reciprocal patron-client relationship between the displacees and the factory. The steel company therefore also gained the reputation as *san laoban* among the displacees (Boss Three, in English), for its 'generosity' for the community welfare.[45]

Psychological, social and economic bonds as such tied the displacees closely to their place and nurtured their minds to escape from ruthless state intervention and appropriation of their space. Many of them held a grudge against the state for selling their land in the 1990s without their knowledge.[46] They also resented the planning control that regulates their own land, forbidding them from renovating or rebuilding their homes. A majority of the displacees also rejected the idea of *chaiqian* as they see their improved houses could accommodate their housing satisfactorily. Even if

[44] I do not have comprehensive statistical data of all neighbourhoods on this point. But according to the statistics from Shanggang Xincun Street Office, one neighbourhood in Pudong, more than 2000 households out of 4,163 displaced households were relying on the rent to survive. Data from other neighbourhoods is unavailable. But according to the recollections of the displacees, it was a common livelihood strategy.
[45] Interview, D101, 18/04/2012.
[46] A few neighbourhoods in Pudong were *de facto chengzhongcun* whose land was appropriated yet the residents were not displaced.

their house was not ideal yet, they had the plan to upgrade it when they could afford as they had been doing it in the past.

> I don't want displacement at all. Our son already moved out after he got married. The only downside of my old home was the small size. But, I don't care how small the room is. It was close to hospitals, close to my son, close to my friends, and close to my old work place. For us, a couple of two, it was enough (male, displaced from Puxi, interview X43, 21/05/2012).

> My old house was enough for me. I had a separate room to sleep, separate room to eat and to cook. I had everything [like modern apartments]. I was happy….The place was so much better. We had many seniors living there. Their common leisure was sitting outside, chatting, playing cards, etc. No strangers would walk in. You leave your door wide open and no thief could walk in without being identified immediately (male, displaced from Pudong, interview D48, 19/03/2012).

However, there is also a 'shadow side' in their attachment to the place (Chawla, 1992: 66), fostering the negative bonds with their place. The consequences of systematic exploitation in the past became increasingly distressing to many residents. First of all, due to the under-investment in their neighbourhoods, they were confronted with many practical problems in their everyday life. For example, as a combined result of the low-lying geographical conditions, inadequate infrastructure and constant damage of existing facilities from industrial and new housing development, many neighbourhoods were under the threat of flood and fire. One neighbourhood (houtan) was not connected with running water supply until the 1990s. These negative experiences affect the way they see their neighbourhoods and foster their acceptance of the dominant idea of a hierarchical place. When asked to describe their neighbourhoods, some residents internalised the stigma and referred to their place as *penghuqu*.[47] In their clarifications, they activated the images and activities—old and new—associated with *penghuqu* such as emptying nightstools, small and dark rooms, organic spatial patterns. Some displacees saw the concentration of new migrants, who are 'uncivilised' and 'low quality', with 'different habits and customs' from Shanghainese,[48] as the problem, stigmatising their neighbourhoods as *penghuqu*. These are text-book examples of lateral denigration, mutual distanciation and corrosion of sense of self, product of territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2007, Wacquant et al., 2014). In a much simpler way, some displacees emphasised 'the lack' in their original community as compared to the modern planned communities they currently lived in, the lack of enough living space, the lack of green space, the

[47] This may have implications for the health and well-being of the dwellers in stigmatised areas. Yet, for this project, I did not have sufficient data to make such claim. See Pearce (2012a).
[48] Interview, D13, D21, D80, 03/2012.

lack of beautiful looks, etc. Whilst some of the lack is acquirable through their efforts, most of the lack they listed is beyond their present capacity. But, even if they could do so, we cannot ignore that each attempt means digging another hole in their life.

Another big problem for them was the industrial pollution from so many factories concentrated in their neighbourhoods. Different from the toxic experience in *Flammable* (Auyero and Swistun, 2009), where contradictory views on the existence and nature of contamination created 'toxic uncertainty' , the displacees were unanimous about their environmental suffering and neither did they have any confusion about the dominators, because of the visibility of pollutants.

> Smoke never stops coming out from the chimneystacks of the steel factories. If you dry your clothes outside or air your quilt on a sunny day, a few minutes later, dirt, or something filthy would be all over them. It also drops on your clothes, your hair, and flies in from your window to your room (Interview, D11, 09/03/2012).

Like residents in *Flammable*, they seldom pursued any political actions in the past. Their dependence on those factories for employment and communal welfare is for sure one explanation. Two more additional explanations can be expected here: their acute sense of their powerlessness and their rationality of subsistence ethics. Many polluters are owned by national state and national functional agencies and are beyond the control of the municipal government. The two big companies, the Jiangnan Shipyard Group and the Shanghai No. 3 Steel company occupied such a massive land parcel that it is unthinkable to relocate them elsewhere. Hoggart (2009 [1957]: 63-64) rightly points out, that, 'when people feel that they cannot do much about the main elements in their situation, feel it not necessarily with despair or disappointment or resentment but simply as a fact of life, they adopt attitudes toward that situation which allow them to have a liveable life under its shadow, a life without a constant and pressing sense of the larger situation'. Indeed, for many displacees, pollution was tolerated for their more urgent need to survive. To quote Bauman's (1989: 130) comment on willing subordination in a totally different context, 'they could not choose between good and bad situations, but they could at least choose greater and lesser evil'. More than one interviewee constantly reminded me that,

> for the poor who are struggling to have their basic living needs met, a better physical environment is a luxury to pursue in life. Unless you die instantly from the pollution, chronic contamination is a part of your fate (Interview, D111, 06/2012).

The negative bonds with their place, confronted by their incapacity to change or escape, foster their hope for external forces to invest in their neighbourhoods and to improve their living conditions. For those *zhiqing* and the socialist workers, they believe it is the right thing and about the right time for the state to take this role, as a remedy to the sufferings they have unjustly endured. Their view was also shared by those who were formerly excluded from the socialist welfare system, such as those *danwei* dormitory lodgers and private homeowners. Their dependency on external force to improve their living conditions coincides with the state agenda of gentrifying their neighbourhoods through the gestural offer of a modern apartment that provides that all their current residence lacks on one condition, that these residents gave up their place. Of course, the exploitative logic is well packaged in the euphemism of better life, or progress, to avoid undermining the legitimacy. Like political elites elsewhere, the elites in Shanghai manipulated the poor people's hope. What those displacees truly wanted was not a new apartment, or progress, but improvement in their living conditions, access to 'the lack', which has been denied in the name of their weak purchasing power. According to my survey, among 177 residents who hoped for housing improvement from the Expo site, 121 residents (68.3%) were willing to share the cost and they were joined by another 27 residents if their share was below 30 per cent. The elimination of the option to stay, dried out the territorial resources that might have bonded the residents to organise and protest. In accepting the proposal of wholesale demolition with an offer of modern apartments from the bulldozer regimes, the displacees not only submitted to the *doxic* rules of the neoliberal housing regime but also legitimatised the appropriation of their properties and foregone injustice that they have endured from the socialist regime in the past.

Conclusion

This chapter sets the scene for the Expo-induced displacement by offering a close look at the displacees' lived experiences in their homes and their vulnerabilities to *chaiqian*. I have attempted to carve out multiple meanings and experiences of home, and capture symbolic violence exercised through the reductionist view of home as a material good and a financial asset whose exchange value triumphs its use value. To most displacees, home is first of all a *necessity* for their survival and their only foothold in the city. In striking their roots in Shanghai over the years, their investment in homes in the form of labour, money, emotion and time, witnessed their livelihood struggle and constitutes an important part of their sense of self. Rooted in the demolished place, they also built their social networks united by a strong sense of community and mutual support, an important source of their social capital. Moreover,

spatial practices of constantly making and remaking a durable and decent place to live through collective effort over generations contributed to the maintenance of family lineage and kinship networks and testified to the moral standing of the dwellers in the family line. For sure, home is not experienced in the same way to all. Similar to feminist arguments, lived experiences of home are ambivalent. Housing distress, toxic habitat and pejorative representations affected some displacees' experiences to great extent. Their perceptions of their positions in the society and their economic incapacity incarcerated them here, despite their yearning for positive change, a decent home. Home in ideal imagination is a source of comfort, security and satisfaction, at least decency. This is the motivation underlying many displacees' constant investment in their homes, improving their living conditions, whenever they were able to. However, the displacees' understanding of home was defenceless in the housing field in contemporary Shanghai. Not only the exchange value of their properties is significantly suppressed and undermined by economic and spatial activities under different regimes of accumulation, but also the symbolic value of their houses was completely removed from the Expo-induced spatial reconfiguration. The displaced were dispossessed of their land, their homes, their communities, their past, and their livelihood. It is only with this background in mind that we can understand the meaning of loss to the displacees in this land war. Domicide is more than the loss of a material space to live. It means an extraction of material and symbolic capitals, an alienation of dweller's identities, and a disruption to or even a dissolution of a stable biological and social reproduction project. The displacees were forced to enter into the housing field and accept or entertain the logic that the exchange value of the resettlement properties defines and upgrades their positions in society. Yet for most displacees, a new home remains primarily a crucial space for them to live and to survive.

Symbolic violence also finds expression through the activation of the hierarchical notion of *xiazhijiao* and *penghuqu* in defining the identity of the pre-Expo site and evoking revolting images and imagination about the place and the occupants. Those representations failed to capture the layered structural forces in shaping the formation of those neighbourhoods and turned deaf ears to the lived experiences of those occupants who through constant struggles made this place their sanctuaries. For these failures, such products not only recreated the same myth about those 'deviating' neighbourhoods but also justified their annihilation by the state, and even consolidated the state's legitimacy through the discourse of *fanshen*.

The symbolic violence exercised through such representations is challenged by my attempt of reconstructing the history of *xiazhijiao* and *penghuqu* under different regimes of accumulation. As Wacquant (2008: 1-2) argues, 'urban marginality is not everywhere woven of the same cloth, and, all things considered, there is nothing surprising in that. The generic mechanisms that produce it, like the specific forms it assumes, become fully intelligible once one takes caution to embed them in the historical matrix of class, state and space characteristic of each society in a given epoch'. By looking at the interplay between state, class, ethnicity and space under different regimes of accumulation, the historical exercise I take in this chapter treats the formation and fixation of those neighbourhoods and the concentration of poor residents as a result of an ongoing and consistent process of exploitation, exclusion and symbolic violence, locking up the marginalised in a stigmatised place. Both in the past and in the present, neighbourhoods in *xiazhijiao* have served as an attractive shelter for the poor, the marginalised and the migrants in succession. The annihilation of *penghuqu* and their siblings in *xiazhijiao* therefore can be seen as part of 'the systematic plan to expel the low-income and unwanted population from the face of the earth' (Harvey, 2010: 245), or at least from the horizon of the rich in Shanghai.

The attitudes of the dispossessed toward such expulsion programmes however are not as straightforward as Harvey would imagine. In this chapter, I have also tried to tease out the mixed feelings of the displacees toward the state due to repeated displacement, which encouraged them to attach firmly to the home and the community they lived in on the one hand and fostered their sense of injustice and delusional hope for a caring state to take due responsibility for their well-being on the other. Their ambivalence is further reinforced by their mixed residential experience and restrained by their inability to change or to escape. The mixed positive and negative feelings put a limit on their agency. The reliance on external forces, primarily the state, to improve their living conditions surrendered their power to control the repressive production of space in the neoliberal era, which is examined in chapters 5 to 7. This finding must be read as evidence against a recent offensive argument made by Kearns and Mason (2013) claiming that when people choose to move, then the process does not count as displacement. The hypocrisy in their middle-class point of view is that for victims of displacement, the choice of a decent place to live are always constrained, and that in fact they do not really have a choice to make.

Chapter 5 : Wounded Life in the Domicide Zone: Oppression, Fear and Despair

> We have no words to speak about our oppression, our distress, our bitterness, and our revolt against the exhaustion, the stupidity, the monotony, the lack of meaning of our work and of our life, against the contempt in which our work is held; against the despotic hierarchy of the factory; against a society in which we remain the underdogs and in which goods and enjoyments that are considered normal by other classes are denied to us and parceled out to us only reluctantly, as though we were asking for a privilege. We have no words to say what it is and how it feels to be workers, to be held in suspicion, to be ordered around by people who have more and who pretend to know more and who compel us to work according to rules they set and for purposes that are theirs, not ours. And we have no words to say all this because the ruling class has monopolized not only the power of decision-making and of material wealth; they have also monopolized culture and language.
>
> André Gorz, in *Justice and the Politics of Difference*

Introduction

This chapter endeavours to direct the analytical language from property rights and just compensation to the oppression and sufferings the displacees endured in losing their homes and communities. The first rationale of doing this is, as I believe, that much of the lasting traumatic effects of domicide as I uncovered from the life of the displacees in the resettlement sites, which I will pick up in chapter 8, cannot be fully understood without an adequate account of the social process and conditions that bred them. The pain of losing frequently exceed, perpetuate and aggravate the pain of loss. Along with the loss of their homes, many displacees also lost their dignity as a human being. Secondly, it serves as a response to the appeal from Libby Porter (2009) who urges us to hear out the lived experiences of displacement and eviction patiently and compassionately. Her plain yet powerful question asks, 'what the daily grind of being displaced actually looks and feels like' (p. 397). To address this question, I will rely heavily on the testimonies from the displacees in order to reconstruct the process of domicide and glimpse into its traumatic impacts upon their bodies and mind, both have been suppressed under the media boosterism. The nature of this question determines that my language in this chapter is mostly descriptive. The brutal and violent realities of displacement and eviction must be told in flesh and blood as the

attempt to overly 'estheticize or theorise those lived realities out of existences as felt pain and passions' is to 'lose the raw anger against injustices and exploitation that powers much of the striving for social change' (Harvey, 1996: 37).

To foreshadow some results of this chapter, the experience of domicide is comparable to that of a war victim, filled with sentiments of insecurity, powerlessness, fear, terror, and despair. Despite the nuances in their feelings, the grief syndrome is prevalent (Fried, 1966, Porteous, 1989, Porteous and Smith, 2001, Fullilove, 2005, Vine, 2010), widely endured by the displacees across the lines of age, gender and class. I argue that this war-like experience is attributable to the bulldozer regime's domination of time and space, and the systematic violence against the displacees inside the domicide zone, which repressively aggregated their pain from existing forms of domination in their quotidian everyday life, such as repressive spatial order, capitalistic domination in the workplace, patriarchy at home, etc. The displacees appropriated this domicide time and space in heterogeneous ways, which in turn shaped the course and intensity of their feelings and influenced their political agency. Their variegated experience of domicide unfortunately created discordance in their political views and actions, and undermined their solidarity to act upon their grievances and fight for their homes and communities collectively. This last point shall add our understanding to the political inactions of the displacee as I have analysed in the previous chapter and individualised resistance as discussed in existing literature (Hsing, 2010a).

'Where is the sunshine? It felt like you are at a war!'

The Expo-induced displacement is unanimously represented as a harmonious, civilised, ordered, and most importantly joyful and caring process in local newspapers and formal publications. According to official reports, 'only' 80 households out of 18,000 registered households were evicted by force (Cui, 2007). Harassment, intimidation and violence against the displacees were under zero tolerance policy. The practice of the Expo-induced displacement turned over the darkest history of *chaiqian* in Shanghai and even established as best practices widely promoted in other parts of Shanghai (Ye and Cen, 2005). The impression one may have after reading those prose and documents affirms the platitudes that displacement is not always against the will of the displacees; it is not a bad thing and it may even be in the best interest of the displacees after all. Here are two representative articles I selected from 62 non-exhaustive news clips from three local

newspapers (Xinmin Evening News, Wenhui News and Jiefang Daily) from 2005 to 2006 when displacement was most intensely carried out.

> Waves of laughter were overheard from Bailianjing of Zhoujiadu Street Office, Nancun of Shanggang Street office, and Nanmatou of Nanmatou Street Office in Pudong: as the first group of the Expo-induced displacees, they signed the resettlement agreement with smiles, left their old home with smiles, and welcome the Expo with smiles. They moved homes happily...Zhang Xuebing [the Governor of Pudong] and Du Jiahao [Member of Standing Committee of Shanghai Municipal Government] presented them a fan engraved with 'better city, better life', flowers and cakes, wish them happier life after Sunshine Displacement (*yangguang dongqian*) (Wenhui News, 11/04/2005).

> Entitled as 'Six hundred jinqi (red banners) testify the support of the Displacees', the other article relates to a story of Mr Xie, who held out and was determined to be a nail household. However, six days before he finally agreed on a resettlement deal, he presented a red banner poetically written with 'caring like relatives, edifying like teachers' to the *chaiqian* agents, and expressed gratitude and admiration to the chaiqian agents, 'you have talked to me for more than twenty times. Even if you decide to evict me, I am determined to present you this banner.' Self-claimed as a 'nail', he finally came around because his heart was 'melted' by the sincerity of the chaiqian agents. To quote, 'They treat me as a friend, as a family member, which make me feel warm' (Jiefang Daily, 05/12/2005).

And, a few photos copied from an album entitled 'People's Expo' to give a more vivid impression of the Expo-induced displacement.

Figure 5.1: Expo-Induced Chaiqian Propaganda
Source: People's Expo Editorial Committee (2011)

Featuring the smiling faces of the displacees, the friendly and considerate *chaiqian* agents, full walls of red banners painted with grateful words in bright yellow colour,

along with many other evocative words and images, those celebratory accounts 'convincingly' substantiate the dominant representation of the Expo-induced displacement as a process of *yangguang dongqian*, in which the displacees were bathed in the sunlight from the radiating sun, i.e. the bulldozer regime. The metaphoric reference to sunshine is rooted in the Chinese cosmology of solar worship (Smith, 1957) and politicised into the worship of an emperor as a personified god (Gao, 2002) ruling over the cosmos under Mandates of Heaven (*tianming*). From the death of feudal emperors arises the organisational emperor, the Communist Party (Zheng, 2010). The old wine of emperor worship was poured into a new bottle. This is most evidently seen in the cult of Mao. In a religiously fanatic way, Mao was mythologised as the sun, the great saviour of the Chinese people, lifting them out of wars, poverty and oppression, represented in the song *The East in Red* or *The Never Setting Sun Rising over the Prairie* (Bauer, 1976). The sunshine metaphor therefore maintains an ideological continuity. By this rhetoric, the bulldozer regime attempted to appeal to the symbolic meanings of the sunlight in expelling the darkness, to conjure up subjective feelings of warmth, security, trust, vibrancy and effervescences. Moreover, the goal was to reinforce the image of the communist party-state, head of the bulldozer regime, as the compassionate, caring and loving saviour to the displacees inside the zone of domicide who were trapped in a hazardous habitat and financially incapable of improving their housing conditions under the emerging housing and land regime.

Elitist in origin and propaganda in nature, those media products are stamped with the interest of the global 'event-media-capital' complex (Lenskyj, 2000, Horne, 2007), producing and maintaining the facade of 'better city, better life'. As the famous line in *1984* by George Orwell (2013: 40) reminds us well, 'those who control the present control the past and those who control the past control the future'. Bearing this insight on the politics of truth, I set out to identify the distances, between lived experiences of displacement and media representations, and between policy on paper and policy in practice (Wacquant, 2008). One of my questions to the displaced was, 'how do you feel about the *yangguang dongqian*?' Rather than elicit a straightforward reply, the response I frequently got was raised eyebrows and a rhetorical question asked in anger and contempt, *where was the sunshine*? Uncle Chen, a state-owned enterprise worker in his late fifties, once humoured me when we talked in a community garden in Pujiang, 'well, some people did see the sunshine. Those people always cause a headache to the Communist Party. The sunshine was so strong that burnt those people's back'. Like a political scientist, he then insightfully commented on the legitimacy of the party-state based on his wisdom as a savvy

worker, 'the Communist Party is never going to be afraid of those who are determined to use force. If you are too poor to feed yourself, they will be sacred and have to give you a bowl of rice. But if you pick up a knife to fight, they have guns, missiles, and atom bombs'. What he seemed to imply are two messages. Firstly, the domicide experience is ambivalent, stratified, or even bifurcated; at least the housing needs of some residents were taken very good care of by the bulldozer regime. Secondly, livelihood security and benevolence are at the moral centre of state-society relations (Shue, 2004, Wright, 2010, Perry, 2008) and constitute the role expectations in political situations. Militant resistance without the justification of violating these moral orders is an open invitation to state oppression through its monopolistic control of physical violence, and vice versa.

The first message was supported by my survey on self-reported satisfaction of the displacement and resettlement. One question asked the respondents to indicate their emotional state at the time of domicide with a five point scale and the mean score returned at 3.05, approximate to the tipping point to a positive attitude (mean score=3.5). However, after reading more than one thousand pages of transcripts and my fieldwork notes, neither his two messages nor the survey result can hold. It strikes me that the utterances from the displacees I worked with are overwhelmingly negative, reflective in their tones, in the choice of words, metaphors, *chengyu* (set phrases), and in their facial expressions and emotional state I observed. Their suffering comprises not only reflections on the loss of places and the collapse of attachment structure, but simultaneously and more importantly interweaves with the loss of dignity and the collapse of the moral universe in defending their sanctuary space (Franco, 1985), which offered them support, trust and intimacy and immuned them from state oppression and violence. Those accounts are filled with pain, depression, fatalism, indignation, disappointment and frustration.

The sharp discrepancy is likely to be caused by my negligence and lack of reflectivity in the survey design. I committed an even worse mistake than Erikson (1976). My question asking the respondents to encapsulate a wide range of emotions and quantify them with a number must have sounded so absurd and unintelligible to them. My inquiry to the process of displacement at interviews and chit chats may have pushed them, including the 'happy movers' to ponder and reflect upon their experiences of bargaining, waiting, packing, leaving, accepting and adjusting, to great details. In doing these mnemonic exercises, the suppressed or marginalised memories might have flashed back to their focus, or as Halbwachs (1992) argues, those memories are reconstructed for the purpose of rationalising a coherent

experience of suffering in the present, which is overwhelmingly negative. In this sense, those memories are retrospective and political in nature. But, even there are mistakes, distortions or exaggerations in their accounts, we cannot simply depreciate values. Here, I find Janet Walker's (2003) notion, 'paradox of trauma' very instructive, and argue that flawed or even false memories are part of the experience of trauma, are symptoms of grieving, and are the wounds that remind us of the human sacrifices made for the 'best ever' Expo. To many displacees, especially the seniors, the Expo-induced displacement was lived like a war, in which they were not simply refugees and victims of atrocity, but 'soldiers' from the opposing side to the state. It is a result of different forms of oppression laboured by the bulldozer regime and their accomplices. The warlike experience features in the profound sensations of disorder and chaos and in the feelings of powerlessness, anxiety, insecurity, fear, alienation and despair, which temporarily suppressed the sentiments from the destabilised attachment structure.

> Not long after they started *chaiqian*, they cut off the water and electricity supplies to our village. In evenings, it was so dark. You felt like you were living in a dark forest. It was so dark that you cannot see your hand in front of your face (*shenshou bujian wuzhi*). [YZ: they cut off your electricity and water?] Unbelievable, right? Cutting off electricity already made your life as hell. You must know, the water from the river now is not drinkable any more. Thirty years ago, you could still fetch some water from the river and use alum to settle the turbid water. You could see your shadow reflected in the water. But now, tons of alum would not have the same effect. Cutting off your water was in fact cutting off your food supply. You cannot eat raw rice. It was not at war, like in the Battle of Sangkumaryung Ridge. You cannot live without water and food [like in the war] (Mr Qian, male, late 60s, displaced from Sanlin, Interview, D29, 12/ 03/2012).

> The minute the *dongqian* team moved in, they told us that this place must be razed in three months. It was like a war. It happened so fast. They promised three months but in less than a month almost all families had been displaced. They told us that the sooner you move out the sooner you see the benefits of displacement (*zao zou zao deyi*). Is it moving? It was fleeing. Just like refugees. (Mrs Sun, female, late 50s, displaced from Pudong, research notes, 14/05/2012).

> At that time, it makes you feel like at war. You know anti-Japanese war, right? It was like that. Everywhere was in hubbubs. Every family was busy packing. All sorts of bags, appliances, and furniture, filled with every one's homes. Jingling and banging, [My family rode with the trucks] all the way to the countryside with all those boxes and bags. It felt like you were fleeing from a calamity (Mr Zhao, male, late 70s, displaced from Puxi, survey interview, 21/07/2012).

These alternative narratives of warlike experience not only problematise the politics of history writing but also subvert the moral order underpinning the domination of the predatory accumulation regime. Its emergence as a referential frame is understandable, however. In addition to the performative power of excessive media products on anti-Japanese war in China (Wang, 2012), many displacees witnessed, suffered and even served in the wars for China's independence. The cultural knowledge and lived experience of the chaos and upheavals of wars therefore provide displacees with the frame and the vocabulary to make sense of the traumatic events. Moreover, I also suspect that it is influenced by the inflation of warfare metaphors in political discourses and the prevalence of 'warfare strategies' employed by the displacers (see the next chapter).

'Negotiating' Domicide: The Cost of Speed

The warlike experience is firstly a result of the rigorous pursuit of speed at all costs, so compressing and depressing that it exposed the displacees to even more aggressive exploitation and domination, intensifying their anxieties and securities in the rapidly neoliberalising economy. The duration of domicide time is subordinated to the time of the master planning and construction of the Expo pavilions. Unlike displacement caused by infrastructure or gentrification projects, the Expo project is too big to fail. Instead of a flexible deadline contingent on the progress of displacement, the Expo strictly enforced a fixed deadline for knocking down all existing building structures, beyond which not only significant financial costs would be incurred but also the reputation of Shanghai as the host city and a global-city-to-be would be in jeopardy. The duration of domicide varied in locations, ranging from one month at least to a year at most, with an average of three months before a neighbourhood of roughly one thousand households were completely bulldozed. However, for any cooperative family, the displacement process rarely took more than a couple of weeks. In this regard, a figure widely cited and touted as a miracle in the local media is indicative of the breathtaking pace of displacement. Allegedly, on a single day, around one thousand households signed the resettlement agreements[1].

For sure, in those celebratory accounts, lip service was paid to the great sacrifice made by the displacees and to the enormous pressure professionally handled by the *chaiqian* agents. However, what they have understated is the stress endured by the displacees in this process. A major source of their stress comes from the hegemonic and compressed domicide time within the zone of displacement. Here, the bodily

[1] Jiefang Daily, 26/02/2006.

time, the calendar time, the industrial time, the family time and so on, structured the quotidian life of the displacees became irrelevant and were displaced by the clock time of the bulldozer regime. War of displacement did not simply disrupt the organisation and structure of the displacees' everyday life, but exploited, colonised and dictated the life-world of the displacees, forcing them to make a 'rational' choice. According to the regulation, the public nature of the Expo-induced displacement entitled the labourer to two days of paid leave. Unsurprisingly, however, none of the displacees was aware of the existence of this regulation. Even after I informed many of them, their immediate response, unanimously, was to ridicule my question, rather than blame the exploitative nature of displacement regime. The overwhelming worry over employment and livelihood would have discouraged them from defending their legal rights should they had known it at that point. The *chaiqian* agents on the other hand take displacement as a profession, and were instructed to work against the clock. Therefore, negotiation meetings were squeezed into any possible free time of the displacees, putting the displacees into multiple exploitations. The destabilised work-life balance posed a challenge to the displacees for the demand of patience, endurance and strength. It is a valid conjecture that a good resettlement deal would eventually compensate the lost time and emotional suffering, but for most displacees, this process was so irritating, painful and helpless that they felt forced to surrender, as illustrated by the following testimonies.

Uncle Fang, now a retiree, told me his experience of 'double exploitation',

> At the time of displacement, it was the toughest time of our factory [a collective factory]. Restructuring of the ownership was on the way. Massive lay-offs also set in motion. Do you dare to take any time off to deal with them [*chaiqian* agents]? What if your factory put you on leave permanently? (Interview, D101, 18/04/2012)

Aunt Chen (in her fifties), eldest among her siblings and a full-time caretaker of her father, bitterly condemned the bulldozer regime for taking advantage of their family emergency at the time of displacement while her father (paralysed) groaned in bed repeatedly during the interview,

> Before the announcement of displacement, my father was just diagnosed with bladder cancer. He had cancer before. In 2000, one kidney was surgically removed. He was then in hospital for a major surgery for a second time. We worried sick for him and we spent all our time at the hospital with him… People say good things come in pairs. So does bad luck. Earlier that year, my mother just had a major surgery for the bowel cancer. Do you think we had any extra time back then? We did not have any energy or mood (*xinqing*) to deal with the hassles of displacement. We asked our youngest brother to deal with the *chaiqian* company. But he was occupied

> by our father's surgery, too. He is the youngest of our family. Every family problem before was always first shouldered by his three elder sisters. He does not have the social experience (*shehui jingyan*) in dealing with this kind of thing [displacement].But we did not have a choice but to ask him. We did not have a choice, really….Can you hear that? Every time I talk about *chaiqian*, he [her father] cries. Every time, I am honest with you. It was more imperative to save the life of our father. We were scared by the recurrence of his cancer (Interview, D52, 21/03/2012).

What if the displacees say no to this domicide time? What happened to the woman I quoted in the beginning of this thesis is indicative of the horrendous consequences of prioritising job and everyday livelihood over *chaiqian*. Her family of three were excluded from negotiations for resettlement deals for a three storied self-built house owned by them and her brother's family. She never had the chance to speak with *chaiqian* agents. This led to her suicide attempt on the day of eviction.

> In 2002, both of us were bought out by the factory due to the Expo-induced relocation. [The severance payment was] Only 30,000 RMB.[2] We had to survive, right? With a huge mortgage, we bought a coach, cut a deal with a transport company and started the long-haul coach business. We have to work day and night, and literally, my husband and I had to live on the coach, otherwise we would end up in debt of thousands of RMB. Do you think we could stand such loss? When the displacement company came in 2005, we could not bear the costs of giving up the business. They [the *chaiqian* company] did not even bother to reach us to offer a resettlement deal. They only talked to my brothers living on the second floor. When we came back very late from work, we cannot find anyone from the *chaiqian* company to talk about the resettlement either. Without any words from them, they destroyed our home (Interview, D106, 04/2012).

It must be reminded that the decision of moving homes is far more complicated. It concerns more than technical calculation of property values, monetary compensation, division of family properties, locations of the resettlement apartments, commuting plans, but also negotiations of living arrangements, familial intergenerational moral obligations, and development of alternative livelihood strategies (Chen, 2009). Those decisions however were expected to be heroically made within a couple of weeks, creating enormous pressure on the displacees. Intrusive and repeated visits were made by *chaiqian* agents to disseminate information, persuade and talk the displacees into cooperation irrespective of the timing. It was rare to reach any agreement on an initial meeting. Stressful meetings of this kind often took several rounds, as some displacees commented; it was 'a seesaw battle'. Disagreements, frequent and inevitable, in many cases escalated to arguments, quarrels or even

[2] Roughly £ 3000.

physical fights. If the peaceful and happy negotiations were real rather than staged as represented in the images,[3] those occasions were 'deviants' whereas tensions and conflicts of various intensity were the norm. After all, three books were dedicated to the witty and resourceful bulldozer regime in resolving conflicts and preventing major social unrest because of the Expo. Those disruptive and dreadful encounters added to the psychological and physical strain.

Aunt Ma, a retired worker-cum-farmer, recalled her depression and deteriorated health condition after a few failed settlement meetings with tears,

> After the initial meetings, the *chaiqian* agents called me and asked to drop by for a visit. They said that I was too unreasonable (*nangao*). Like I told you before, I am out of condition. I cannot take any shock or surprise. [I have a]Heart problem. When the *chaiqian* agents were in my house, I felt scared suddenly. I was not lucid. My newly born granddaughter was crying all the time. And, I could not even hear her cry. My mind was like miles away. After that visit, I could not think. I could not work. I could not take care of my granddaughter. I did not remember to cook for the family, either. I felt apathy. I stayed at home dumbly and idly (*shasha daidai*). I could not sleep at night. I was incapable of looking after my own granddaughter. I bought a few books on infant care and even made a dietary plan for her. But I seemed distracted. When she was crying, I felt like I could not hear anything. My mind was far-gone. I did not know why she was crying. I did not remember to feed her. I could not focus on anything (Interview, D2, 08/03/2012).

Noticeably, this is a well-articulated account of the psychological state during displacement, diagnostic of the traumatic power of those intensive, recurrent, and distressing meetings where loss was negotiated and bargained. Her narrative did not offer much clue on the context that provoked her depression and numbness, but the character assassination *nangao* commented on by the *chaiqian* agents based on previous meetings hints that the process must not have been easy for her family. As judged from her reactions, the label *nangao* is less to stigmatise than to terrorise. A snapshot of an episode at a negotiation meeting offered by Grandma Wu (in her eighties), head of her family, shall enrich our understanding of the production of anxiety and fear of those encounters.

> Once, this Mr. Gao from the *chaiqian* company was at my home to offer a resettlement deal. There were some disagreements within our family. It [family conflict] was quite natural. Big family always has some conflicts between family

[3] I accidentally met one old woman from Pudong who was asked to pose for a photograph by the Party Secretary of her Residents Committee during the displacement to show her gratitude to the bulldozer regime. She was deeply regretting being coerced into taking this staged photo, which now undermines her claim to fair compensation after she discovered her family was significantly under compensated according to the regulation.

> members. They want our house but eventually they will give us resettlement housing. This Gao however meddled in our disagreement and tried to exploit this crack in our family (*cha yijiao*). We did not want to speak with him. We were then arguing and having a row. Suddenly, Gao pounded the table, giving off a very loud sound. I asked him, "Mr (*shifu*) Gao, are you here to negotiate or intimidate me today? If you are here to intimidate me, fine, I am an ordinary woman and could not bear your threat. If you are here to negotiate, then we sit down and talk". Can you believe it? He thumped our dining table! My son was furious, and asked him, "How dare you act so maliciously?" I could not be bothered talking to him. I told him, "pound as you wish. The table is mine. If you pound again, I will leave. I do not feel like continuing our negotiation. The house is mine. How come you are so menacing when you are after my house?" (Interview, D60, 22/03/2012).

Her account incisively ridicules any romanticisation of the negotiation meetings, as represented in the propaganda. Following Bourdieu (1991), I suggest that negotiation is a euphemism, concealing the hierarchical power relations of such encounters. Taken place in the homes of the displacees, a negotiation meeting however is a public encounter, infused with state power and authority but embedded in intimate relations of the displacees. Here, we may borrow Goffman's (1990) instructive notion, 'performance', to understand the exercise of power and the cause of her indignation. Like most displacees, she sensed no opportunity to stay put, and was expecting at least a dialogue, or a bargaining as in the marketplace, if not as in the ideal model of communicative action in the public sphere (Habermas, 1984). Her compromised script for the public performance however did not concede her moral authority as the head of her big family. Representing the state in appropriating the property, the *chaiqian* agent placed himself in a higher moral and political position. His actions declared the coercive power of the state. To this senior displacee however, let alone the morally corrupting exploitation of family disputes, his intervention in a family affair and subsequent act of pounding the table reversed the host-guest relations in this private sphere, thereby violating her moral standing as a family head and as a host. Despite her assertion of resistance out of anger, her family eventually reached a resettlement agreement at a later negotiation meeting. They moved out before the deadline out of fear and helplessness. It is hard to tell to what extent this episode may have influenced their final decision. But the story of Mr Wang, a retired bus driver shows that determined disobedience to authority would only escalate the situation, making the disobedient more vulnerable to stress, shame and terror. Subservience and resignation seems a practical choice to extricate from the emotional suffering and for harmony and equilibrium, as suggested by the comment 'if I cannot fight against you, I can avoid you (*gaobuguo ni, duode qi ni*)'

(17/03/2012). Listening to this comment with swearing words, one may easily relate to his deep sense of pain, injustice, and outrage.

> The *chaiqian* team came to my home every night. The mother fuckers (*tama de*) came to talk a lot of nonsense. I lost my temper in the end. Those mother fuckers came in around eight or nine o'clock every night. It was so fucking tiring. After one meeting, I told them not to come to my home any more. I warned them, "if you dare to come tomorrow like this late, be alert, I am going to kick you out with a rod". After this incident, they were afraid to come to my home. They came to my neighbours' [homes] but they avoided coming to mine. But they would not put this whole thing to a halt. Once they thought I was *nangao*, they sent the police, the street office officials, the Resident Committee and the *chaiqian* team to scare me, do my thought work (*sixiang gongzuo*), and called on a *xietiaohui* (a coordination meeting) in the end. My family was the first victim of this meeting…I was on a sick leave from the bus company at that point. I was just discharged by the hospital after my heart surgery. It was so fucking exhausting and draining. I was afraid that I was going to die of those meetings. My sister also came to talk to me. She was worried that I might have another heart attack. It is not worth it, is it? Just suck it up and move (Interview, D85, 01/ 04/2012).

His deposition unravels an important tactic of the *chaiqian* regime—the battlefield is changeable, subjected to the strategic calculation of the *chaiqian* regime. Once the negotiation meetings failed in the private arena, the *chaiqian* regime would mobilise the bureaucratic resources and organise coordination meetings in the public arena, retreating to the formal coercive power of the state. On those meetings, the displacees were exposed to the gaze of state agents from different departments on different levels. The asymmetrical power relations and the ritualistic settings brought alive the memory of *pidou dahui* (the struggle meetings) during the Cultural Revolution. Although physical violence akin to that of the struggle meetings rarely occurred, the 'thought work' imposed substantial symbolic violence, aggregated the pressures and engineered consent (Anagnost, 1997).

My analysis of the experience of being in the zone of domicide thus far disembeds the displacees from their family relations. If we peek into the domestic settings of the displacees, one may further nuance the domicide experiences as a result of existing power structure and domestic disputes within the displacees' families. In chapter 7, I shall zoom into those domestic arrangements and the collapse of family as a collective unit in resisting the bulldozer regime. Here, I wish to focus on their implications—the feelings of despair, helplessness, depression and alienation. Bourdieu's critical analysis on temporal power can inform our understanding of those extreme feelings. Although *hu* (household) was the legally defined unit of displacement, and all members of the household were legally constructed as

collective owners of the demolished properties and as named displacees, negotiation meetings rarely involved all members of a given household to voice their different concerns and to work out a satisfactory resettlement plan for all members. Voluntary resignation by the displacees from those meetings was common, but this was more likely caused by the lack of legal vocabulary, by distrust of own calculation inability, and by the intent to avoid intensifying latent familial conflicts rather than disinterest. In many cases however, the *chaiqian* agents purposely exploited existing family conflicts and power structure and excluded some family members from the decision-making for greater efficiency and effectiveness. The exclusion of those displacees on the one hand denies the right of those family members as the owners of the demolished properties and on the other hand renders their future unpredictable and dependant. Without any power to participate or influence the resettlement plan, their fate was placed in the hands of other family members whose ideal role was to liaison with the *chaiqian* agents and represent the interests of the rest, or at the mercy of the *chaiqian* agents who were expected to act compassionately and caringly to serve the interests of the displacees rather than the bulldozers. The division and co-optation of family members bred the exercise of absolute power over other members, increasing the latter's vulnerability to 'most brutal forms of manipulation of their fears and expectations' (Bourdieu, 2000: 230). For the excluded, the domicide time, following Bourdieu (2000), is 'an alienated time' featuring a helpless 'wait[ing] for everything to come from others, from the holders of power over the game and over the objective and subjective prospect of gain that it can offer' (p. 237). But for the displaced families as a whole, this is the moment of family estrangement, or in extreme cases, family break-down. Furiously blamed by many displacees, *chaiqian* not only killed their homes but killed their family, '*jiapo renwang*' (family broken, members dead) as in their original words.

I met Mr Gao (almost eighty years old) in a community garden in Pujiang. He isolated himself from the crowd and sat quietly in the corner. Living together with his son's nuclear family, he describes his relations to his son's family as worse than a lodger to a landlord. Emotionally distant to his son's family long before the displacement, he had envisioned an independent, peaceful and relaxing life after displacement through rearrangement of living space, away from frequent abusive arguments and quarrels with his daughter-in-law. As the named owner of a private apartment in a *lilong*, he however was excluded from all negotiation meetings, for his 'cognitive inability' (*gaobu qingshuang*) to understand the complexity of *chaiqian*. The exclusion forced him to accept whatever came his way.

> I have never seen the *chaiqian* regulation. I don't know the amount of money we received from the *chaiqian* company. I didn't know the living arrangement. I didn't know when to move. I didn't even sign the resettlement agreement. When my son told me to pack and move, I followed his orders and jumped on the truck (Interview, X32, 10/05/2012).

His exclusion was a result of the 'making-out' between *chaiqian* agents and his son during *chaiqian*. But the exclusion can also be engineered by the *chaiqian* agents. Drifting apart from his two sons, an old man in his sixties remarked on his exclusion with great anger and frustration:

> That night, the *chaiqian* agents went to my home and discussed with me and my two sons concerning the resettlement plan. It lasted until half nine or ten. We were all tired and my eldest son had to work early the following day. So we all agreed to convene the meeting again the following day. Later that night, my two sons walked past the *chaiqian* office. They were pulled into the office for another meeting without me. Around 11 o'clock, my younger son came back and woke me up. He asked me to come down to the office to sign the agreement. They had signed the agreement. I went ballistic and scolded him, "how dare you sign an agreement so casually?" Weren't the *dongqian* agents profiteering from my pain (*kaiyou*)? They took advantage of me. If Chairman Mao were alive, those agents would have definitely been executed by shooting. Are you serving the interest of the people or the country? Our family was set up (*kengle*) by the *chaiqian* agents (Interview, D54, 21/03/2012).

The Use of Fear

Living inside the zone of domicide is living inside chaos, suffused with violence and fear. The sensations of chaos was generated by the daily intensive flow of people, machinery and traffic in and out of the zone of domicide on a large scale, demolishing the lived space of the displacees and tearing apart the social fabric of the targeted communities. This was a state orchestrated effort to produce a 'landscape of fear' (Tuan, 1979), that of crime, of collateral damage, of property loss, of bodily harm, of emotional survival, and most importantly, a far greater fear of state power. Displacement and eviction frequently mixed the tactics of exhortation and intimidation (Zhang, 2001) whilst violence, physical or symbolic, was one of the chosen domination repertoires rather than a last resort. Although not all displacees were direct victims of physical violence, most of them personally witnessed the violent attacks and forcible evictions of their neighbours (see Table 5.1). Trauma may be personal but fear is infectious.

Table 5.1: Personal Experience of Illegal Chaiqian Tactics

Incident (N=300)	Direct Experience	Direct Witness
Harassing family members	49 (16.3%)	108 (36%)
Harassing and attacked by thugs	19 (6.3%)	115 (38.3%)
Damaging roads, water and electricity supply, and other infrastructures	50 (16.7%)	232 (77.3%)
Forcible eviction	19 (6.3%)	248 (82.7%)
Threaten job security	7 (2.3%)	0 (0%)

Source: My own survey, 2012

Indeed, fear is inherent, omnipresent and saturated in everyday life (Virilio and Richard, 2012) given the uncertainty (Giddens, 1990) and the risks (Beck, 1992b) we have to bear. Such quotidian experience of fear was intensified by and enmeshed with the 'situational fear' inside the zone of domicide. Those fears were diverse, explosive, inflating, conflating and mutually reinforcing, growing into such an acute and powerful state that it reached beyond the capacity of most displacees to control and to maintain a normal living. Such intense fear is one of the defining features of life during *chaiqian*, and shapes the choices of the displacees. In most cases, fear became so unbearable that the only way out of it was to compromise and move outside the zone as soon as possible.

The eviction of the migrants marked the political production of fear. The migrant workers as 'others' inside the domicide zone became the first group of victims due to their lack of entitlement to citizenship and property (Shin and Li, 2013, Shin, 2013). The elimination of the migrant workers was only a necessary preparation before setting in motion the organised crime,[4] further transforming the social geographies of the targeted communities. As the main users of the 'illegally' constructed houses and employees of rural enterprises, eviction was carried out cunningly through the destruction of 'illegal' buildings and suspension of unregistered or regulation-violating workshops. The eviction of migrants paralysed the social and economic organisation of the local communities and thereby demonstrated the inevitability of place annihilation. Like a rehearsal, it also proved the determination and solidarity of the bulldozers to destroy the space in a most effective and efficient way.

[4] To call many *chaiqian* tactics a crime is not exaggerating as testimonies I am about to present will show.

The declaration of *chaiqian* zone did not simply demarcate a no-go area but invited in a wide range of social actors to profiteer from the injuries of the displacees. Quite paradoxically, it was a site of decline and death but it was also the place of thriving economic opportunities. Not long after the migrants moved out, the crew of the bulldozer regime intruded, including the staffs from the *chaiqian* companies, government officials, construction workers, lawyers and if necessary mafias, most of which were outsiders to the local communities. Scavengers and second-hand goods recyclers soon followed and flooded in, collecting waste materials or looking for good bargains. Migrant workers and relocation companies were hired to help the displaced families to pack and move out. As soon as one family moved out, construction workers soon arrived, damaging the buildings to prevent squatting. The flow of large numbers of strangers compounded by the exit of the displaced families destabilized the social relations, and thereby undermined the sense of security inside the domicide zone that was based on familiarity, close community ties and trust between the neighbours (Zhang et al., 2009).

The dying landscape became a source of fear to the displacees. Strangers were perceived as threats to personal safety in the neighbourhoods. Not only did they outnumber the local residents, but their suspicious background amplified the anxieties and insecurities. Mr Zhu (in his forties) from Sanlin remarks on his fear,

> I work in Songjiang. It was far from Sanlin. So, sometimes I had to stay in the dormitory of the factory overnight. My wife had to stay at home alone. I was among the first few families that left the village at an early stage. They had already destroyed many buildings. All ruins. People with different backgrounds were everywhere, day and night. Black (gangsters) and white (lawful) —all sorts of people. She was scared at night. Indeed, no people would feel differently. I was also worried about her, a woman at home alone. You don't have a choice (Interview, D27, 11/03/2011).

Landscape speaks. It conveys semiotic messages (Herbert and Brown, 2006), but the message is not sent to the displacees alone. It extends to thieves and burglars. More than one displacee reported their personal experience of being robbed during *chaiqian*. Most crimes took place at night, but daytime robberies were not uncommon, making it difficult to predict and calculate the risks. Although the lost properties might not be of significant value (e.g. cell phones, petty cash, electronics), the direct experience of break-ins was traumatising. The fear of future crimes factored into many displacees' decisions to move out.

One woman in her seventies recalled her scare after a personal experience of a break-in,

> My husband was in hospital, so I was home alone. One night, a burglar broke into my home. I was in another room and heard some noise. But I did not realise it was a housebreaker. On the following morning, I found my home was trashed. All valuable belongings were gone. I was scared to death and agreed to move out (Interview, D102, 18/04/2012).

Unlike the middle-class who may influence the public discourse of security and erect walls to protect themselves in exclusionary spaces against unwanted dangerous others (Low, 2003, Pow and Kong, 2007), the displacees were living inside of a zone of abandonment. Increased risks to crimes and the actual rise of crime rates did not translate into a public agenda and increased police force, as investment in a dying place is a waste of public money. Crimes reported to the police were either deferred or ignored, as tracing burglars in a time of chaos was barely possible. And, sometimes, the lost properties were so trivial in value that the displacees decided not to go through the bureaucracy at all. On other accounts, suspecting and witnessing the police in collusion with some crimes, many displacees did not have any faith in the police to serve justice. Hence, the neoliberal subjectivisation of personal responsibility was effectively at work. The displacees were forced to remain vigilant, policing the flow of people and detecting potential criminal activities themselves. Such personal investment instead of reducing anxieties only intensified the fear of crimes, leading into bodily symptoms—over-alertness, nightmares, sleep deprivation, etc. For seniors, the ordeal was particularly painful to go through.

A woman in her sixties acutely recounts her dreadful experience of insomnia during *chaiqian*, mixed with a dry sense of humour,

> They [the thief] have some professional ethics (*zhiye daode*). They did not want your whole wallet, only after cash. No bank cards, no ID cards. Wallets were thrown on the ground. Also, your clothes were scattered all over your place. You would definitely feel scared. You could not sleep at night without worrying about being robbed. A little noise would wake you up. Insomnia, night after night. Too bitter (ku a), too bitter (Interview, D36, 15/03/2012).

No matter how hard the displacees tried to reduce their risks to crime through their own territorial actions, it was impossible to remain vigilant constantly for their other commitments (work, study, personal life, etc.). Any negligence would increase their vulnerability to robberies. Repeated suffering from burglaries and the absence of effective control from the police, pointed to a straightforward way out—accept the

deal and move out. This is a fine example of displacement by pressure in Marcuse's (1985) typology. Remarked by Aunt Cheng (in her fifties) on her frustration about the repeated break-ins,

> They [the local government] evicted the renters from my home. If they [the renters] did not move, *chengguan* [street order control officers] came and evicted them out. They pull down their rolling shutters and did not allow them to do business. Those rolling shutters were mine and several were stolen in the end. After the renters were gone, there were only three of us in my big house. How was it possible to watch over such a big yard? You had to sleep at night. You had to work during the day. Lots of stuff was stolen. My family did not want to move. So they sent in the scavengers. You cannot tell [who were thieves and who were scavengers]. Sometimes, they were just thieves. Would you be scared in the same situation? [Sigh], there was nothing you could do. Just sign and leave. It is more important to save life first (Interview, D117, 01/04/2012).

The sense of insecurity and fear was further intensified by the inconveniences, nuisances and danger of living in a construction site. Once a family agreed to move out, the piece-meal destruction was soon carried out, regardless of the harm to the families nearby. Detached self-built housing were immediately destroyed while windows, doors, non-bearing walls of tenement buildings were immediately removed, giving off enormous dust clouds and noise, and leaving behind piles of building waste. Environmental hazards aside, the sitting displacees had to suffer the danger associated with the destruction. But to the bulldozer regime, risk of this kind were calculated as less important and less probable than that of holding out and squatting, which might slow down the process of demolition. By making appropriated properties no longer habitable for the early movers, it made it impossible for them to compare their resettlement packages with later movers. Also, it reduced the potential efforts to evict the squatters. But, like any statistical calculation, probabilities can never be confused with certainties (Douglas, 1992, Scott, 2012). When life-threating accidents caused by the destruction did happen, the victims become tragic yet unfortunate collateral damage. Their life was expendable to the cause of the Expo.

> We have not yet all moved out before they started to destroy our community. I almost died in one accident. I was home watching TV in bed on that afternoon. They were destroying my neighbour's house, which was right behind mine. Around two o'clock, a concrete board slashed into my home. They were pulling off the structure of my neighbour's house and one concrete board just flew inside mine, cutting through the wall. I was knocked to the ground, bumped my head badly. I was so scared and my blood pressure went up to 220. I was just outside from hospital after the first stage of chemo treatment. I could not stay in hospital. My family had to work and all belongings were at home. At that time, our communities were full of

waidiren (outsiders). You had to be alert in case they came to steal your stuff. My neighbours came to check on me immediately and took me to hospital. The doctor was worried as well. My blood pressure was too high. He admitted me to the hospital immediately, asked the nurse to put me on saline and forbid anyone talking to me, in case my blood vessels might explode and lead to a stroke and brain damage (Mrs Chen, interview, D103, 20/04/2012).

Workers were destroying the roof of a displaced family's home while they were still living inside at the time

Figure 5.2: Producing a Living Hell
Source: Courtesy of a displacee (photo taken in 2007), 2012

Fear is always politicised to the advantage of the powerful (Hollway and Jefferson, 1997, Shirlow and Pain, 2003). It is socially produced to irritate and to intimidate the displacees, turning their peaceful life into a state of despair, with incalculable risks and unforeseeable dangers. In most cases, it was the scavengers, the migrant workers, the thieves and burglars, the construction workers, and other unidentified outsiders that took the blame for increased sense of insecurities. However, they were only the scapegoats anchoring the displacees' angst from the inability to lose their homes and communities in a dignified way, and covering up the dirty hands of the bulldozer regime. Speculative land development is an organised crime. This must be understood metaphorically as well as literally. During the Expo, the bulldozer regime was not hesitant to use illegal violence against the displacees by appropriating and exploiting the displacees' fear. Their tactics were appallingly discreet, in order not to backfire and undermine their legitimacy. Sometimes, this entailed an indifference or connivance to reported crimes or on other occasions, the bulldozer regime created ripe conditions for crimes, or simply encouraged and instructed criminals to commit crimes with pardon and immunity. This is illustrative by the following testimony from Aunt Zhou (in her mid-forties) from a naturally emerged group interview. Her nuclear family were amongst the few families who insisted on fair compensation. One day, she received a kind warning from a sympathetic migrant worker before her home was robbed by this migrant worker and his working partners.

> He has conscience. He warned me, "Ayi, please do not feel scared tonight. We feel sorry for your sufferings. But, I will have to come to break your door tonight. The *chaiqian* company asked me to break your doors". Even warned by him, my husband and I were still scared that night. "Bang" —a huge noise, our door was knocked down. Scavengers came in and took away all our belongings. My husband was so pissed off. [YZ: why didn't you call the police?] Don't be so childlike. They had everything planned already. You really think the police had no idea of their scheme? My husband was furious. He stamped his feet in anger through the night. Nothing you could do to stop it (Interview, D13, 03/2012).

The extent of fear would be unimaginable if her family had not received a warning beforehand from the kind migrant worker. Such dramatic performance was rare, usually reserved at a later stage after most families had left, meaning fewer eyes watching over neighbourhood safety and over the conducts of the bulldozer regime. The normal tactic favoured by the bulldozer was the untraceable but irritating harassment or intimidation. For many displacees, it was their everyday life of being roused by the sudden heavy knocking on their doors or windows at nights. Some displacees also reported being visited by burglars with 'professional ethics' who stole nothing but messed up everything in their homes. No one hurt, nothing stolen, nothing damaged—frequent nuisances of this kind made it useless to seek help from the police, regardless if they could be trusted at all. Staged crimes perfectly mixed with real crimes, with the most desirable outcomes to the bulldozer regime. It fuelled the fears of the displacees, confused the displacees about their vulnerabilities to real crimes, and made it extremely difficult and eventually impossible to calculate and contain their fear rationally. Many displacees chose to leave to contain such unbearable state of fear. As commented by Herzfeld (2009: 263), such intimidation was 'the most unobtrusive kind of violence—the violence of the creeping corrosion of solidarity'.

The Spectacle of Violence and Terror

For most displacees, what they feared most was *qiangqian* (forcible evictions) frequently staged as spectacles of violence and terror. To onlookers, *qiangqian* is confined to the final coordinated violent scene of evicting the 'nail households' from their premises (see Qin, 2013, Erie, 2012, Mertha, 2009b) and such violence is intimidating enough to convince the rest to give up fighting. However, to expose the sheer extent of violence, I wish to point out that *qiangqian* is better understood as a sequence of events. Hannah Arendt (1970) made a cogent point that violence unlike power requires justification for its use. Those nails had to go through the bureaucratic formalities of *xingzheng caijue* (administrative arbitration), *qiangzhi*

chaiqian tingzhenghui (public hearing on forcible eviction), and *qiangzhi zhixing tongzhi* (forcible eviction notice), to justify the terror, before they were forcibly evicted from their homes. Whilst each bureaucratic procedure served the interest to maintain a respectable appearance of rule of law, it was an abuse of the coercive power of the state, a reinforcement of the slander against the evictees, an escalation of violence, an accumulation of bodily pain and the feelings of powerlessness and despair, paralysing the psyche of the evictees.

By the time the evictees received the formal eviction notice, the 'truth' about them being selfish, stubborn, unreasonable, greedy, and uncivil had already been manufactured through ritualistic arbitration meeting and public hearings. Those meetings rarely left any traceable verbatim evidence if the displacees were not savvy enough to make a recording. However, the eviction notices (Figures 5.3 and 5.4) provided us the opportunity to investigate the production of truth, and the justification of violence. I gathered two types of eviction notices from the displacees. A formal eviction notice was sent out to each displaced family stamped by the district government, accompanied by a few informal eviction notices by the leading agency of the bulldozer regime with a similar stamp during the days before forcible evictions. The genres of writing in those two types of eviction notices were strikingly different, with different performative power. Whilst the state issued formal eviction orders written impersonally, citing legal vocabulary to justify the eviction decision and warning the displacees about the forthcoming forcible eviction if they refused to evacuate from their premises, the informal eviction notice from the bulldozer regime mixed intimidation with exhortation in addition to the violence of law. But, the absence of the subject for the action *xiwang* (wish) in both notices challenges the formal/informal distinction with an enigma—who was/were instructing the evictees? The hidden message requires political imagination to decipher. One of the decoded messages lead to my conviction that corporate power and state organs coddle with and find each other as a spokesperson to voice their greedy desires for speedy accumulation. With the institutional support from the government, the bulldozer regime showed no mercy to abuse their power. As we can see from the second example below, their threat to the displacees was elaborate, explicit and tyrannical, without any euphemism and concealment.

Statistics were used as objective factual evidence, as we can see from two notices below, to demonstrate the genuine support from the early movers and to persuade the displacees to give up their pointless and selfish fight. What is questionable here is not the truthfulness of the statistical figure but 'the truthfulness of the truth' (Liu, 2009:

42) or how support was defined and quantified, and how statistical reasoning came to define and legitimatise reality. To the first question, the syntax of the statistical statement plays a great part in encouraging confusion and misunderstanding. The generalised conclusion of overwhelming support from a great majority of the displacees (*jue daduoshu*) follows immediately after the statistical quantification of families that accepted the resettlement deals in the previous clause. This discursive tactic casually establishes causality between the rate of acceptance and the rate of support, thereby, vindicating an ambiguous misinterpretation through a precise big number. Even if the validity of this line of reasoning is accepted, it must be noted that the quantification excludes the diverse situations under which the displacees made the decision to accept the resettlement offer from moral sentiments and judgement. An acceptance, even under duress, here was counted as a genuine and legit vote as a heartfelt consent. To the second question, Theodore Porter (1995: X) offers a trenchant explanation that statistical representation of the reality is one of the political solutions to a political problem. Similar to its historical precedents, this statistical truth-making is repressive (Rose, 1990). The 'objectivity' and 'impartiality' detonated by a statistical figure adds a flavour of 'scientific rationality'. The scientifically calculated number 98 per cent powerfully vouches for the validity and credibility of the resettlement programme. The obedience of the majority self-evidently legitimatizes authoritarian killing of the displacees' homes. By activating the discourse of fairness, premised on the consistency of a tyrannical resettlement programme rather than the universal value of justice, it constructs the forcible evictions as less an order from an authoritarian state but as a result of the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville, 2003). The emphasis on the extreme small number of the defiant minority further implies that the source of the problem lies not in the resettlement programme but in the displacees. This typical strategy of blaming the victims lends further legitimacy to stigmatise and attack the moral characters of the evictees, as in the nine imperative sentences with an exclamation mark at the end in the last paragraph.

The dates of forcible eviction rarely informed the displacees. Those stated in the eviction notices were open and suggestive. It means that the evictees were unable to prepare for the confrontation with state violence and for the destruction of their homes. Kafkaesque accounts of the lived experience of forcible eviction occur repeatedly in my fieldwork notes—life was dictated by the naked power of the bulldozer regime, deprived of any certainty. One plausible explanation for the delay is that a forcible eviction is a concerted performance and requires time to coordinate the efforts from different bureaucracies. However, the testimonies from a few

evictees convinced me that the decision of the exact timing of eviction was meticulously calculated to acquire the land from atomised displacees at minimal costs, economically and politically. Each eviction was planned at a time of an impasse when only a few families were holding out. Their immediate neighbours had already moved out, meaning the loss of most possible support from these bystanders (Smith, 1998). Its suddenness and randomness make it difficult to prepare and to mobilise support from other sources.


上海市浦东新区人民政府

强制执行通知书

[redacted]

浦东新区建设局于[redacted]作出房屋拆迁裁决，裁决你户在接到裁决书后的15日内迁出本区[redacted]，迁入本区[redacted]

因你户在裁决规定的期限内未完成搬迁，浦东新区建设局向本机关申请强制执行。经本机关审查，浦东新区建设局已于[redacted]作出房屋拆迁裁决，在裁决规定的期限内你户未完成搬迁。为此，根据《上海市城市房屋拆迁管理实施细则》第二十五条之规定，本机关将于本通知送达之日起的十五日后责成有关部门强制执行。

为使建设正常进行，希望你户能自觉执行裁决书的内容。

特此通知。

[redacted]

[Title of Government Authority]

Notice of Forcible Eviction

[Reference Number]

[Addressee]

[Indicate the date and substance of the Arbitration Decision]

Given your family did not evacuate from the site within the deadline, the Construction Bureau of Pudong District Government applied for a forcible eviction. After our review, the construction bureau had made an arbitration decision on [date] and ordered your family to evacuate from site on a deadline. According to article 25 of Shanghai Chaiqian Bylaw, we shall order relevant authorities to evict you out after fifteen days upon your receipt of this notice.

For the benefits of the scheduled construction, [we] wish your household to comply with eviction notice and move out for the benefits of scheduled construction.

[closing]

[Seal]

Figure 5.3: A Formal Eviction Notice from Pudong District Government

Source: Courtesy of a displacee (information related to personal identity redacted and all translation is mine), 2013



敬　告　居　民

[redacted]居民：

因你户未在区房地局《房屋拆迁裁决书》规定的期限内搬迁，黄浦区人民政府按照《上海市城市房屋拆迁管理实施细则》的规定，已责成黄浦区房地局和黄浦区公安分局根据《房屋拆迁裁决书》对你户实施强制执行。

现在，你户离强制执行搬迁日还有[redacted]天！

目前，黄浦区世博动迁居民签约搬迁率已超过 98%，事实充分证明了绝大多数居民对世博动迁的信任和支持，充分证明了阳光政策一竿子到底是经得起检验的。为了确保按时拆平交地，为了确保世博会园区各项建设项目的如期施工，为了党和政府的威严诚信，为了我们对绝大多数已搬迁居民的郑重承诺，我们将以更坚定的信心和更坚强的决心，坚持世博动迁“阳光政策一竿子到底”不动摇，坚持按期完成世博动迁拆平交地不动摇。

希望你户莫再执迷不悟！莫再侥幸观望！莫再漫天要价！莫再错失最后的机会！调整心态！慎重思考！权衡得失！珍视自己的正当合法权益！尽早达成拆迁补偿安置协议！

此致。

黄浦区世博会园区前期动迁工作指挥部

[redacted]

[To the Residents]

[Addressee]

[Indicate the arbitration decision and the Eviction Notice from the government]

Only _days left before forcible eviction of your household!

More than 98% of families had signed on the deal and moved out—this hard fact proved the trust and the support from a great majority of the displacees for the Expo-induced displacement, and that our consistent chaiqian policy bears examination. For timely demolishment and clear the site on time, for scheduled construction of the Expo site to be carried out on time, for the authority and credibility of the party and the government, for our commitment and promises to early movers of a consistent policy, we shall stick to our *chaiqian* policy with greater confidence and determination and will not compromise and give in. We are determined to destroy the site as planned.

[We] wish your household to, stop being unrepentant! Stop speculating and wishing to get a better deal! Stop greedily asking for more money! Do not lose out the last opportunity! Adjust your attitude! Think carefully! Weigh your loss and benefits! Treasure your legitimate interests! Agree on a resettlement package as soon as possible!

[closing]

[Seal of the head agency in charge of displacement]

Figure 5.4: An Informal Eviction Notice from Huangpu Chaiqian Zhihuibu
Source: Courtesy of a displacee (information related to personal identity redacted and all translation is mine), 2013

Each eviction is a spectacle of terror. As Charles Tilly (2003: 237) points out ‘terror is a strategy rather than a creed’. The spectacle of eviction delivers at least two outcomes. One immediate end is to remove the eyesores from the road to profits. The other is to turn the eviction of a private family into a public, exemplary and pedagogical event. An eviction is a violent political ritual, like a public execution

analysed by Foucault (1977: 58), with an aim 'to make an example, not only by making people aware that slightest offence was likely to be punished, but by arousing feelings of terror by the spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon the guilty person'. It communicates an intimidating message to a specific group of onlookers, socially and psychologically distanced to the evictees but also face displacement from neighbouring communities, that centralised violence from the state is at the disposal of the bulldozer regime and the consequence will be the same if not worse than those evicted.

Fan was one of the evictees I secretly consulted for this project. I met Fan and her ex-husband Wang on a humid summer afternoon at a discreet location in Pudong for fear of implicating each other in the censorship[5]. They had already divorced before the property demolished for the Expo for the greater benefits of their single child. Fan and her teenage boy were evicted on a cold morning in winter without any warning, four months later after the receipt of the formal eviction order. Speaking of her experience of eviction, she could not stop sarcastically admiring the militarised political artifice of the bulldozer regime. 'They are the elites of our society, you know? They have a whole strategic plan to evict you, to control you, and to challenge your moral bottom line (*daode dixian*). They are the elites of the most vicious kind'. To her, the prolonged delay was to paralyse the social support she managed to secure. As it was approaching the Chinese New Year, she had relaxed her guard against the unpredictable forcible eviction. Her own moral sensitivity fed on her hope for a peaceful new year under her own roof. The blitz-like eviction on that cold rainy morning robbed her of any opportunity to mobilise political resources. 'There was no sign of it coming. They are apt at blitz (*turan xiji*)'. She giggled and continued, 'They did not simply come to destroy your home without knowing whether you were at home. So before they brought up the whole action, they first sent up a janitor from our compound to check on us first and pretended to ask for water. It was around eight o'clock in the morning. My son just had all term-end examinations from school and we decided to indulge ourselves with a long lie in bed. I decided to ignore his knocking. But, he kept knocking and asking a few times and I was determined to ignore him. A few minutes later, I heard the rambles from the bulldozer machine driving closer and the thunder from hundreds of people walking downstairs. Until then I realised the eviction was happening'. Her intuitive action was to check the situation outside from her window. The appearance of the organised eviction came to

[5] To protect the safety and avoid my use of her story here becoming an 'incriminating' evidence against her, I do not want to disclose the date of interview here. Same concern applies to the cases of Chen and He below.

her as a great shock. 'There were hundreds of people, like a flood'. However, it was not a disorganised crowd. The eviction team proved to be highly professional and was marching forward toward her home in clear formation as recalled by Fan based on her judgement of the dress style. The frontline was secured by low-rank officers in riot gear, followed by police in their uniforms, protecting the government officials and supporting professionals from public institutions (i.e. doctors, firemen, *chengguan* [street order maintaining officers], etc.), with a defensive wall of officers in uniforms setting up parameters of violence zone. Outside parameters stood hundreds of spectators and onlookers, who were strictly instructed not to film or take any photos but to watch the spectacle only.

This militarised organisation was described by Fan as 'Japanese troops sweeping a village', graphically resembling the representation of anti-Japanese war in dramas. Fan bitterly smiled, 'we both were honoured model workers in socialist past, and now we were the state enemies'. Wang cut in and added outrageously, 'It (the Party-state) always say the Japanese were cruel, as a matter of fact, it was much crueller than the Japanese. It does not even treat you as a human being'. Indeed, the eviction relied on pure physical violence without any moral or legal limits, even though there was no apparent drastic resistance as confrontational as in the eviction of Pan Rong, a female fighter who threw homemade petrol bombs at the bulldozers.[6] Before her son and she were able to put on decent clothes and prepare for a last fight, three doors made of steel were broken by force. Her son in his underwear was dragged out barefoot immediately by officers in riot gear. After a short time of pointless fighting, Fan was pulled downstairs. Her son tried to make a phone call asking for help but unsurprisingly mobile phone signal was jammed. Their family possessions were packed and towed away without a notary statement. At the time of the interview, the whereabouts of their family possessions remains a mystery to the couple. All they saved on that day was her son's school bag.

Evictees in such context were treated as the *homo sacer* whose bare life ceases to have any value and is vulnerable to murder without any punishment (Agamben, 1998). Humanity and conscience vanish into thin air. Unsurprisingly, even pardons frequently granted to seniors and minors in criminal charges became inapplicable (also see Hart, 1988). Every member of the evicted family was found guilty of jeopardising public interest and thus punishable by the state sanctioned violence. On the eviction day of Mr Chen's family, Chen was arrested from his workplace by armed policemen because of an alleged anonymous tip suspecting him of possessing

[6] See http://www.infzm.com/content/38292.

dangerous arms. Before this official arrest in public scene, he had already been illegally detained and assaulted for more than a week at the conference room of his workplace. ‘Beating was not a big deal to them. On the first day, they just slapped my face for no reason. A co-worker called the police for me, and the police got back at me, telling me, “you want to complain about me? Let us go and take it to the municipal police bureau”’. On that day, he simply gave up resistance at all. After a ritualistic body search, he was immediately escorted to a rental apartment under house arrest. Meanwhile, his wife and his nearly four-year-old son were expelled from their ‘small but cosy’ apartment. His son was taken away from his wife who was forced out with both arms restrained by two strong-armed men in uniforms. Rootless in Shanghai, the couple never let their son out of their sight since he was born. Separation anxiety trigged by the disappearance of his mother was amplified by witnessing the violence to his mother and by being detained in an unfamiliar place with strangers. Chen’s wife was brought to the rental apartment later that afternoon, with blood on her feet cut by glasses on the ground when she was dragged. A neighbour to their current residence remarked on her experience of witnessing the eviction of this family, ‘a decade ago when I was displaced from the city, they [the *chaiqian* agents] were like thugs. A decade later, how come they still acted like thugs?’

A surveillance team was sent to monitor them closely, both inside and outside the apartment, restraining their freedom. Their son, however, was not brought back to them until early next morning, and was under house arrest of a similar kind. That day was the longest in their life, losing their only sanctuary space in Shanghai and separated from their only child at the same time. ‘As a father, I felt heartache for not being able to protect my son’, said Chen, ‘When I learnt that he was taken away by the *chaiqian* agents after I have seen my wife alone, I was scared to death’. Guilt and self-blame experienced as heartache torment the couple constantly for the traumatic effects of eviction to their son’s psyche. Whilst psychoanalytical vocabularies are out of their stock, the discernible changes in their son’s behaviours send out an alarming warning. ‘For a long time after the eviction, he had troubles in sleeping. We let him sleep in our bed, but every night he had nightmares. He would suddenly wake up alert and fearful’. Nightmares speak of the darkest terror. When I was working with this couple, I was tempted to involve their son and retrieve further details of those nightmares, not to decipher the meanings of those imaginary experiences, but simply to have a shallow taste of the pain he suffered after the expulsion. In doing so, however, I was worried that it would only have brought him greater harm than have helped him to heal the wounds. My research impulse was therefore suppressed. The

absence of any accounts of those nightmares however does not make it less valid to connect them with the crisis he was going through. As Foucault (1986: 47) writes, 'in dreams he *[sic]* encounters what he is and what he will be, what he has done and what is going to, discovering there the knot that ties his freedom to the necessity of the world'. What Foucault seems to suggest is that dreams interweave our temporal experiences of past, present and future, and give rise to agency in future, in the sense of both yearnings for emancipatory alternatives (see Pun, 2005) and actions to resist and change. In this light, his response after exposure to those dreams voices his suffering.

His heightened alertness after exposure to those nightmares can be read as an intuitive response to defend his 'ontological security' (Giddens, 1990: 92), the security of being in the present, which was understandably in a dire crisis after a recent sudden collapse of the meaningful life-world. External danger and political violence similar to what he personally experienced became so ubiquitous and powerful beyond the control of his adult parents. Fear and insecurity were accumulated and intensified by those frequent dreams. Trust in full-time protection from his parents was shattered and had to be secured on sight provocatively to be real, leading to his 'irrational' attachment behaviour. Chen's wife continues, 'when he was awake, he simply followed me everywhere at any time, even when I had to use the bathroom. He could not stay alone without seeing me for a second. He became distant to his father. He only needed me, no one else'. Indeed, attachment to a mother figure is common in childhood across cultures (Bowlby, 1971) but rejection of a father figure and regression to infantile attachment behaviours at his age can only be explained as a self defence mechanism to demonstrate and resolve frustration, confusion and pain this child was suffering.

Without a chance to heal, immediate surveillance, the presence of violent specialists, and living homelessly until this day are not helping this boy recover from the psychological trauma. When I first met him, it was in their bare concrete apartment on a burning summer afternoon. Their apartment was the only one in a row of houses without an air conditioner. My T-shirt was uncomfortably wet and sticky as I was sweating during the whole interview despite an old pedestal fan facing toward me. Chen's wife kept the door and windows open to cool down the room. His son however quickly retreated to a tiny room with doors and windows securely locked. Chen's wife told me that this was typical, 'Even when we both are at home, he locks the door and windows, too. You see the tiny window in our bathroom? We always keep it open to circulate the fresh air. Every time he uses the bathroom, no matter for

what purposes, doors and windows are always locked'. Wound of the mind never stops bleeding. A closed space is like a bandage patching up this open wound, offering him maximum security. 'What if bad guys break-in again'? He once asked his mother. The frustration and fear as conveyed this big 'if' do not wither away but escalate through the years. On my second visit, I was talking with his mother in the living room and the topic of the police violence emerged from our conversation. Having overheard our talk, he shouted from the bedroom, 'One day I will kill all of them with a bomb'.

Killing the oppressors might be an aggressive but immediate solution to right the wrongs, but the public gaze during the eviction makes humiliation perpetuating. The onlookers were not innocent witnesses of state violence. Following Foucault (1977), to observe and to witness is to guarantee the punishment and to take part in it. Their presence in silence made them if not accessories but one source of shame and anger, especially to females. Bodily struggles always violated their bodies, and the gaze of the public aggregates their feelings of humiliation. Mrs He, in her eighties, could barely talk without weeping when talking about her experience of eviction. The time of eviction was never explicitly informed in her case, either. It was on a summer morning. Other family members were out at work. Her daughter was shopping for fresh food at a morning food market. She was alone at home when eviction took place. Doors had been reinforced in case of a sudden eviction but turned out to be futile. She was carried out from the second floor and 'tossed to the ground as trash'. Her daughter soon came back to defend their home and physically altercated with the eviction force. 'She tried to get inside our house and protect our home. They of course did not let her. It was in late summer. She was only wearing a shirt on top. So many strong men were beating her, a single woman. Her shirt was soon torn off in the bodily conflicts. In the end, there was only a bra covering her top, exposed to the crowds afar. What kind of government is capable of doing such things? How could she live as a decent woman anymore?'

Leaving, Crying and Loss

It became quite understandable that only 80 families were counted as evictees. To most displacees, they were simply tied of the anxiety and fear. Leaving became their way out of the battles. Once an agreement of resettlement plan was made, the displaced families must pack their belongings and move out within a few days. Time, as condensed as it has already became in constructing the Expo, became too invaluable and scarce during displacement to spare finding proper closure with

familiar places and people that constituted the 'structure of meanings' (Marris, 1974: 4) developed over a long span of the displacees' life trajectories. The pace of the displacement was so intense that it created a crisis in the experience of time and space, robbing many displacees of the opportunity to dig deep, to make sense of what is happening and what *chaiqian* really entails, to gain insight of the *chaiqian* business, and making them numb. Therefore, mourning was more common at later stages, bursting out at moments when departing homes with the home-moving trucks knowing that this is a one-way journey, or witnessing their homes falling into pieces within hours or a couple of days, or until they have resettled in the transitory housing and realised what was lost in this chaotic moving process. In response to my question regarding their feelings when moving out, few of them could articulate their intense feelings other than the memory of the simplest and intuitive reaction of crying. Tears may have evaporated, but the communicative act of weeping tells us all about their frustration, loss, and sorrow.

> I was really sad. I was very reluctant to leave and burst into tears….I invested my whole life in building the home (female, 70s, Interview, D79, 28/03/2012).
>
> My daughter cried all the time in the first few months we moved out. She was at junior high school and had to go back to the neighbourhood on her way to school. She was born there and grew up there. You would get used to that place if you lived there long enough too (female, late 40s, Interview, D39, 15/03/2012).
>
> I didn't like them to demolish my home. I cannot remember how many times I cried at that time. Sometimes I even woke up suddenly because of crying at night. I am not lying….It only took two months before everything was bulldozed to the ground (female, 60s, research notes, 16/03/2012).
>
> We cried when our house was demolished. I felt so sad. My partner was sick. I had a big open balcony. I worked and saved for my whole life (*shebude chi, shebude yong*), and invested all my life in this house. We have running water on our balcony connected with water pipes. In a row of houses, mine was the best (female, late 70s, interview, D53, 21/03/2012).

Those seemingly simple, monotonous, and repetitive narratives of crying over the loss of homes also convey strong sentiments for the loss of belonging, continuity and connections. Home in the material form is an extended self (Beck, 1992a) and this home-related identity is produced and reproduced through home-making practices (Blunt and Dowling, 2006). This is particularly pivotal to understand the feelings of the self-built housing owners whose dwellings in most cases were constantly renovated to materialise an imagined family life that is at least materially decent. However substandard in the eyes of the technocrats, those dwellings remind the

displacees of the life journey they travelled to become who they were and constitute a key site of livelihood struggles. Created with enormous investment in the form of emotions, labour and money, those houses engender the Lockean possessive impulse. The final form of their houses prior to displacement was the result of efforts of renovation and redevelopment over generations, attentive to the changed housing needs of family members. Such practices are conducive to the development of stable attachment and sense of rootedness. *Chaiqian* therefore not only annihilated their lived place but also destroyed part of the displacees' sense of self.

Although the process of uprooting is not as sudden as in 'natural' disasters—caution must be taken to maintain such distinction as warned by Kai Erikson (1994) and Neil Smith (2006), the precise moments of home annihilation to many displacees remain a painful shock. This experience of cutting off one's roots in a familiar place argues Mindy Fullilove (2005) is commensurable with corporeal trauma. Numbness only lasts for seconds if it is a sharp, clear cut. As the displacees settled down, the muggy and entangled sentiments of attachment and loss slowly became crystallised. The cut appeared so deep that words or scales are incapable of describing their pain, and so clear that no scar tissue was left to remind them of the existence of their roots. Like a phantom limb however, the lost past constantly flashes back in the present and exacerbates the pain of transition (Greene et al., 2011). The relationship to the destroyed life space is not severed, detached or resolved, but transformed, eternalised and engraved in the psyche of many displacees. To many people, especially the seniors, death is the final outcry of their bodies protesting for the loss of familiarity and continuity. At a point in my fieldwork, I simply lost count how many senior displacees regretted the loss of their old neighbours and friends who slowly died of sorrow and depression after displacement. Less life-threatening, depression prevails. The metaphoric remark on the 'emptied heart' from a retiree allows us to have a taste of the tip of the grief from uprooting.

> I felt deeply sorry and regret for moving out. After I moved to a new home [*guodu fang*, rented house before moving into the resettlement housing], I went back there many times. All [had] gone. It was empty. I stood there with feelings that I could hardly describe-my heart was empty (*xinli kongkong de*). [It was] all empty. There was no way back. No way back. I should have taken some pictures [of my old home]. Now, it is all in my memory. All [is] in memory. No way back. No way back (male, 50s, interview, X11, 02/ 05/2012).

Figure 5.5: Grieving for Lost Places
Source: Wei (2010)

For thousands of displaced residents hired by the factories at the Expo site, especially the younger generation of workers-cum-displacees, they had to cope with even more formidable crises in their livelihood and work-related identity due to closures or relocation of the factories at the Expo site. Although older workers, especially those close to legal retirement age, had the option to retire early, the middle aged and the younger generation were particularly vulnerable to the threat of unemployment and associated psychological malaises. 'Caring' factories might be conservative in firing any workers but if tactfully, they could join forces with the 'daring' factories like the steel factory, strategising the relocation as an opportunity to dump the redundant labour force. Those workers, former owners of the state-owned enterprises, followed the downfall trend since the reform (Lee, 1999) and had no influence in the management to control their fate. In the case of the steel company, the workers' union and the party organ were in collusion with the management, blocking the channels of communication and resistance. Through *fenliu*,[7] *maiduan*,[8] *xiebao*,[9] *bingtui* or *bingxiu*,[10] and other similar measures, more than one thousand workers lost their jobs at the factory through hidden mechanisms.[11] Families with members hired by those factories therefore were confronted with the challenge of a wholesale disintegration of their life. The loss of homes was compounded by the feelings of livelihood insecurities, eroded status and privileges as socialist workers.

[7] Job reassignment from original post to newly created posts or other post within the working units or to the reemployment centre to be re-hired. See Lee (2000).
[8] Workers who are laid off with a one-off payment based on the length of employment and other settlement fees. See Hurst and O'Brien (2002) and Gallaher (2009).
[9] Temporarily unemployed during which the workers labour contract with original work units are maintained and the latter shall keep contributing to the social security fees according to the temporary unemployment agreement until the workers' retirement. See Gallaher (2009).
[10] The former refers to workers who retire early due to lost labour power or severe health issues and the latter refers to sick leave.
[11] Data here is based on personal communication with many former workers of various companies at the Expo site in different interviews from March to June, 2012.

A male worker in his forties worked for the steel factory remarked with great anger and defeatedness on his tough choice of breaking his own 'iron bowl':

> Do you know how big our factory used to be? Such a big factory disappeared from the scene. My father worked in the factory, too. So did my mother. The factory was not just a factory. It was a home…They cannot forcefully lay you off. But commuting two to three hours, every working day is exhausting enough to make you reconsider your job options. Getting up at five in the morning and returning from work at nine or ten at night. It is beyond your reasonable physical strength. What did the state do? You [the steel factory] are a state-owned factory. You [the steel factory] are not a private business. They [the state and the factory] don't care if you have to commute long hours. They did not compensate your loss commuting. In their defence, they offered free shuttle bus. But, the place is in *shenshan laolin* (remote suburbia without households). There were no vehicles apart from the shuttle bus. And the shuttle bus only runs during the commuting hours. If there is a family emergency, what can you do then? My son was five years old then. My wife and I were both fulltime workers. One of us had to make the sacrifice. So, I decided to quit. You don't have a choice, do you? (Interview, D51, 19/03/2012).

Conclusion

Writing up this chapter has been particularly painful, not only because those negative emotions were so depressing it forced me to take a break constantly but also because of my fear that my command of English vocabulary does not do justice to the displacees' pain and anger when they confided in me their personal stories. Their pain and suffering are private, experiential and incommunicable. They are so intense, complex and layered that the attempt to dissect and name them accurately is prone to wrong judgement. Frequently, I also find myself lost in their testimonies—the open wounds on their body and mind were inflicted in such an appalling way that the damage is beyond my political view and the stock of my academic knowledge. How could I possibly decide whose suffocated life story merits some space to breathe in this chapter? How could I possibly extract an episode from a sequence of repressive events of displacement embedded in a system of oppression simply to narrow down their desperate feelings? How could I possibly to retell their frustration caused by those staged theft and break-ins? How could I possibly communicate the extent of pain caused by forcible eviction?

Herbert Gans (1962: 220) lamented over four decades ago, 'American redevelopment planning so far has proceeded on the assumption that relocation is secondary to redevelopment, Thus, great pain are taken with planning for clearance and the reuse of the site, but plans for the present occupants of the site are treated as by-products of

the redevelopment proposal'. To him, at the heart of the injuries of the displacees was the treatment as 'by-products', not out of the callous intention of the powerful elites, but because of the discrepancies between technocratic and popular views of places, which allowed the reproduction of a repressive social and spatial order and caused great pain to those evicted. Whilst the emerging elites in China are keen on importing planning expertise and urban development practices to catch up with western civilisation (Olds, 2001, Keeton, 2011) —a best practise area of urban redevelopment was created during the Expo, they have surely imported the whole package. Combined with the authoritarian political culture, the displacees, as this chapter shows, were not simply treated as 'by-products' but as wrong people in wrong places, as the dispensable, or worse, as subhuman, or as enemies.

By telling those private depressing stories in this chapter, I tried to bring those vocabularies of pain, bitterness, terror, and grief to the focus of our discussion on *chaiqian*. I wish to urge the planners, the politicians, the lawyers and the academics to suspend our disagreements and quibbles on the property rights and principles of justice loaded with our academic jargon, and dwell on our moral truisms to understand the pain of the displacees and the real costs of the Expo, a showcase of 'progress in humanity'.[12] Such moral truism, as Kai Nielsen (1991:25) convincingly argues, relies less on 'a fancy moral theory' than on 'a rather rudimentary moral sensibility or what Engels once called a sense of human decency'. For this human decency, what we need is to reject upfront the naturalisation of inflicting pain upon others unnecessarily (Nielsen, 1991), and despise the policy programmes that treat humans as nonhumans or subhumans (Margalit, 1996), or simply, as David Smith (1994) echoing Porteous (1989) suggested, put ourselves in the displacees' place and ask, how would we feel if we were asked to give up our own homes and communities, and how would we feel if we were treated as by-products, guinea pigs or enemies of the public, suffering from state tyranny? Whilst those personal stories are certainly unsettling and unjust, the social context making them possible in the first place warns us about the pathological systematic nature (Young, 1990). This is the topic I turn to examine in the next chapter.

[12] This is one of the core values upheld by the International Bureau of Exposition.

Chapter 6 : The Organised Crime on Trial: Exceptionality, Immorality and Sufferings

'Men at their birth are naturally good. Their natures are much the same; their habits become widely different'.

Chinese Three-Character Classic

'…we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it'.

Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have attempted to unravel the infusion of diverse forms of oppression and violence that have inflicted great pain on the displacees and forced them bitterly to give up their homes and communities. Either through cunningly discreet and well hidden tactics of staged theft or environment hazards, or by virtue of naked intimidation, mental torture, barbarian eviction or abusive detainment in its purest form, the bulldozer regime spared no effort in acquiring absolute domination of time and space on the Expos site, which repeatedly undermined legal justice and challenged the common sense morality. If the Confucius doctrine or Adam Smith is correct about human condition, it would be much easier to blame those *chaiqian* agents as sociopaths, or at least pathologically aggressive, taking pleasures from causing or watching other people's suffering. However, as the case of the staged theft shows, it is untenable to jump to such conclusions. The pertinent yet perplexing question to ask is how were those uncompassionate, cruel and apparently illegal acts committed by cognitively and morally competent social actors possibly conceived, legitimatised and naturalised in a civilised society? The complex causal chains of the displacees' sufferings are the focus of this chapter.

By addressing this question, this chapter will not shy away from assigning blame and responsibilities. However, I should lay bare upfront my 'disloyalty' to the displacees' grievances and my discontent with the legalistic discourses and practices. In breaking

with the displacees, I have Nancy Fraser's (1989) suggestion in mind, which cautions me to keep a vigilant eye to the aims and the interests of the displacees with whom I identify with. To many displacees, defining the state as a criminal is theoretically difficult[1] (Green and Ward, 2004) and limited in practical value. Even if they hold grievances against the state, it is those corrupted and transgressing *chaiqian* agents , 'keys to a dimension of citizenship'(Lipsky, 1980: 4), that must be held accountable for their suffering. This is not a new discursive strategy. For them, displacement is concrete and real in the sense that it is caused and executed by real people rather than mythical corporate bodies or impersonal bureaucracies (Blomley, 2004: 98), or as an 'end product of a large and abstract process' (Piven and Cloward, 1977: 20). I have no doubt on this point. However, in narrowing to such individualistic charges, I believe it runs the risk of entrapping and subordinating to the legal game (Bourdieu, 1977, 1991); and of misrecognising the magnitude and the social causes of the injustices the displacees endured. I consider it crucial at this juncture not to 'relay' the stories of the displacees as substantially as I did in the previous chapter but to speak of their consciousness more closely under the theoretical gaze in order to examine the social nature of their suffering critically (Spivak, 1988).

My disagreement with the legalistic practices lies firstly in the sanitisation of the legal vocabularies that narrowly focus on the observable, nameable and quantifiable bodily damages (Das, 1995); secondly in the separation of *persona* from person (Emmet, 1967) and thirdly in the obsession in proving intentionality and causality (Arendt, 1994, 2003), before arriving at a 'rational' and 'safe' judgement and decide the form and extent of punishment appropriate to the atrocity. This line of reasoning, following Bourdieu (1991), is restrictive and insulting, exercising a new round of symbolic violence. If not excluding the possibility of lodging a petition completely, it would easily lead either to a doomed failure due to the difficulty to prove causality, or slip into a situationist argument blaming the authoritarian situations or bureaucratic rationality that suppressed or displaced the moral agency of the social agents. However, based on the evidence I gathered, many *chaiqian* agents showed great inclination to Machiavellian power games, deceptions, corruptions, cruelty, violence and other law-violating actions to get their jobs done. In many cases, they proved considerable initiative and creativity in exercising their discretionary power to force the displacees out of their homes, with meticulous calculation of the consequences of their actions. Those reflective actions under such asymmetrical power relations during the displacement cast reasonable doubts on their mores and

[1] Under the Sovereignty-state model, it remains quite challenging to define the state as a criminal.

conscience. Therefore, I will not reduce to the argument claiming that evil is bred in the absence of choice and agency (Milgram, 1974, Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).

In the argument developed below, I see those *chaiqian* agents not as cogs in the assemblage of the bulldozer regime, but as Bourdieusian (1990b) reflexive agents with various beliefs, values, mentalities, knowledge and interests that socialised and contributed to the structuring of the Expo-induced domicide culture, one of whose defining features is exceptionality. By exceptionality, I use it in a much broader way that refers not only to the failures of protecting the rights of the displacees as in the concept of 'state of exception'(Agamben, 2005, Ong, 2006, Gregory, 2006), but also to the exceptional fast-track policy practices (Swyngedouw, 1996, Baptista, 2013), within or beyond the established regulatory frameworks. Although originated from discursive glorification of the Expo, the exceptionality of the Expo, is constantly activated, laboured and legitimatised through societal efforts, leading to the devaluation and dehumanisation of the people on the Expo site. It is this exceptionality and moral corruption, facilitated by the floating responsibility and structural incentives within the bulldozer regime that encouraged the *chaiqian* agents to take initiative in flexibly assembled bulldozer machinery, which caused the naturalisation of massive suffering of the displacees.

Voices of Hope: Lies and Rationality

I begin by examining the discursive practices that rationalises and legitimatises the Expo. Shin (2012) argues that the Shanghai Expo, together with the Beijing Olympic Games and the Guangzhou Asian games, was staged by the Chinese ruling elites to facilitate capital accumulation and to entertain their aspiration for building a unified nation. Whilst he sensitizes us to the instrumental value of the mega-events during their preparation, I wish to push backwards the temporal focus and chart out the way the Expo was legitimatised over the course of its production, from the conceptualisation of hosting an Expo, to actively bidding and preparing for it. This extended temporal focus and reversed analytical angle shall address an under-explored issue: the inherently contested nature of mega-events and their weak legitimacy (Hiller, 2000, Gotham, 2011). This is particularly pertinent to the Expo because it displaced not only a large number of local residents but also a few powerful 'socialist land maters' (state/military-owned enterprises) (Hsing, 2010a:34), who are not simply beyond the control of the Shanghai government but in rigorous competition against it for territorial power. It will also reveal a much more complex picture of power and rationality behind the bidding and hosting of the Expo. My

analysis shall show that the Expo, as one of those spatial fixes, was a product of processes unfolded with diverse, contingent and practical logics, manipulated by the ruling elites to accommodate the power dynamics within the global event industry and rapidly changing global and local conditions. The Expo was constantly rationalised, legitimatised and glorified in realpolitik at different stages through different normative discourses, to neutralise the resisting movements, especially from the people whose home were destroyed by it[2].

In the lifespan of the Expo, the growth machine drew upon an array of discourses to construct the Expo as a project of national significance. Voices of hope, filled with sentiments of urgency and unrealistic imagination of the benefits of the Expo were predominant in the bidding stage. 'Voices of decline' as in Beauregard's (2003) term, were systematically manufactured and activated by the politicians and the planners at a later stage to justify the changes of the site choice. I categorise those normative discourses into higher order ones such as nationalism/patriotism, modernisation and developmentalism, and lower order ones of urbanisation, distributive justice, new urbanism and sustainability, to build up societal dedication to the Expo.[3] It must be noted that these discourses are not mutually exclusive. Neither does the higher/lower distinction correspond to the spatial scales. The difference lies in the values they appeal to and the normative power they have. Those lower ones frequently, through partial identification with higher ones, derive legitimacy from higher ones. Similarly, higher ones also constantly adapt their narratives to accommodate the changes in lower ones. I maintain that it were those higher ones that were decisive, not only in legitimatising the means of eviction but also in paralysing the political agencies of the displacees. Since my primary interest lies in the implication of those discourses to the displacees, I will narrow my temporal focus to the discursive construction of the Expo before the displacement.

But let me first introduce the political context when the Expo was brought to the political agenda. The initial conceptualisation of the Expo was the convergence between China's modernisation project in post-Mao's era and the imperialist mission of the Expo as a global cultural institution to advocate a European-centric notion of progress, modernity and world order (Roche, 2000). The embryo of the Expo came into shape at a time when Maoist ideology and China's modern history suffered a selective and instrumental negation, in which progress is no longer defined by class

[2] Flyvbjerg(1998) made a similar argument along this line.
[3] I am inspired by David Harvey's analysis of the discourses surrounding the construction of highways in Baltimore. See Harvey (1992).

struggles nor egalitarianism but by the hard measurable facts (Vogel, 2011, Kluver, 1996). The initial idea of hosting an Expo in the 1980s was nurtured precisely by the revised perspectives of history. Dynon (2011) is right in that the Expo was less to brand Shanghai as a normative model for Chinese cities than for branding the party for its continuous domination in the Chinese society. However, we cannot understate the changing geopolitics in the 1970s and the non-material forms of globalisation (Olds, 2001). Wang Daohan, the first mayor of Shanghai in the reform era, developed his interest in hosting an Expo from his impression of the Osaka Expo and his conversation with Japanese Expo producer, Taichi Sakaiya, who was dedicated to co-organise an Expo on China's soil. Of great interest to Wang were the hard facts of development brought by the Expo to Japan's economy: annual GDP growth at 11.6 per cent, 0.15 billion USD profits from tourist revenues, iconic architectures, infrastructural legacies, and FDI investment from high technology companies (Wu and Shi, 2009). However, constrained by the substantially inadequate physical infrastructural base of Shanghai, discouraged by national strategic focus on Southern China, compounded by economic crises and the student movement in the 1980s, and frustrated by the withdraw of financial commitment from the Japanese government, Shanghai gave up this plan. But the historical detour firmly established Shanghai's position in possible intra-regional competition for hosting an Expo and bolstered an entrepreneurial way of thinking about urban space (Chen, 2010).

When the idea of hosting an Expo was brought to the table again in the early 1990s and translated into a formal bid at the turn of the new century, the practice of entrepreneurial urbanism had been established as a new orthodoxy for urban governance in Shanghai (Wu, 2003a, 2003b), and enthusiastically pursued by Wang's successors, the Shanghai Gangs (Jiang Zemin, Huangju and Chen Liangyu) and the economic tsar, Zhu Rongji. By that time, neoliberal urbanism had made its mark on Shanghai's urban landscape (Olds, 1997, Chen, 2007, He, 2007, He and Wu, 2005, 2007, Qin, 2013). In this process, Chinese intelligentsia also underwent rapid stratification, with a group of them firmly identified with the state-market-intellectual complex (Wang, 2009). They are the suppliers of intellectual resources for ideological control to contain social grievances and to neutralise critiques and resisting actions. In doing this, they produced, endorsed and legitimatised a plethora of discourses including (sub)urbanisation, distributive justice, new urbanism, historical preservation, and sustainability. Those discursive resources were already at their disposal to rationalise Shanghai's bid. On this regard, let me summarise a few salient ones based on a collection of 33 newspaper articles from the mouthpieces of the party (Jiefang Daily, Wenhui News, Renmin Daily and Guangming Daily) and

the impact assessment section of Shanghai's bidding report (2002) before Shanghai secured the bid.[4]

(1) ***Economic growth***[5]: The Expo would boost Shanghai's economic development, especially the infrastructure and property market. A figure is indicative here, 'the land value surrounding the Expo site would be increased by 300%'.[6]

(2) ***Human qualities:*** the Expo would be a 'civilizing' process to improve the quality (*suzhi*) of Shanghai citizens and the Chinese in general.[7] But more specifically, it would 'rationalise' and 'optimise' the quality and structure of the people near the Expo site given the overall planning of the Expo site.[8]

(3) ***Ecological sustainability***: the relocation of industrial plants and factories and subsequent greening efforts would transform the toxic environment and improve urban biological diversity.[9]

(4) ***Aesthetical landscape:*** the industrial landscape and the disordered living space were out of place in a globalising Shanghai.[10] Iconic exhibition halls and renovated industrial plants would become Shanghai's new landmarks for leisure consumption.[11]

(5) ***Distributive justice:*** the siting choice of the Expo in one of the shanty town areas and the offering of resettlement housing in planned communities in the suburbs to those displaced residents who were incapable of improving their living conditions on their own would improve their quality of life.[12]

To critique textual knowledge, it seems crucial to deconstruct the texts and analyse the reasoning behind them. My short summary here does not do any justice to those

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[4] The temporal distinction between discourses during the bidding stage and the preparation stage is important because they were delivering different political outcomes. This point can be made clearer through the notion of public transcript. In the bidding stage, those discourses were to rationalise the imagination of the Expo and justify the decision to bid for it. It was an announcement of their public transcript, something they wish to deliver. In the preparation stage, they had to grow into the mask in order not to undermine their own project. Those discourses had to construct a coherent narrative that not only reaffirms the legitimacy of the decision to bid for the Expo but also rationalises the gap between reality and imagination of the Expo, even if some of those discourses followed the same line of reasoning and furnished similar vocabularies as those in the bidding stage.

[5] Apart from the arguments for economic boosterism and human capital, the rest of the arguments were drastically shifted when the choices of the Expo site was changed from the suburbs to the city centre, with the influence from international planning expertise and BIE. See Chen (2010).

[6] Shanghai Expo Bidding Report (2002), Vol. 2, p. 212.

[7] Renmin Daily, 27/02/2012.

[8] Shanghai Expo Bidding Report (2002), Vol. 2, p. 212.

[9] Zheng Shiling, fellow of Chinese Academy of Science, Wenhui News, 11/11/2002.

[10] Wenhui News, 16/03/2002.

[11] Shanghai Expo Bidding Report (2002), Vol. 2, p. 212.

[12] Ibid.

well-articulated lower order discourses, testified by political elites and hundreds of academics, based on their meticulous studies of previous expos in advanced economies, sophisticated 'scientific' modelling and calculation, and consultation with international expertise. I gave up my interest in this direction after a telephone interview with the leading investigator in charge of the *ex-ante* environment impact study for the Expo,[13] which convinced me that further effort is not worthwhile. How such texts were produced seems analytically more interesting and valuable than the linguistic dimension of those discourses. *Realpolitik*, dominated by the ruling elites, prevailed in the production of such knowledge, or lies to be precise.

> Fieldwork Entry, 31/05/2012
>
> I read the bidding report today. The figure of popular support in the environment impact assessment section was quite surprising. According to the report, 90 per cent of the displacees supported the Expo-induced displacement. But my interviews with the displacees so far seem to suggest the opposite. Is it part of the politics of memory? Is it because the life after displacement was not as they were promised? Should I use the same questionnaire? I called the leading investigator in charge of the environmental impact assessment after quite some efforts to locate her. Again, so difficult to speak to those insiders. I asked her if it is possible for her to share the original questionnaire and full survey report so I can use as a base line. However, she told me that they did not actually conduct a survey and the figure for popular support was their estimation based on similar scale of infrastructure development in Shanghai in the 1990s. I was surprised as the report states that her institute conducted a survey with the displacees. She laughed on the other side of the phone, and told me that in their report to the government for drafting the bidding report, they 'explicitly emphasized the fact that we did not have enough time to carry out the survey with those people who would be displaced'. I told her that the report did not warn the readers and misrepresented the studies. She agreed and told me the context in producing this report, 'time was too short back then. We were only given ten days to finish this environmental impact assessment. We did not have time'.

My initial response to her comment was shock and anger. Political decision-making was replaced by callous lies as if those on the receiving end of political decisions should take whatever comes along their way. Chen (2012a: 292) was convinced that the CPC can no longer rely on lies to rule but my finding shows that the deception never loses purchase power in political undertakings. Lies, as Hannah Arendt (1972: 4) once wrote, 'have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings'. From Sun Tzu to Machiavelli, political lies are widely advised as a favoured tactic to secure power. My initial interpretation of such scandalous deception by the Shanghai government was framed through this line, using James Scott's (1990) conceptual lens

[13] It also briefly assessed the social impacts of the Expo.

of 'public transcript' and seeing it as another product of the elites to maintain a respectful facade. The benefit of hindsight in writing leads me to question my indifference to the audience consuming those arguments. The prematurity of my thought lies in that the deception at the bidding stage was not primarily aimed at Shanghai citizens or any layperson, although they might have justified the bid and mobilised public support, they were first and foremost produced to entertain the BIE's rational vision of modernity and progress in order to win the bid. As Arendt (1972: 6) trenchantly points out, '[a] liar has the great advantage of knowing beforehand what the audience wishes or expects to hear'. The Expo regime, well informed by Expo producers from Germany, Canada and Japan, knew astutely that they had to deliver some reasonable, rational and well-articulated arguments for an 'impartial', 'objective', and 'disinterested' [14] vote for Shanghai from Shanghai's allies whose 'friendship' was secured through several rounds of lobbying before the vote on December 3 2002, even when it entailed vote-for-money or vote-for-political-concessions[15] ransom from the BIE member states (Chen, 2010). The truthfulness of the calculation or reasoning was less important than masterful political manoeuvre of geopolitics in bidding for mega-events (Lenskyj, 2000), or than successful marketing campaigns relying on evocative images, sounds and words[16] to sell the city (Horne, 2007). My point is not to suggest that rationality lost purchase to emotionality, rendering the Expo an irrational business. Quite the contrary, the Expo business adheres faithfully to rationality of power. This point is nicely put by Flyvbjerg (1998: 228), 'the freedom to interpret and use "rationality" and "rationalisation" for the purpose of power is a crucial element in enabling power to define reality and hence, an essential feature of the rationality of power'.

To sell the Expo to the Chinese citizens, legitimatising efforts were penetrated by nationalist sentiments. Shanghai's bidding decision was put forward at a time when nationalist sentiments were paramount in China. The rise of nationalist sentiments was a result of not only the boosted confidence from the booming economy but also the party's rigorous efforts to manufacture legitimacy through nationalist discourse after the demise of popular faith in communist/socialist ideology (Saich, 2004,

[14] Those are the professional codes for member states of BIE. See BIE (1972).
[15] The CEO of Carrefour initiated a French business elites club supporting Shanghai's bid at a time when the Carrefour was stuck in a scandalous case in China for violating the foreign investment law yet maintained their ambitious plan of a 16 billion USD investment in Shanghai to outcompete its competitors (Walmart). This is based on my own investigative work with evidence from various sources, which unfortunately had to be cut from this thesis.
[16] The marketing campaigns of the Expo regime were greatly appreciated as a major strength of Shanghai by the BIE investigators. Comments on this point in their conclusion were much more extensive than on any other aspects. See Chen (2010: 192).

Farquhar and Berry, 2004, Fewsmith, 2008), further reinforced by the ongoing bidding campaigns for the summer Olympics, and fuelled by a series of geopolitical events—the resumption of the Sovereignty control of Hong Kong and Macau, the bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by United States troops, the successful hosting of the APEC conference in Shanghai, and the accession to WTO. The world Expo, as an imperialist cultural institution whose invention was imbued with nationalist ideology (Roche, 2000), offered another site for the articulation of state censored nationalist sentiments to consolidate the legitimacy of the CPC. In return, those nationalist sentiments rationalised and legitimatised Shanghai's bid for the Expo.

The overwhelming normative power of nationalist discourses do not simply come from constructing an imagined community, but most importantly from unifying different social groups and cementing the Chinese society for the anti-imperialist revolutions and modernisation undertakings for more than a century (Zhao, 2000). The articulation of nationalist discourses is embedded in China's modern historical narrative of 'the century of humiliation' (Gries, 2004: 43), dating back to Qing's court's defeat in the Opium War (1840-1842) and subsequent opening-up of Shanghai, among four other cities, for international trade under the humiliating Nanjing Treaty. This defeat was an insulting moment that unsettled the China-centric world view of the Chinese people and propelled the political elites, intellectuals and the mass to explore the pathways of modernisation and to restore China's wealth and power (Schell and Delury, 2013). Irrespective of political differences on the roads to modern, powerful China, as Zhao (1998: 290) commented, nationalism 'engulfed all that stood in its path' and 'permeated them all', with a common objective, to shake off the humiliating and backward past and restore China's glory. The CPC dwells on this nationalist dream as well. Despite the fact that the Party now breaks all moral contracts with the masses, the yearning for modernisation remains a powerful tool to maintain its political legitimacy.

The temporal proximity between China's humiliating century and the invention of the World Expo, and Shanghai's significant position in this history, offered the elites ample room to unearth historical evidence to construct a coherent historical narrative of China's engagement with the Expo. For Wu Jianmin (2009), former Chinese Ambassador and a liaison for Shanghai's bid, China's participation in the Expo is a summary of China's century of humiliation. Although Chinese pavilions and exhibitions won a few medals from previous Expo organisers, the display of ancient relics, in stark contrast to advanced technologies in the West, only highlighted the

'backwardness' of the nation. Adding to this injury was the insulting Orientalist representation of the barbarian China by the colonisers through the display of embroidered shoes (symbol of patriarchal domination of female body), instruments of torture, and models of Chinese people addicted to opium, gambling and violence.

In addition to China's encounters with the Expo, political fictions with sketchy fantasies of hosting an Expo from more than a century ago also provided cultural resources for authoring China's association with the Expo, and emphasising the meaning of the Expo to the Chinese. In *The Future of New China* (Liang, 2010[1902]), *The New China* (Lu, 2010 [1910]) and *The New Dream of the Red Chambers* (Wu, 2010[1905]), all three authors unanimously situated the Expo in Shanghai and saw the Expo as a symbol of the revival of the Chinese nation. Liang Qichao (2010[1902]), one of the most prominent political activists in republican China, in his imagination of new China dreamt of the Expo as an occasion when the British Kings and Queens, the statesmen from Russia and Hungary, and the leaders from other imperialist nations would all pay tribute to China, while Shanghai as the host city would be a site for disseminating Chinese wisdom. What his utopia entailed is not an aggressive imperialist vision of China's future but the intense sentiments of an injured national identity and the yearning for national honour. This point is echoed by Lu Shie (2010 [1910]) in whose novel the Expo was more than a showcase of China's power, of greater importance were the disappearance of colonial governance in Shanghai, and the polite White foreigners who were no longer 'pushing their way by shoving around the Chinese civilians' but eagerly studying Chinese culture in Shanghai. In all three novels, the Expo is constructed as a spectacle with a simple message that was well summarised by Wu Yanren(2010[1905]: 283), 'China eventually has this moment! (*Zhongguo ye you jintian!*)'.

It is not far-fetched to suggest that Shanghai's hosting of the Expo, to those authors and many nationalists, is a symbol of China standing up psychologically, of equal importance to Mao's proud claim of China's political independence in Tiananmen in 1949. The symbolic value of the Expo, to avenge the humiliation and to recover *mianzi*,[17] transcends the possible and actual economic opportunities. It is no surprise that the Chinese national leaders promised a 'most successful, most wonderful, most memorable Expo' through full-scale institutional support (diplomatic, financial, regulatory, etc.) for Shanghai to the Expo community during the bidding process.

[17] *Mianzi* is the social aspect of face in Chinese culture, referring to one's moral standing in a society, as compared to *lian*, which usually refers to one's moral decency. See Zhai (2011) and Gries (2004).

Born in this political context, Shanghai's bid for the Expo was represented as a project of nation-building, or more accurately, as a showcase testifying the party's achievement of modernising the nation, particularly, the correctness of Deng's architecture of socialist market economy. Repeatedly emphasised was the symbolic meaning of China as a developing country in fighting in a game exclusive to powerful nations in advanced economies. China's entry to this game is convincing evidence of the party's accomplishment in materialising the nation's century-long dream. In a front-page news article entitled, 'Yearnings from billions of Chinese', the paper quoted the speech from Shanghai's leadership,

> Hosting the Expo is an important indicator of national power. After two decade's reform, the national power has been improved. Bidding for an Expo is a symbol of our improved international status and national power. It will provoke patriotic enthusiasm of billions of Chinese and push forward the historical progress of the revitalisation of the Chinese nation (Wenhui News, 11/03/2002).

Due to the priority of political lobbying at the bidding stage, a full scale legitimatisation of the event to domestic audience only became a major political agenda after Shanghai secured the bid at the end of 2002. The urgency of political legitimatisation at this stage lies in that the choices of alternative development strategies have been effectively eliminated after the success in bidding. As the 'sweet lemons' discussed by John Elster (1983) informs us, the city's as well as the nation's priority for the coming decade now must be dedicated to the event in order to grow into the mask the elites presented to the international community and the Chinese audience, even though the Expo tasted much sourer than it expected, and even though there were more urgent political agendas. The preparation of this event became an exception to routine political governance. In response to my question regarding regional or intra-agency conflicts, the director from the municipal planning bureau laughed at my way of thinking, and told me that,

> We had this slogan back then: "All available resources must be poured to this event". Hence, there was no conflict at all. This was the instruction from the leaders from central government. Resources, not only from Shanghai but from every corner of the country, were mobilised to prioritise Expo-related projects. Several subway lines in the city were given priority to accommodate the needs of 70 million visitors to the Expo site (25/07/2012).

To further legitimatise the event and exceptional measures in the coming years, in early 2003, the municipal government organised another round of city-wide debates

within the whole state apparatus on the meaning of the Expo to Shanghai,[18] with the input of scientific discourses similar to those in bidding stage but were furnished with meticulous detail, endorsed and dominated by a group of leading urban economists, sociologists and political scientists in Shanghai. Sentimental discourses appealing to passion sidestepped to the background but were never muted, whereas discourses appealing to science and reason took control again to rationalise the Expo project. In the final report from this debate (2002), unanimously, those authors took the greatness of the Shanghai Expo as a given, all they did was to find or manufacture[19] facts that fit in this narrative through selective use of positive figures and sophisticated modelling, and to justify the incompatible facts through their scenario-based proposals.

Through such discursive exercise, the state-led Expo regime avoided the deliberation of the necessity and legitimacy of the Expo, which is rather contentious when a large segment of the society has been marginalised by the reform in the 1990s. By projecting the consequences of hosting an expo, imbued with the power of scientific and nationalist discourses, the regime mobilised popular support for hosting the event. If scientific discourses were easier to resist, the nationalist discourses make critiques politically risky. This must be attributed to the mystification of the CPC as the embodiment of the nation, the only saviour and the guardian to the century-long quest for wealth and power (Zhao, 1998) in the state-controlled nationalist discourse. Articulated through the vocabulary of *aiguozhuyi* (patriotism), the nationalist discourse authored by the party's historians in post-Tiananmen era made it difficult to attack the party-state without being accused of being unpatriotic.

For the displacees, such discursive construction created formidable challenges to lodge their complaints or to organise effective protests. The displacees were not only effectively excluded from the legitimate scientific language to speak about the Expo, but were also deprived of the political opportunity by the nationalistic discourses. The defining feature of the state-led nationalism, as Charles Tilly (1994: 133) points

[18] The mouthpiece of the party Jiefang Daily and Wenhui News published a series of editorial commentaries on this debate. See Jiefang Daily, 13/03/2003, 17/03/2003, 18/03/2003, 19/03/2003, and Wenhui News, 20/03/2003, 01/04/2003, 04/04/2003, 27/04/2003, 11/04/2003, 15/04/2003.

[19] For instance, in one report on the impacts of the Expo on quality of life, a Tongji University based research team led by Zhu Dajian (2002), a key policy consultant to Shanghai Municipal Government and keen promoter of creative city in Shanghai, predicted the Expo would contribute to Shanghai's annual GDP growth at an average rate of 2 per cent, as compared to the scenario of not hosting the Expo. In their calculations, population growth, currency rate (Chinese RMB to USD), and annual growth of fixed asset investment were controlled at current growth rate, and predictions of tourist revenues and inward investments were held as independent of political and economic contexts. Those assumptions have already limited the predicting power of their models but authors still boldly claim their predictions as convincing evidence of the importance of the Expo to Shanghai's economy.

out, is the moral appeal mandating that 'citizens identify themselves with that nation and subordinate other interests to those of the state'. As a result, political openings from tensions and contradictions between a sympathetic central government and a predatory local authority (see O'Brien and Li, 2006, Cai, 2010), if not closed completely, were left with tiny fissures. In defending their right to stay, they would be under the moral pressure of acting against the interest of the national state, meaning the possibility of losing sympathy from the rest of society. Moreover, the memory of their personal violent encounters with the party-state and witness of political violence against the students in 1989 powerfully warned them what the authoritarian regime is capable of in confrontational situations. As a result, consciously remembered and eternalised fear about the state was conjured up to censor the political subjectivity and paralyse the political agency of the displacees. This is a persistent theme in the responses of political inactions from the displacees. The following testimony from a man whose grandfather was classified as a capitalist in the 1950s and family property was confiscated during the Cultural Revolution, is representative.

> The Communist Party is good at putting big hats on people (*dai maozi*, arbitrary classifying woes and friends). If you do not move, they will give you a big hat, accusing you of ruining the national image and jeopardising the Expo project. Do you think an ordinary citizen like me can bear such accusation? No one dares. You do not want to go in that direction. Fighting against the national state (*gen guojia dou*), do you want to live or not? (Interview, D81, 31/03/2012).

Devaluation and Dehumanisation of the Displacees

By appealing to both reason and passion, the discursive practices effectively legitimatised the exceptional import of the Expo. At best, such ideological legitimatisation can only extend to the preparation of the Expo as a disruptive emergent political situation or an abnormal state of urban governance, requiring *ad hoc* measures and additional resources for successful delivery of a best ever Expo to the international community. This structural condition may encourage the 'moral inversion' (Adams and Balfour, 1998: 4) in the event of displacement, under which condition the problematic of the displacement were split and excluded, or even worse, redefined as a good thing that not only necessitates the greater good but also in the best interests of the displacees. But, it is contentious to make a logical jump from this point to the conjecture that this condition directly led to the transgression of social norms and legal boundaries and permitted the violent, in symbolic or physical form, treatment of the displacees, although the causality cannot be denied here. After all,

from persuasion to force, the bulldozer regime had a wide range of political options to arrive at the goal of removing people from the Expo site. They could have chosen a much more humane and compassionate way to relocate the displacees from the Expo site. But instead, in addition to exploiting the displacees' traumatic memory of encounters with state power, they consciously chose the most vicious ones from their arsenal: deception, intimidation, abuse and violence.

What truly 'emancipated' the minds of the *chaiqian* agents and made those horrendous actions permissible and eventually routinized as a normal practice during *chaiqian* must also be registered in the discursive construction of the displacees as expendable and undesirable biological beings, members of the polity but were excluded from legal protection. This is a collective enterprise of the urban planners and legislators, embedded in their view of modernity in post-Mao's China but boosted by the exceptionality of the Expo and condoned by the Expo community. Such demeaning view of the displacees manufactured a psychological and social distance between the agents of the bulldozer regime and the displacees, allowing the former to relax their moral guard and eschew their political responsibility to the latter as equal fellow citizens. As Bauman (1989: 184) argues in his dissection of the causes of that Holocaust, 'Responsibility is silenced once proximity is eroded; it may eventually be replaced with resentment once the fellow human subject is transformed into an Other'. Although racist resentment of the Other is absent from the Expo induced domicide, the legal and policy practices followed the same logic and successfully accomplished the same outcome: the redefinition of moral and legal boundaries, and the immunity of the *chaiqian* agents from transgressing established regulatory frameworks, both justified by the exceptional situation of the Expo.

Inarguably, the judicial and political culture of China offers a most fertile soil to nurture such pathological mentality and aggressive actions. However, by limiting our critique to structural ills in Chinese society, I am afraid it will let go a most important source of oppression, thereby giving away the possibility to transcend the peculiarity of Shanghai Expo. The suffering of the displacees in Shanghai must be attributed to the politically unaccountable BIE—puppet of politicians and global corporate elites—a keen promoter of neoliberal urbanism and violator of human rights. Their corrupted organisational ethics and the bureaucratic rationality turned those events into a major contributor of political violence in our time.

The Expo, as 'an arm of state foreign policy and diplomacy' (Roche, 2000: 53) in a cultural guise, is merely another site for geopolitical games in contemporary world. This game is exclusively played by the politicians, in coddling with the global

business elites. Their right to vote is frequently used as a piece of symbolic capital to leverage for greater economic and political exchanges from the bidding countries, in the forms of bribery, gifts, 'investment', bail-out of business investment; all accepted norms justified through moral relativism in the bidding process (see Chen, 2010). As such, the Expo is only a chess piece in a bigger political game, with trivial use value in itself for the voting states. Their involvement in the production of the Expo is only to conceal the political dealings behind the scenes where their real interest rests. On this point, BIE is not shameful to admit. In their official guide for organising an Expo (Bureau International des Expositions, N.A.), they explicitly stated that the voting decision is influenced by 'international relations between the candidate country and the voting BIE member state' in addition to feasibility and viability, and the proposed theme of the proposed Expo, with no room for human rights protection. But, this is not the real problem. The greater concern for me is BIE's apathetic view of human rights protection as a worthless value to pursue, irrelevant to their imperialist organisational agenda(Chen, 2010)[20]. However, this is understandable. When the anonymous voting system effectively diffused their responsibility, ensuring no voter could be traced back to take the blame for awarding the global event to a shameful record of human rights violations, there is no need to shoulder such responsibility and take it seriously. Extending C. Wright Mills' (1956: 344) critique on the moral bankruptcy of the powerful elites in America to those BIE voters, 'as an individual, they are morally defenceless. But as a group, they are politically indifferent'.

If indifference is enough to question their mores, their insensitivity, or perversion to be more accurate, is more than sufficient to testify to their sins. According to the memoir of Chen Zhixing (2010: 197) (deputy director of Shanghai Expo Bidding committee), the voters in reviewing Shanghai's candidacy for the Expo considered the residents on the Expo site not as humans with housing rights and human rights to be protected but as threats whose resistance would put the implementation of the Expo in difficulty. It was the Dutch Ambassador in the end who vindicated the credibility of the Chinese government in terms of the financial capacity of resettlement, based on his observation from working as a diplomat in Beijing (Chen, 2010). What concerns me here is not the ambassador's selective use of evidence or his bourgeoisie perspective, but the capacity of him as well as those voters inside the Expo community to make a decision affecting people, to whom they do not have to be accountable. Their presence at the BIE assembly is entrusted by their sovereign

[20] According to Chen's recollection, the executive committee of BIE repeatedly excluded discussion on human rights as an organisational objective to pursue and a criteria for the Expo bid evaluation.

states foremost to serve the interest of their own nations. It is unrealistic to expect them to give up their national interest in exchange for the well-beings of people in another country in this zero-sum game. Even if it is their intention to defend human rights, the temporal distance between their decision and the political consequences, blinded by their trust of 'responsible' Chinese colleagues, can easily paralyse their sociological imagination, entertaining their impulse for denial.

One group of those 'responsible' colleagues I am putting on the defendant seat are the planners. Robert Goodman (1971), a practising radical planner, bemoaned that the conformity of the planners to the repressive social structure and the dominant ideologies had created an ever more repressive social structure, making the life of the poor even more miserable. Quite conservatively, he conceded that the plans might have been conceived with good intentions and some consequences were unintended. However, he insisted that this is inadequate to exonerate the responsibility of the planners because 'any individual ought to be responsible for his *[sic]* acts and participating in immoral acts is simply immoral' (p. 96). Whilst I agree that planners are inexcusable for becoming the dupes and accomplices of the repressive regime, I am less convinced by his concession to the platitudes of side effects or unforeseeable consequences. This line of argument is indefensible when direct displacement is part of the plans. Annihilating people's homes is always a conscious, calculative and strategic decision. Like any spatial practices, it is bounded with moral reasoning (Smith, 2000). It requires the planners to deliberate morally on not only the utilisation of people's spaces but also on the treatment of the current users as fellow citizens in a polity. Whilst the planners might appeal to technical language to justify their decision on spatial designs, they are bounded on the latter issue by the universal 'golden rule' of human existence that 'treating others as you want to be treated yourself' (Smith, 2000: 48). Therefore, to examine the benignity of the planners' hearts, we need to place how they treated those people directly affected by their plans at the centre of our inquiry.

Let me first introduce the context of the siting decision before I examine the conscience of the urban planners in Shanghai. The siting choice of the Expo was an arranged marriage of Chinese politicians and the BIE technocrats matched by international planning expertise. It differs from the state-led production of transnational urbanism in contemporary Shanghai (Olds, 1997, Ren, 2011, Chen, 2007) in that the power structure of the Expo community and the rule of the bidding game were decisive in shaping the agency of the entrepreneurial state. It is true that Chinese urban planners frequently bend their principles for political wills, but their

possession of professional knowledge allows them to occupy a privileged position in the bureaucratic field. On the one hand, they are the key producers of professional planning knowledge for political decision-making. On the other hand, they are the problem-fixers to rationalise and materialise the ambitions of politicians. The initial proposals of the three Expo sites in Shanghai's suburbia respected the critical and professional inputs from the urban planners. Those choices were 'rational' decisions based on their algorithm in their land use model and maintained continuity with their planning rationality to modernise the city at minimum costs since the 1990s. Displacement was only a variable in this algorithm, and the displacees as human beings were reduced to a number, whose fate was dictated by a simple mathematical calculation. The inspiration to locate the Expo on Shanghai's waterfront in the city centre came from a planning exercise for the Expo by a group of students from a Paris-based planning studio during their summer camp in Shanghai.[21] One team of students dismissed the assigned locations by the Chinese planners and chose the waterfront to develop their planning. This bold choice was appreciated by the Chinese planners for their creativity; however, it was the popularity of this proposal within the BIE based in Paris, entertained by the Chinese politicians in the mentality to secure the bid at no costs, that forced the Chinese planners to reconsider their siting choices and evaluate the possibility to host an Expo on the waterfront. In less than four months, rationales for this new site choice were neatly reasoned by the Chinese planners and presented in the final bidding report. Similar to what Flyvberg (1998) noted in the Aalborg project, what we see here is that rationalisation is produced whenever powerful elites need one. In a bird's eye view of the city, planning decisions that affect the lives of millions of people on the planned site was so casually and hastily switched from option A to option B in *realpolitik* as if people fell under those plans were packable and transportable things.

The view of the displacees was no less humiliating in rationalistic discourses than in the *realpolitik*. Let me quote in full-length one rationale presented by the Shanghai Bidding committee to the BIE. Zheng Shiling (professor in planning and a member of Chinese Academy of Sciences) and his colleagues from Tongji University, a prestigious university in China for the architecture and planning departments, reviewed the report.

> Population density in the planning area for the Exposition will be reduced to 1/20 of the current level. Mobile population will increase. The residents in this area will become younger and better educated. More foreign residents will move in. All these

[21] Sanlian Weekly, 2007, vol. 12.

> changes will be in line with the population plan and policy of Shanghai to optimize the population structure and improve the population quality (Shanghai Expo Bidding Report, p. 212).

In a more elaborate narrative, the research team on Expo planning headed by Professor Zheng and funded by the Shanghai municipal government further justified the choice of the site,

> Inner city is densely populated, resulting in environment degradation and hindering the rationalisation of urban land use structure. Population settlement in the suburbia on the other hand is too dispersed and city building investment did not generate adequate return. As a result, the countryside is weak to attract people, and more people are poured to the inner city….The Expo can contribute to the adjustment of urban structure, controlling the population scale in the inner city and exporting inner city population to the suburbia**….According to the principle of population replacement, 400,000 highly qualified and entrepreneurial talents will be imported to the inner city; meanwhile, 1.5 million people will be exported to the suburbia, resettled along the metro lines from the city centre to the suburbia. Eventually, the number of people living in the inner city will be limited to 8 to 8.5 million (my emphasis)** (Tongji University Research Group for Expo 2010, 2006: 73-74).

The eventual choice of the Expo site adheres to the logic of 'rent gap' (Smith, 1987). The primary objective is to release for profit a large parcel of waterfront land in the city centre whose exchange value was depreciated by the industrial use and self-built housing. But, in rhetoric, the agenda is concealed under environmental sustainability (e.g. heavy pollution) and public health. The cause of the problem following this logic lies neither in under-investment nor uneven development but in people's residential choice. In this line of reasoning, intervention must be found in effective control of the population flow and manipulating the space, similar to apartheid (Western, 1981, Hart, 1988), classifying the political subjects and disperse different categories of people to the right social space. This Chicago School view coincides with and reinforces the discourse of *suzhi* (loosely translated as human qualities or human capital) that originated from the social engineering of birth control in the post-Mao's China but identified with nationalist teleology to rejuvenate the nation. Under Deng's modernisation project, according to Yan (2003a) and Anagnost (2004), *suzhi* discourse has been activated as a value-coding mechanism to facilitate the rapid capital accumulation. One key discursive tactic is to devalue the bodies of the subaltern class (e.g. peasants, manual labour) and to legitimatise their inferiority to other groups in the social hierarchy, so that exploitation of their labour in the market can be mystified as improvement of their personal capacities in both quantity and quality, and naturalised as morally legitimate and just (Kipnis, 2007, Tomba, 2009).

In most illiberal form, social inequalities are justified and perpetuated in political discourse in a most explicit way.

'Younger', 'better educated', 'foreigners', 'highly qualified', and 'entrepreneurial talents', those are precisely the false categories to code, compare and order human bodies under the dictatorship of the logic of the market, echoing the agenda of the Expo to civilise the local citizens. But, different from the 'civilising' project in Glasgow as observed by Gray and Mooney (2011), disciplining the destitute is too-consuming for Chinese planners. Their once-for-all quick fix, learning from their ruthless allies in reforming the SOEs sector (Solinger, 2009), is to map out the undesirables and to import the superior groups who are more conducive to the accumulation of capital. Cautiously worded, what both quotes above imply is that the predicament of the current users manifests their own low quality and unfitness for the jungle of the market. They are inferior to the group with higher quality who can generate more economic benefits, therefore they no longer deserve the location where they currently live and are obliged to give away their land for the other group. Otherwise, their continued existence on the Expo site was unhealthy for the growth of the economy. In this sense, the Expo was conceptualised with a sinister intention as a filter for a Darwinist society, contributing to the ladder of spatial citizenship. Dangerously, this view of space and society resembles Nazi's vicious view of race and space to justify genocide. Richard Darré, the Nazi minister of Agriculture, laboured on the garden view of population policy that,

> he *[sic]* who leaves the plants in a garden to themselves will soon find to his surprise that the garden is overgrown by weeds and that even the basic character of the plants has changed. If therefore the garden is to remain the breeding ground for the plants, if, in other words, it is to lift itself above the harsh rule of natural forces, then the forming will of a gardener is necessary, a gardener who, by providing suitable conditions for growing, or by keeping harmful influences away, or by both together, carefully tends what needs tending, and ruthlessly eliminates the weeds which would deprive the better plants of nutrition, air, light and sun (cited in Bauman, 1989: 113).

It should not be too surprising to note that farmers, at the bottom of human quality hierarchy, who gave up their spacious houses, their farmland and their livelihood to resettle the urbanites in a relatively superior position in this ladder, were never mentioned in the Expo plan. Appropriation of their land was taken for granted, in no need of professional labour to justify it. Gestural gifts (cakes, fans, and medals) awarded to the displacees from the Expo site never reached their doorsteps. To the planners and the politicians, the farmers simply did not exist in their accounts of direct last resident displacement. Understandably, they were seldom credited for their

enormous sacrifices to the Expo. A male worker used to live on the resettlement site commented on the exclusionary practices with fatalist sentiments internalising the unjust social order against them,

> They [the urbanites] are the birth children of the state; we [rural households] were adopted. Adopted children cannot be compared to the birth children. There is nothing you can do about it (Interview, D27, 11/03/2012).

The planners, like the personnel in the penal apparatus in Wacquant's analysis, are performing the same role of 'imposing categories, upholding material and symbolic divisions, and molding relations and behaviours through the selective penetration of social and physical space' (Wacquant, 2009: 304). In a twisted neoliberal logic,[22] the devalued bodies of the displacees only entitle them to places appropriate to their positions in the social hierarchy. As such, they are incapable of and unqualified to desire for a better place. The director from the Municipal Planning Bureau replied to my persistent questions on the failure to use the resettlement sites to exemplify Shanghai's solution to 'better city, better life' that,

> Of great concern to us back then was how to relocate people in a most effective way. We certainly thought about planning of the resettlement sites, but there was no point spending too much on it. The prime agenda was to move these residents out as soon as possible so that the site can be prepared for hosting the Expo. Besides, the displacees are practical. Their priority lies in the size and the function of their living space. **They are not yet at the stage of caring about designs, overall plans, aesthetics, etc.** (25/07/2012).

The second group I am after is the legislators. Their efforts encoded immoral values as a rule of law for the zone of *chaiqian*. It is also their efforts that systematically obstructed and denied the displacees' rights to stay put, to constitutional protection, and fair compensation for their loss. As the last defence of the moral and legal order, the judicial system muted, collapsed and conspired to the collective orgy of the Expo-induced domicide. For the space limits, I shall summarise a few key compromises in the regulatory framework to the force of market and the

[22] I agree with Kipnis (2007) on the point that the articulation of *suzhi* discourse is different from the blame-the-victim rhetoric in that structural cause is not denied but morally justified.

exceptionality of the Expo based on the regulations relevant to the Expo induced displacement to expose the symbolic violence of law.[23]

To regulate *chaiqian* practices on the Expo site, an *ad hoc* short and vague Regulation on the Expo induced Residential Displacement (hereafter ERD) overrides legal orders on different levels. It not only abandoned the displacees on the Expo site and deprived them of the minimal legal protection under pre-existing regulatory framework, but also explicitly coerced the displacees to surrender personal rights and interests to the nation by simultaneously appealing to the moral disciplines of the displacees and legal violence. As an overarching legal document, ERD only defines the obligations of the displacees and offers no concrete advice of their rights and the procedures to seek legal remedies. Article 3 mandates that all individuals as well as impersonal units *yingdang* (must and should, interchangeable) submit to the needs of the construction work for the Expo, and evacuate themselves in line with the progress of the Expo project and the deadline specified in the Demolition Permit.

The directive word *yingdang* must be taken seriously here. Ross and Ross (2000) highlight the categorical difference in English in terms of legal obligations connoted by the directives of 'must' (*bixu*) and 'should' (*yingdang*): the former carries strong technical obligations whose non-performance implies punishment whereas the latter implies weak deontic obligations whose adherence is a matter of moral duty. But the Chinese legal language has been ambiguous in the usage of strong and weak obligations. As Cao (2004) argues, in Chinese language they are identical, carries same weight in defining legal obligations of the political subjects. However, Cao also nuances that *yingdang* might 'signify a kind of indirect command latent with moral connotation' yet its substitution of *bixu* in legal language implies no lesser legal force (p.66). The choice of *yingdang* in the legal document therefore can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to moderate the authoritative tone without weakening the coercive power of this regulation. More importantly, this choice is politically astute as it appeals more to moral censorship and peer pressure on accepted social norms than to the authority of the state or the violence of law alone. In so doing, it can

[23] Law is a very elusive and elastic concept in China. As Keller (1994) points out, there is a great confusion on what counts as law in China. This is exemplified by the variegated wording of legal orders in China, such as *falv*, *fagui*, *guiding*, *tiaoli*, *xize*, etc. Policies from various levels of government may have same power as laws. To inform my analysis, with the inspiration from Santos (1987), I categorised them into core (Constitution, Land Law, etc.) and periphery laws (Housing Policies, Planning Act, *Chaiqian* Regulations, etc.) to analyse the interlegality of the Chinese legal system on displacement. A further distinction between regulatory law (e.g. *koujing*-detailed regulations) and facilitative law (e.g. Shanghai Bylaw on *Chaiqian* 2001) borrowed from Blandy and Wang (2013) is also applied to inform my understanding of the exceptionality of the Expo in the legal system.

exonerate the responsibility of the state from direct confrontation with the displacees in the event of disputes. From this view, it is not difficult to understand the rationale behind the careful wording of the negations for compensations as affairs between 'relevant parties' (*dangshiren*) rather than with the states in the second part of article 3.

In the event of negotiation failures, ERD advises the displacer to follow the legal procedure specified under the section on *shizheng dongqian* (displacement caused by public infrastructure) of Shanghai Bylaw on *Chaiqian* 2001 (hereafter Bylaw), rather than cite directly the violent term of 'evicting out first, settle disputes later' (*xian chaiqian tengdi, hou chuli jiufen*), a legal lexicon invented by the Shanghai municipal government for displacement under its jurisdiction. This is a pre-emptive clause to allow the displacers to take over and demolish people's homes whilst compensation for people's loss is in dispute and court litigation is still in process, meaning that even if the displacees can afford legal costs and find the juridical system on their side, they would have already lost their homes for months or years (see Shih, 2010a, 2010b).

The Bylaw attempts to hide the dirty hands of the local state behind the displacers, being it developers in commercial development projects or agencies appending to the state apparatus in public infrastructure development. But in either situation, the Bylaw is to maximise the gains of the displacers rather than protect the interest of the displacees. It allows the displacers to decide most crucial parameters for *chaiqian* in the Displacement and Resettlement Plan (DRP) submitted for getting a Demolition Permit. Upon approval by the housing authority of the local state, the DRP becomes the most fine-grained regulation governing *chaiqian* practices, of equal power to a law. In this sense, the Bylaw is akin to the Black Act that not only facilitates and condones injustice, but also naturalises, legalises and perpetuates injustice. The legal apparatus is not simply an accessory but an authority in the killing of people's homes.[24] More cunningly, the Bylaw is formulated with a calculative eye to prevent latent pre-emptive actions that may halt the developers' project. Since the DRP is only required to be publically announced after its approval, the displacees, if without any connections with insiders, would have lost all opportunity to influence how the game of *chaiqian* might be played, if not prevent the displacement altogether. The political opportunity is confined to accept the DRP, and push the boundary of the

[24] The distinction between law in text and law in practice is important. Law is an important source of power to the displacers but in the practices of *chaiqian*, law is only selectively enforced. In most cases, the displacers appeal to pure violence and moral pressure.

DRP through constant bargaining, making the exploitation and injustice tolerable and subordinating to the established order.

The 2001 Bylaw, in line with cancellation of all in-kind housing benefits in 1998, established the monopoly status of money in *chaiqian* compensation and cancelled the parallel in-kind resettlement practised for decades in the city. This can be seen as another victory of neoliberalism in China's 'rule of law' project. Indeed, it might not be worthwhile to single out the triumph of money here, whose destructive power in transforming social relations into calculative monetary exchange has been critiqued by great minds from Marx and Engels (2008 [1848]), to Simmel (2004), and to Sandel (2012). In Communist Manifesto, we find the notion of 'cash nexus', sharply criticising that money is more than alienating labourers but reducing human relations into nothing but 'naked self-interest' and, 'callous cash payments' (p. 37). Relationships between humans turn into relations between things. Following Marx, Simmel in his masterpiece on money argues, 'money is free from quality and exclusively determined by quantity' (p. 281). The reduction of quality to quantity subordinates social relations to instrumental, precise, and arithmetical calculations. As a result, social questions run the risk of being transformed into mathematical questions. Their perceptive remarks remain relevant in our time, in which everything seemingly can be put a price tag on—our emotions, our legal rights, and even our future yet to come. Those monetary exchanges propel Michael Sandel to question the moral limits of market. I have no intention of substantially repeating their poignant ideas rather than extending those ideas to analyse the implication of the Bylaw briefly here. The view of housing as a tradable, quantifiable and monetisable commodity devoid of moral, emotional and social values in the legislature is an antithesis to housing as a 'biological and social reproduction project' (Bourdieu, 2005: 21). The money compensation, computerised by an 'impersonal' and 'objective' algorithm of the size, location, and the residual value of the physical properties, conceals the exploitative relations. In so doing, moralities and politics of *chaiqian* is effectively replaced by trivial technicalities of compensation, revolving around issues of who gets what and how much.

Such technical issues bring about two dehumanising effects that I believe are contributing to the systematic failure of the legal system and making the displacees more susceptible to manipulation and exploitation by the displacers. Firstly, the Bylaw may primarily serve to dissolve and transfer property rights, but in so doing, it inevitably destroys the material base for the displaced families as a stable social group and forces them to negotiate the dissolution and reformation of their families

in order to make another collective investment to shelter themselves. However, the divisibility of money encourages individual members, in many cases under the manipulation of the displacers, to pursue their personal interests, which frequently leads to family conflicts or breakdowns (see chapter 7). Secondly, the DRPs for the Expo attach a price tag on each family member in 'housing difficulty' (*zhufang kunnan*)[25] to increase their overall compensation in order to purchase a resettlement house. To qualify, the displacees must also go through demeaning marriage test, pregnancy test, and *hukou* test, as if losing legitimate properties is similar to entering into the state benefit payroll system. If eligible, they may receive a cash payment decided not by their actual housing needs but by the location of their current house and by the phase of the displacement programmes. What it seems to suggest is that the value of things and locations transcends the value of the displacees as owners and more importantly as humans. The headcount with an increased compensation, as the state's feminine left hand (Bourdieu, 1998a: 2), was welcomed by many families in precarious situations. Through selective inclusion, the double standard of compensation drives a wedge between the displacees in the same locale and destroys prior social ties that might unite the displacees to protest against the displacers.

Floating Responsibility and Profiteering from Domicide

The previous two sections revealed the production and legitimatisation of immoral values under the exceptionality of the Expo, which suppressed, dehumanised and abandoned the displacees. This section, I shall further examine how individual conscience was compromised due to the functional and social division of labour. It creates several important conditions for immoral actions: floating responsibility, bureaucratic rationality and structural incentives. This adds to Harvey's (2005b) notion of 'accumulation by dispossession' by questioning the social processes and moral conditions that make it possible. In the first section, I purposely avoided the implication of nationalist discourses on the state apparatus. As a symbol of the nation's dream for wealth and power, acquired irrefutable political legitimacy to mobilise the whole state apparatus to clear any hindrance in its way. The bulldozer regime was a state-led temporarily assembled *ad hoc* giant bureaucratic machine with a clearly defined goal to demolish people's homes with least input and within an unnegotiable deadline. It was the 'hegemonic bloc' in Gramsci's term (1988), comprised of government agencies, party organs, legitimate or illegitimate violent specialists, legal apparatus, and grassroots organisations, each with distinctive

[25] In Pudong, housing difficulty is defined as per capita living space in less than 10 square metres. In Puxi, the line is set at 7 square metres per person.

interests, organisational culture and operational principles. It is analytically difficult to map out meticulously and accurately the organisational structure of this bulldozer regime for the involvement of diverse agents from different government positions, at several stages, on different levels and to various extent in this process. Nonetheless, the bulldozer regime was able to establish a clear hierarchical chain of command based on pre-existing governance structure, dead (i.e. *danwei*) or alive (see Figure 6.1).

I classify the organisations involved in the Expo induced domicide into three tiers based on the primary roles of those organisations. The first tier is what I call '*loaded firefighters*', consisting of the state council, Shanghai municipal government and the Expo, including their subordinate administrative organs. In this organised crime, their role is to supply the cash, stamp on the *chaiqian* regulations, and contain social grievances through their functional agencies. Although Expo-induced domicide is a party-state project, affairs related to land and displacement were centralised under the *ad hoc* Janus-faced organisation, the Expo Land Bank, which could engage in land speculation as a private land developer on the one hand and was entrusted with the enlightened responsibility to protect the interest of the society on the other. Its jurisdiction is confined to the land within the Expo site, which previously was under the management of three district governments respectively. As a legal body, the Expo Land Bank represents the local states as the *de jure* displacer in appropriating the land from the existing users and signing the resettlement agreements, thereby covering up the dirty hands of the states. Given the scale and complexity of residential displacement, the land bank is extremely short-staffed to carry out the displacement on its own. The solution was technical and rational: a wholesale valuation of the costs of displacement was purchased from professional valuators and cash from the central and municipal government was showered to the district governments and state-owned enterprises, who command greater territorial power and larger pool of administrative resources at their disposal, in exchange for their services to negotiate with the displacees. As the nominal supervisors overseeing the process, the central government and the municipal government were less interested in protecting the interests of the displacees than to put out 'fires' caused by the displacees in different places, resolving the most alarming disputes on condition that those disputes were lodged within the political boundary and the consequences did not shadow the project of the Expo.

The second tier includes the district governments, their subordinate street offices, and the SOEs on the Expo site, in territorial struggle with the municipal states, which I

call '*military strategists*'. In monetary agreement with the Expo Land Bank, each district government set up a militarised command centre, or *zhihuibu* in Chinese. *Zhihuibu* is frequently used in military settings or political emergent situations. In displacement, *zhihuibu* were responsible for designing the regulations, coordinating internal and external agencies, mobilising resources and formulating strategies, overseeing the implementation. They were headed by either governors or deputy governors of each district as a temporal arrangement or a 'loan' of their political titles. Similarly, heads or deputy heads from different government offices were also borrowed to staff these centres as an additional political task to their routine jobs. In so doing, the command centres could easily mobilise fragmented bureaucratic resources within their own organisations and reduce inter-agency conflicts. As the *de facto* displacers, the district authorities decided the *koujing*, drawing legal resources from existing regulatory frameworks with two exceptions, which were under their discretion under the Shanghai Bylaw 2001, i.e. minimum floor size of resettlement housing and minimum monetary compensation per square metre. Similar to a political campaign, displacement as a political task was further downloaded to the street-offices and township governments. On each level, smaller command centres of similar political arrangement were established to coordinate and manage the destruction of people's homes within their territories.

The third tier is the messy ground where Expo-induced displacement was minutely planned and routinely carried out in a gigantic scale. This is a 'gray zone' in Javier Auyero's (2007) term where normative boundary between legal/illegal, legitimate/illegitimate, permissible/impermissible, and state/gangsters crumbles and obfuscates. Violence in different forms were visualised in the everyday life of the displacees through their interactions with the *chaiqian* agents, from which they learnt the harsh reality of being in the neoliberal regime of accumulation and were disciplined and coerced to subordination. On this level, domicide was meticulously broken down into small tasks carried out by a group of professional *chaiqian* agents, grassroots state appendices and gladiators from various professions inside or outside the political establishments, under regular instructions from their superiors to rationalise the organisation and improve the efficiency (see Figure 6.2). Those are the street-level bureaucrats in Lipsky's (1980) terms who practise and make policy through their daily interactions with the displacees. I call them 'domicide operatives'.



Figure 6.1: The Organisational Structure of the Bulldozer Regime
Source: my own

During Expo-induced *chaiqian*, each planned demolition area was mapped out as a *jidi* (bastion), and a *dongqian* (displacement) office with multiple functions was set up as the main office for everyday administration, as the mediation centre in the event of conflicts, and the walk-in centre for information and contact during the displacement process. The major labour force at this level was the *chaiqian* companies, the contracted displacers, selected by the district governments. As professional home destroyers but outsiders to the bastion, they relied on a pool of flexibly recruited mediators from both masculine and feminine hands of the state apparatus (Bourdieu, 1998a) to negotiate their access and perform their routine home destruction business. These mediators, each possessing a particular set of skills or knowledge may include neighbourhood police force, cadres on placement, social workers, neighbourhood party-organs, co-opted authoritative figures, residents committees, lawyers, teachers, etc. The recruitment was contingent throughout the displacement process. Whenever necessary, either for a particular case or for as permanent supplement to the company's workforce, new members from existing bureaucracies may be transferred and assigned to local offices. The balance of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in the team of domicide operatives enabled the bulldozer regime to exploit the established social networks by the grassroots bureaucrats and people's trust in expert knowledge—lawyers in particular on the one hand, and to preserve a group of detached personnel to enforce policies and regulations on the other. Apart from the routine task force on the third tier, special task forces staffed by government officers and young cadres under party career observation programme, mostly from the district governments, were organised to deal with 'tough' households, who were refusing to cave to the *chaiqian* companies. The simple rationale was to ensure that destruction was carried out according to the schedule and reduce the legal costs. Efficiency was the only mantra for the street-level domiciders.



Figure 6.2: An Anatomy of the Domicide Operatives
Source: my own

At first sight, it seems quite 'irrational' to outsource the displacement, loaded with political interest, to these professional *chaiqian* companies given their notorious reputation amongst Shanghai citizens, especially after an old woman was burnt to death by a *chaiqian* company. With a mixture of *bai* ('white', law-binding) and *hei* ('black', violence-prone) personnel, *chaiqian* companies through their 'business' interactions with the local citizens in the previous decades acquired the name as the hit men of the developers, unpunishable by the law. The invitation to those *chaiqian* companies during the Expo, however, is practical and politically calculative. It is practical because it is beyond the capacity of the government to displace millions of people in such a short time. It is politically calculative for the inherent instrumental rationality. As private businesses, these *chaiqian* companies unlike government organisations are freed from the moral constraint that puts social justice as a top priority. Their *raison d'etre* is to pursue technical efficiency to displace the residents with least input to maximise their return on investment, which is in congruent with

the agenda of the clients of their services—the local governments. This business arrangement allows the state to split morally contentious and politically threatening task outside the realm of politics, and reap the benefits of business professionalism. In doing so, it transformed straightforward political antagonism between the displacees against authoritarian state in the political sphere to civil conflicts between the displacees against business malpractices in the market sphere. Acting as an impartial mediator or hypocritical defenders of the interests of the displacees (e.g. making concessions on behalf of the *chaiqian* companies), the state agents through their interventions could even reinforce the legitimacy of the state in appropriating people's lifelong investment in land and private property. Moreover, such labour arrangements also produced great confusion for many displacees to pin down the displacers and frame their grievances against the real authors of their sufferings. The political logic behind the conflation of coercive power of state and capital became crystal clear to me after a confrontational conversation with Tu Jianliang, the duty officer in charge of unresolved Expo-induced *chaiqian* conflicts in Pudong District Government, when I was an under-cover petitioner with a group of aunts I worked with (see chapter 8).

June 2012

Tu: Displacement is a private business between *chaiqian* companies with the displacees. The government has nothing to do with it.
YZ: Are you trying to put the blame on the *chaiqian* companies?
Tu (impatiently): It is not the responsibility of the government. They were the people who negotiated with the residents and signed the agreement with them.
YZ: What was the responsibility of the state then?
Tu: Our responsibility was to explain the policy [to the displacees] and supervise the conducts of the *chaiqian* companies. We did not sign the agreement.
YZ: Why were government officials from street offices, from district government, from residents' committees all involved in the negotiation with the displacees?
Tu: You need to focus who were the displacers on paper here. They [government officials] did involve in the *chaiqian* process. But still, it is not the responsibility of the government.
YZ: What if the displacees now were unhappy about the terms in the resettlement plan because of deceptions or fraud because of the involvement of those agents at the time of signing the agreement?
Tu: Again, who were the displacers here? You need to get this right. Who signed the resettlement agreement [with the displacees?] The *chaiqian* companies. Have problems? Sue them. We can mediate but it was not our responsibility.

This conversation is extracted from a two-hour recording I made secretly. To contextualise this encounter, we were petitioning against an environmental hazard

right next to a resettlement site. Tu was impatient from the very beginning, as he believed that we were in the wrong place, even after we informed him that our visit was instructed by his colleague earlier that morning. His response here might be interpreted as an exercise of state power in mundane governance to discipline petitioners like me to become 'patients of the state', to borrow Auyero's term (2012), by kicking them around, forcing them to lodge one complaint after another and travelling from one agency to another. But, there is more to this inquiry of who to blame than could be revealed. It is an example of floating responsibility, one of the conditions that permit immoral actions, produced by the division of labour. Writing on the role of modern bureaucracy in the Holocaust, Bauman (1989) alerts us that moral regions of the bureaucratic actors are vulnerable to short-sightedness when their actions toward the final end are mediated by functional and hierarchical division of labour. In this situation, personal morality is either replaced by bureaucratic rationality, requiring the agents to address a problem in their position in a most efficient way, or diffused by the floating responsibility in the bureaucracy, that no one claims responsibility for the disastrous outcome of their collective enterprise. Floating responsibility, as Bauman (1989: 163) warns, is 'the very condition of immoral or illegitimate acts taking place with obedient or even willing participation of people normally incapable of breaking the rules of conventional morality'.

It is inarguable that *chaiqian* companies were the legal contracted bodies, a major labour force for displacement, who signed resettlement agreements with the displacees. However, their negotiation was constrained by the *koujing* formulated by legislators in a bird's eye view of the displacees. Their working progress was also reviewed weekly by the heads at the command centres. In reaching the final agreement their actions were also facilitated and mediated by a group of state agents and professionals under the political order. *Chaiqian* companies therefore are only brokers and scapegoats of the state. Zhu Aijuan, the deputy party secretary of the *chaiqian* division of Pudong Real Estate Group, frankly appreciated the contribution from those mediators to the achievement of her *chaiqian* company,

> Ten words from a *chaiqian* company staff are less decisive than a word from the cadre at residents' committees. Without the participation from cadres and party members from the street offices and residents committees, I doubt the displacement would be implemented so smoothly (*The Grand Displacement in Pudong*, p. 16).

Zhu was honest about the absence of institutionalised power of her company. The efficiency of the company would be seriously impaired without the state agents who

embody the power of the state. In the war against the displacees, each of the latter were a warrior of the state, hand in hand with the *chaiqian* companies, and performed a distinctive function in their capacity in the collective destruction of homes. Heads of different government agencies were stationed in the command centres organising daily meetings to formulate tactics to overcome the setbacks in the everyday bargaining with the displacees. Lawyers were on-site as 'volunteers' not to teach legal language to fight against the state but to promote the unfair treaty of *chaiqian koujing*. The task forces were spontaneously organised by the state ready to target and conquer the most stubborn families reported by the *chaiqian* companies. As a last resort, the eviction apparatus were prepared to demolish people's homes before legal procedures were exhausted. The complaint system absorbed and recycled the grievances within the bulldozer regime,[26] obstructing the formal channel to address grievances. The justice system was more than ready to embrace 'misrule of law' (Holston, 2008: 66), selectively applying or suspending the law to give leeway to the bulldozers.

As the mediators between the *chaiqian* companies and the displacees, these state agents were there to convince the displacees to give up their homes using different tactics. But they were exempted from any accountability charges despite the fact that their actions were crucial and in some cases were decisive in closing the land deals. Traces of the involvement of themselves or their agencies were effectively removed as the final written resettlement plan was between the displacees with the Land Bank and the contracted displacement company. Such arrangement resulted in a mixture of business morality (ends justify means) and bureaucratic morality (procedural rationality) (Bauman, 1994). Displacement of a family became a collective enterprise that no one claimed ownership and responsibility.

In this land war, *chaiqian* companies were most prone to moral and political corruption due to their labour structure. Most *chaiqian* companies only recruited a few managers with sound knowledge on housing policies, *chaiqian* regulation and financial management to perform key administrative tasks such as finance, auditing and documentation to comply with local regulation and to reduce their overhead costs. The majority of the frontline employees who were responsible for on-site negotiation with the displacees were activated from registered practitioners, borrowed from other companies, or temporarily recruited from the labour market with no knowledge in this field. They were free to quit at any time. After a once-for-

[26] Complaints lodged at independent petitioning offices were returned to agencies that provoked the complaints in the first place.

all short vocational training course that lasted five days, they were sent off to negotiate with the displacees on behalf of the company and the state. A majority of them lacked adequate knowledge in the field, had only minimum commitment to the profession and very weak loyalty to the company. Apart from those frontline negotiators, organised gangsters were also in clandestine relations with the *chaiqian* companies to intimidate families to move out. The internal division of labour further diffused their moral responsibility toward domicide victims. Moreover, these *chaiqian* agents are overly protected under current regulations. They will only be disbarred if their misconducts are proven to have 'consequences' (as in 1994 Regulation) or they fail twice in internal performance evaluation conducted by the housing authorities (as in 2002 Regulation). The former creates burden for the displacees to prove a clear causality of events, and effectively excludes legitimate claims against the *chaiqian* company employees on the ground of harassment. The latter, echoing 'three strike law' in Chinese dialect, *shi bu guo san*, essentially issues each practitioner impunity card for the first violation and allows one to continue practicing in a lucrative, non-transparent and under-regulated business.

> *Chaiqian* companies hired all sorts of "talents". What kind of talents? They are all bastards. Some have nimble tongues. Some are daredevils. Some are thugs. They are all assembled in *chaiqian* companies. Like a hospital, there are surgeons, physicians, cardiovascular surgeons, genitourinary doctors, all sorts of people. Otherwise, it would difficult for them to do their job. *Chaiqian* companies are the mob boss (Uncle Wang, displaced from Puxi, Interview, X15, 02/05/2012).

> The *chaiqian* company knocked down my home before I agreed on the resettlement. They did it on purpose. They wanted to get an upward hand. All my family belongings were still inside. I called the police. The police told me that the *chaiqian* company were a group of thugs and they cannot do anything about it. They were the untouchables (Ms. Lu, displaced from Puxi, Interview, X38, 15/05/2012).

Whilst immunity from personal responsibility is an important condition for immoral actions, it is inadequate to address the misuse of the system for personal agenda or the convergence between personal interest and organisational goal, which motivates the social actors to transgress social norms. Here, I find Bourdieu's generalisation of Weber's argument very instructive—'one obeys the rule when the interest in obeying it predominates over the interest in disobeying it' (2005: 129). In addition to the immunity from personal responsibility, the bulldozer regime was created with strong political, economic and symbolic incentives to encourage the *chaiqian* agents to transgress social norms and participate in immoral acts.

To this analytical agenda, we need to look into the exercise of power within the apparatus of the party-state. It was implemented in a fashion similar to the socialist campaigns with rigorous participation from the state agents. As insiders of the political establishment, they are susceptible to the party's values and ethics, which demand absolute loyalty and obedience to authority, through numerous ideological indoctrination programmes. Their performance is disciplined by the bio-power technology of the CPC, subject to the personal evaluation system (Bakken, 2000, Lee, 1991). To the state agents involved in the collective destruction of homes, especially those cadres who were sent to the *jidi* to 'develop their political skills in the university of *chaiqian* without walls',[27] it was not another piece of routine job but a critical moment to testify their loyalty to the party, to demonstrate their political skills and to prove their qualification for a higher position. The higher their positions, the higher stake they have in this collective home destruction business.

In Pudong, for instance, thirty-eight cadres were sent to grassroots organisations during the displacement to facilitate the process, and six middle-aged cadres from different positions were called for duty in a special task force called the 'sharp-knife squad' (*jiandaoban*) , with the mission to 'punch the knife in the key positions in the battlefield and solve the problem as soon as possible'.[28] Tu Jianliang, whom I confronted while doing fieldwork happened to be a member of this squad. His personal reflection of working for the squad in his journal entry was quoted in *The Grand Displacement in Pudong*.

> Journal Entry of Tu Jianliang
>
> In the critical moment of the Campaign to Educate Party Members to Preserve Their Vanguard Nature, the Expo Coordination office established a working group of cadres sent down on job placement to target the most difficult cases. I was fortunate to be a member of this squad. For a month, we have been working hard and exploring the most efficient method for our task. We consciously connect the theory of party-member's vanguard nature with our *chaiqian* practices, and tempered ourselves in the practice, developed our political skills. We received a most vivid and inspiring lecture on this subject through our practice in the grassroots (p. 208-209).

Given my personal encounter with Tu, it is difficult to convince me that this journal entry, loaded with bureaucratic worldview and official ideology, could testify to his ideological submission. His denial of the responsibility of the state was as a matter of

[27] *The Grand Displacement in Pudong*, p. 8.
[28] *The Grand Displacement in Pudong*, p. 203.

fact, a denial of his personal responsibility and his profiteering from destroying people's homes. He was amongst a group of cadres promoted to higher positions after the displacement. For political bureaucrats like him, interest in their political career is a powerful motivation to participate in the violence against the displacees. In a political system where public offices are appointed without traceable justification, it is analytically presumptuous to establish causal links between political performance in the displacement and later career advancement in the political ladder. But the rise of more than a few politicians, such as Zhang Xuebing,[29] Cao Yazhong,[30] and Tao Ye[31] reveals a convincing pattern.[32]

In addition to the political incentives, the state agents also seemed to have become immersed into a military culture and mentality in performing their tasks. Military terminology like 'sharp knife squad' is more than abundant in the official representation of the displacement process. For instance, in the *Grand Displacement in Pudong*, several leaders of the bulldozer team are represented as *junshi* (military advisors, p. 31-51) and the subordinates were represented as *bing* (soldiers, p. 46). The political order of displacing the residents was represented as a task of *junling* (military order, p. 97). Special task force in the name of *gongjian zu* (Difficulty-Conquering Unit, p209) were strategically established to negotiate with 'stubborn' families. In addition, several high-level leaders of the domicide team were demobilised military officers.[33] The inflation raises a morally disturbing question as to whom the state is at war with? To this question, perhaps no political elites dare to offer any answer. What concerns me behind the inflation of military language is the colonisation and normalisation of a military logic in the civil sphere. This military mentality centres on determination to execute orders and obsession with state-sanctioned violent means to destroy without moral concerns.

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[29] From 2004 to 2008, he was the governor of Pudong New District. Since 2008, he became the assistant to the Mayor and Director of the Public Security Bureau. In 2011, he was promoted to the position of Deputy Mayor of Shanghai.

[30] He was the Deputy Commander of Expo-Induced Displacement Command Centre (Pudong Section) and now has been promoted to the Chief of the Environment Protection Bureau of Pudong District Government.

[31] Former Deputy Director of Letters and Visits Office of the Committee of Agriculture and Industry, key negotiator for tough 'nail households' and promoted to Office Assistant of Pudong Expo Area Management Office in 2012.

[32] Also see *The Grand Displacement in Pudong*, p.156-157 and p. 281-294. Most cadres were either promoted to a higher government position or received very positive feedback from their superiors.

[33] Han Nailing, director of *Chaiqian* office in Pudong and deputy director and deputy party secretary of the Expo Affairs Coordination Office at the district government, used to be a colonel. Ke Xun, Director of Inspection Office of the Expo Affairs Coordination office, used to be a staff officer and a colonel. Hu Xingyi, party secretary of Sanlin Town used to the director of Political Department of Senior Colonels and Army.

Militant Annihilation of Homes in Sanlin in 90 Days

"Is there anyone incapable of doing the job?" At one meeting, Hu Xingyi[33] sternly asked his subordinates…Since he promised to live up to the military order that he made to the leadership of the district authorities, he had to pressure his subordinates and set a hard goal for them: by the end of the first fifteen days, 30 per cent of the families must be displaced. In the second fifteen days, 70 per cent must be displaced. In the third fifteen days, more than 90 per cent of the families must be displaced. By the end of 30 December 2004, more than 95 per cent of properties must have been evaluated and more than 95 per cent of families must be displaced. Hu told four leaders of *chaiqian* teams, "this is our objective. If anyone think this is impossible or is unwilling to do this, raise your concern as soon as possible. I shall replace you with someone else who is competent and willing immediately" (in *The Grand Displacement of Pudong*, p. 98).

With such strong incentives and determination, the bureaucrats were more than capable of practising the political crafts and military tactics in a most ruthless and vicious way to target the displacees whom the party promised to serve. The testimony from Mr Chen reveals how Tao Ye betrayed his trust, manipulated his family's hope and undermined his solidarity with his neighbours.

> I was on my internship at a new factory that day. One guy from the factory told me that Tao Ye wanted to have a conversation with me. I went with him to the conference room. Before it started, Tao instructed me that the conversation must be kept strictly confidential. He promised to find my family resettlement housing and also a job for my wife. I trusted him. So I kept the conversation from my co-workers. I was not savvy enough to ask for a written record. When I met him again, he denied all the offers (Interview, D110, 06/2012).

Another deposition from Mrs Yang shows the ruthlessness and cunning military craft of Wang Guodong, former deputy director of Megaprojects office in Pudong District Government,

> One day, Wang Guodong, with his colleague Ye Guoliang, manager of the *chaiqian* company came to my home. I did not know they were actually the advance soldiers, the scouts, investigating how prepared my family was. They were leaders of the *chaiqian* team. So, I was quite polite to them. I made them both a cup of tea. They asked me what I really want. I asked them to give me an offer. They were only willing to offer 20,000 RMB, even less than we previously bargained. I told them, "you are not really here to negotiate". Wang stormed out and Ye stayed in my home and forced my husband to the bedroom. Before we came to our senses, the eviction team came and destroyed our doors like thugs. We both were pulled out. Wang was out to call reinforcement. Can you believe this? He could have informed us that eviction was coming that day. But he just left and called eviction team up (Interview, D97, 16/03/2012).

It is also this underlying political logic the integrity of law was comprised, devastating the last institutionalised defence of the displacees. In normalising the fast-track eviction procedure, Judge Lu, a party cadre from Pudong People's Court and also assigned for a job placement in *chaiqian* offices during the Expo, commented that,

> The court defends social justice. Between efficiency and justice, the court prioritises justice…But the government prioritises efficiency. This is because the government and the court have different duties and therefore they prioritise different values. This is a natural difference…It is perfectly normal for the government to sacrifice justice for efficiency. **No fish can survive the cleanest water (shui zhi qing ze yu).** It is impractical to speed up work when strictly abiding by the law. Only when the land is cleared can the Expo pavilions be built. **No need to worry about the sacrifice of justice**.[34]

For scholars on the Chinese legal system, her confession perhaps is not too surprising. The absence of autonomy of judiciary system from local administrative agencies and the party politics are widely documented (Potter, 2004, Alford, 1999, Yu, 1989) and have been nicely captured by Lubman's (1999) term, 'bird in a cage'. This schizophrenic statement is indicative of the systematic failure of the judicial system during the domicide. The very law created by the ruling elites to regulate the exercise of power and define the limits of social actions, becomes revocable and negotiable on the Expo site, as if the Expo site was an isolated political space independent from the rest of the nation. The state of anomie as observed by Durkheim (1984) in social crisis or transitional times seems to be able to be instigated by the elites to deploy in a confined space for particular political agendas. By arguing this however, she also loudly ridiculed the meaning of the justice system and violated the ethics of her own profession. If we look into what is unsaid in this collusive communicative act (Thornton, 2002a: 668), the corrupted conscience becomes more straightforward and appalling. The old Chinese saying, *shui zhi qing ze wu yu*, if translated more properly for this context, means that illegalities and immoralities are necessary conditions for the survival of the Expo project. This saying in Chinese is followed by *ren zhi cha ze wu tu*, which means that if one is overly observant and critical one may lose one's friends. What she confesses is an answer to St. Augustine's question on the nature of state as enlarged robber band. The Chinese state is indeed a robber baron functioning under the guise of a justice system that is in league with the perpetrating states. This is precisely what Auyero (2007) observed in the gray zone in Argentina that political

[34] Lu, *Reflections on Expo-induced Displacement*, available from http://www.pdfy.gov.cn/css/pdpub/upload/2005092009181764 84.doc last accessed 21/08/2012.

agents actively participate in collective violence. In this context, the life of the displacees are not worthy of protecting.

Apart from the political interest, the domicide operatives were also easily seduced by the monetary benefits from the *chaiqian* business. Mediated by cash, the compensation method conveniently offered the operatives the opportunity to retain or extort money from the displacees without noticed from their supervisors. Such illegal activity was easily covered up by the legitimate means, through the so-called *buchong xieyi* (supplement agreement) as an appendix to the standard resettlement agreement. In addition to this money, the financial arrangement also encouraged the *chaiqian* companies to perform their job in a most efficient way. In Pudong, each resettlement agreement brought by the *chaiqian* companies was paid 5000 RMB. Although they were assigned to work on certain caseloads, these companies were forced to compete against each other due to the centralised control of the resettlement housing stock and the routine progress review. Since all companies were given same access to the housing stock, those who were able to work more 'efficiently' could tempt the displacees with better resettlement housing and secure a resettlement agreement. Their progress was also periodically reviewed. Those companies who failed to meet the quota had to pass their caseloads to other companies[35].

For the managers of the *chaiqian* companies, their interests in this business were far greater. This is due to the ambiguous nature of their companies and their associations with the bureaucratic field. The hybrid ownership structure, the development trajectory and the party organs inside the *chaiqian* companies convincingly testifies that the state itself is the perpetrator.[36] For this project, I only investigated five companies due to the accessibility of their business records. These *chaiqian* companies are subsidiaries of three giant shanghai-based property corporations that were either fully owned or controlled by the local states (i.e. Pudong Properties, Shanghai Pudong Development (Group) Co. Ltd., and Shanghai Nanfang Group). Their specialisation in *chaiqian* business can be seen as a corporate strategy to diversify the investment, reduce internal transaction costs and diminish the business risks for their parent companies (Chandler, 1977). Under the mask of modern corporations, those de-statised property development corporations; however, all have

[35] The Grand Displacement in Pudong, p. 13.

[36] They were Lujiazui Dongchaiqian Co., Ltd, Shanghai Lianyang Dongchaiqaian Co., Ltd., Pudong Chengshi Jianshe Dongchaiqian Co., Ltd, Pudong Fangdichan Dongchaiqian Co., Ltd, Shanghai Shinan Fangwu Dongchaiqian Co., Ltd and Shanghai Qili Dongchaiqian Shiye Co., Ltd. The first three were contracted by the Pudong District government whilst the latter two were with the Huangpu District government.

a built-in Leninist party organ inherited from the command economy. The incorporation of party organs in the corporate governance structure entangles the morality of the state, the party and the shareholding companies, which are not always in congruence. To some extent, it resembles the *nomeklatura* system widely practised in the planned economy (You, 1998). Therefore, the Expo-induced displacement was more than a business opportunity, as both their economic and political careers were at stake.

In the context of limited interest in domicide, psychological mechanism of splitting, attributing the immoral actions to a split self, is also an alibi for the perpetrators (Adams and Balfour, 1998). However, as Stanley Cohen (2001) argues, splitting in Freudian sense is unconvincing and overly dramatic because it is very unlikely that the perpetrators are unaware of their own actions. The perpetrators are able to have a cohesive self and they are capable of exercising moral judgement. For him, role instantiation, compartmentalisation and segmentation are more compelling mechanisms to explain the psychology of the perpetrators. In those situations, morality of our (in)actions performed under social masks is separated from personal morality. This is the discursive tactic used by the migrant workers to tip off the family before they destroyed the door to that family's home in a midnight raid, as I discussed in the previous chapter. Similar tactics were also used by a residents' committee worker to rationalise his ambivalent feelings in soliciting compliance from a 'stubborn' family in his neighbourhood.

> There was this family. They had a pretty tough life. They could barely make their ends meet. We all know this family well. But we had to intervene and mediate. Why? This was passed down from the superiors as tasks. It came as part of the job. I did not want to get involved in this business at all. They were really poor. It was their last chance to get something for themselves. I did not have a choice (27/05/2012).

Again, as I have been insisting, neither making an immoral action less painful, nor giving up the sympathy and compassion for others to get the job done is an excuse to exonerate their responsibilities for engaging in immoral actions. 'I am just doing the job' should not prevent us from thinking as a person with skills and knowledge, rather than as professionals detached from our self as person. Whyte (2002) convincingly argues that we have more in our life to pursue outside our organisational life. The thing we sell to the organisation is and should only be our labour instead of our conscience.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I attempted to tease out the causes of massive sufferings of the displacees as documented in the previous chapter. I challenged the view that accredits a coherent logic to the production of the Expo and ignores the *realpolitik* in rationalising and legitimatising the Expo. My approach situated the Expo in the global and local contexts and examined how the discursive practices of bidding and preparing were embedded in wider discourses and influenced by different logics. The casual change of the Expo site and subsequent production of political lies and knowledge is representative of the ruling elites' pathological view of the local citizens as expendable and manipulatable subjects, devoid of any rights and opportunity to live and imagine an alternative life. The construction of the Expo as a nation-building project powerfully legitimatised the exceptionality of the Expo and transformed the Expo site as a site for flexible accumulation (Weber, 2002, Zukin, 1991) as well as a political space for 'distinct governing regimes within the broader landscape of normalized rule' where 'organised hypocrisy' dictates the operational ethics of governance (Ong, 2006: 103,113) .

However, this is not limited to the authoritarian China. Researchers on mega-events (Hall, 1992, Essex and Chalkley, 1998, COHRE, 2008, Gold and Gold, 2010) repeatedly observe that political desire to secure the event as a spatial fix to urban social and economic 'crisis' fuelled by over-positive prediction of the impacts of these events more often than not transcends the concern for meaningful participation of the citizens in the bidding stage, let alone those citizens who will be directly affected. Neither should we limit the irrationalities to mega-event industry alone. What they truly reveal is the prevailing political rationality of our time that spatial fixes are constantly searched and secured through systematic deprivation of ontological security for a vast segment of our society (Feldman et al., 2011). Defamation, devaluation, dehumanisation, and abandonment of the powerless citizens are the most common strategies to secure and perpetuate the power of the elites for their dominance in our contemporary world (Wacquant, 2008)

The strategies of the Chinese elites in late socialist China are not drastically different but they certainly have more cards to play than their counterparts in western democracies do. Most crucially, they inherited a Leninist party-state and a repressive social structure from the communist past, which allows them to creatively destruct as well as reconstruct the system to the advantage of the political elites and their intellectual and market allies, through either re-writing history, ideological onslaught

and societal ideological campaigns, or justifying and reproducing inequalities. What they seemed to have effectively accomplished in preparing the land for the Expo was the organisation of a war of all against an individual family. With diffused responsibility, coupled with (personal and social) moral corruption and legal failures, the *chaiqian* agents in this home-killing machine offered another cogent example of the destructive potentials of mankind and the violent nature of capitalist accumulation, a recurrent theme of capitalist modernity. For the displacees, the land war against their homes, a threat to their existence, is a crisis moment calling for a fight before they surrender. How they fought in the war is the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 7 : Domination, Resistance and Fate

‘It is the interaction of the perpetrators and victims that is “fate”’.

Paul Hilberg, *The Nature of the Process*

Introduction

The testimonies from the displacees thus far have attempted to tease out the layered emotional experience of domicide: indignation, shock, frustration, fear, contempt and grief. This is a cluster of ‘attack mode’ emotions (Jasper, 1997: 107), which in theory can be appropriated and transformed to spur political actions when framed as a result of external forces or social actors. Yet, throughout my fieldwork, I was confronted with the analytical puzzle: the widespread popular grievances and the prevalent political docility. The displacees were aware of their pain and the authors of their sufferings; however, political inactions were more frequent than political actions.

When the displacees did put up a fight, their actions against the predatory accumulation regime were less likely to be open, organised, militant collective defiance than individualised and bodily resistances. Those collective actions I was able to resuscitate from the accounts from official and unofficial sources were by and large transient, localised and tame, resembling what Lee (2007) calls ‘cellular activism’ in her description of labour protests in China. Isolated and confined to a locality, none of those actions escalated into a cross-class and networked protest movement. Those individualised resistances on the other hand employ a spectrum of stratagems, performed with different appearances. In most cases, the last fight of the displacees might be described as elementary form of resistance in Guha’s empirical frame (1999), or placed under James Scott’s term ‘everyday resistance' (1985), in the forms of ‘a war of words’ (p. 281) through discrediting the state agents, gossiping the political scandals, dismissing terminology of ‘compensation’ or ‘sunshine’ policy, or voicing their grievances in cyberspace, and of ‘informal, often covert’ opposing actions ‘concerned largely with immediate, *de facto* gains’ (p. 33), such as delaying valuation, avoiding negotiation, holding out, squatting on appropriated properties, bribing and co-opting the *chaiqian* agents. On other accounts, some displacees in a more dramatic way used their bodies to protest and to increase the compensation, by speeding up marriages, ‘faking’ marriages/divorces/pregnancies, updating *hukou*

registrations, etc. In most extreme cases, rational and calculative actions yielded to overwhelming feelings of desperation and anger, triggering resistance against violent property appropriation through suicide or homicide, often violent. If the whole point of resistance was for a better life in the future, one is left immediately with a conundrum. What is the point of giving up their own lives and leaving behind a traumatised family?

As a matter of fact, family break-down and dysfunction is one of the many risks the displacees had to bear when they entered into negotiation meetings with the *chaiqian* companies, and is the most traumatic yet most likely, common outcome if they hesitated, or decided to take any actions and failed to prove their conformity in time.[1] Displacement not only severed the displacees' roots to their sanctuary space but also destabilised their family relations and sowed the seeds for family conflicts. Those conflicts may unfold in different trajectories and revolve around diverse issues. Family where 'ordinary laws of the economy are suspended, a place of trusting and giving;…where interest, in the narrow sense of the pursuit of equivalence in exchanges, is suspended' (Bourdieu, 1996: 20), seemed to cease to function as a basic social unit to protect members from a predatory accumulation regime, or even worse, turn into the accessories of the brutal bulldozer machine. Instead of fighting against the displacers collectively as a family, many stories I collected from the field seem to show the exact opposite; a Hobbesian war of all against all within a given displaced family.

The brief preview of the political agency of the dispossessed poses several theoretical challenges to existing scholarship. Moore (1978: 79) argues that 'effective action against the social causes of suffering must be collective. Individual actions are not to be dismissed, and are certainly better than no effort at all unless they occur at the expense of other victims, as unfortunately is often the case. But individual solutions that help only minority by definition do not change the situation'. My sketch of the landscape of resistance therefore firstly doubts the promise of community as a political agent to counter the force of the market and the power of the state (Logan and Molotch, 1987, Davis, 1991). Subsequently, it questions the likelihood and the efficacy of a cross-class alliance loosely connected by a shared social/territorial identity to assert a collective right to the city under the current accumulation regime in China (Shin, 2013), when the basic unit of society, bonded by blood, kinship and loyalty, was so easy to collapse. The outcome of

[1] On this point, the alienated time experienced by many displacees and the stories of the homeless evictees are telling evidence in chapter 4.

individualistic resistance on the other hand challenges the genuineness of ideological tenet underpinning the accumulation strategy in contemporary China, which tries to recover the value and the ethics of family to buttress the shock of neoliberal reforms to the political subjects (Whyte and Parish, 1984, Whyte, 1997, Forrest and Izuhara, 2012). Furthermore, those bodily resistance questions the distinction between moral rights and legal rights (Dworkin, 1977), the boundary between resistance, disobedience and crime (Scott, 1985), and the rationalistic assumption of resisting activities (Popkin, 1979).

These challenges bring to the fore the analytical focus of this chapter: the conditions, processes, mechanisms, efficacies and implications of this wide range of resisting activities. The central question I wish to answer in this chapter is, why the displacees chose less effective, or morally and legally contentious actions, to defend their homes, and at what costs? My answer to this question will be guided through a body of literature on political opportunity structure (Marx and Engels, 2008 [1848], Piven and Cloward, 1977, Tarrow, 1994, McAdam et al., 2001, Meyer and Minkoff, 2004, Meyer, 2004) that reconciles the objective openings in general political structural conditions and on particular issues, with the subjective perceptions of such openings and contentious repertories (Tilly, 1993, Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, Scott, 1990, Auyero, 2004). This places the learnt contentious tactics for making political claims at the centre of my analysis. By addressing this question, this chapter shall offer a close-up view of the power struggle between the displacees and the bulldozer regime, and within the displaced families or a given displaced family. The latter focus shall add further political complexities to existing literature on displacement that stops the analysis on the scale of community (Shin and Li, 2013, Weinstein and Ren, 2009), and avoids romanticising resistance, as warned by Ortner (1995: 179), which overlooks the fact that 'individual acts of resistance, as well as large-scale resistance movements, are often themselves conflicted, internally contradictory, and affectively ambivalent'. It will do so by taking into account the displacees' embeddness in their social and political relationships, and analysing how different positional embeddness influenced the dynamics within the displacees and shaped their political agency (Granovetter, 1985, Bourdieu, 1990b, Michelson, 2007).

The argument of this chapter can be summarised as follows: The displacees' submission to the dominant legitimate language in discussing *chaiqian* and their failure in asserting their voice to the dominant discourses lead to their loss in this land battle before it began. The fragmentation and compartmentalisation of the displacees, as a result of institutional legacies and the displacers' domination over

time, space and money, reinforced by *ad hoc* repression, pre-emptively created formidable obstacles for open and collective actions of different scales, reduced available political options of the displacees, and forced them to resign to individualised and bodily resistances. The negotiation within an individual family further exploited the institutional and social embeddedness of each member of individual family, in addition to the tension created by monetisation of compensation and routinised immoral tactics. The coercion, co-optation and cooperation of atomised family members created internal strife within individual displaced families and shaped their agency to resist. As a result of such broken ties and internal conflicts on different scales, the displacees reduced the political and economic costs for the displacers and in a way aggravated and perpetuated their own sufferings.

'We Want a Reasonable Compensation'

To make sense of the political actions the displacees chose, we need first to understand what the displacees expect and understand displacement and the changes brought by displacement in the first place. This is shaped by a particular set of ideas about rights, entitlements, justice, ethics and morality. It must be admitted that violation of this universe does not necessarily or always motivate individuals to join collective actions to address their grievances. But, as I believe, the question merits our attention, as firstly it is a starting point that shapes the political agency of the displacees in terms of their subjectivities, claims and tactics; and secondly it offers a close up view of the discrepancies between the technocrats and the displacees in the construction of the meaning of displacement.

In the dominant technocratic view, displacement is a pure economic transaction and the displacees are rational and calculative *homo economicus,* with the agenda to maximise their interest. Such technocratic view is most reflective in the over-simplistic explanatory economic model below developed by Cui (2007), a planning officer at the local government, based on his personal working experience as a *chaiqian* agent. Given his personal career trajectory, he of course paid tribute to the generosity of the compensation offered by the Expo regime in his doctorate thesis and believes that the high compensation standard was decisive in winning the support from more than 97 per cent of the displaced families.



Figure 7.1: Economic Modelling of Displacees' Gaming Behaviours
Source: Cui (2007: 279) and my translation and clarification

For now, I shall refrain from repeating my critique of this model for decontextualising the displacees' decisions from the power relations and their moral universe. Here, I wish to focus on the ontological flaw and the manipulative logic of this economic rationale. First, this model presumes the existence of a land market that is beyond the control of the state, and purely dictated by the law of supply and demand. From Polanyi (2001[1944]) to Bourdieu (2005), social theorists have convincingly argued that market is a social construction. The practice of land management and development in China is not an exception. In the debate between Annie Haila (2007) and Zhu Jieming (2009), Haila compellingly dissects the conceptual ambiguities and ontological fallacy in the inflation of the vocabulary of land or real estate market in China whilst empirical evidence suggests otherwise. A perfect empirical example here would be the Janus-faced shareholding land development companies who steal public wealth with the support from the state through the abusive use of eminent domain and the iron fists. Secondly, the so-called market-based valuation only calculates the residual value of the appropriated properties without taking into consideration land use rights, let alone the rent gap created by the land speculation. Unsurprisingly, this valuation is enormously below the desired offers of the displacees. The perversity of this statecraft lies in the fact that the discounted valuation set up a baseline for the worst-case scenario and reduces the expectations of most displacees about what they could possibly get. When a gestural bump from the valuation is made, it creates the impression that the

offer from a caring state is in the best interests of the displacees, as compared to an 'objective' and 'fair' offer from the ruthless private developers under the principle of the market. In this way, it not only saves the state from ideological attacks but also consolidates its legitimacy.

As Cui confesses, no concessions from the side of the displacers can ever meet the expectations of the displacees under any circumstances, as it is unrealistic and against the principle of the market. His view is shared by a director at the municipal planning bureau. But for him, the impossibility resides in the displacees' confusion of temporal experiences and conflates different claims surrounding the issue of *chaiqian*. For him, the difficulty of *chaiqian* and the intensive conflicts it involves is a result of the displacees' unreasonable need to 'want a fundamental change in their life at one go without putting in more of their own efforts'[2]. As he believes, it is unfair for the displacers in charge of present displacement to resolve the grievances from unemployment, severe diseases, extreme poverty, and historical sufferings (*zhiqing*, confiscation of properties in the 1950s and during the Cultural Revolution) because those past sufferings were caused by various policy regimes, irrelevant to *chaiqian*, and should not be conflated with the land appropriation. It is also unreasonable to expect the displacers to take care of the displacees' excessive needs for future well-being of all members, let alone generations not yet to come. In his logic, temporal boundaries are as important as spatial boundaries and must be clearly demarcated. The arbitrary control of temporal discontinuity or ruptures is the cornerstone of 'reason' in *chaiqian*. *Chaiqian* is a problem of here and now, bearing no weight on history or the future. This view reveals the hypocrisy of the accumulation regime that tends to ignore that one source of their social power is their domination over time. While it is the past structural injustices suffered by the displacees that lay the foundation for their powerlessness in the present land game, those injuries can only be taken advantage of rather than framed as legitimate claims to be pursued through the avenue of *chaiqian*. Whilst for the displacers, the future needs of the displacees are unreasonable to be put on the table for negotiation.

For the displacees on the receiving end, the success of the Expo bid has already decided their fate. In chapter 5, I have discussed the normative power of nationalism underwrites the Expo project, which makes subordination of personal interest to national interest a mandatory order. Most displacees were aware that the annihilation of their homes is inevitable and it is only a matter of when, how and where to. The big question as to why they had to leave was not at all practical even to contemplate.

[2] Interview, 25/07/2012.

One should not be too surprised then to find that the displacees share little intellectual radical excitement for the right to the city, neither in terms of Lefebvre's (1996) call for the right as urban inhabitants who appreciate the use value of the city as 'oeuvre' that nurtures the collective life and who can assert a 'right to freedom, to individualisation in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit….to participation and appropriation' (p.173-174), nor of Harvey's (2008) conceptualisation as a right to 'greater democratic control over the production and utilisation of the surplus' in order to collectively 'reshape the process of urbanisation' (p. 23), nor of Peter Marcuse's (2009) suggestion as a collective right claimed on a 'higher moral plane that demands a better system in which the potential benefits of an urban life can be fully and entirely realised' (p. 34).

But, this is not to say that the displacees had no impulse to pursue that direction. Compensation and resettlement as two Bourdieusian euphemisms (1991) are well known to the displacees: the so-called resettlement housing has to be purchased with the money received from the state as compensation under asymmetrical power relations and unequal terms. The adoption of those terms is to conceal the exploitative nature of *chaiqian* and maintain the respectful appearance of the state as a law-abiding and decent market player. The heinous predatory logic is nicely put by Mr Li as the logic of gangsters.

> I had in my hand the land certificate issued by the party state, which clearly states that I can sell the land to whomever I want. At the time of displacement, the state denied my right and I do not have such right. This certificate was issued by the Communist Party in 1950 not by the Republican Party. How could you deny all my rights stated in the certificate. This is robbery. If I go to the shop, I told you that I want this pen or that pen. But you do not want to sell it to me. Can I just take it any way? What is the difference between this robbery (of pen) and that robbery (of land)? Is it not the logic of gangsters? (Interview, D58, 21/03/2012).

The tension between the impulse and the action, in Durkheim's (1984: 293) words, comes from 'the working classes do not really desire the status assigned to them and too often accept it only under constraints and force, not having any means of gaining other status'. The displacees, despite their differences in class identities, are in the same position in this land battle as the working class in industrial production was, powerless to halt or stop the inevitable coming of the wheels of the bulldozer machine. The sense of inevitability, writes Moore (1978: 490), 'rules out any serious struggle, or at least any serious struggle with a prospect of victory' and 'implies a conception of the universe ruled at least in part by blind forces of fates ultimately not responsive to human will and actions'. Immersed in such defeatist feelings, the

displacees were tamed to become pragmatic players in this field of displacement, following the rule of game set by the bulldozer regime and adopting the legitimate language in discussing their fate. As Burawoy (2012: 193-194) explains, 'the very act of playing the game simultaneously produced consent to its rules. You can't be serious about playing a game…if at the same time you question its rules and goals'. This is another example of symbolic violence the displacees reproduced themselves by 'unwittingly contribute to their own domination by tacitly accepting, in advance, the limits imposed on them' (Bourdieu, 2000: 169).

For the majority of the displacees, their claim was to bargain for a higher exchange value of their existing properties so that they can at least move on with their life in an estate that they were kicked into. This future-needs-oriented claim, as Perry (2008) might comment, in nature is a tame one for subsistence rather than for political citizenship. Compensation constitutes the central subject of their claims, as it is crucial to increase their consumer power in buying decent resettlement housing that meets their needs. But, they knew well no matter how much compensation they squeezed out of the displacers, it would not significantly improve their economic conditions nor advance their positions in the housing ladder, as the dominant view claims. To many of them, home ownership in the planned gated neighbourhoods was not an appealing ideology at all, since they see themselves as owners of their existing houses and apartments any way and more importantly, they rarely see their houses from the view of the market. Most of them share the perspective of the working class in the UK (Allen, 2008:7), houses are dwelling space rather than easily tradable properties subject to the dictating power of the inflow and outflow of capital. Their seemingly 'obsessive' demand for greater compensation is less out of a desire for a decent life than of a need to prevent their life from getting worse. A senior woman told me, 'only water flows downward and people have to go upward'.[3] This is the moral economy of the peasants in Southeast Asia as examined by James Scott (1976), but also applicable to understand the displacees' life-world. *Chaiqian* brings little promise other than bigger apartments with modern convenience on condition that they can make great efforts in adapting to a new life in a strange place. Their fight is to ensure that such efforts would be kept at minimum, and foremost, would not exhaust their available resources and impoverish their life in the resettlement sites.

Of primary concern to the displacees was to ensure that compensation would enable the basic needs of each family member be properly satisfied. Those needs include education, health care, employment, transport connections, nursing, etc. Considering

[3] Interview, X33, 12/05/2012.

the under-developed resettlement site and the enormous costs of making all relocation arrangements, the displacees had to prioritise diverse needs, to resolve the conflicts between members, to make inevitable sacrifices, and to practise their life wisdom again as they did to satisfy their needs under socialism, to keep this transition as painless as they could. Because of such complexity, the decisions hardly came as a result of peaceful, straightforward and easy process. The moral compass of the displacees was caught up in the tension of competing discourses of an ideal family (Hansen et al., 2010) and practical constraints of displacement. They were confronted with the tension between greater autonomy promised by the divisibility of monetary compensation, and the greater dependence on familial reciprocity in making collective investment in resettlement housing, nursing, education, etc. They had to negotiate familial responsibilities and obligations, and balance the interests between family members.

In arriving at such a decision within displaced families, familial reciprocity disciplines the displacees' needs and expectations of a reasonable compensation. Depending on the family structure of the displaced families, they had to negotiate inter-generational and intra-generational responsibilities amongst their members. In many families, this inevitably involved the negotiation of money transactions, thanks to the monetary compensation that entitles each member to a fair cut. It increased the chance that economic rationality and materialistic calculations evade, corrupt and damage intimate relations. Of course, this is not to deny, as Zelizer (1994) points out, that people constantly negotiate the meaning of money and make economic transactions in all social relationships, but to suggest that the frequency and intensity of conflicts and compromises incurred in such decision-making shape family dynamics and lead to family estrangement (Yan, 2003b, Davis, 2010, Li and Huang, 2012). In the case of Mr Huang,[4] his father had to borrow a substantial amount of money from relatives on his mother's side and pay off his uncles, aunts and grandparents on his father's side so that the absolute ownership to the two bedroom resettlement apartment could be transferred to him to increase his chance of success for courtship and marriage. The monetary transaction puts severe strains on his family relations. He was regretting the loss of emotionality in his family and hinted that family dramas of this kind could have been avoided had the compensation been reasonably higher in the first place.

Although the displaced families have diverse needs, almost unanimously, they would prioritise the interest of the younger generation of their families. Education and

[4] Observation, March to July, 2012 .

marriage was at the top of their concerns. The first perhaps does not need any further elaboration. No parents want their single child, the only hope of their families to obtain the 'first world' conditions and the only reliable supporters for their old age (Fong, 2004), to lose out in the competition for elitist careers due to disruption in their schooling in their formative years or the lack of opportunity to access high quality educational establishments that are all centrally located in the city. The issue of marriage is more pertinent and urgent to families with a grown-up single child, especially when this single child is a male. The transition to a market-based economy provoked the shifts in the meaning of housing and the social values related to its consumption. The emerging market-based housing supply and the soaring price for a reasonable-sized apartment have created enormous pressure for the younger generation to have a place for their future nuclear families. The ethnography of heterosexual families in Kunming in Zhang's (2010) work offers us an intriguing example of how individual self-worth and marriageability are largely hinged upon the possession of material properties, and particularly the ownership of housing. Same conclusion is made by Sun (2012b), who conducted an ethnographic study of the marriage market in public parks in Shanghai (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3), that men's ownership of private housing independent of parental generation is a condition of entry to this matchmaking market. During her study, she even read some advertisements explicitly stating that 'no talk without an apartment' (p. 113).

The growing anxiety amongst Chinese parents and urban youth seem to suggest that the tension between housing and romance, as Pellow (1993) once wittily commented as 'no place to live, no place to love' in the early reform era, is not solved by the introduction of the market mechanism to the housing sector and the political initiatives to improve the housing conditions. Instead, it has been aggravated by the dominance of the market and its associated values in every sphere in Chinese society, squeezing out affective feelings of any social relationships and producing a growing anxiety for the youth to leave their natal families and develop intimate relations with others. Societal obsession in private property ownership effectively creates a repressive structure for the urban youth today that with no *own* place to live; they have no *chance* to love. Bargaining for higher compensation based on the needs of the youth and of the generations yet to come is reasonable and justified for many displacees (especially the peasants and the self-built housing dwellers) as the land ownership to their homestead allows the flexibility to accommodate the changes in family structure. In addition, such change is more than a practical adaption of family housing structures but a ritual of inter-generational wealth transfer to maintain the continuity of family lineage and enhance the mutual dependence between family

members by patrilocal living arrangement. Such flexibility has been deprived by the supply and the ownership structure of the resettlement housing. Changes in family structures thereafter can only be solved by collective investment in the commercial housing market. This is a sudden shift in their consumption pattern of housing and a makeover of their moral universe in imagining and organising their families. Aunt Cheng who petitioned for under-compensation for four years at the time of fieldwork explained why every penny of the compensation meant so much to her present family and the generations yet to come.

> To be honest, I can give up. But, what about my son? Where is he going to live when he grows up? What about his child? What about his grandson? He will have nothing to pass down (Interview, D117, 22/04/2012).

Figure 7.2: Marriage Market Advertisement in Shanghai
Figure 7.3: Parents in the Marriage Market in Shanghai
Source: my own, 2012

The moral universe of the displacees shapes their understanding of the changes brought by displacement and their expectations of a reasonable compensation. *Chaiqian,* to many of them, is an opportunity to improve their living conditions but foremost is a challenge. Whilst every displacee yearns for a happy family, unhappiness caused by unpleasant discussion or unavoidable sacrifices, is another cruel and inevitable piece of reality that they had to bear. However, conflict avoidance as a golden principle for harmonious relationships still have some purchase in contemporary Chinese society, and make crafty maintenance of social relations a better option (Yang, 1994). Increased compensation, which allows them to cope with these diverse needs and interests brought by *chaiqian*, therefore, is a viable and reasonable solution to avoid such dreadful experiences, against the backdrop of a neoliberalising economy. Despite their modest expectations, the displacees seldom defend such interests in an egocentric, aggressive and Hobbesian way. Here, I concur with the view of Madsen (1984) that people are practical philosophers who are 'not interested in knowing what good persons are like but in

acting as good persons do' and 'reconcile their real life situations with their moral ideals' (p. 4). Their persistence on higher compensation is not to capitalise on *chaiqian* or undermine the public good, but to adhere to *daoli* (reason) and *liangxin* (conscience). This is the cultural logic of the reasonable compensation. In negotiating with the Expo regime, many displacees did not adhere to the law or the market, but to moral principles, even if it meant compromises in their economic interests. Aunt Cheng, a female displacee in her 50s, told me at a follow-up interview after our collective visit to the court to address her grievance,

> It is important that one's behaviour should not make oneself feel ashamed. The state wants our land to develop, *laobaixing* (the mass) support such decision. I am not asking you [the state] to compensate me ten or twenty new apartments. That is not reasonable. I understand. We must follow our conscience. Right? I supported you [the state] but what you have done to me in return (Interview, D117, 22/04/2012).

To her, the land grab is more a social exchange rather than monetary transaction between the state and her family. As we can see, neither right nor wrong is explicitly used in her narrative, but the reference to conscience engenders a clear claim of morality premised on self-discipline and reciprocity rather than the universal notions of justice. Disciplined by such moral codes, her loss of homes and communities is to be compensated *reasonably* rather than *justly*. Being reasonable is to follow her conscience moulded by the socialist morality that demands personal sacrifices for greater good. From her perspective, this same moral principle not only disciplines her, but should also be applied to judge the state. As Cohen (1927) argues, 'a property right is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but between the owner and other individuals in reference to things' (p. 9). The personification of the state therefore enables her to assign popular relational ethics to evaluate good and bad practices of property exportation, justice and injustice of the outcomes.

Cheng was not the only one to let conscience decide the reasonable level of compensation offers. Ms Fan offered a similar account to explain her consistent claim to be resettled on site yet was rejected by the bulldozer regime.

> I first proposed [to the *chaiqian* company] that I would accept a small one-bedroom apartment close to my old one in Pudong. I do not care how small it is. Just a nearby one. My son's school was in this area…. I was not asking them to compensate me an apartment of hundreds of square metres. I told them, you could just compensate me a similar-sized apartment as my old one, or even a smaller one. However difficult living condition I might end up, I would not accuse you [the chaiqian company/the state] of anything. They always accusing me of making excessive and unreasonable demands. But this was my only demand back then (Interview D112, 06/2012).

For Fan, her proposal for a similar or even smaller sized apartment was a big comprise of market principles. She did not cite the regulation of on-site resettlement to support her claim either. It was a reasonable demand, as she did not request a policy-based resettlement plan that would at least double her living space. Her insistence on on-site resettlement was not to speculate on the increase of property value but to ensure her son could continue studying at the same school. Therefore, her concession of economic interest to the state is a circumscribed trade-off between economic gains and her moral obligation to her son. It is an unjust but necessary concession that she was willing to make. However, to the *chaiqian* agents, such claim was translated as greedy and vicious intention to speculate on the real estate market. The irreconcilable gulf between the dominant market, legalistic view and the popular moral views of *chaiqian* and compensation becomes a source of conflicts and sows the seeds of resistance, which I am exploring in the following sections.

Divide and Conquer: Failed Open, Collective and Institutionalised Resistance

In this section, I shall first explore the reasons of the rarity and failures of collective actions, following the analytical frame of Scott (1985: 241-248) on everyday resistance in Sedak, especially his insight on the internal divisions of the subordinated groups and routine repression. Organised defiance is certainly not an alien experience to the Chinese citizens. Commenting on Tarrow's (1994) generalised description of authoritarian states' repressive tendency toward grassroots movements, Perry (2002: xxiv) points out that China perhaps can be seen as an exception. Unlike authoritarian states elsewhere, the Communist Party's ideological commitment to the mass line, rooted in Chinese political culture in justified rebellion, encourages contentious actions and even occasionally sponsors mass campaigns for their instrumental value to consolidate the legitimacy of the ruling factions of the political elites. Historical experience of political struggles, according to Perry's (2003: 266) remark on the lasting impact of the Cultural Revolution, 'imbue ordinary citizens with a greater awareness of the possibilities and practices of mass protest'. Despite the political risks and frequent oppression, spontaneous or reactionary collective claim making was never absent from the political landscape in China and has been intensified by the ongoing reform in the post-Tiananmen China (see Cai, 2010). The widespread organised bottom-up resistances, regardless of the diverse nature of their claims and outcomes, even lead Goldman (2005) to celebrate the potential for democratisation in China's soil. Therefore, to argue that the rarity of collective actions is a result of the lack of political experience is unfounded from a historical perspective.

Neither is it empirically true in the present study. During my fieldwork, I was only able to access a few displacees who joined collective actions in their neighbourhoods. Those localised collective actions however were extremely short-lived, as compared to a nine-year collective action in another district in Shanghai (Shi, 2008). As Brunn (2013: 259) points out, the power of collective actions resides in 'connecting, focusing and agitating of a given mass of people'. The rarity of such actions and their failures to achieve the desired outcomes as I shall examine in this section should be registered with the systematic deprivation of political resources and opportunities for mobilisation through the revolutionary tactic, divide and conquer, masterfully employed by the communist party for its long-lasting dictatorship (Perry, 2007). The displacees were confronted with major obstacles to join forces with displacees inside and outside the immediate boundary of their neighbourhood, not to mention to further 'jump scales' (Smith, 1992: 60) and mobilise sympathetic citizens, intellectuals and activists on their side.

The division between the displacees is firstly created by the institutional settings enabling the 'accumulation by dispossession' in China which, as Harvey (2005a: 181) conceptualises, is a process of constructing 'the bundle of rights necessary for capital accumulation' to dictate human lives. Amongst the bundle of rights, property rights, as a recent legal construction in China, is perhaps a most important one to sustain land-centred accumulation in Chinese cities. I have no intention here to wrestle with the definition of property (rights) in various disciplinary traditions[5] (Brown, 2007, Hann, 1998), or to debate with non-reflexive academic praxis that using this notion to prescribe pills to solve the problems arises from China's grand project of neoliberalisation[6] (He et al., 2009, Zhu, 2002). For my analysis here, I follow Verdery's (2003: 14-20) relational view of property that 'specifies what things have

[5] This is for sure not an easy task. Property rights may be seen as people's relationship to things, or interpersonal relationship to things (Cohen, 1927). The most popular definition is economistic and legalistic, focusing on a disaggregated bundle of abstract rights, including rights to use, rights to derive profits, and rights to transfer or alienate (Demsetz, 1967). Anthropological and sociological traditions tend to follow the substantivist school pioneered by Polanyi (2001[1944]), anchoring their theorisation on social and cultural relations. This approach embeds the material objects to a web of social relations and attempts to understand how social actors negotiate the relationship to things. In so doing, it avoids methodological individualism. Along this line, politics and morality becomes inherent and inevitable issues for discussion (Hann, 1998).

[6] For example, Pils (2009a) is doubtful of the legislating efforts in defining clearer boundaries of property rights. Despite the advancement—better to have a law than not, she believes that the law is symbolic. The legal construction overly interferes in civil issues whereas inadequately keep the power of the state in check in the process of appropriating private properties. In this sense, the law is merely another tool to serve the prevailing logic of capital. Haila (2007) argues that such uncritical embracing of the vocabularies of capitalistic economics is in fact constructing the market as the new emperor in China.

what values and who counts as a person' (p. 18) and positions the things in a web of social relations imbued with power, subject to constant contestation and negotiation. One of the functions of property rights is to create boundaries, 'concerning what belongs to whom and who belongs to or has affinities with some larger entity' (p. 18).

As I have been repeatedly arguing against the ontological presumption of temporal discontinuities in analysing China's neoliberalising process (see He and Wu, 2009), the institutional legacies inherited from China's communist past as I would argue, have been as much creatively destroyed as creatively reconstructed (Lee and Selden, 2007) in order to reduce the cost of capital accumulation and 'construct class dominance' (Harvey, 2007: 41). The departure from socialist redistribution to a market-based organisation of social reproduction in China results in ambiguous property regimes with mixed logics. The deliberately ambiguous property rights arrangement (Ho, 2001) therefore augments the displacees, complicates their internal structure, and makes it difficult to construct a shared identity as victims of the Expo. They were compartmented by jurisdictional boundaries, cut through by the rural-urban divide and further split by the ownership structure of their properties. The site of the Expo and two major resettlement-housing sites occupy the land under the jurisdiction of four district governments. As a result of decentralised governance in Shanghai, land-related governance is by and large controlled by the district governments, a critical institutional arrangement for 'local state capitalism' (Keith et al., 2013: 125-133)[7]. As the *de facto* displacers, the district governments have the power to formulate the most fine-grained regulations on *chaiqian* within the general legal frame. Similar in format, however, those regulations vary significantly in the overall process of displacement, the formulas of compensation, the openings in participation and the contact agencies for appeals and grievances. Such technical difference in legal framework, although not entirely intentional, reinforced the geographical boundaries and created practical difficulties for the displacees to arrive at a common vision on the target of their defiance.

Even within the single district of Pudong, where more than 10,000 households lost their homes to the Expo, the caste-like hierarchical structure caused by the rural-urban divide (Whyte and Parish, 1984), and the complexity of land and housing ownership resulted from the predatory land-centred accumulation in the previous decades, created tremendous obstacles for political mobilisation and a cross-class

[7] Both the state council and the municipal government regularly controls and monitors the land use given the concern for food security (Lin, 2009). But there are many tricks the local governments may play to bypass the regulations such as cutting a large parcel of land into smaller pieces, to facilitate 'local state capitalism' (Keith et al., 2013: 112-139).

alliance. Owing to the dual land ownership, the collective ownership of the land in the countryside as compared to the state ownership of land in the city creates an institutional cleavage between the urban and rural *hukou* holders. As per regulation, land appropriation of two types of land must follow different procedures and offer additional compensation packages to the farmers, including compensation for the loss of their agricultural products, labour force resettlement, and collective infrastructures, etc. The collective ownership of the land allows the farmers to frame their grievances in a much more powerful way as compared to urbanites, including those urban self-built housing dwellers, who cannot ground their collective interest in the land of their communities. At best, they could make a claim of ownership to their *zhaijidi* [8] (building plots) or in most cases, to their houses only.

In addition to the gulf wedged by the land ownership, the displacees were further divided by the property rights arrangement of their housing. The housing stock on the Expo site is a mixture of self-built owner-occupied houses, commercial housing, public rental homes, *danwei*[9] (work unit) housing and shared ownership apartments, and *chengzhongun*[9] properties, houses without legal titles, amongst other types. Contestation of property ownership of each type of housing in this short list had to employ different rhetoric, resort to different policies and target different authorities.[10] Such diverse institutional settings created further obstacles for the disgruntled to formulate their tactics. The accounts selected below show the missed opportunity for mass protests because of the failure to reconcile their differences caused by

[8] This is another example of conflicts caused by deliberate institutional ambiguity. State ownership of urban land was arbitrarily imposed in the 1980s in revising the Land Law, taking advantage of violent appropriation of private properties during the Cultural Revolution (Wilhelm, 2004). Many displacees contest the legitimacy of state ownership of the land underneath their properties and refuse to accept the legalistic separation of land use right from land ownership, as a shift in policy regimes (the quote from Mr Li in this chapter can be seen as an example). It is against the local traditions. This may be seen as an example of the violence of law, disproving traditions that hurdle the free circulation of capital, as argued by Springer (2013) based on his study in Cambodia. Protests in similar rhetoric were employed by public/*danwei* housing tenants who acquired their properties during the communist era and claim absolute ownership to their properties although the law specifies clear limitations on the tenants' rights to such properties.

[9] Self-built housing on formerly collective-owned land was left intact to reduce the cost of resettlement during the land appropriation and ownership conversion before selling the land use right to developers.

[10] For instance, renters of *danwei* housing need to manoeuvre and craft their relations with both the displacers and their *danwei* in order to get a fair compensation. Their status as socialist workers offers them the moral resource to frame unfair treatment as a further betrayal of socialist contract. Such cultural resource however is not at the disposal of the self-built housing owners. It was rather straightforward for them to contest on the land ownership and the under-compensation for their loss of land use right. For *chengzhongcun* property owners, they were further deprived of the opportunity to contest the land ownership and had to seek sympathy from their former collectives. Illegal housing dwellers had to defend the legality of their buildings as a survival strategy in material poverty.

institutional settings and to construct their actions with a shared vision for secure livelihood.

> To put it bluntly, we had been abandoned for a long time before the displacement. We thought we were governed by our brigade. But the brigade told us that we are no longer part of it. Our land had long been appropriated. People on the sixth production group were luckier. Their land had not been entirely appropriated. They were still part of the collective. We from the fifth production group were unfortunate. We had no land left. Each production group was in a different situation. Our brigade had six production groups. No group was in the same boat (female, *chengzhongcun* property owner, interview D76, 28/03/2012).

> We farmers had such spacious houses. Those Shanghainese lived in crowded conditions. Ten people might live under the same roof. They of course wanted *chaiqian*. It is a good thing for them. For us, poor farmers, we did not want *chaiqian* at all. It impoverishes us. No one wanted to be displaced (female, farmer, interview D10, 09/03/2012).

> Those people from Zhoujiadu were different from us. They own their properties. They built their houses. Many of them lived there for generations. Ours was built by our *danwei*. Our *danwei* distributed to our parents' generation. So now, we were the de facto owners (female, SOE danwei housing dweller, Interview D111 06/2012).

> On that side of the road was the apartment buildings. On this side was our *penghuqu* (shanty housing area). They treated us completely differently. Their properties were valued at 8000 RMB per square metre while ours were only several hundred RMB. Location-wise, we were only separated by a road…Some of theirs were commercial housing and some were privatised during the housing reform. They could sell but we could not. Our housing [ownership] was different. Plus, we knew no body in that part (female, self-built owner-occupier housing, Interview D13, 03/2012).

Following Bourdieu (1999c), one might comment that the displacees in these fragmented groups are so immersed in their own social spaces and microcosms, constructing 'us' and 'them' along so many different lines as we have seen from the quotes above, that they failed to see things outside their particular positions, and misrecognised the commonality in their 'positional suffering', which could have engulfed their differences if the view of the macrocosm was taken into consideration. The pluralistic views of political possibilities, a combined effect of the displacees' diverse positions in the social hierarchies and the organisation of the demolition; however, are more than dividing the displacees, destroying their social bonds and preventing political coalition. Worse, they restricted political imagination, turning the 'privileged' compensation standard applied to one group or in one locality as the ultimate goal of protesting actions for those in inferior positions in other places. Ironically, those claims frequently dwelled on a sense of distributive justice. This

popular view is remotely comparable to Rawlsian (1971) liberal philosophical theorisation of justice as a social contract established by individuals under a veil of ignorance in fair conditions. Neither basic liberties nor equal opportunities are the principles of justice (Rawls, 2001: 42-43) that the displacees were pursuing. Their view, hardly self-consciously though, is rooted in the Confucius ethics that sustains hierarchical social order in the social space and posits justice not as measured against universal value but as relative perception derived from comparison to others in the same social and spatial category (Zhang, 2008a). As Ying (2001: 34) noted, the repressive power of such moral cultures lies in that it restricts, undermines and tames political actions. Distributive justice for them is sought not by overthrowing the oppressive structure or the powerful growth machine in truly privileged position through collective efforts, but to make an unjust situation less unjust, or as unjust as those in better positions, competing to become less miserable victims. This said, it is perhaps highly unfair to dismiss the value of such actions altogether. For one, those practical actions are for sure better than resignation, despite how ineffective they are to bring real change. For another, arbitrary privilege is born to be fought against in any social circumstances; even such fight might disturbingly let off the real culprit and enable the reproduction of domination. This is nicely put by Primo Levi (1986: 27), 'it is the duty of righteous men *[sic]* to make war on all undeserved privilege, but one must not forget that this is a war without end. Where there exists power exercised few or by only one against the many, privilege is born and proliferates, even against the will of the power itself; but on the other hand it is normal for power to tolerate and encourage it'.

Tolerance and encouragement, however, are perhaps too passive and ineffective to eliminate the chance of political uprising. New divisions must be constantly making cooperation between the displacees a pipe dream. Potential alliances were prevented by the piecemeal process of land appropriation and demolition. The Expo site within the jurisdiction of each district was further divided into small and controllable neighbourhoods according to the time management of the domicide business. This might be attributed to the limited capacity of the bulldozer regime to operate the domicide business on such a gigantic scale at the same time. However, by creating those spatial boundaries and controlling the timing of domicide, it also contained possible resistance in a given locality. This was only possible with the cooperation from the displacees whose high level of uncertainty of displacement (timing, possibility, etc.) turned them into bystanders to the victims of other localities. The non-transparent planning process certainly fuelled their uncertainties. For many displacees, displacement had been a haunting ghost and speculations had circulated

in some neighbourhoods before they were finally displaced by the Expo. Each false alarm desensitised the displacees' reactions and aggregated their sense of uncertainty. Despite the Expo having been successfully secured in 2002, most displacees were suspicious that they would be displaced given the sheer scale and the land politics entailed by the project.

> We knew Shanghai was successful in the bid but we had no idea it involved *chaiqian*. Besides, there were many versions of the Expo site at that time and no one was affirmative about the location. What I thought back then was, Shanghai No. 3 Steel Company was way too big to be relocated. No one could possibly have the financial capacity to relocate such a huge company. We thought, Shanghai Expo might, like Aichi Expo, find a place in a remote suburban area and dismantle all pavilions afterwards (Mrs Fan, interview, D112, 06/2012).

The only reliable source of information on displacement to most displacees was the final *chaiqian* announcement distributed by the bulldozer regime (see table 7.1). The control of timing is of course centralised in the hand of the bulldozer regime. It speculated on the displacees' rationality to take control of uncertainty by getting on with their mundane everyday life before the final arrival of *chaiqian* notice rather than let uncertainty dictate their life to take precautions when nothing has been set in motion. The rationality of the dominated becomes one of the most powerful weapons of the dominators (Bauman, 1989).

Co-optation and manipulation offered the bulldozer regime more effective ammunition to destroy the solidarity between the displacees and more powerfully, to coerce one displacee against another. In chapter 6, I have discussed the effect of the head-count method of compensation in undermining the solidarity between the displacees in a given locality. The baseline of compensation in this method was determined by the number of entitled people in a given family rather than the value of the appropriated property. Resettlement offered to those displacees, who would otherwise become homeless under the property-based compensation method, was coloured in a way to address long-term social injustice and exercise the power of the state in redistributing wealth. These people became the prime target of co-optation. Moreover, additional subsidies were offered to displacees with disabilities or severe health problems, or suffering from unemployment. Such almsgiving paid off a large number of displacees in material deprivation and secured their subordination. This has not yet taken into account the additional offers in the supplementary clauses in the resettlement agreement to solicit the consent from a few families who were purposefully selected to unsettle the social fabric of a given neighbourhood and

sometimes were used later as real-life examples for manufactured realities of *chaiqian* in official propaganda.

Table 7.1: Knowledge of Displacement and Actions before Displacement

Knowledge of *Chaiqian* and Actions before *Chaiqian* (n=300)		Frequency	Percentage
Timing of knowledge of *chaiqian*	During the Bidding Process	67	22.3%
	When *chaiqian* finally started	233	77.7%
Source of knowledge of *chaiqian* (Multiple Choice)	TV, internet, and other media	40	13.3%
	Neighbourhood meetings	51	17.0%
	Final *chaiqian* announcement distributed	260	86.8%
Efforts made to study the regulatory frameworks	Yes	64	21.3%
	No	236	78.7%
Efforts made to improve housing conditions to increase compensation	Yes	35	11.7%
	No	265	88.3%

Source: my own survey, 2012

But, co-optation remains expensive. It is absolutely free to manipulate the displacees' desires, preferences and interests through the logic of the market, making them believe that the real enemies undermining their real interests were among themselves. All they needed was a compelling pitch or performance to create anxiety and encourage competition for a decent resettlement apartment that is in short supply and convince them to make a 'rational' choice. It must be noted that neither scarcity of economic resources is a given condition nor choice can be freely made according to one's will. On the former, Sahlins (1998) reminds us that scarcity was created rather than a natural *a priori* condition, due to a particular cultural system in valuating resources and organising the way to satisfy human wants. On the latter, Bourdieu (2005: 22) persuasively argues that 'though it is not incorrect to say that production produces consumption, supply, by the very fact that it tends to eliminate some or all of other possible ways of satisfying housing need….contributes to imposing a particular way of satisfying this need, while apparently respects the rights of the sovereign consumer'. Yet, scarcity was real for the displacees because the supply of resettlement housing was centralised in the hands of the bulldozer regime. For most displacees, the meagre compensation only allowed them to purchase apartments in suburbia. While the quantity of the supply there was sufficient, the quality of housing (size, layout, floor-level, building facilities, communal designs, etc.) was always in a false state of scarcity. This effectively forced the displaced families with diverse housing needs and preferences to compete against each other in the jungle of the

resettlement housing market. On this issue, Engels (1993 [1887]) lamented more than a century ago,

> Competition is the completest expression of the battle of all against all which rules modern civil society. This battle, a battle for life, for existence, for everything, in case of need a battle of life and death, is fought not between different classes of society only, but also between the individual member of these classes. Each is in the way of the other, and each seeks to crowd out all who are in his way, and to put himself in their place….But this competition of the workers among themselves is the worse side of the present state of things in its effect upon the worker, the sharpest weapon against the proletariat in the hands of the bourgeoisie (p. 87-88).

By constructing a resettlement housing market and forcing the displacees to compete, the bulldozer regime could rest their craws in most of the time rather than excessively rely on the coercive power of the state. All they had to do was supply the information on the housing stock in terms of its availability and conditions, either by their *chaiqian* agents or through less costly media channels, and let the gene of the market work on the anxious mind of the displacees. Numerous bulletin boards were set up at visible locations inside a targeted community to keep the displacees updated with the overall process.[11] As soon as one family signed an agreement, clear marks would be made to warn the displacees of their diminishing choices.[12] When the displacees were hesitant to buy the story of scarcity, according to displacees in Pudong, migrant workers were conveniently hired to dress up like the local residents and queue in front of a *chaiqian* bastion, creating a false impression that the longer the displacees hold out, the less opportunity to purchase an apartment they truly want, the higher possibility to live inside a property for the rest of their life unhappily. Of course, such vicious schemes were only possible with the cooperation of the displacees who either willingly withheld the process and content of negotiation offers (usually more than they could get) or were coerced not to disclose their final offers to their neighbours under explicit threat from the *chaiqian* agents, the penalty of which would be a nullification of the agreement (see Table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Hampered Communication between the Displacees

N=300	Frequency	Percentage
Knowledge of Neighbour's Compensation	40	13.3%
Disclose Offer to Neighbours	51	17%
Threats Not to Discuss with Outsiders to Your Family	196	65.3%

Source: my own, 2012

[11] See *The Great Displacement in Pudong*, p.12

[12] Some displacees told me that displacers in their neighbourhoods wrongfully did so to create pressure on them while those apartments were still available.

It should be pointed out the nullification was an empty threat. However, the party-state led nature of the Expo-induced *chaiqian*, and the arbitrary exercise of state power, reduced the displacees' capacity to think like a legal subject protected by the law or a rebellious subject against tyranny. The submission is further secured though routine repression carried out by the police during the displacement as a constant reminder of the dictatorial power of the state. Open comments, critiques, grumbling or gossip, with or without contentious intentions, were non-discriminatorily defined as deference or threat, and were punished through routine surveillance of the public space or meeting places—the potential sites for political dissents. In doing so, it reduced the possibility of spontaneous association and political mobilisation, and forced the displacees to retreat to 'hidden' sites and take more disguised forms of resistance as greater safety came from anonymity, subtlety and indirectness (Scott, 1990). Technology indeed offered such possibility that allowed the disgruntled displacees to communicate over the phone without being publically identified by the surveillance team. Yet, the ramifications on the psychology of the displacees were more profound, making such political alternatives incapable of mobilising the others. Repression by intention was to amplify the situational fear the displacees had already suffered and compellingly teach them the cost of political actions. A displacee recalled an incident in his neighbourhood in which a non-contentious hangout was conceived by the bulldozer regime as a threat and was suppressed by the police immediately. With the iron fist ready to hit, the displacers left no chance for hidden tactics of gossiping or rumouring[13] to subvert their power.

> There was this guy named L in our neighbourhood. He was my next-door neighbour actually. We once were hanging out around a small shop owned by another neighbour. It was pretty normal. We always went there when we were free or after dinner. Gasanhu[14] (chitchats on random issues, rumours or gossip). So we talked about *chaiqian* as well. My neighbour L made one comment that the *chaiqian* companies were not trustworthy. Somehow, this comment got back to the *chaiqian* companies. Someone must have overheard this. You know what happened to him? *Chaiqian* companies came to his home and threatened him. It was only a random conversation. Can you believe it? He was taken in by the police and charged with spreading rumours. He worked for a bank back then. It affected his job. [YZ: was he spreading rumours though?] It was not a rumour at all. It was only a comment! The police came after him for making a comment. [YZ: what happened afterwards?] Every one became cautious. No one dared to talk. Whoever talked, whoever got punished (male, 60s, displaced from Puxi, interview X46, 27/04/2012).

[13] See Scott (1990) on rumours and gossip as hidden tactics of subordinates in the face of power.
[14] This is in local dialect.

The most inhibiting factor for open and organised actions perhaps lies in that protests, open or covert, would only prolong the dreadful experience, adding more pressure to their everyday life. A few delays here and there, justifiable as following bureaucratic procedures, could easily exhaust the displacees' resources and manipulate their mind. This is based on the assumption that the justice system or the complaint system would perform their role as they were designed and act impartially to the displacees' claims. As I have shown in previous chapters, the whole state apparatus was mobilised with a shared goal of destroying people's homes without moral and legal limits. The role of the complaint system or the justice system was more to contain grievances rather than to serve justice. Sympathetic treatment to the displacees on such bureaucratic encounters was to instil a false hope to the displacees that further radical actions were unnecessary, at least not until the system proved to be failing them. Yet, inactions as a result of bureaucratic incapacity[15] or collusion with the displacers were the more common and possible outcome the displacees could expect. Mrs Yang, a female displacee, joined collective petitions with her neighbours. She recalled how the officer at the municipal *xinfang* office supported their claims initially and even promised a timely response but again and again kept them waiting and eventually flipped sides and allied with the displacers[16]. Over and over again, denied justice through those bureaucratic encounters shaped the displacees' expectations of what they could achieve through their actions. To quote from Auyero (2012: 7), such political interactions 'provide the poor with political education or daily crash courses on the working of power'. When fighting became useless in practice, it fostered a growing sense of fatalism, and led to programmatic efforts to accept and get by with harsh realities of displacement. This would make better sense if we take into account the fact that fighting also incurs additional investment in time and money. Besides, the incentives of free-riding a collective action was not at all unappealing (Olson, 1971). As one displacee told me, 'if they could have [more compensation after the fight], then I shall have too'.[17]

[15] See Minzner (2006) and Chen (2012a) on the discussion of the institutional incapacity of the *xinfang* system. The sheer number of citizen complaints the *xinfang* agency received each year makes it difficult for the agency to investigate each case thoroughly. Also, their weak positions in the bureaucratic field itself discouraged a serious and effective attempt to resolve non-legitimacy damaging petitions.
[16] Interview, D97, 20/04/2012.
[17] Interview, 13/05/2012.

To Fight or To Flight?

The above analysis attempts to tease out the conditions and mechanisms that reduced available political options for the displacees and forced them to defend their interests in individualised, family-based and atomised forms. Before negotiating with the *chaiqian* operatives, displaced families usually had formal or informal discussions in terms of the resettlement arrangement and their family tactics to squeeze out a better offer. But, the decision of fighting or not and how to fight are further circumvented by the structure of authority and power within the displaced families, exploitable by the *chaiqian* agents. In many cases, this decision-making process can create more tensions between family members, destroy the last protection of the displacees, plant the seeds of familial conflicts and divide the displacees into atomised individuals in the war against a powerful bulldozer regime.

It is worthwhile to restate that *chaiqian* is a process of dissolution and reformation of families owing to the inevitable changes of housing consumption. It destabilises the structure and routine politics within the displaced families and compels the displacees to enter into ritualistic negotiation, contestation and transfer of authority, power and wealth between different generations and amongst family members. As such, this is not always a democratic process, immune from patriarchal or masculine domination. The authority and power in making a collective decision, either to accept the offer or to bargain for a higher compensation package, does not necessarily derive from seniority in the family. But, the disciplinary power of filial obligations makes it a moral duty to respect the interests and opinions of the senior generations, whilst whether to respect their powerful positions at the time of *chaiqian* negotiations is subject to pre-existing family politics and the manipulation of those insidious *chaiqian* agents. It is beyond the capacity of this chapter to reduce a complicated picture of the internal politics of the displaced families in a few broad brushes as above given the diversity of their family histories, structures, trajectories and relations. One pattern however was quite clear to me that the knowledge acquisition of the regulatory frameworks tended to increase one's chance to gain influence in making the decision for the whole family. After all, the negotiation process is not a bargain between equal footing market players based on the principles of equality and willingness. For most displacees, violence and other open protest actions were last resorts. The game, to be played well, must be played according to pre-determined government regulations on *chaiqian* and housing and avoiding making a foul act, which would significantly undermine their claims. Literacy and knowledge of those regulations therefore become crucial and access to such

knowledge is likely to increase a member's likelihood to gain authority in this decision-making process.

Yet, the entry ticket to the negotiation meetings was surveilled and manipulated by the *chaiqian* agents based on their observation of family dynamics. This is due to the inconsistency of legal and cultural construct of ownership to the appropriated properties. *Chaiqian* agents could selectively apply the definition that is most advantageous to them in a particular situation to get their jobs done most efficiently. Usually, since compensation was based on the residual value of the appropriated properties, the property owner as strictly specified in the Property Rights Certificate or the Land Use Rights Certificate was approached during initial contacts, excluding the members who might be *de jure* owners to the collective property under the Civil Law. Once their knowledge of the displaced families increased during the process of negotiation, they would easily choose to approach the formerly excluded members in the name of respecting the authoritative figures in the displaced family in practice, the collective ownership of family properties, or the head suggested in the *hukou* registration booklet. Such arbitrary power was further amplified by the eligibility test of a displacee under the 'head count' compensation standard, excluding 'tough' owners from compensation altogether. Let me quote the *chaiqian* experience of Mr Feng[18] here, as an example. At the time of displacement, Feng had divorced his wife for a couple of years but they did not clearly settle the matrimonial property out of concern for the well-being of his wife and his single son who had no place to live other than this property. During displacement, he was not only denied as the legitimate owner of this property but also deprived of any right to represent his son to negotiate with the *chaiqian* agents. He did not qualify as a displacee as he lived elsewhere and was not in housing difficulty despite the fact that he was lodging in his sister's apartment after the divorce. By controlling the entry to a negotiation meeting, *chaiqian* agents effectively secured domination throughout the negotiations and undermined the organisation of collective interest of a given displaced family.

The bond between family members was further severed by the fact that the displacees experienced *chaiqian* in variegated ways, which was shaped by their personal memories of state repression and their tolerance of violence and pain, as well as their political agency. As Scott (1976: 227) reminds us well, 'the memory of repression is one of the principal explanations for the absence of resistance and revolt'. On this point, let me first quote in full an account offered by Uncle Zhu, in

[18] Interview, D113, 06/2012.

his late 50s, who lost his home to the Expo pavilions in Puxi without a meaningful fight.

> For the mass, political actions against the government are always futile. From the generation of my grandfather, to that of my father, to my generation, the political guts of each generation have been moulded and squeezed by the education of the Communist Party. The prophecy of ancestors is insightful—People cannot fight against government officers (*min buy u guan dou*)…. My grandfather fought against the state. The possessions of our ancestors passed down to my grandfather was confiscated by the communist regime. He was stigmatised as a member of the four social groups,[19] an enemy of the nascent communist regime. He was expelled to the farm where he spent his whole life. This was not only about him. It affected our whole family. My father was defined as the son of the four social groups and was punished. The punishment against my father implicated my generation. Generation after generation, we no longer dare to fight. The right hand of the state is the police force. The left hand is the military. The back stands the prison. Fight against the state? Quit the pipe dream! (Interview, X11, 02/05/2012).

His quote nicely illuminated the pedagogical function of political memory in developing the sense of political opportunities and grasping the permissible 'contentious repertories' that emerged from experience of political struggles (Tilly, 1978, 1993). Of greater interest to me as captured by this quote is the 'geologically layered quality' of Chinese families (Tang and Parish, 2000: 17), in reference to the stratification of life chances and political experiences according to the coming age of the population under rapidly changing political climates (i.e. pre-socialist time, the golden age of socialism, the cultural revolution, the early reform era and the neoliberal time). The political experiences and consciousness between different generations are quite different due to their personal trajectories, influencing their decisions to fight or leave cooperatively. For the oldest in my study (70s or above), they had the experience of hardships of war, emancipation in the golden days of socialism, the state terror during the Cultural Revolution and the material prosperity in the reform era. Their faith in the communist party and indoctrination in the party's history writing and ideology, supported by their rapidly improving living conditions as compared to the experience of hardships in their formative years, are convincing enough for them to be grateful to the party as saviours to their lives and to support the party's well-packaged programme. A grandma who represented her family in

[19] This is a very ambiguous categorisation and prescription of people's political identity under the communist regime. Strictly, it refers to people who were arbitrarily classified as landlords and rich peasants and whose actions were deemed as anti-revolution or non-conformity to the communist mores.

signing the first resettlement agreement in her neighbourhood attempted to convince me that she was not a victim of domicide.

> I have faith in the Communist Party. The party is good. Without the party, I would never have the chance to live in this kind of apartment. I am now very happy. Thanks to the party, I do not have to work but I still receive monthly pension. Without the party, I would have been dead for ages. If not for Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou, we would not have this happy life. Even in dreams, I cannot forget the greatness of the party (displaced from Pudong, interview, D69, 25/03/2012).

For generations of Uncle Zhu's age or younger, some share the sentiments of the older generations, either of heartfelt gratitude for the caring state in helping them to survive the hardest times of their lives or of their precarious position as long term state benefits recipients. But for a majority of them, their personal experience of state terror and repression to their parents and themselves during their formative years, the pain brought by the restructuring of the economy, growing inequalities in all spheres of their lives and rampant corruption shattered their faith in socialism and the party. Unlike the protesting farmers in Li's (2004) study, there is no hierarchical difference in their distrust of the regime. The whole state apparatus is seen as corrupted. A one-off experience of betrayal or punishment to any member of their family is enough to destroy their trust in the regime, let alone repeated exposure to political scandals. Aunt Zhou, a witty woman in her late 40s, was the granddaughter of a 'landlord' who was honoured by the tenants for frequent exemption of rents in bad years and kind loans in hard times but was harshly prosecuted by the Communist Party. Her memory of her childhood was defined by terror while she had to live in exile. Her father gave up all their family possessions in the socialist transformation era in order to escape the same fate of her granddad but the class label of her family as landlord severely limited the life chances of her family. Her husband's loss of job due to the reform of state sector economy was the final blow completely destroying her remaining trust in the party.

> The Communist Party is a whore who wants a monument for its chastity. It robs you of your land and your home. Instead of compensating you for your loss, you have to be grateful to the party for the life changing opportunity. I suspect there aren't any other parties in the world that can be as shameless as the Communist Party. The capitalist countries invade other weak countries and steal the wealth from other nations for the benefits of their own. The communist party on the other hand relies on robbing own citizens under its governance (Interview, D13, 03/2012).

As a result of the layered quality, *chaiqian* was perceived in ambivalent and contradictory views by different members of a displaced family. So were the views

of the necessity and possibility of resisting actions. This further strained family relations and escalated contestation of the authority and power in their families in representing others whose life trajectory was shaped by different forces and their experiences of the state power were so different. This of course was exploited by the *chaiqian* agents. Those who have little knowledge of the mechanism of *chaiqian* other than a loyal heart for the Communist Party were frequently approached to negotiate the deal or to persuade the rest to comply with the political order from the party.

The eventual choice of putting on a fight and the tactics of resistance also depended on the available resources and the costs of protesting actions perceived by the displaced families, as Moore (1978: 125) points out, 'throughout the centuries one of the common man's most frequent and effective responses to oppression is flight'. For the displacees, using the law to address their grievances or defend their legally defined rights is less effective and useful than exploiting the ambiguities and loopholes in the law as the powerful elites always do. They are rightful resisters appropriating the instruments and symbols for their practical agenda (O'Brien and Li, 2006: 3). Moreover, this legalistic solution presumes that the displacees were able to find daring and sympathetic lawyers to represent them in courtrooms. As Michelson (2006, 2007) observed, political embeddness of Chinese lawyers in the political bureaucracy and their selective bias of legal cases may compromise the lawyers' professional integrity and personal conviction in legal justice. *Chaiqian* is a politically sensitive matter. Lawyers on *chaiqian* in China are different than their counterparts on poverty in the United States who integrate their professions with the objective of the state in managing the poor, according to Katz's (1982) ethnography. Lawyers on *chaiqian* are indeed abundant but when the case involves the local government, they gave up too easily and were too afraid to speak truth to power. A displaced family were once represented by a law firm practising in Shanghai but based in Beijing. Initially the lawyers were very sympathetic to their situation and only charged them a few thousand RMB for legal representation. But shortly after, they were told by the lawyers that the best option was to give up and take the offer as their firm had been warned explicitly about political revenge from the local government.[20]

Bodily resistance exploiting the vague legal definition, the inconsistencies with other regulations and governing practices and the difficulties in effective control and monitoring of the implementation, offered the displacees an attractive yet morally

[20] Interview, D109, 06/2012.

controversial and legally contentious option. The inconsistency in *chaiqian* regulation is created by the dual compensation standards, i.e. property-based compensation and head-count valuation, which allows the displacees to select a higher compensation package. Although the displacees must go through an eligibility test under the head-count (e.g. length of residence, length of pregnancy, marriage, *hukou* status, etc.), in practice it is difficult and time-consuming to authenticate the displacees' bodily tactics. Under a tight *chaiqian* plan, some displacers may tacitly tolerate those actions as long as legitimate documents can be supplied by the displacees. To do this, there are two popular tactics, intra-city migration and contractual marriage. Extended family members could update their *hukou* registration to the address of the appropriated properties before *chaiqian* (Wu, 2004). The outcome depends on how stringent the local police are in enforcing the *hukou* regulation and freezing incoming migration to a place publically announced for demolition.

The other popular tactic is marriage/divorce of convenience. A married couple with a single child, upon mutual agreement, may file a non-fault divorce, and then either or both quickly enter into contractual marriage(s) with other adult(s) with or without kids. In this way, it would at least double the original compensation, and in some cases may even triple the compensation, after paying off the contractual partners. It is a perilous act because if the *chaiqian* companies take the issue seriously and follow bureaucratic procedures to verify the authenticity of the marriages/divorces, they may press charges for fraud. Moreover, the displacees engaged in those dramatic measures must also bear the consequence of moral critique from their potential supporters, and the risks of damaging their marital relations when the contractual partners refuse to terminate the contract or blackmail for more money. Many politically docile displacees bemoaned that fake marriages/divorces were eroding social morality and failure to charge those frauds were signs of cowardly bullying by the state and undermined social justice.[21] A retired teacher in her seventies who was only able to buy one resettlement apartment for a spacious two-floor old alley house went ballistic after learning about her neighbour's 'shameful' shams:

> Can you believe it? They were a family of three, living in a 7-square metres room. The old couple filed for a divorce and married with others. Their son also quickly married a female migrant. They have exhausted all their means and managed to secure three resettlement apartments here. The old guy did not want to divorce again with the contractual partner before he died of a heart attack. Now his son is suing his

[21] Again, their view of social justice is a comparative notion and best understood as fairness amongst people in their category.

> fake stepmother for the ownership of the property under his father's name. This is bullshit! They have no *suzhi* at all. But karma came after them (interview, X19, 04/05/2012).

But, are those couples to blame for the decaying morality or disobeying the law? For the couples who performed this kind of bodily resistances, which unfortunately I only met two during my fieldwork, they were willing to pursue this tactic only because they could not see other choices to secure or improve their livelihood. A woman in a contractual divorce with her husband at the time of my fieldwork [22] humoured me with Petogfi's poem with a Chinese flavour.

> Everything is about money nowadays. Marriage is nothing, family is nothing, both can be given up for money (12/04/2012).

During *chaiqian*, romance or freedom is a false dichotomy choice when survival needs after *chaiqian* are primary concerns. In a society where everyone is so aggressively pursuing Deng Xiaoping's 'truism'—to get rich is glorious—the displacees simply embraced the elites discourse to the fullest extent in their capacity. Having said this, I do have my own sentiment for the moral dilemma raised by those performative acts. My view is closer to Sandel (2012) than to Zilizer (2005) and I believe that certain things cannot be put on sale on the market; a bottom line to defend the integrity of social morality. My intent here is neither to pass on my hypocritical judgement nor to discredit these resistances. After all, none of them got married under duress or under any pressure. My agenda is to make a repeated point on the symbolic violence of the perverse rationale of our time that sees and treats human bodies as properties from the point of the market, 'a lower mode of valuation' (Sandel, 2012: 33) inappropriate for respect and dignity.

Manufacturing Conflicts, Destroying Families

The structural tensions within the displaced families and the limited supply of available effective ammunition to fight back further reduced the potential for large scale, open resistance. But, for the displacers, this is not yet sufficient to ensure a sweeping victory in the land battle. Their domination in the legal field and the mobilisation of the state apparatus equipped them with more destructive tools to secure subordination. The displaced families frequently had to suffer additional pain from the strains of their social and family relations. In some cases, frustration in the confrontation with the state for reasonable compensation is internalised and turned

[22] They divorced before the Expo-induced demolition of her mother's property and did not get back together immediately because of their anticipation of demolition of her husband's homes.

into family conflicts. Such conflicts, once provoked, often destroyed the more stable social relations based on unconditional loyalty and trust. The displacees were then divided into atomised individuals, if not fighting against each other, were fighting hopelessly alone in the war against their families. The neoliberal ethics of possessive individualism find expression perfectly in this land war (Harvey, 2005a: 69). Suicide or murder became an act of desperation.

The organised, family-based protest actions were usually sustained by the popular belief in collective ownership of the appropriated family properties, with moral authority derived from traditional family values and practices of co-ownership of family property since imperial China (Eastman, 1988). Family members were legally and morally held responsible for each other's well-being. The ownership of family property was patrimonial and patriarchal: without a proper ritual of *fenjia* (division of family assets), family property would remain collectively owned even though family members might live under different roofs (Yang, 1945). This tradition was partially acknowledged in early socialist China, although masculine domination was heavily attacked, at least in the legal text, for gender equality (Ocko, 1991). However, the boundary of family and the definition of family property were deliberately ambiguous in early legal texts because firstly, political campaigns soon confiscated most family properties and demanded absolute loyalty to the party over any other social organisations; and secondly the vaguely defined family as a legal unit reduced the costs for an incompetent caring socialist state to offer social benefits to all members (Ocko, 1991).

The contradictions with the hegemonic legal discourses whose supply and interpretation is controlled by the party-state in the neoliberal era allowed the *chaiqian* agents not only to counter the resistance from the displacees but also to provoke and intensify conflicts and destroy the bonds within the displaced families. Protests grounding collective ownership of land and housing were harshly attacked for stripping the party of its fancy new clothes under current land-centred accumulation strategy. The truth is, however, the current state ownership of urban land capitalised on the violent taking of land and property during the Cultural Revolution (Hsing, 2010b) and arbitrarily nationalised the land of private self-built housing without the owners' consent (Wilhelm, 2004). For peasants, although they are the *de jure* owners of the land within the boundaries of their rural collectives, the ambiguously defined 'collective' in legal text allows the grassroots state organs to act as *de facto* owners in speculating on the land development (Lin, 2009). Worse, in the event of land appropriation, the law grants the local states and their brokers the

unleashed power to proceed with appropriation without consent from existing land users and consensus amongst all legitimate property owners (Hsing, 2006). In the land ownership war against the state, the displacees were therefore doomed to defeat however morally legitimate their claim might be. For instance, Mr Zhu, a senior farmer, contends that the land has been passed down for generations in his family and private ownership survived the collectivisation and chaotic revolutionary campaigns. Therefore, he refused to accept that the land was owned by the collective or the state instead of his own family.[23]

By suppressing all contestations on land ownership, the regime reduced the hope of a higher compensation, and effectively turned the displacees' claims derived from co-ownership into a family matter of assets division. By doing so, it increased the competition for collective resources between family members. Conflicts often arose when family members could not agree on the principle of distributing family assets among members who could no longer live together[24] and arrive at consensus on the named property owners for all resettlement apartments. This provided an opportunity for the *chaiqian* agents to manipulate family relations of a displaced family, by advising a 'fair' distribution of compensation, or by threatening the deprivation of other member's compensation because of another's contestation or *lianzuo* in Chinese, or by alienating one member from another. This is the source of family dysfunctions or breakdowns I have heard over and over again in my fieldwork. The following account is quite representative in demonstrating the corrupted morality of the *chaiqian* agents in undermining the bond between family members.

> We used to live together. At the time of *chaiqian*, the *chaiqian* agents came to my husband and told us that they were ready to offer us a compensation package enough to purchase two two-bedroom apartments. But now they could only offer us a package enough to purchase a three-bedroom apartment because my brother-in-law rejected the initial plan and thought it was unfair. My husband was furious so he came to my brother-in-law to verify the story. My brother-in-law had no idea what my husband was talking about and denied it immediately because he had not yet met any *chaiqian* agents. A few days later, *chaiqian* agents came to negotiate with him and told him that my husband wanted to take all the compensation and would not share a penny with my brother-in-law. The two brothers were arguing and quarrelling. We then fell apart after this big row. We both took a smaller package and both were unable to have my father-in-law live with either of us. Now he lives alone. But two brothers never spoke to each other again. Every time we went to visit him, he cried desperately (Interview, D14, 03/2012).

[23] Personal document.
[24] They cannot make a collective investment in the resettlement housing and had to negotiate money transactions in order to have an exclusionary ownership status to a resettlement apartment.

Families were particularly susceptible to manipulation because of the invasive nature of negotiations for compensation packages, which allowed the fieldwork *chaiqian* operatives to observe family dynamics and the power relations so as to apply the right pressure at minimal costs. Before initial contacts, *chaiqian* agents usually had done their homework to survey the family structure and property relations of their targeted families. They have the best tutors on their side, i.e. the residents' committees/villagers' committees, and the grassroots party-organs, thanks to the state-led nature of Expo-induced displacement. Both residents' committees and villagers' committees are not a formal part of the state apparatus. But, as grassroots organisations, they reify the power and the authority of the state in performing administrative activities. In this sense, they might better be seen as political appendages of the local states. Their daily job can range from bodily governance such as family planning, birth control, and certification of marital status, to social intervention in disputes between family members or neighbours, to organising grassroots civic organisations, to political representation of the residents in mediating and negotiating with higher levels of authority or economic/social organisations (Read, 2012, Zhu, 2010). These committees do not command substantial financial resources themselves but their discretion power in administering state almsgiving, certifying the eligibility of citizens for particular social benefits and organising civic activities (dance club, trips, basic health checks, etc.) enable them to occupy a prime position in their local milieus. In performing their daily duties, staffs of those committees, usually residents of the neighbourhood as well, may acquire intimate knowledge of the families within their jurisdictions through daily contacts with the residents in their quasi-official capacity or through their personal relations. Such information may include not only impersonal statistics on family structures, compositions, income level or employment status, but also much more personal information on family relations, social connections, family histories, etc. When assisting *chaiqian* companies were assigned to them as a political task, the leaders of those committees, with great interest to benefit from *chaiqian* politically and economically,[25] proactively intervened in the negotiations, despite the fact that *chaiqian* was outside their purview.

Owing to the mixtures of state agents and employees of the *chaiqian* companies in the field of domicide (see chapter 5), those grassroots organisations frequently

[25] Politically, the leaders may advance their political career. Economically, their labour is paid by the chaiqian companies or the state in the form of bonus or overtime.

confused a request for assistance from a *chaiqian* company as a political order from their superiors. In a working report submitted to the township government office, the villagers committee portrayed the demolition permit as 'policy' and their assistance was 'guided' by the 'spirit' (*jingshen*) of this document'[26] The managers of the *chaiqian* companies were addressed as 'leaders', implying an administrative hierarchy between *chaiqian* companies and the villagers' committee. In the same report, they also outlined their major tasks during the displacement, including 'organising meetings with the displaced families', 'explaining the policy', 'investigating each family' and 'visiting the families to be displaced'. In doing so, they acquired first-hand information of the displacees' attitude of displacement and expectations of compensation. Such information was critical as it allowed the *chaiqian* company to tailor their compensation to targeted families and reduce the overall costs of *chaiqian*.

The private information of the displaced families was coded, standardised and tabulated in computer software, specifically programmed for Expo-induced displacement in Pudong. In this digitalised panopticon, the software placed the private sphere of the displaced families under the gaze, surveillance and calculation of the displacers. It bears similarities with the policing technology of *hukou* registration system. But functionally and legally, they are categorically different. The registration of one's *hukou* with the police implies consent to allow personal identity information to be used for social control and the policing system is limited in accessibility to assure confidentiality. But, the displacement software was designed to pry thoroughly into the private lives of the displaced families. From financial perspective, it is indeed cost-effective, reducing the time on intelligence gathering during the negotiation process. Less repressively, the software provides the street-level *chaiqian* operatives the most updated accurate information about the property relations, family relations and the available housing stock. More repressively, each member of the displaced families was placed under the microscope to be studied by the displacers. Needless to say, the development of this database was behind the closed door of the state with no consent from the displacees for abusing such confidential information. The only agenda was to demolish their homes in an efficient and cheap way.

The detailed knowledge of the displaced families allows the *chaiqian* agents to deploy a most unsettling tactic that takes advantage of families as a relational entity. They can easily bully the weakest member of the displaced families so that the whole

[26] Personal Document.

family would compromise and leave without a fight. The weakness resides less in their personal tendency of conflict avoidance than in their embeddedness in social relations, economic organisations and political institutions. To many displacees, *chaiqian* was a disruptive event, adding a new form of oppression to the pain they have already been suffering. As such, most displacees I spoke to tended to keep such disruption to a minimum. Yet, for *chaiqian* agents, forcing people to give up their homes is the only duty in their job description.[27] With the unwavering back-up from the state, they carried out their work without any temporal and spatial boundaries, invading into the public life of the displacees and making the everyday well-hidden tactic of 'foot dragging' or 'feigned ignorance' (Scott, 1985: xvi) wishful thinking.

Personal social relations of the displacees are vulnerable to the *chaiqian* agents' manipulation. Mrs Yuan, a laid off worker, suffering from severe depression and heart problems, was grateful to the caring residents committees at her original place. The 'cadres' frequently came to her home for small chats to cheer her up, to invite her to join group activities, and to keep her informed about latest trendy topics in their neighbourhoods. Those activities sometimes are the duty of the cadres of the residents committee and sometimes out of care of friends and neighbours, were cultivating *guanxi* between them. As Yang (1994) points out, the craft of *guanxi* places a focus on long term reciprocity, obligations and bond rather than immediate materialist interests. Mrs Yuan not only trusted these cadres but felt indebted to them, or in her words, *qian renqing*. When these cadres came to her home on behalf of the *chaiqian* company, she was under the moral pressure to comply in order not to jeopardise their relations. 'For the sake of their face, I decided to move out. For one, they have been good to me all these years. For another, I might need them in the future. You cannot just break the tie with no room to manoeuvre in the future'.

The zombie *danwei* system was also at the disposal of the *chaiqian* agents to intervene in *chaiqian* disputes and pressure the displacees working for them to move out under the threat of job security. A police officer told me about a 'disciplinary' meeting organised by Pudong District Government before his home was demolished. The attendees were limited to around 40 policemen working in Pudong whose homes were within the *chaiqian* red line. During this meeting, they were explicitly instructed not to provoke any disputes with the *chaiqian* companies and not to get involved in any conflicts on behalf of other family members. Moreover, they had to do the thought work of the rest of their families. Otherwise, they would be held

[27] See *The Grand Displacement in Pudong* for numerous examples.

personally responsible for any consequences.[28] Another respondent reported a similar account. His son, who is a young doctor, was called in by the head of the hospital while he as the head of the property owners was negotiating with the *chaiqian* companies. His son's well-paying job at the hospital was threatened and he was instructed to pass the message on to him. Out of his concern for his son's employment, he took whatever was put on the table by the *chaiqian* agents with the knowledge that the compensation package was far less than he could have received[29].

The employers of those displacees hardly had any vested interests in displacement. I suspect that their interference was based on political pressure from the local government due to their institutional links with the state apparatus. Even if they might have wanted to keep out of the private life of their employees—displacement is a private business after all, they may lack a powerful moral cause to justify their disobedience of political orders from the local states. On this point, educational establishments with a moral and legal duty to protect their students from harassment should not be exonerated from their responsibility in condoning the *chaiqian* agents to intrude onto the campus and bully the students who were about to lose their homes without the consent from their guardians. A girl recalled her humiliation when she was called out by the Director of Studies in the middle of a class for a 'friendly' chat with the *chaiqian* operatives. She never expected the *chaiqian* operatives would come after her to the university, so she refused. The whole class was disrupted and watching at her. To avoid further drama, she agreed to speak with those *chaiqian* company agents. In the meeting, she was told to persuade her parents to give up fighting even after she made it clear on numerous occasions before this incident that she was supportive of her parents and she had no influence in the negotiation.[30] A similar story is represented in the *Grand Displacement in Pudong* but was promulgated to praise the initiative and persistence of a *chaiqian* agent with a 'loving' and 'considerate' heart. In this story, Mr Sun paid a visit to a teenage girl at her junior high school. Sun met this girl once during a visit to her family when making an offer to her parents and noticed the armband with three red strokes she was wearing. The armband indicated that she was a leader of the Young Pioneers.[31] After a failed attempt to convince her parents to take the offer, Sun immediately visited the girl at her school with the tolerance of the schoolteacher on the second day and showed up at her school every day in order to have a 'heart-to-heart' conversation

[28] Interview, D68, 25/03/2012.
[29] Interview, X43, 21/05/2012.
[30] Interview, D100, 20/04/2012.
[31] A child organisation created in the revolutionary time consists of children between eight to fourteen years old and remains an important institution in Chinese primary school for the symbolic rewards.

with the girl. Sun told the girl that her parents were still having concerns about *chaiqian* and were holding back the Expo project. The morning after this moving conversation, the couple took their daughter with them to the *chaiqian* office in their neighbourhood and signed the resettlement agreement'[32]

The reason I am selecting those two accounts is not to insinuate that the young generation should be deprived of their political agency during *chaiqian* negotiations. On the contrary, I believe that, each member of a displaced family, regardless of age, gender or knowledge of displacement, should have a voice in the family decision concerning the fundamental change to their residential space. What concerns me most here is the penetration of the abusive power of the displacers deeply into every aspect of the displaced families' everyday life. Family decisions on displacement and resettlement therefore no longer followed the economic rationale to maximise economic interest, or a social and cultural logic to rearrange family obligations and rights, but also a political logic of compromise, to minimise harm from the predatory regime. Numerous accounts I have presented so far show that this last one is most decisive for the displacees to make up their mind. By making everyone in the displacees' network a subject of political discipline and punishment, the collective responsibility system rooted in China's penal history successfully destroyed the support the displacees could have received and more maliciously, turned each one into a possible accessory to domicide. There is little wonder that families were so vulnerable to collapse in displacement.

Conclusion

What has this chapter contributed to the overall thesis? Firstly, this chapter offers a juxtaposition of the technocratic view and the popular view of the meanings of displacement and resettlement. I have attempted to carve out different logics underpinning those views and lay bare the tensions and contradictions. Specifically, as I maintain, the market based and legalistic view disembeds the appropriated properties from the historical context of their acquisition and the moral universe organised around them. As E. P. Thompson (1978: 171) once argued, 'every contradiction is a conflict of value as well as a conflict of interest; that inside every "need" there is an affect, or "want", on its way to becoming an "ought" (and vice versa); that every class struggle is at the same time a struggle over values'. The suffering of the displacees as I documented in chapter 4 may also be explained by

[32] *The Grand Displacement in Pudong*, p.103-104.

their failures to articulate a competing value system based on their moral economy and their subordination to the dominant view emphasising the exchange value.

Secondly, this chapter tentatively provides an explanation of the prevalence of political acquiescence in the Expo-induced domicide. My analysis avoided seeing the displacees as a unified subordinate group and delved into the internal divisions that effectively undermined their solidarity and deprived them of the political resources to organise large-scale open defiance. As a result, families were at the centre of this land war. The war started with contestation against state expropriation, unfolded through family conflicts, disagreements and compromises, and frequently ended up in family tragedies: lost affections, betrayed trust, broken networks, calculative actions and self-serving competition; all became the advantage of the *chaiqian* agents. My analysis shows the disheartening breakdowns of families due to the politics of negotiation meetings and the manipulation of family relations in the *chaiqian* process. To my knowledge, no existing scholarship has yet reported similar findings. This is likely because we do not actually know much about the actual process of displacement so far and we tend to romanticise resistance in the study of the politics of displacement and forcible evictions. But it is more likely because of the corrupted conscience of the *chaiqian* agents who capitalised on the condition of exceptionality and the authoritarian political culture. It is also more likely because of the overdraft of mutual trust and support within families after repeated social engineering under the governance of the CPC, whether it is the class struggles that turned family members against each other under Mao, or the neoliberal ethics that encourages personal freedom and possessive individualism (Yan, 2003b, 2009b, 2009a, Whyte, 2005, Meng, 2008). The logic of market in the reform era constantly destroys the bonds of families, kinships and community and undermines their capacity for effective resistance actions. When the law of the market prevails, as argued by Polanyi (2001[1944]), it shall 'annihilate all organic forms of existence and to replace them by a different type of organisation, an atomistic and individualistic one' (p. 171). The principle of 'freedom of contract' shall replace 'non-contractual organisations of kinship, neighbourhood, profession, and creed were to be liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual and thus restrained his*[sic]* freedom' (p.171).

The displacees are entrapped in the tension between individual freedom and group solidarity, and in most cases, the rationality of the market prevailed. Admittedly, the symbolic violence inherent in the dominant view must be placed at the centre of intellectual critique here. And, the utterly horrendous moral corruptions of the

chaiqian agents must be pinned down to contextualise the displacees' choices. But, echoing the quote from Hilberg (1980: 35) in the beginning of this chapter, is it not the interactions between the displacees with their oppressors that determined their fate? This question might be quite unsettling and perhaps unfair to ask. After all, most displacees never had any prior experience of dealing with displacement or coping with purposely instigated family dramas of such intensity and frequency in their lifetime. But, hypothetically, had the displacees trusted their neighbours or their family members back then, could the story of displacement as this thesis has been authoring so far be told differently? The failure to defend their reasonable claims more powerfully and persistently foretells the fate of the displacees in the resettlement sites. This is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 8 : 'You Feel Like You are Living in a Morgue': Infinite Injustice as the Real Legacy of the Expo

'Those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men [*sic*] by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word'.

'Men *[sic]* ought either to be indulged or utterly destroyed, for if you merely offend them they take vengeance, but if you injure them greatly they are unable to retaliate, so that the injury done to a man ought to be such that vengeance cannot be feared'.

Nicco Machiavelli, *The Prince*

Introduction

So far this thesis has attempted to reconstruct the process of the Expo-induced *chaiqian* with a focus on the exercise of power in annihilating the Expo site and the interactions between different political actors in the production of massive suffering and immorality. The failed attempts from the displacees to resist state oppression more effectively and to take control of the domicide process—albeit not entirely a political agenda within their reach—foreshadowed prolonged injustice and pain the displaced have to endure. The objective of this chapter is to offer a description of the post-displacement lives and examine the real legacies of *chaiqian* caused by the Expo. As such, this chapter may be practically used as a reality check of the political rhetoric of *fanshen* or of the cliché, that *chaiqian* is a good thing for the uprooted. In doing so, we shall also be able to get closer to the pathological hypocrisy of the political economy of *chaiqian* in contemporary Chinese cities, especially when it is mixed with the logic of distributive justice (e.g. as a solution to housing shortage, poor living conditions, or housing inequalities under the socialist economy).

In short, my analysis will show that the displacees are economically, socially, emotionally, physically and politically impaired by the Expo induced *chaiqian*. This is hardly a surprise given the violent process of *chaiqian* this thesis has captured. It is also in harmony with the conclusions from classic sociological studies of the outcomes of dislocation (Young and Willmott, 1957, Jennings, 1962, Erikson, 1976, Jacobs, 1961, Marris, 1961, Western, 1981), especially the compelling work on the infamous clearance of Boston's west end (Gans, 1962, Fried, 1966, Hartman, 1964),

and more recent studies on HOPE VI in the United States (Goetz, 2003, 2010, Manzo et al., 2008), as well as those research in other cities in the world (Olds, 1998, Fullilove, 2005, Fang, 2006, Meyer, 2008, Campanella, 2008, Porter, 2009, Desmond, 2012, Boo, 2012). These disheartening impacts of displacement are concisely summarised by Hartman (1983: 305-306), 'in seeking a new place to live, the displaced tend to move as short distance as possible, in an effort to retain existing personal, commercial, and institutional ties and because of the economically and racially biased housing-market constraints they face. What they find usually costs more, has less adequate space, and is of inferior quality. Involuntary residential changes also produce a considerable amount of psychosocial stress, which in its most extreme form has been found analogous to the clinical description of grief'. Several themes as Hartman identified here can be found in my analysis, but to be sure, different cultural contexts (e.g. race) and institutional arrangements (e.g. the stock of public housing, *hukou*, the rural-urban divide, etc.) shall add complexities and nuances to this picture.

The persisting and belated nature of the domicide trauma is another point this chapter will bring to our attention. Apart from the causes I outlined in prior chapters (e.g. brutal evictions, lack of participation, family breakdowns), I wish to point out that the repressive resettlement housing regime and the governing technology are adding further injuries and thus obstructing the healing process. Ostensibly, by making resettlement housing (mostly new and decently sized in planned communities) a mandatory part of the compensation package offered to the displacees at a discounted and acceptable rate with full private property ownership, the Chinese government has managed to effectively prevent the majority of the displaced from becoming homeless or living in inferior conditions. To outside observers, such arrangement seems to have transplanted a human face to the predatory growth regime, and assisted the displacees in coping with the aftermath of uprooting. This is a misinformed illusion. We must not overlook the fact that the production of the resettlement housing is an important moment in the process of primitive accumulation in Chinese cities. It is the manufactured demand of resettlement from the displaced that not only feeds *chaiqian*-related companies but also lubricates the whole land development and sustains the growth of the residential property market (Wang, 2011, Wei, 2013). With great dependence on this market segment, the displacees have neither much freedom nor any bargaining power; although this is not to say that their needs are handled with great care and moral sensibility in the first place (e.g. recall the speed of the whole process). After all, at the time of displacement, most resettlement neighbourhoods were not yet built. What the

displacees bought into were dreams of their would-be life in a community as advertised by the bulldozer regime rather than the reality. As they moved in and slowly settled down, many problems started to emerge. Caught up in the process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, the displacees are incapable of organising effective actions to seek remedies for their victimisation, to resist repeated oppression or to improve their conditions. As a result, the pain from losing their homes, as documented in chapter 5, are compounded and perpetuated, and the injustice they have to suffer becomes infinite.

I build this last argument on the work from Sack (1986) and Hsing (2010a). Territoriality, as Sack (1986: 2) defines, is 'a human strategy to affect, influence, and control'. I use deterritorialisation to refer to the process of losing control over a territoriality and reterritorialisation to refer to the process of regaining control. Evidently, this is about power struggle over the organisation of space and the meaning of place. Whilst the state-led growth regime uses (de/re)terrorisation as a governing technology and accumulation strategy (Hsing, 2010a, Ren, 2010), society may resist such forces to protect the social fabric from complete destruction as the double movement thesis from Polanyi (2001[1944]) reminds us. The predicament of the displacees resides in the fact that their old roots were completely brutally cut off yet their new roots have not yet fully laid down in their new places. Their wounds take time to heal. It takes more time when the previous social, economic and emotional ties are completely destroyed and when the resettlement sites are not a nurturing enough environment. It seems infinitely delayed when salt is constantly poured on the wounds as in intentional repression or in silent compulsion of the market (Marx, 1976 [1867]). For this reason, I share the sentiment of Fullilove (2005: 12) that the trauma of displacement stays with the displaced for a lifetime and may affect generations after generations, not only through memory work and symbolic practices (Till, 2012), but also constantly reminded, activated and aggregated in place-making practices in the resettlement sites. It is also for this reason I suggest that we should remain open to the lingering impacts of Expo-induced domicide and refuse to put a temporal limit on charging against the injustice produced by the Expo regime.

Politics of Siting Resettlement and Gangster Capitalism

It was unprecedented in Shanghai's city-building history to displace such a huge number of families for a single project all at once. Given the high political stake displacement entails, the Expo regime cleared two sites in Shanghai's frontier to

build resettlement housing for those dislocated (see Figure 8.1). Both Sanlin Expo Homeland and Pujiang Expo Homeland are planned communities built from scratch on farmland reclaimed from the local rural collectives. Of a far larger scale, the resettlement site in Sanlin is closer to the Expo Park and was reserved to accommodate the displacees from the east section of the Expo site. Three clusters (Yongtai, Nanping and Sanlin Expo Homeland) were constructed between the borders of the Middle Ring Road and the Outer Ring Road in less than three years. In off-peak hours, it usually takes one hour to commute to the Expo Park by public transport and far longer to the city centre. The displacees from the west section on the other hand were forced to migrate to Pujiang Town (one of Shanghai's infamous copycat projects) in Minhang district, 20 kilometres away from the Expo site on the shortest route via expressway. There is only one bus connecting this site to the old demolished neighbourhoods. Without traffic congestion, it normally takes two hours to travel to the original place. Although the commuting time has been shortened to half by the recently connected metro line, the costs go up as well. As Slater (2009: 307) reminds us, a critical perspective on land economies must pay attention to the underlying structure of interests. Some logical questions to ask then are: why did the regime choose the suburbia? Why did they choose to resettle the displacees on two separate locations and why these two particular locations? If the intention was to respect the consumer sovereignty of the displacees by offering greater freedom of choice, would it not be more reasonable to allow them to choose where to live, even if their decision was limited to these two options only? These questions become more pertinent when we take into consideration the proximity of a waste incineration plant in Sanlin (about 500 yards from the closest neighbourhood) and the stock of empty resettlement apartments on both sites.[1] The former raises the question of both distributive and procedural environment justice, and the latter casts doubt on financial efficiency and bureaucratic rationality.

[1] There is no published data on this point. But at the time of my fieldwork, I did a small accounting exercise in a neighbourhood in Sanlin to get an overall impression on the availability of empty apartments. I selected twenty units (danyuan) in twenty six-story buildings, which I had access to inspect inside and counted empty apartments in these buildings. Five out of forty apartments were clearly empty, showing no sign of personal effects. My impression was frequently confirmed by the residents in interviews as well. Inside their buildings, there were always one or two empty apartments and more empty ones in highrises.



Figure 8.1: Two Major Resettlement Sites for Expo-induced Chaiqian
Source: Based on the GIS base map of Shanghai on ArcGIS, accessed online 2014

Considering that *chaiqian* was the precondition and an indispensable component of the Expo project, it seems reasonable to expect that the planners would have some critical thoughts on this matter. When these questions were thrown to the planning officers from the municipal government who oversees the land development on the Expo site, the intellectual merit of these questions were quickly dismissed as too 'natural' and 'normal' from their technocratic point of view to build resettlement neighbourhoods in suburbia.[2] To them, this is how *chaiqian* has been practised over the past two decades in the city and the Expo-induced *chaiqian* is for sure not an exception despite the fact that exceptionality is the ontological condition of the Expo project (see chapter 6). This line of reasoning seems to suggest that, the more *chaiqian* is practised this way, the more legitimate, inevitable and normal it becomes. The normalcy of such practice is further reinforced by the conviction that this is how *chaiqian* should be working, as it is a part of the larger process of rationalising the urban space that a modernising and globalising Shanghai can proudly dwell on.

[2] Interview, 25/07/2012.

Commerce, industry and residence each has a place of their own. Perin (1977) convincingly argues that any land use intervention is underpinned by a moral assumption of social categories and social relations between different groups. As such, the land use system is also a moral system that 'reflects and assures social order' (p. 4). What we could infer from their normative view here is a religious conversion into a neoclassical theorisation of urban spatial structure in contemporary Chinese cities and a new moral system premised on the purchasing power of the consumer subjects. Widely shared by the ruling elites, this conversion negates the socialist morality and spatial structure established under short-lived socialism, along with the repudiation of Maoist ideology and Marxism. Under this touted neoclassical land use model, urban space is to be organised under the doctrine of the exchange value of the land (Alonso, 1964). Through competitive bidding between various financially constrained 'rational' utility-maximising social actors in a functioning land market, the powerful device of land rent sorts activities and people into different locations. In this way, land defined as scarce resources according to the neoclassic theorists can be used in a most 'efficient' way and also the 'best' way.

An extensive and compelling critique of the location theory can be found in David Harvey's (1973: 162-194) classic text, *Social Justice and the City***.** His brilliant analysis goes beyond 'churlish criticism' (p. 167) that narrowly focuses on the imperfections of the market in arriving at Pareto optimality. To expose this theory as deficient, he challenges its ontological negligence of the absolute quality of space and institutional settings, both condition the urban process over time. For Harvey, the land use occurs in *sequential* manner 'across an urban space divided into a large but finite number of land parcels' (p. 168), *contra* the neoclassical theory's ignorance of time and space. Private property ownership, an ontological condition for capitalist production, grants the land owners monopoly control of the land, and in a competitive bidding model, this means that 'the rich can command space whereas the poor are trapped in it' (p. 171). The 'success' of the neoclassic theories in modelling urban land use and their seemingly empirical relevance, as Harvey points out, reside in the infusion of rent and location and their exclusive reliance on notion of differential rent (p.176, 188), assuming that rent declines the farther the distance away from the centre. The assumption of centricity then further challenges the mechanism of competitive bidding in such models, which presume that land use determines value whilst in practice the reverse mechanism that value determines land use is more common in capitalist cities (p. 189). When value determines use, warns Harvey,

> The allocation can take place under the auspices of rampant speculation, artificially induced scarcities, and the like, and it loses any pretence of having anything at all to do with the efficient organisation of production and distribution…. Social policy, no matter how well-intentioned is helpless…the rentier will get that pound of flesh no matter what (p. 190-191).

Harvey's persuasive analysis of course can be extended to argue against the state-led spatial engineering in contemporary Shanghai. But, what I wish to emphasise in my analysis here is the underlying power struggle and the material and symbolic violence involved in producing such an oppressive spatial order and in *normalising* the *doxic* rules in the housing field. The rapid spatial restructuring in Shanghai is *par excellence* of Marx's primitive accumulation. In refuting Adam Smith's conservative treatment of primitive accumulation as an innocent process, Marx (1976 [1867]) compared it to the original sin and argued that primitive accumulation is 'nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producers from the means of production' (p. 875). This is a brutal process, as Marx writes, 'it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part' (p. 874). Marx's reference to a mythological pre-historical past has received many critiques (Perelman, 2000, De Angelis, 2001, Harvey, 2005b, Sassen, 2010) pointing out the ongoing nature of primitive accumulation as a condition for the survival of capitalism. Given the modern techniques in primitive accumulation, Harvey (2005b) proposes a new term, 'accumulation by dispossession', to incorporate an array of processes and mechanisms in consolidating the domination of the ruling elites in today's world, of similar nature to primitive accumulation. With historical and geographical peculiarities in mind, Harvey contends that the proactive role of the state in conspiring to the search of temporal, spatial and institutional fixes is a common feature.

The Chinese experience is distinctive not so much in the techniques of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession but in the persuasiveness of the party and the state in facilitating capital accumulation. What is witnessed in China over the last three decades is the rise of 'a new robber baron class in league with the Communist Party' (Walker, 2006: 6) whose wealth is accumulated through 'a veritable orgy of corruption, embezzlement, bribery, kickbacks, graft, smuggling, currency manipulation, influence peddling, and theft of state funds to amass personal fortunes and privatise state monies, enterprises, and properties' (Holmstrom and Smith, 2000: 10). As we shall see below, the city-building business is an epitome. In this process, the ruling elites successfully established the hegemonic principles, values and structures and facilitated the ongoing spatialisation of class (Zhang, 2010).

In doing so, it also effectively disciplines the subjectivity and agency of those victimised.

The reformers inherited many legacies from socialist urbanism—inefficiency, irrational, and fragmented are only a few salient ones. Under Maoist ideology, cities were built to facilitate socialist industrialisation in addition to the symbolic value in demonstrating the superiority of socialism over capitalism (Ma and Wu, 2005: 5). Dismissed as a commodity, land was freely allocated to the *danwei* for infinite use according to the overall economic plan in Mao's China. Consequently, prime locations frequently were occupied by industrial clusters, sitting next to residential compounds (see chapter 4). Considering the bureaucratic inefficiency in allocating resources and the problem of soft budget constraints, the *danwei* were enticed to hoard a large parcel of land and building materials for future expansion despite that they did not have the capacity to materialise the plan yet (Lu, 2006: 91-97). Hoarding behaviour as such produced inequalities between *danwei* occupying different administrative hierarchies, and aggravated the shortage of resources and land. Situated within the judicial boundaries of territorial states, many *danwei* were subordinated to the leadership of the functional states of a higher administrative level, outranking the territorial state authorities (Hsing, 2010a). For this reason, these *danwei* frequently were operating like fortresses, outside the political control of the territorial states, trenching the property rights in socialist cities. They were also the basic cells in organising collective consumption within their own territories. The cellular organisation of collective consumption, compounded by the prioritisation of production in socialist accumulation, put severe constraints on housing provision and urban infrastructure development (Wu, 1997). The problem was further worsened by the Cultural Revolution during which industrial development further ate up vacant land in the city centre whilst investment in social reproduction was in stagnation. Political ideology aside, the root of the problem as the reformers argue is the ignorance of the economic value of the land. The solution, as informed by the capitalist other, is straightforward. The value of the land must be firmly respected and the rationalising device of land rent must be at the centre of urban process in the reform era. For the device to work properly, the Chinese state made a serial effort to construct a land market. First, it ironically legalised the violent robbery of private properties during the Cultural Revolution and nationalised all the land in the city (including the land underneath self-built properties) in 1982 (Hsing, 2010b, Wilhelm, 2004). Second, it eventually resolved the legal tension by separating the Land Use Right (LUR) from land ownership in revising the Constitution in 1988 and allowing the LURs to be transacted and speculated in the land market without changing the

nature of state ownership. The territorial states on different levels are legally recognised to monopolise the supply and management of land within their administrative boundaries.

The land reform creatively destroyed the institutional barrier for speculating land development by different agents without undermining the party-state's legitimacy. In constructing a land market, it also created a huge rent gap between the capitalised ground rent depreciated by the current industrial use and poorly maintained working class housing, and the potential rent projected by highest and best use (Smith, 1979, Wu, 1997). It openly invites competition but mostly collusion between different actors for its appropriation. The transformation of the meaning and value of land also intensified the conflicts between territorial states (*de jure* land owners) and the working units as the functional states (*de facto* land owners), or what Hsing (2010a: 24) calls 'socialist land masters'. Both are interested in capitalising on the land stock on their turfs and engaging more proactively in land development for enormous economic gains. Development companies affiliated with them quickly sprung up (Wu, 1999). In the meantime, township and village corporations also grew rapidly with the assistance of local corporatist states in the countryside, converting large parcels of agricultural land for industrial development (Oi, 1995).

However, this city-building game in general has been played to the disadvantage of the territorial states. In addition to their weaker owner status in law, the ongoing reform of the state economy sector pushes those *danwei* to operate like private firms, meaning that rent must be taken seriously in economic decisions, especially in terms of location choice. Meanwhile, planning technocrats, devotees of Alonso, allied with the territorial states, assisted the 'natural' sorting process by categorising land use and creating zoning controls (Chen, 2007: 48). In 1986, Shanghai announced the first urban master plan in the reform era, with an emphasis on the construction of CBD on the Bund area and the specialisation and concentration of industrial activities in many industrial clusters on the urban fringe.

The land reform is only a small piece in completing the puzzle of building a market system. Of equal importance here are fiscal reform, housing reform, relaxation of *hukou* restrictions, reform of the state economy, rescaling of the state, and transformation of the financial sector. Those reforms have started to cause profound changes in the power structure and moral values established under the socialist era,

most evidently after the introduction of double-track pricing system[3] (Sun, 2004). Despite their ongoing nature in the 1980s, the conservative impulse of socialist institutions and practises continue to influence the production of space. In this decade, Shanghai witnessed the first wave of residential displacement in post-reform era due to state-led redevelopment. Between 1979 and 1990, as many as 120,000 registered households lost their homes.[4] However, the great majority of them were offered *in situ* in-kind resettlement akin to their acquisition of welfare housing under socialist era. Those redevelopment projects were financed through diverse mechanisms, deriving money mostly from the government but also from the *danwei*, the residents, private capital and loans. Small in scale and slow in process, as compared to *chaiqian* in the ensuing decade, such redevelopment efforts were valuable in protecting the interests of the inhabitants.

Apart from the socialist legacy, the democratic efforts from the radical intellectuals and university students to some extent challenged the officialdom in marketizing their power in this process (Zhao, 2001). The factional conflicts within the party elites between the conservatives and the reformers also complicated the pathway to a market economy system (Fewsmith, 2001). It was the Tiananmen massacre that invited more aggressive measures to be taken with astonishing intensity and audacity. The discourse of *wending* (stability) in post-Tiananmen era mutes the radical intellectuals and democratic activists,[5] and encourages the alliance between political and economic elites to carry out more radical measures to maintain their dominance (Sandby-Thomas, 2011). For Klein (2007), such political manoeuvring is an example of disaster capitalism, referring to the reliance of the neoliberal agenda on crisis moments to bring about the unthinkable changes. As the reform deepens after Deng Xiaoping's ideological 'breakthrough' for a 'socialist market economy', gangster capitalism also sweeps into Chinese cities robbing public assets and accelerating social polarisation. Meanwhile, a cult of political elites known as the Shanghai Gang, with Jiang Zemin (promoted to national president after Tiananmen massacre) at the top, acquired greater influence in central leadership and impacted Shanghai's development trajectory.

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[3] The double pricing system allowed socialist elites to trade raw materials acquired from the state at a fixed price and trade them at a higher market price. This allowed these elites to convert their political capital into economic capital. According to Sun Liping (2004), a renowned Chinese sociologist, this is a key mechanism for the reproduction of the ruling elites in contemporary Chinese society, different from the circulation of ruling elites in Eastern European countries (see Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995).

[4] Shanghai Construction Chronicle (1986-1991).

[5] Many radicals went into exile and some were imprisoned to this day whilst most allied with the market or resigned from public engagement. See Wang (2003b).

In 1992, the strategic importance of Shanghai was rediscovered and it was repositioned as the 'dragon head' in the Yangtze River region. In neoliberalising the economy, territorial states underwent drastic rescaling and restructuring. District boundaries were adjusted with most prominent changes in Pudong where an *ad hoc* new state agency was created to take control of the land development on the east bank of the Huangpu River, and also in suburbia where counties outside the outer Ring Road were incorporated into different districts (Hartog, 2010: 26). Apart from the expansion of their territorial boundary, district level states were delegated with more power in approving land use and land management, attracting FDIs, maintaining public infrastructures, etc. (He and Wu, 2009). In line with the general trend of fiscal decentralisation on national level, district authorities were also allowed to retain a significant portion of fiscal income from land related development. Take the land conveyance fee for example; only 15 per cent is required to be submitted to municipal government for collective consumption in infrastructure, education and maintenance and alike.[6]

Administrative decentralisation further complicated the structure of the land battle. The financial gains from land development enticed those territorial and functional states to compete for a bigger share. A land enclosure of a far larger scale than that occurred in England was accelerated in the 1990s. Huge tracts of land were divided and controlled by developers of different nature through violence, under-table dealings, corruption, bribery and embezzlement of public funds.[7] The differences and conflicts between socialist land masters also create persuasive 'black land markets' for different agencies to speculate LURs in both cities and the countryside against legal procedures (Lin, 2009: 94-101). By monopolising the land supply, the territorial states have great advantage in taking control of land development. In actively participating in the land battle, the role of the territorial states however went through categorical changes. Entrepreneurial states, frequently used in existing literature, is inadequate to capture all the dimensions (Solinger, 1992, Duckett, 1998,

[6] Telephone Interview, 16/09/2013. In Pudong, all fiscal income is retained at the district level.

[7] The fall of Zhou Zhengyi and later the demise of the Shanghai Gang is an example here. The rise of Zhou Zhengyi in Shanghai's property development sector benefited enormously from his political connections with local political elites. His downfall is related to the redevelopment of eight divided land parcels (known as *dongbakuai*) in Jin'an District in the city centre. His close contacts with political elites enabled him to acquire the land with no land conveyance fee under only one condition that the displaced must be resettled in his housing development. After acquiring the LURs, he refused to resettle the displacees and provoked furious residents to act collectively and petitioned in Beijing. Political opportunities were on the side of the displaced. Political opening was enlarged by the power shifts in the central leadership (Jiang's retirement and the rise of Hu Jintao) at that time, rendering Zhou a primary target of factional struggle and eventually led to his imprisonment. Following him, the former Mayor of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, and a group of his underlings were found guilty in embezzling public funds and speculating on land development. See McGregor (2012).

Wank, 1999, Wu, 2003b). The state operates like private firms, as well as predators and robbers. Various government departments established their development companies with start-up capital from government fiscal transfers, bank loans, 'shares' from the employees and money from subcontractors (Hsing, 2010a: 42-43, Wang and Murie, 1999). Given their association with the state agencies, those development companies acquired easier access to the inchoate land market at a lower cost.[8]

The political capital of state bureaucrats and party cadres now also acquired higher symbolic value and became the primary target of private entrepreneurs. Both political elites and the emerging business elites were interested in converting the capital they possessed in exchange for greater benefits in the frenzy land development. Many under-the-table deals were closed with the influence of the Shanghai Gang and their protégé. The collusion is made much easier by the ongoing reform of the state economy sector on the one hand and the *xiahai* (jumping ships) of the state bureaucrats on the other. With different justifications of the necessity of restructuring of SOEs (e.g. financial solvency, economic efficiency, increasing competitiveness) and through different measures (e.g. merger and acquisition, forming shareholding companies, selling out, etc.), the restructuring of the city-building industry arrived at the same end like reforms in other spheres, that is to privatise the whole nation (Hsing, 2010a). The consequences were far-reaching. Public assets were split by those companies and viciously transferred to red capitalists as their private properties. The LURs acquired illegally by those development companies were also divided up and after various transfers and sales; it became extremely difficult for outsiders to track the LURs transaction records and became fertile ground for corruption and embezzlement.[9] A few development companies with a strong state background emerged as the most powerful developers. With a huge parcel of land in their hands, in addition to their easier access to financial capital and the land market, these companies are able to monopolise the

[8] Land development in Pudong is an excellent example here. In 1990, to develop Pudong, Shanghai municipality established the Pudong Development Company. Along with three other development companies, it acquired a huge piece of land in Lujiazui (the financial centre in Pudong) without actually paying a penny to the municipal government.

[9] A case in point here is the restructuring of Shanghai Economic Housing Development Centre (SEHDC). At the time of its reform, it possessed a huge land parcel of 1 million square metres, allocated by the municipal government for developing affordable housing. During its restructuring, the development company under SEHDC, headed by the Deputy Director of SEHDC, transferred 45 per cent of property share of the development company and the LUR to a private development company registered under his own name. Through similar tricks, two more private companies headed by red capitalists acquired the remaining shares of the development companies. The rest of the robbing of public wealth became quite straightforward. The red capitalists exchanged their shares and 'naturally' controlled the new shareholding companies. See *Business Weekly*, 10/2007.

property market.[10] But, most importantly, the 'marriage of convenience' between economic elites and political elites accelerates the formation of a hegemonic bloc in the city-building field.

Without effective demand, the land enclosure perhaps would not be so intense. The demand was manufactured and manipulated by the state through three measures to help the developers. Firstly, the housing reform extended the consumer revolution to the housing sector (Davis, 2000) and pushed the now consumer subjects to secure their own shelters in the commercial housing market. Secondly, the infamous 365 urban renewal project in clearing the land in the city centre created a huge demand from the uprooted. In the 1990s alone, more than 600,000 registered households were evicted from the city centre.[11] Despite that the Shanghai *Chaiqian* Bylaw 1991 required on-site resettlement; the state colluded with the developers to build commercial properties and high-end residential properties on the cleared land for both parties to profit from the renewal projects. This made it difficult for the displaced to move back. In-kind resettlement projects sprawled in suburbia became the only option for the displaced, especially after on-site resettlement died away and monetised compensation came into dominance (see Figure 8.2). In 1997, Shanghai government made off-site resettlement in suburbia a standard practice in *chaiqian* and selected four sites on the edge of the Middle Ring Road and the Outer Ring Road to develop resettlement housing projects (see Figure 8.3), mixed in with commercial housing projects.

[10] According to an influential financial newspaper, 60 per cent of the top 50 development companies in Shanghai are associated with the state, although their ownership is hard to define due to their giant corporate structure, with numerous shareholders from the private sector. *See 21st Century Business Herald*, 6/11/2006.

[11] My calculation based on Shanghai Statistics Yearbook (2013).



Figure 8.2: Distribution of Major Resettlement Sites in the 1990s
Source: Based on the GIS base map of Shanghai on ArcGIS, accessed online 2014



Figure 8.3: Distribution of Major Property Development Zones
Source: Based on the GIS base map of Shanghai on ArcGIS, accessed online 2014

The city-building practices since the 1990s allowed for an oppressive social-spatial structure to take shape. The new hierarchies have been translated into a mental structure defined by the linguistic patterns, in correspondence with the employment structure and the economic power of different social groups. As the local saying goes, 'those who speak a foreign language live in the city centre, those who speak Mandarin live in the middle and those who speak Shanghai dialect live in the suburbia mixed with those who speak none of above'. The production of these hierarchies comes with a 'naturalising effect' (Bourdieu, 1999a: 124), legitimatising their reproduction. The account from Uncle Chen is germane here. He was acutely aware of the unjust nature of *chaiqian*; however, instead of challenging it; he went on rationalising the off-site resettlement arrangement. I confronted him on this point and he quoted a line from a Hindi movie *Awara* to justify,

> The son of a thief always turns out to be a thief and the son of a good man always turns out to be good. This is how society works…. If you have *beijing* (political background) or you are super rich, the city is your paradise. For the poor, this is your fate. Accept it (Interview, X15, 02/05/2012).

Already victimised, the displacees were further injured by the Machiavellian power games between the city-builders and the lingering effects of the land enclosures in the 1990s. As we can see from the maps above, Sanlin has been the destination of resettlement since the first wave of *chaiqian* in Shanghai. For the planners, it seems logical to resettle the displacees from the Expo here. This choice is further backed up firstly by a rationalistic argument for cost-effectiveness given the relatively adequate basic infrastructures here compared to other locations, and secondly by an affective argument for staying close to the demolished neighbourhoods. Such rationalisation is pale once the veil of local land politics is stripped off. Most of the land in Sanlin has already been controlled by the development companies with government background.[12] They did so through bypassing the legal procedure in acquiring huge parcels of land and undercompensated the original owners.[13] Their dominant control of the land here allowed them to engage in both land development and LUR speculation. Locating the resettlement housing projects here enabled the developers

[12] Major development companies with red background include China National Real Estate Development Corporation Group, Shanghai Real Estate Development Corporation Group, Pudong Real Estate Development Corporation Group, and Vanke.

[13] Each time I walked past the Sanlin Township government building, I saw many former farmers petitioning for the loss of their land. Before I left Shanghai, I witnessed an organised demonstration in front of the government building. Also, see *21st Century Business Herald*, 06/02/2009.

to profit without any financial risks.[14] This however has not yet adequately addressed the *realpolitik* in land development here, which sacrificed the interests of the displaced from Puxi. A land parcel of 1.8 million square metres was planned to build resettlement housing for them however it was hoarded by a private developer, Zhou Xiaodi, who amassed enormous political and cultural capital during his business practices in Shanghai (Yang, 2008).[15] His conflicts with his business partners (mostly development companies with state background), intersected with struggles with various politicians, caused troubles for the Expo regime who treasured timely resettlement to avoid social unrests. As a consequence, the displacees from Puxi had to be relocated elsewhere. The choice of Pujiang was not innocent, either. Pujiang Town is notoriously known as the backyard of the former mayor, Chen Liangyu. It is part of his image project of one-city-nine-towns, under which programme Shanghai transplanted the exotic landscape of ten foreign countries and built ghost luxury villas in those places. Pujiang was designed with an Italian flavour. In building this image project, large land plots were illegally acquired from the local collectives and hoarded by major developers in close contact with Chen. The Expo-induced resettlement need to be situated in this context. Suffice to say, it is neither natural nor normal to have resettled the displacees in suburbia. Profitability and efficient resettlement dominated the decision-making while 'better life' was never a primary concern for the displacers. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps easier to understand why many displacees comment on their *chaiqian* experience as 'switching between hells'.

Plans that Die Hard

The resettlement apartments were offered to the displacees in the form of *qifang* (pre-sold housing), meaning that when the displacees agreed to sign the resettlement

[14] Albeit sold at a discount, the resettlement apartments were purchased by the displacees with the money received as compensation. When the compensation was not enough, the displacees sometimes had to pay the difference. With such a stable and effective demand and the support from local authorities, the developers did not need to worry about sales, marketing and financing.

[15] According to the journalist, Yang Haipeng, Zhou maintained close contacts with many high level politicians and judges in Shanghai. His nightclub was once used as a brothel for corrupted politicians in the 1990s. To accumulate fame as well as to have easier access to the bureaucratic field, he frequently appeared at charity events and even won many titles from the local authorities. He joined China National Democratic Construction Association, one of the eight minor parties recognised by the CPC. His donation to Fudan University (QS ranking 88 in 2014) even secured him a seat on the university board. Moreover, through his political connections, he founded the first civilian-run higher education institution in Shanghai and financed two public hospitals in branching out in Pudong district. In doing so, he gained enormous influence in many fields. With willing assistance of politicians, he at a time became the untouchable. If not for the attempted murder of his business partner, it is hard to say if he will ever be brought to trial.

contracts and purchased their new apartments, these resettlement neighbourhoods were still under construction. For most displacees, the only information they could rely on before making a substantial investment was the advertised layouts of the overall resettlement sites, the buildings and apartments, enriched by the 'compelling' pitch from the domicide operatives during negotiation meetings and by the promises from the major political figures on their patronising visits (see table 8.1). Loaded with jargon and abstractions, the technical maps and plans were beyond the knowledge of many displacees. Since time is the essence for the Expo, some so-called *yangbanfang* (showcase apartments), built with great care to showcase the quality of the resettlement housing, were open to visit and inspection in order to help those 'defensive' displacees make up their mind, especially those displaced from Puxi given the remote location of their new homes. Therefore, when the displacees decided to take the resettlement offers, they also accepted enormous uncertainties and risks. Although many of them were concerned about such arrangements, they agreed to take the offer any way. Their limited option to satisfy their housing needs is for sure one explanation. But, what convinced most displacees, as I learnt from my conversations with them, was their trust in the state to abide by the contract and to deliver on verbal promises. It was also such trust in a benevolent state that led them to agree willingly to the fact that public infrastructures would not be fully developed to accommodate their needs for several years after they moved in. For instance, the metro line did not extend to Pujiang until 2009, two years after the displacees settled in. By the time I left Shanghai, the residents in Pujiang, especially those seniors, were still living in fear that an urgent health issue would very likely lead to fatality as the promised hospital has not yet built, and the closest hospital with emergency services was more than an hour's drive away. Most of them had to refrain from visiting friends or relatives in the city centre for too long because metro services stopped before midnight.

As the producer of plans and maps, the Expo regime could easily manipulate the displacees by selectively (mis)representing the resettlement neighbourhoods. Because neither the plans nor the promises were included in the written resettlement contracts, they could alter the plans or break their promises once they secured consent from the displacees without taking any legal responsibility. Therefore, many displacees in Sanlin Expo homeland were ballistic about these unexpected changes. They did not realise that the incineration plant was so close to their new homes. Those who lived next to the Middle Ring Road were furious to find that the small road on the map was in fact an elevated expressway full of traffic day and night (see Figures 8.2 and 8.16). They were also shocked to discover that the big community

centre they were told about was now replaced by more than fifty additional apartment blocks, which were supposed to be built on the site of a big furniture shopping mall. Many were also disheartened by the fact that they had to pay a few thousand extra because the actual sizes of the resettlement apartments slightly exceed the sizes they agreed to on the resettlement contracts. The costs caused by the fault of the developers ironically had to be covered by the displacees.

Table 8.1: The Displacees' Knowledge of Resettlement Housing during Chaiqian Negotiations

Knowledge of Resettlement Housing	Sanlin Expo Homeland		Pujiang Expo Homeland (N=147)	Total (N=300)
	Sanlin Locals (N=25)	Pudong Expo Site (N=128)		
Shown the floor plan of the resettlement apartment	22 (88%)	102 (79.7%)	127 (86.4%)	251 (86.7%)
Shown the layout of the neighbourhood	16 (64%)	90 (70.3%)	116 (78.9%)	222 (74%)
Offered the chance to visit and inspect the sample apartments	0 (0%)	17 (21.1%)	117 (79.6%)	134 (44.7%)
Allowed to walk around the sample resettlement neighbourhood	0 (0%)	36 (28.1%)	126 (85.7%)	162 (54%)
Allowed to inspect the interior of the sample apartments	0 (0%)	21 (16.4%)	123 (83.7%)	144 (48%)
Worried at not being able to inspect before purchasing decision	23 (92%)	98 (76.6%)	28 (19.0%)	149 (49.7%)

Source: my own survey, 2012

With absolute control in producing the rehousing estates, the planners turned the resettlement site into a lab for practising their techniques. Both sites are what Bosker (2013) might call planning mimicries, although the traces of counterfeits were better concealed than simple transplanting. Whilst Sanlin Expo Homeland acknowledges the credits of Yuen Long in Hong Kong, Pujiang Expo Homeland claims valuable experiences from Italy. In transplanting the international ‘best practises’, the planners executed what Jane Jacobs feared most in modernist planning with strong determination and extraordinary treatment of planning as a piece of art featuring the dominance of visual aesthetical order (Jacobs, 1961: 387-405). As we can see from Figures 8.8 and 8.9, there is a clear spatial segregation between different functions. The land on each site was divided into smaller, regular and rectangular plots specialised in single use. All residential clusters were built with a mixture of low-rise (five to six stories) and highrise (eleven to seventeen stories) apartment buildings with modern facades. They were strictly separated from the shopping malls, leisure and cultural facilities. Outside the residential compounds, the road grid is a straight-line with four to ten bus lanes and narrow sidewalks on both sides and minimum disruptions. They were planned to facilitate rapid flow of automobiles. The only two streets planned in a humane scale are Banquan Road in Sanlin and Puchi Road in

Pujiang because of the location of the clinics, the food markets and the schools. They are also the streets not completely dead, with some *renqi* (with some street life) (Holston, 1989, Zhang, 2006). Inside the residential compounds, functional divisions were also created to maintain a visual order. Apart from the huge block close to the elevated expressway in Sanlin, all planned communities were divided into several rows of apartment buildings, surrounding a communal green space at the centre. Some gymnastic equipment and playground facilities were installed in the green space after repeated requests from the displacees after they moved in. The inside road design also favours automobiles despite that most of the displacees do not own cars.

Figure 8.4: Sanlin Expo Homeland
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

Figure 8.5: Pujiang Expo Homeland
Source: my own, Pujiang, 2012

The planning of the rehousing estates is a material justification of the legitimacy of *chaiqian*. The planners constructed monumental space as an orthodox historical narrative of Expo-induced *chaiqian* as well as a reminder of how distressing past life was (see Figures 8.6 and 8.7), teaching the displacees to be grateful about what they have now. They also eradicated all the eyesores of the displacees' old homes they invalidated in the planned communities, namely those many 'lacks'—lack of visual order, of modern conveniences, of adequate green space, of efficient land use, of sanitary facilities and privacy (see chapter 4). When exercising their power in producing the new spaces, the planners were in fact imposing a new way of life. Peter Marris (1974: 57), paraphrasing Robert Weaver, points out that 'what is to be accomplished is not the recreation of a way of life, without rats, dirt and overcrowding, but a miracle—a shock of enlightenment which, like a religious conversion, transforms a person overnight'. In making authoritarian planning decisions, the planners narcissistically see themselves as know-it-alls with a dictatorial power over every one's peculiar interests and preferences. It violated many principles that are crucial for a vibrant community as James Scott (1998) and Jane Jacobs (1961) have argued. For Scott (1998: 143), the planning and

development of a neighbourhood is similar to the evolvement of a language, a social product of the speakers. It is true that the linguists and experts may develop professional knowledge about it, but they can never fully claim authority and dictatorship in everyday practises. The openness, diversity and the flexibility of a language are the main reasons that keep a language alive. In a similar vein, Jacobs (1961: 255, 387) warns that when planning is practised like taxidermy, ignoring a 'great range of unofficial plans, idea, and opportunities', 'the results impoverish life instead of enriching it'. With no input from the displaced concerning how they wish their new life would be, the planned Expo Homeland may look good from a plane but are rather ineffective in accommodating the daily needs of the displaced. In addition to the under-developed public transport and collective facilities, the modern neighbourhoods, advocated to offer all the conveniences, confront the displaced with many modern inconveniences, demanding extra efforts to cope with the changes to their lives.

Figure 8.6: Sculpture of a 'Grateful' Displaced Family
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

Figure 8.7: A Relocated Shikumen in a Mini-Park
Source: my own, Pujiang, 2012

Figure 8.8: Sanlin Expo Homeland Planning
Source: Based on Google Earth Image, 2014

Figure 8.9: Pujiang Expo Homeland Planning
Source: Based on Google Earth Image, 2014

As I have mentioned in chapter 5, the supply of resettlement housing (one to three bedrooms apartments) forced many families, especially those extended ones, to renegotiate their living arrangements. A family of three or more generations who did not wish to live separately was very unlikely to find a proper apartment of a decent size and sunlight exposure from either site. Some families purchased two apartments on the same floor and creatively but illegally took down a wall to connect two separate apartments and live as a big family. Others had to live in separate locations. As land is money, the planners and the developers were stringent in constructing buildings not for profit. Within each neighbourhood, there was only one two-storied communal building ideally for public use. But these buildings have been mostly taken over by the newly established residents committees. There is no space inside those communities to accommodate activities in need of bigger or safer rooms than the displaced private homes. Consequently, ritualistic activities such as ancestor worships, death rituals and banquets were pushed to the streets and performed in public.

Figure 8.10: A Mourning Hall inside the Camp
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

Figure 8.11: Ceremony of Worshiping Ancestors (Burning Joss Papers and Koutow)
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

Since there are no elevators in five to six storied apartment buildings and the highrises are more expensive in management charges, the seniors with mobility concerns and the physically handicapped had to compete for the ground level apartments, which are humid and dark, so as to avoid becoming ‘prisoners’ in their own homes. But even if they could luckily secure a ground-floor apartment, their mobility remained severely hampered by the absence of disabled access to the buildings. Neither could they move around independently because of the road bumps and steps intentionally built to slow down traffic inside their communities. Whilst the

small green space and the exercise equipment invite the inhabitants to walk around and socialise, the limited provision of benches kept many residents away. The understandable absence of public toilets confined many seniors and those with health conditions to a small radius of their homes in case of any emergencies. Such inconvenience further reduced popular use of the centrally-located green space and leisure facilities, problematising the adequacy and the distribution of the collective consumption. Many displacees attempted to resolve the issue in their own way. Those in the high rises made best use of their relatively spacious hallways and people could take their small stools downstairs and make the hallways their meeting spots. For those in the low-rises, the close-by bike shacks were converted to a small salon with recycled chairs and couches to escape from their matchbox like homes and meet their new neighbours.

Figure 8.12: Socialising in the Hallway
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

Figure 8.13: A Bike-shack Salon
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

The planners in Pujiang seemed to be more considerate, conceiving the place as more than bedrooms for the displacees but an important site for contact, leisure and a flourishing life. To this agenda, they purposely practised the modernist planning technique of stilting in a few neighbourhoods; using concrete pillars to elevate the buildings and leaving the ground floor unoccupied[16] (see Figure 8.14). The monolith apartment blocks above then were planned and designed with precision, calculating the use of living space 'centimetre by centimetre'.[17] The idea is that the unoccupied

[16] Based on my observation, the planners seem to have invested most energy and resources in the 5th residential cluster, which was built as a show neighbourhood during *chaiqian*.
[17] See http://www.expo2010.cn/expo/sh_expo/zlzx/sbjxs/wqjm/userobject1ai23003.html

spacious floor would be used as meeting places or for collective activities. Clearly, such design bears the imprints of Le Corbusier (1967) whose notorious utopian vision of an ideal residential quarter is elevated on *pilotis* (stilt) so that the nature on the ground is intact and the circulation of traffic can be organised more efficiently. The top-down plan in Pujiang, turning blind eyes to both the criticism (Holston, 1989) and cultural differences, was doomed to fail. The displacees rarely use this open space as planners had envisaged. As a matter of fact, the function of this space was never communicated explicitly and the property right definition of this space is also rather ambiguous. As a result, such space receives minimum maintenance and is empty and dusty most of the time. In many places, it has been appropriated as a parking lot.

Figure 8.14: Elevated Apartment Block
Source: my own, Pujiang, 2012

Figure 8.15: Mould in One Resettlement Apartment
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

Whereas the planners may rationalise the planning failures from experimenting in exotic planning exercises as a lack of deliberation, they cannot do the same for their ignorance of the limits of their professional knowledge and their alliance with the developers for economic interests. Because open green space is legally required for planned communities and more green space has been used as a marketing trick to sell the resettlement location, the planners fulfilled the requirement and promises by greening almost all empty land plots. However, they did so rarely with a fastidious eye to the visual and aesthetical order as in the same way they designed the buildings and created functional segregation. Vegetation was planted in the most cost-effective way, showing no evidence of gardening knowledge. For the residents on lower floors, they were frustrated by numerous mosquitos, bugs, flies and other insects hiding in the bushes or trees right outside their windows, in a far worse condition than in their demolished neighbourhoods. For the same reason, many residents refused to sit in the flower terraces and the small pavilions overarched by the vine trees during the summer. But, perhaps gardening is too trivial for the planners who were concerned with the overall big picture and specialised in designing residential space. What

disappointed many low-income families most lies in the planners' presumptuousness, universalising their middle-class way of life, with remote knowledge about how the poor have to cope with life without modern equipment. The kitchen in many buildings was designed with the presumption that smoke ventilators would be installed by every family and therefore reduce reliance on windows for the same function. The problem is that the ventilators were not affordable by more families nor were the windows used in such a limited way. Seeing their kitchen window as a pure decoration, one displacee furiously asked, 'Are those planners idiots with no practical knowledge in their life'?[18]

In fact, the quality of the resettlement housing is a shared concern. The low-ceilings of the apartments, although standard in modern housing, failed most former self-built homeowners who are used to high ceilings in their former homes. Depressing is the common word when describing their experience. This not only applied to the seniors but the younger generation as well. For fear of breaching the resettlement contracts and thereby incurring additional costs, the developers completed the resettlement housing projects within the agreed *guoduqi*[19] (transition period). Although Shanghai is known for the speed of transformation, it was astonishing for the displacees to witness hundreds of new apartment blocks rising from a vast vacant land in less than two years. Some displacees even compared the construction process to 'playing with Legos', building a new floor in no time. The metis they acquired from their life and working experiences, as embodied in the Chinese proverb, *mangong chu xihuo* (equivalent to small fire makes sweet malt in English), led to their belief in the poor quality of their new homes. Many families call the resettlement housing projects *toufu* projects (slapdash buildings). They are surely right. At the time of my fieldwork, their new homes were only six years old. The displacees were furious about the cracks in the building foundation, hollow wooden walls, mould in their bedrooms (see figure 8.15), the broken electronic door system, etc. What they found most unbearable was the lack of insulation. Because all the apartments were offered in raw concrete state, each family had to decorate their new homes when they moved in, creating a tremendous amount for noise for their neighbours. All displacees had the dreadful experience of living with a hammer and a driller right next to their ears. Even when there was no decorative work within their building, the displacees had to creep around inside their homes to avoid conflicts with their neighbours downstairs.

[18] Survey interview, 18/07/2012.
[19] During which time, the displacees had to rent and live somewhere else before the resettlement housing was ready.

For those living next to the elevated expressway, insomnia now has become part of their life.

Figure 8.16: 'My Home is a Living Hell'
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

Despite the fact that each neighbourhood is gated, guarded and surveilled, the displacees were frustrated by the prevalent petty theft and crimes. Following Newman (1976), I suggest that the planning and management of these communities made theft and crimes much easier to commit and difficult to prevent. According to Newman, high crime rates may correlate with three features in building designs: anonymity, lack of surveillance and availability of escape routes. Unfortunately, the design of the resettlement communities checks all three traits. The displaced families did not move in all at once. All newcomers to the planned community, the displacees barely know each other, not even their next door neighbours.[20] Their socialisation is prevented by the matchbox design apartments, partitioning at least twelve families on different floors in a single unit, with doors shut all the time. There is no semi-private or semi-public space as in the demolished neighbourhoods that cultivated interpersonal contacts. Worse, they are intimidated to (re)connect with others, let alone seek each other's help.[21] As many displacees believe, there is a particular set of values, cultures and practises associated with highrise buildings, treasuring privacy, anonymity and boundaries. Gone are the days where private life extends to public space. Everyone is treated and expected to act as separate beings. Such impersonal ambiance of the resettlement sites made it easier for thieves to blend in. It became even easier when there were few 'eyes on the street' as what Jane Jacobs (1961) might say. For one, although densely constructed, each neighbourhood is too big for people to keep an eye on things on their streets. In Sanlin, one resettlement neighbourhood consisted of almost 400 apartment buildings. For another, confined to

[20] The displacees from Pujiang frequently quoted an example on this point. A man who lived alone was found dead almost a month after he died of a heart attack at home. No neighbour was concerned enough to call the police after not seeing him for nearly a month.
[21] An example here would be that many displacees refrained from visiting their former neighbours or friends who now live in the same building because they dislike the hassle of taking off their shoes or putting on a shoe cover in their homes.

their private homes, the displacees were prevented from looking out their windows due to the interior designs. Moreover, there was nothing for them to see. Streets inside the residential compounds are dead because of the strict functional division. This therefore fosters greater dependence on the surveillance cameras. Inadequately installed, the cameras are poorly maintained by short-staffed and irresponsible community security teams who shoulder too many responsibilities in maintaining the neighbourhoods. Mostly laid-off workers or migrant workers, the security guards lack the skills and training in combating and preventing crimes.

The lack of security negatively influences the way the displaced viewed their *chaiqian* experience. Interviews were filled with their nostalgic accounts about the old days when they could leave their door wide open without worrying about crimes. A related complaint is the loss of *renqing,* the intimate interpersonal relations, that engenders a sense of belonging, comfort, security, trust and warmth. As Campanella (2008: 166) comments, 'rebuilding a city's broken infrastructure is one thing; rebuilding broken lives and wrecked communities is quite another'. On this point, Fullilove (2005) is more sceptical as she argues that no effort of rebuilding or even replicating a demolished neighbourhood can ever repair the damaged mazeway so delicately organised, socially and geometrically. In her words, 'those who were near are too far, those who were far are too near' (Fullilove, 2005: 14). My study returned the same findings. At the time of my fieldwork, the sociological sense of community was largely missing. '"I" continue to exist, though damaged and maybe even permanently changed. "You" continue to exist, though distant and hard to relate to. But "we" no longer exist as a connected pair or as linked cells in a larger communal body' (Erikson, 1976: 154). Most displacees went through a long period of adaption to the emptiness and isolation in the resettlement. An old woman described to me her experience in the initial two years, 'when I moved here, I stood on the street one day. Looking ahead, there was no one. Looking back, there was no one either. Finally someone came to ask me why I stood there. I told him I would go nuts (*gangdu*, in Shanghai dialect) if I entrap myself in the flat alone for the whole day. The whole neighbourhood was empty. There was no one'. Another woman quickly added, 'Like I said earlier, if you shoot randomly with a machine gun, I can guarantee no one is going to be shot'.[22] Many of them did not know where their old neighbours now live and did not know where to find them. They roughly know the faces of their new neighbours who moved in later and have not yet developed the tight, deep and reciprocal relations that they could reliably count on as they used to. One displacee

[22] Interview, X21 and X22, 04/05/2012.

commented that, 'everyone moves here from all corners of the city. No one cares about others. G*eren zisao menqianxue* (literally translated as everyone only sweeps the snow on his/her front door)'.[23] His quote nicely captures the new mores for highrise living, distant and private. A figure from my survey results might also be indicative here. Only 30 per cent (91 respondents) reported that they have a mutually supportive relationship with their neighbours now compared to 70 per cent (211 respondents) reported that they had so in the past. The loss of social connections provokes profound sense of loneliness, especially for the seniors in empty-nest families whose sons or daughters had to live in the downtown area for various reasons (job, study, dislike the location, etc.). When I asked their permission for a chat, some seniors would invite me to their homes and hold me there for hours. This was significant sociologically because most people I worked with were extremely suspicious of strangers. The coldness of the place and people led some seniors to joke that they moved into a morgue and everyday life is passively structured into 'three waiting', waiting to eat, waiting to drink and waiting for the call of death.[24]



Figure 8.17: Changes in Social Circles
Source: own survey, 2012

Such loss is magnified by the governing practises of these planned communities. As Cochrane (2007: 49) points out, the notion of community is rather elusive and ideologically slippery and the meanings have always been subject to contestation and moralisation in history. Owing to the growth of professional and technological knowledge related to administrative practises of the modern state, according to

[23] Interview, X4, 01/05/2012.
[24] Interview, X8, 02/05/2012.

Nicolas Rose (1999: 176), community has become a sector of government. Through different programmes, the practises of government through community 'encourage and harness active practises of self-management and identity construction' (ibid). At the centre of this process is the cultivation of entrepreneurial subjects. Since the mid-1980s, community building emerges as a central subject in political discourses in China (Bray, 2006). It differs from western discourses and practises in that community is specifically defined with a fixed geographical boundary and the primary agenda underlying this enterprise is to consolidate the party-state's power base in society when the *danwei* system started to fall apart. As the reform keeps destroying socialist institutions and traditional values, community building now takes a similar goal and trajectory as in the western context (Bray, 2006). However, it would stretch too far to see community building strategies as capable of 'building an inclusive society' (Staeheli, 2003: 816). Embedded in China's overall social engineering process, this governing technology of community has been practised in correspondence with stratified citizenship (Tomba, 2009).

For peculiarities in their formation, the resettlement communities are governed by diverse regimes, reflective of hybrid governmentalities (Sigley, 2006). Bought at a discounted rate, the resettlement apartments are banned from free market exchange for five years, meaning that the displaced cannot vote with their feet even if they realise that the new residential space is not an ideal place to live during this period. Ostensibly, it protects the interests of the displaced, as with the slow improvement of infrastructures and amenities; the land value will increase and reflect in their housing price. However, by imposing a strict ban, it also prescribes an inferior and defective identity to the resettlement housing and the displacees. It also forces many displacees to put their new apartments on the black market, bearing great economic and legal risks. Some others rent out their apartments and live elsewhere, mostly in better locations.

Given the 'rural' nature of the resettlement locations, most displacees refused to update their *hukou* registrations for fear of losing their privileges, status and benefits as urbanites and Shanghai citizens, although the address they listed as their homes no longer exist on Shanghai's maps. For most displacees, Shanghai is specifically reserved for Puxi, the western part of the city, and the rural places are not part of Shanghai. Resettlement in rural areas therefore is a punishment, relegating them to a lower social class, banishing them to become rural and therefore causing them identity crisis. Commenting on this point, a displacee repeatedly emphasised the meaning of location to the Shanghainese: 'when we were in Shanghai, we belonged

to the First World. Now, we migrated to the Third World. Worse, Pujiang is the most backward bit of the Third World. The politicians never care about the Third World'.[25] Complaints of this kind are not without reason. The uneven geographies of Shanghai as reflected in the contrasting landscapes, infrastructures, facilities, and public services are for sure a good start. Some families only keep their old registration so that their children can be admitted to a better school in the city centre. Whilst it is true that there is no regional difference in universal welfare provisions within Shanghai (e.g. medical insurance, pension, etc.), great regional disparities can also be found in the social benefits distributed through communities (e.g. caring for seniors, the sick, etc.). This is because the availability, form and value of the latter all depend on the fiscal prowess of the local states. Therefore, holding onto their old *hukou* registration may be interpreted as a form of resistance, symbolically defending their injured identity and materialistically preventing a total collapse of the security nest they relied on.

However, without formally changing their *hukou* registration, the displacees are subject to old and new governing apparatus in both localities. An unintended outcome is that they are further economically and politically undermined. Economically, because urban planning and local decision-making are heavily relied on by the *hukou* institution and effective population management, inaccurate information on population distribution challenges the effectiveness of redistributive policies and delays the improvement of local infrastructures and public services. Instead of ameliorating social inequalities, it widens social gaps between the central and the periphery locations. Politically, it complicates the formation of collective interests and allows the bureaucratic system to sabotage collective actions by exploiting the incoherency. On the one hand, the displacees are disentitled to participate in political affairs that affect their well-being on everyday basis through formal institutions in the resettlement sites. This puts a strain on the political options for their rightful resistance. On the other, with a declining political interest and engagement in the public affairs in their old places, the displacees' political participation such as voting became rather symbolic.

From the onset, each community is under the management and administration of two grassroots institutions, namely the residents committees and the property management companies. The former reifies the power of the state carrying out everyday governance whilst the latter, subsidiaries to the development companies, pursues the logic of the market in performing their duties of property maintenance. In

[25] Interview, X11, 02/05/2012.

practice, however, there are some overlaps in their duties, such as community security, maintaining social order, etc. As per regulation, members of the residents committee are supposed to be elected by the local residents, yet due to the urgency of penetrating state power from early on, the initial staff members were appointed by the local states. The assignment of local cadres from Sanlin and Pujiang to the resettlement residents' committees intensified conflicts. 'Rural' in place of origin, these agents are believed to be incapable of managing the displacees occupying a higher social hierarchy. Whilst elections were organised later, the firm control of elections by the local states and the power politics within established residents' communities betrays the intention of grassroots democracy and allows many appointed staffs to stay in the office. In one neighbourhood, a younger member with more votes than the head of the residents' committee was denied as the winner of an election. Elections aside, there are also entry barriers to the residents' committee such as age and education qualifications to keep up with the overall trend of professionalisation and entrepreneurialisation. In my study, I was not able to find any 'granny cadres' (Pan, 2005a) in residents' committees who invest in the job not for fame or political careers but for the interests of collective good. According to the displaced, the younger cadres, especially the college graduates, barely know them personally outside their professional capacity. Relying more on computers and cold phone calls than on home visits, the new way of governing does not meet the popular expectations for a more personal care and reciprocal relations. For those who relied on the personal contacts from residents' committees as a source of security and belonging, the professional detached concern alienates them and undermines the political trust. A female displacee with severe depression and heart disease commented with tears in her eyes,

> in the past, if I did not feel well, I could phone the residents committees, they would send people immediately. If no one was available, they would call my families immediately. Here, nothing is going to happen….They [former cadres at residents committee] treated you like a family member. They knew me personally. You did not even have to ask for help. They would do it for you. You would feel so warm in heart. They always walked around every day. They would visit me at home, chatting with me and inviting me to many social activities. When I visit their office for help, they would make sure that I could get an answer right away. If the person in charge of my problem was not available, they would take notes and make sure I was visited later that day. Here, last time I went to ask about minimum allowance, no one cared enough to tell me the exact procedures for filing an application. They had to dig out my files. They just kept me waiting, waiting, and waiting (interview, X41, 16/05/2012).

Another possible cause for the declining trust in residents' committees lays in their overlapping responsibilities with property management companies, which allow them to exploit the ambiguities and download their workload.[26] The property management companies are not democratically selected, either. They were appointed by the developers. As private companies, they are naturally enticed to maximise their profits by offering their professional services in cleaning, repairing and security. Their income is supposed to derive from the monthly property management fees collected from the displacees, although their current pricing is subsidised by the state for the sake of the Expo brand. As the only legitimate provider in housing maintenance, they however frequently overcharge their services or extort from the displacees for petty work.[27] To many displacees, especially the self-built housing owners, those costs put an additional financial pressure in meeting their needs. This pressure is particularly so for the former farmers who lost their land and have to pay everything for their subsistence. But, most of them agree to pay such fees on the expectation that quality services would be provided. Conflicts then arise when the services prove to be unsatisfactory. Seeing themselves as customers rather than subjects of the property companies, the disgruntled displacees stopped paying the monthly charges. They however are weakly protected by the law. A few families have already been served with a notice from the lawyers hired by the private companies for possible legal charges.

In my fieldwork, I did not have the chance to speak with managers of the property management companies. However, I encountered a few security guards and repairmen during my intensive visits to many neighbourhoods. Paid a minimum wage, they are quite sympathetic to the displacees and agree that withholding payment is understandable. But, they also have a different story to tell. First, as a consequence of insufficient funding, the property management companies are increasingly incapable of providing services. Their ever expansive responsibilities also make them under-staffed.[28] Second, whist some housing problems are fixable in their capacities, structural issues as a result of the poor housing quality are out of

[26] In Sanlin, some public services and civic responsibilities have been shifted to an NGO based in the monumental building citizens centre. The membership charges however have kept many residents away. Also, many seniors, the main consumers of their services, find it difficult to travel the long distance to this place. They prefer a more decentralised provision of such services.
[27] Extortion is of course concealed. For the displacees, they expect timely maintenance and repair work. Yet, the property companies frequently kick them around or delay the services. To speed up the process, the displacees had to bribe them with small gifts.
[28] For instance, in one neighbourhood in Sanlin, there is only one security guard who is in charge of surveillance, gate-keeping and coordinating emergencies at the same time.

their hands. Given their testimonies, it seems to suggest that resistance from the displacees only leads to a vicious cycle, further undermining their interests.

Unlike middle-class housing estates, where residents have strong awareness and resources in organising their interests through homeowners associations to counter the power of the property companies (see Tomba, 2005, Zhang, 2010), the displacees I worked with failed to form their own associations to sack or supervise the property management companies and to take control of the housing maintenance fund.[29] A primary difficulty goes back to the broken social ties and the problem of socialisation in the new places. To file an application for establishing such associations, they would need at least five dedicated owners as main points of contact to deal with red tape and oversee the organisation of property owners and the election of representatives. But, what prohibits most residents from doing so were their lost trust in the residents' committees who are legally responsible to take over the organisation process once an application has been registered, and a greater fear of retaliation from property management companies whose power is under assault. Without an organisation to represent and speak for them, the displacees are vulnerable to the oppression of both the state and the market power.

With all the planning and governing failures in mind, it should not be too surprising to find that most displacees were dissatisfied with new homes and communities, although they felt more satisfied on matters related to their individual housing than to the communal facilities and environments. This is confirmed by the survey study on residential satisfaction. For this project, a five-point Likert scale (from 1, meaning 'very dissatisfied' to 5, meaning 'very satisfied'[30]) was used to ask the respondents to indicate their satisfaction level with different traits of their neighbourhoods. The selection of those traits was based on existing residential satisfaction measurements and the initial findings of my interviews. Before reading the results as presented in table 8.2, I must underscore the meaning of *yiban*, the midpoint, which may influence the way we interpret the data. I chose to use *yiban* instead of *zhongli*, the Chinese equivalent to neutral, in framing the midpoint. *Yiban*, which may be literally translated as indifference or tolerable, is more tilted to negative feelings in this context. This is based on my findings from interviews. In discussing their feelings

[29] Only one neighbourhood established the homeowner association. Legally, the leaders of this association must be elected by all property owners. But strangely, the displacees I interviewed in this neighbourhood never heard of this association. I was not able to meet the leaders of this association either.

[30] During actual surveying, the midpoint was not read to the displacees to mitigate the desirability bias.

about the resettlement sites, the displacees frequently used *yiban* or *mama huhu* interchangeably. Their elaboration typically involved a rationalisation of their frustration of the status quo. What typically followed *yiban* or *mama huhu* is either a statement, 'you cannot compare it to the commercial housing projects [which is supposed to be of better quality]', or a rhetorical question, 'what can you expect from a resettlement apartment'?[31] For this reason, I interpreted and grouped the midpoint in the category of dissatisfied. The general conclusion from the survey results then is that the displacees felt overwhelmingly frustrated by the resettlement housing estates or at least felt restrained from a more decent living as they aspired to or as commercial housing dwellers. In this sense, their views toward the resettlement housing estates are mediated and disciplined by their perceptions of own positions in the social space, and are expressions of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1991).

As we can see from the table, only the provision of basic utilities and services were positively received by a majority of the displacees, although physical changes in floor plans and housing size were positively acknowledged by close to half of all survey respondents. The former finding is certainly not difficult to understand given the advancement in technology and utility infrastructure in Shanghai in general[32] and the relatively low cost through centralised planning and supply. The latter two were at the top of the scale perhaps because the improvement in individual housing conditions, especially in terms of average floor size and 'ordered' building designs, has been the main selling point to legitimatise the *chaiqian* programme and secure the compliance of the displacees. Compared to the crowded and physically deprived housing conditions of many displacees, such changes in dwelling space are noticeable and easier to conjure up euphoric sentiments.

Even if we ignore the influence of language here, the findings from my survey remain largely different from the studies of Wu (2004), Li and Song33 (2009) and Day (2013), where a majority of displacees reported their satisfaction with resettlement housing. I see no point in performing advanced regression analysis, or any cross-category analysis (gender, age, income, etc.), as we can find in the work I just mentioned or hundreds of studies we may find on the same topic. Other than

[31] In conducting the survey studies, I also discussed this matter with the surveyors, and we all strongly felt that *yiban* is not strictly neutral in attitude but more negative in this context.
[32] In 2000, tap water supply coverage reached 99.97 per cent in Shanghai. Gas supply to households increased by 11 times from 2000 to 2010. In the same decade, households with internet connection more than doubled (from 2.47 million to 5.17 million). See Shanghai Statistics Yearbook (2013).
[33] The work by Li and Song (2009) is of most comparative value here. In their study, the mean scores of all 21 indicators are higher than 3, ranging from 3.01 to 3.61. In comparison, only 7 out of 24 indicators in this study have a mean score higher than 3, ranging from 3.07 to 3.43.

showing that some displacees are more satisfied than others, analysis in that direction is politically futile and dangerous. At best, it may lead to more targeted redistributive policies to mitigate the negative impacts, presuming the state is a benign and responsive agent. This perhaps is delusional and dangerous since the CPC never pursues such philosophy itself. As one of the founders of the CPC, Chen Duxiu, passionately warns in 1916, 'the servility in the hope for a good government conducted by elites with virtues is the same as in the wish of slaves for the blessings from their masters, and of subjects for greater benevolence from their emperors and ministers' (in Li, 2008: 4). Apart from humanising domicide, it cannot challenge the structural forces and processes that constantly produce such effects. Worse, such findings can easily become accessories to the domicide machine claiming that chaiqian after all is not bad for all displaced, further undermining the weakening solidarity amongst the displacees. Of course, I have no intention of discrediting the value of such analysis but on reminding the politics of statistical representation. Given my own agenda is to lay bare the euphemised violence of resettlement arrangement; a simple descriptive analysis is sufficient to communicate my point to the layperson.

Table 8.2: Residential Satisfaction Survey

Indicators	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	*yiban*	Satisfied	Very satisfied	Mean
Internet and TV network connection	1.7%	7.0%	40.0%	49.7%	1.7%	3.43
Provision of water, electricity and gas	2.0%	6.7%	41.0%	48.0%	2.3%	3.42
Housing layouts	2.0%	16.7%	38.7%	40.3%	2.3%	3.24
Housing size	4.0%	17.3%	35.3%	40.3%	3.0%	3.21
Education establishment	4.0%	10.7%	53.0%	30.7%	1.7%	3.15
Community landscaping	5.0%	17.7%	43.0%	31.7%	2.7%	3.09
Architectural design	4.3%	14.0%	53.7%	26.7%	1.3%	3.07
Public facilities maintenance	5.3%	21.7%	43.7%	29.0	0.3%	2.97
Sanitary conditions	6.0%	23.3%	42.0%	26.3%	2.3%	2.96
Fire safety	5.7%	23.7%	44.7%	25.0%	1.0%	2.92
Shopping	8.0%	28.7%	33.0%	28.0%	2.3%	2.88
Community cleaning services	6.0%	26.6%	42.7%	24.7%	0.7%	2.88
Overall ambience of the neighbourhood	6.3%	21.7%	55.7%	16.0	0.3%	2.82
Exercise, gymnastics, and playgrounds	7.0%	30.0%	47.0%	15.0%	1.0%	2.73
Community security management	11.7%	30.3%	39.0%	18.7%	0.7%	2.67
Leisure and amenities	8.3%	35.3%	38.3%	17.0%	1.0%	2.67
Public transport	12.7%	32.0%	33.0%	21.3%	1.0%	2.66
Parking management	11.0%	30.0%	43.0%	15.0%	1.0%	2.65
Sound proofing and noise control	20.3%	30.7%	32.0%	15.3%	1.7%	2.47
Senior centre	18.3%	35.7%	29.7%	14.0%	2.3%	2.46
Property management	19.0%	32.3%	35.0%	12.3%	1.3%	2.45
Medical services	19.0%	38.0%	25.0%	16.3%	1.7%	2.44
Housing quality	20.3%	32.3%	31.7%	15.3%	0.3%	2.43
Sense of safety	25.7%	33.0%	28.0%	12.7%	0.7%	2.30

Source: my own survey (N=300), 2012

Considering that the legitimacy of chaiqian is founded on a nurturing environment for a better life, survey findings show that the resettlement community itself became

a main source of distress, incapable of helping them lay down new roots, tearing up the political illusion to pieces in the same way as the regime destroyed the displacees' homes. When hopes are high, we can expect grim reality slowly unfolding as such to aggravate the pain and loss from uprooting and triggers profound feelings of betrayal, disappointment, indignation, victimisation, nostalgia and loss. Such mixed feelings are conveyed in accounts like this,

> we all get nostalgic at some point. When you grow old, you always want to return home. We Chinese people have this set phrase, *luoye guigen* (Falling leaves settle on their roots). That is my home. The government wants my land for other purposes. *Laobaixing* (the mass) like me eventually has to give away. But, you (the government) cannot fail your promises. You cannot deceive me and trick me into this dumpster! (Interview, displaced from Puxi, X45, 21/05/2012).

Or as reflected in the testimony offered by a woman,

> how to describe my feelings. Well, I miss it like missing a lost child. People say that a child is a flesh of the mother (*haizi shi mama shenshang de yikuai rou*). Moving here is to lose a child. What kind of mother would abandon her child? You cannot do anything about it. They want your land (Interview, displaced from Puxi, X41, 16/05/2012).

Her testimony here echoes Fried's (1966) and Marris' (1974) comments that people mourn for the loss of their place akin to grieving for a lost person. To many displacees, home is an extension of the body, and its annihilation is a permanent destruction of a part of the person. After six years living in the resettlement sites, many still find it difficult to identify with the new places. They continuously see themselves as 'out of place'.

> I do not feel I belong here and will never belong to this place. My root is in Zhoujiadu. That is the place I belong. Give me a piece of land there, I will move back right away. I do not want to live here (Interview, displaced from Pudong, D79, 28/03/2012).

It is impossible to encapsulate all the disheartening effects of *chaiqian* upon the lives of the displacees in this short section. Before moving onto the next section, let me add a few additional comments to debunk the myth that the displacees made a great fortune out of *chaiqian*. First, the dispossessed farmers are permanently impoverished, as they were offered neither any employment opportunities nor any skill training. The land for citizenship programme pioneered by the Pudong government is utterly wrong in confusing universal citizenship rights with

compensation for the loss of land and homes.[34] Second, costs such as decoration, purchasing new furniture and switching service providers, part of the whole resettlement process were not covered by the compensation package at all and used up much of their family savings. Third, for most families, their living expenses soared due to additional costs in transport, food and service charges.

Deterritorialisation, Machiavellian Moments and Perpetuating Injustice

In the last section, I have outlined the observable impacts of *chaiqian* upon the displacees. This section shall shift the analytical focus to the way the displacees cope with the long lasting trauma of *chaiqian* and make their lives tolerable. Or, more accurately, I wish to tease out the forces that prevent them from doing so, injuring them completely and permanently. In this sense, this section deals with the same issue as in chapter 7, looking into the subjectivities and agency of the displacees in securing a place to recover. In addition to the framework I used in chapter 7, this chapter incorporates a new perspective: territorialisation. I suggest that the failed attempts to seek justice and to mitigate the problems are combined effects of deterritorialisation and defeat in reterritorialisation. I will look into two cases unfolding in different trajectories and with different logics but somehow arrive at the same outcome: infinite injustice.

The first one is a short story about an evicted family. In chapter 4, I described the sufferings of the evictees who were brutally removed from their own homes as *homo sacer*. Here, I only have space to offer Miss Fan's account about her family's ongoing journey in seeking justice after the initial uprooting. Although this is an individual account, her family story represents all forcible evicted families I managed to talk with. After eviction, Fan never received any resettlement offer. For so many years, she has been doubling up with her mother in a room that is fourteen square metres. Her son is now in college. Unlike most Shanghai students who prefer to exploit regional inequalities in education and stay in Shanghai, he went to northern

[34] Farmers who lost their land for building the resettlement housing were incorporated in a social insurance scheme called *xiao chengzhen*, as compared to *da chengzhen*, the universal programme for the urbanites. In Chinese, *xiao* means small and *da* means big. The titles of these two programmes self-evidently explain the lasting stratified citizenship. The intention was never to fully include the farmers in the polity. Pension and medical expenses coverage are significantly lower than the receipts of *da chengzhen*. The middle-aged were victimised most for discrimination in the labour market. Their age and lack of skills are all barriers to get a job in the formal sector. But even if they do, their coverage in the *xiao chengzhen* allows the employers not to pay additional contributions to their insurances. If they could not find any job, the monthly allowance of 350 RMB (£ 35) is all that they have to rely on before they qualify for pension (the retirement age is 55 years old for women and 60 years old for men).

China and seldom visits home. After all, he has no foothold in Shanghai any more. Before he went to college, he moved from one rented room to another because his parents doubled up with relatives whose housing condition was crowded already. Behind this practical constraint lies in their parents' greater concern for his safety and psychological well-being.

After the eviction, Fan started petitioning at different levels of authorities and became a primary target of political persecution by the local state. Her life trajectory thereafter resembles Zhou, the kindergarten teacher who was forced to give up job and family to petition for justice, in Qin's (2013) ethnography of domicide in Shanghai. This is because that registered caseload of petitioning on a higher level directly reflects the political career of the major politicians on lower levels (Chen, 2012a, Minzner, 2006). The political discourses of *weiwen* in post-Tiananmen era creates what Yu (2010: 37) calls a political structure premised on rigid stability, discouragement, containment and suppression of political discontents through primarily state violence and ideological control. Whilst the petitioners conceived the fragmented bureaucracy as a political opportunity (O'Brien and Li, 2006), the petitioning system and the political structure turned political resistance in this direction into suicide, inflicting great pain on themselves. The higher level they attempted to visit, the greater state violence they had to counter, the greater pain they must endure. Losing faith in Shanghai government and legal justice, Fan chose to travel all the way to Beijing, seeking sympathy and justice from the emperor directly. Each visit requires considerable strength, determination and courage. She has to hide from the radar of local states and neutralise all the suppression both on the road and in Beijing before she can arrive at a petitioning office. If she were caught, she would be immediately detained and put under arrest in a hotel room or a black jail before she can be escorted back to another black jail or detention facility in Shanghai. Within the territory of the local states, abusive violence escalates. Beating by policemen as she describes becomes small punishment. She once attempted to escape from the stalking of local state agents and jumped off a moving train. Unfortunately, she permanently injured her leg.

Having seized the power from barrels of a gun, the party-state knows aptly the war-craft: to paralyse the enemies most effectively, they must hurt what people treasure most and destroy the supportive networks for good. Instead of targeting Fan alone, repression extended to every family member, especially their son. Her ex-husband was beaten up for checking on her whereabouts in the local police station. Her son was evicted by landlords several times because the local police notified the landlords

that Fan was ‘a contentious woman’. Their relatives were harassed by the police if Fan successfully covered up her trails and hid from surveillance. Her mother was put under house arrest as well whenever a major political event came up in Shanghai or in Beijing. To justify the constraints of her freedom from concerned neighbours, Fan was defamed as a procuress, polluting the moral order. On such occasions, she would also be unable to work, which gave her employer who had already been pressured by the local state a legitimate reason to sack her. In 2011, her case file was formally closed after a so-called *xinfang zhongjie* (case-closing) hearing, which forbade legal representation and was only accessible to her and government recruited ‘impartial’ reviewers. Despite the fact that she remains homeless, the hearing permanently closed the doors of justice through formal institutionalised channels.

As human beings, we all need a place to lay down our roots, to socialise, to grow and to have a flourishing life. We need a place that we can return to, to feel in control or to find meaning, being this place a home, a neighbourhood, a workplace or a city. However ambivalent the relationship might evolve into, we need such a place to ground our life. What we can read in Fan’s case is a concerted effort in destroying every place that she could securely put down some roots, interact with people and amend her protective nest. If we see the territory we inhabit at different scales forming a protective structure like an onion, hers has been diced. The pain she has been enduring exceeds far beyond simple uprooting or domicide. The political machine has atomised her, imposing severe penalties for her attempts to be spatially and socially rooted again. She compares such experiences of repeated oppression as being raped, ‘raping (me) once is not enough. They have to do it over and over again’. Her testimony echoes earlier discussion that home is an extension of self. Dispossessing her home repeatedly is constant destruction of her sense of self. By making her permanently homeless and rootless, the regime has exterminated her as a social being. As Bourdieu (1999a: 124) argues, ‘anyone is said to be “without a home or hearth” or homeless is virtually without a social existence’.

The second case I am examining now is about an ongoing collective action from the resettled displacees protesting against the construction of high voltage powerline towers in Sanlin (see the highlighted area on Figure 8.8). The territorial politics is much more complicated than in Fan’s case. Fan never had a moment for healing and is totally defenceless in the territorial struggle against a unified bureaucratic state. In the second case, both the difficulty of reterritorialisation for the displacees and the territorial conflicts within the state play a part in perpetuating injustice and victimisation. As I have mentioned in previous section, the displacees had no control

in the production of their new homes in the neighbourhood. As such, they were completely dominated by the developers and the hypocritical state. Despite the increased development density, the proximity to the incineration plant and the mismatches between building plans and reality, they moved in as agreed on in the resettlement contract without any resistance.

There are several reasons for their inactions. First, they were so busy with decorating their new homes and moving on with their lives that such efforts restricted or even blinded their perceptions and experiences of the toxic environment (also see Auyero and Swistun, 2009). Second, they sensed no political opportunity to protest or seek justice given the authoritarian nature of the resettlement. They did not have a choice in terms of where to resettle. Besides, there is no concrete evidence or paper trail for them to sue the developers or the *chaiqian* regime for breaching the resettlement contracts. Because both the expressway and the incineration plant were planned and constructed before their neighbourhoods, they took their imprisonment in the new toxic habitat as their own fault or bad luck, knowing the negative effects of pollution upon their health. They coped with the industrial pollution in the past. As long as the situation was contained, they thought they could endure it again. Living with pollution is a routine part of their life. Third, the ecology of the resettlement neighbourhood also created formidable challenges for political mobilisation. As I have mentioned earlier, the highrise buildings discourages socialisation. Understandably, it contains the communication of political dissents.

Finally, what also prevented them from acting was that they are acutely aware of the difficulty in connecting with total strangers to protect their collective interests as homeowners. As many studies on environmental activism have shown, proximity to the toxic facilities affects people's perception of risks and impacts, and undermines the solidarity (Walker, 2009, Lora-Wainwright et al., 2012, Devine-Wright, 2013). Those most concerned about the pollution all live in the huge neighbourhood closest to the expressway and the incinerator. This neighbourhood is a mixture of indigenous farmers, the urban displacees and the renters who are socially excluded migrants. More concerned about cheap rents, the renters have no interests in joining the homeowners. Between the farmers and the urbanites, there is also a mutual distanciation preventing trust and cooperation from development (Bourdieu, 1999a). The farmers believe that the urbanites are the much blessed children of the paternalist state and the intruders who take away their land. The urbanites on the other hand see the farmers as culturally backward and politically narrowminded. Many urbanites even compare their forced relocation to live near farmers akin to the rusticity

programme under Mao. Socially disintegrated, the displacees are unable to challenge the authorities for site choice.

In 2009, the construction of the high voltage powerline towers started, only a few metres away from the walls of this residential compound. The siting is rather cunning. It sits on the administrative border between Sanlin and Beicai. The existing power grids in Beicai section allows the company to create confusion that the project is an ongoing one rather than a new project, in the hope that the displacees would accept it as they accepted the incinerator plant. By constructing the towers right outside the compound, it also undermines the displacees' claim for violating their property rights. But most critical to their vicious plan is the loophole in Chinese legal system. According to the Planning Act, land use changes proposed by a developer or existing LUR holder do not need to inform affected parties until they have formally secured approval from the authorities. Sensing potential resistance from the residents, the company did not even publicise the plan after it secured approval from the authorities as the law stipulates.

The secrecy continued before the night of assembling the steel towers. In preparing the construction, they had deceived the concerned residents that they were going to build a community centre for the seniors. On a rainy night, the company erected two towers. The residents were shocked the next morning to discover two giant towers outside their windows. They could not stand further victimisation. So, they immediately sought information from the residents' committee and the township authority, both of which claimed no knowledge of the project at all. In great anger, they reported to the petitioning office at Pudong district government on the grounds of electromagnetic radiation and health hazards. They were well received by the planning authorities that promised a swift investigation. This however did not stop the project. The conflict escalated into physical confrontation and several senior residents were severely beaten by the construction workers. Only until the arrival of the local police did the beatings stop and the seniors were sent to the hospital for emergency treatment.

Figure 8.18: 'Spider Web' in Sanlin
Source: my own, Sanlin, 2012

Figure 8.19: Protest against the High Voltage Powerline in 2009
(The white banner reads: where is the 'blue sky' (impartial officials)? Who is going to care about *laobaixing* (the mass)?)
Source: Courtesy of a displacee (with mosaic effect to protect their identities)

Initially, the township authorities and the residents' committees were very sympathetic toward those displacees and supported their collective actions. The project was temporarily suspended for a couple of months. In the meantime, the displacees simultaneously sought to mobilise other displacees to join their collective actions and petition their case to higher level of authorities. With no legal grounds on this matter and considering the temporal delay, they did not consider the law as a weapon. The former effort was more successful than the latter. But even so, they were only able to reach the residents from buildings along the powerline.

With a ticking clock of the Expo, the growing tension and their repeated petitioning and protesting attracted the attention from both district and municipal authorities for fear of damaging the face of the Shanghai government. Under pressure, the electricity company, knowing its violation of legal procedure, issued an urgent announcement of the construction plan. A meeting was organised by the Shanghai municipal government to intervene in the conflicts but failed to reach any agreement. A few months later, before the construction resumed on the following morning, the police with the cooperation of the residents' committee tricked a few activists to a chat over tea and threatened to detain them. It signalled a significant shift in the territorial politics. The residents lost their allies inside the bureaucratic field.

On the second morning, hundreds of people dressed in army uniforms—indistinguishable if they were truly army force, migrant workers paid off by the company to dress in this way, or private security force—were transported to guard the construction site. The displacees were furious to witness this scene. They did not wait to organise their resistance that day. A few ran into the construction site without worrying about their personal safety to prevent further construction. Mostly seniors, they were heavily beaten by the uniformed guards. Some displacees who saw the beating were appalled and rushed to help, whilst most were terrorised. The police arrested many displacees on the scene, including a breast-feeding mother and a woman who passed out. A few were released later that day but eight were held in detention overnight. Aunt Wang, in the police interview, questioned the legal ground of her arrest, and was shocked by the response from the police,

> if you want to sue, sue the Communist Party. We are taking orders from the Communist Party. We [the police force] are the gunmen of the party. We load the bullet, aim but only shoot those as the party boss instructed. (Interview, 06/2012)

The trajectory of their activism and the framing they used so far resembles the NIMBY activism reported elsewhere. Fischer (2000:132) sees NIMBY conflicts as a result of the clashes between cultural rationality and technical rationality in the decision-making process. This is a rather simplified version of the social reality, ignoring the exercise of power in politics and the divisions within the epistemic community. As Auyero and Swistun (2009) bring to our attention, the epistemic community, with different interests and agendas, produce great confusion and shape the victims' perceptions and agency. The politicians, including those in more technical positions (i.e. Planning Bureau and Environment Protection Bureau), visited this neighbourhood on several occasions to inspect the real situation. Their shocked expressions and reassuring comments on the proximity were interpreted literally by the displacees. Under the request from the displacees, the authorities also commissioned a public institution to conduct an environmental impact assessment. The technicians, lack of political crafts, also conveyed a message to the displacees that the radiation level was higher than regulation when they took the test onsite. Meanwhile, the displacees also collected many online articles on the health impacts of radiation and TV programmes on physical health to support their protest. Accredited health professionals also warned them about the risks of exposure to electromagnetic radiation, especially for the children.

To their great disappointment however, the final report of the impact assessment loaded with mathematical functions and technical jargon denied the legitimacy of their petition grounded on health concerns. Allegedly, the radiation level was far below the regulated level.[35] Acting like health professionals, the environmental science specialists claimed that there was no risk for personal health. Planning department also came out to defend the agency claiming that the construction plan met legal regulation. According to their measurement, the closest line was 28 metres away from the apartment building, whilst the Planning Code only requires 20 metres distance from any structure, implying that there are no risks or health threats. The displacees refused to accept the report and continued their joint actions. The politicians rapidly intervened by promising a satisfactory solution after the Expo. This is a political tactic to drain away the raw emotions as well as a warning about the risks of sustained action. Under the moral and political pressure, the displacees decided to suspend temporarily their actions for six months. Their compromise missed the opportunity to connect with international media and tell their version of the story about Shanghai and a 'best ever' Expo. The anger soon died away and their reterritorialisation effort was sabotaged by more targeted repression tactics, for instance, threatening the job security of the activists' family members. After the Expo, with all the international attention moving away, more orthodox political tactics such as delaying, shuffling around bureaucratic desks or simply ignoring them became the dominant strategy, in total break of the oral agreement with the displaced. In April 2012, the Expo Bureau as the agency coordinating the affairs within the territory of Expo site was formally dismissed. Legacy management was handed over to a development company whose sole organisational ethics was organised around profit maximisation.

At the time of my involvement, their collective action was at a dead end, becoming rather symbolic. The prospect of failure was an elephant in the room that no one wanted to speak out to avoid completely destroying their efforts. Disheartened by the ineffectiveness of their actions and worried about their safety, many activists sold their new homes and moved elsewhere. Those without such an exit option continued their territorial struggle by visiting the petitioning office weekly. Each visit to the government office resulted in the same response, to wait. I tagged along to a few petitions during the fieldwork. In a typical *xinfang* encounter, it lasted less than 20 minutes unless the displaced were determined to attract political attention by turning it into a spectacle. The conversation was not only cold and distant but also technical,

[35] Report Number 20100023, photocopied from the displacees.

requiring the displacees to employ a particular set of political language. There was no detached concern like 'what I can do for you'; only political jargon like 'what is your *suqiu* (appeal)'. Like the activists observed in Eliasoph's (1998) ethnography, the displacees' colourful language in our conversations shrank rapidly in such encounters partly because of their awareness of the public nature of such meetings but most importantly because they do not have the linguistic capital in playing the political game.

Initially, I had a research agenda in joining their petitions, mainly to observe the power dynamics in such encounters and the contestation of knowledge production. I looked into the health effects of high voltage powerlines in top medical journals and translated the conclusive findings from several articles published in the *British Medical Journal* and *The New England Journal of Medicine*. However, after a petitioning meeting with a specialist from the Environmental Protection Bureau, I realised that efforts in this direction could not achieve anything. The technocrats easily discredited those epidemiological studies by emphasising the different planning and technical standards in China. But, limiting my intervention to observations during such meetings allowed me to be more sensitive to the territorial politics, bureaucratic leviathan and the political artifice. Outranking the municipal government in the administrative structure, the electricity company was another untouchable socialist land master, headed by the brother of He Guoqiang who ranked the eighth of Chinese Politburo Standing Committee before his recent retirement. Pudong district government as the *de jure* land owner was coordinating this project between different agencies under its territory and had no actual influence in land use or planning. To avoid similar mistakes in making conflicted comments, the municipal government issued a secretive internal instruction for all frontline agents in relevant agencies. Little wonder the displacees were kicked around. It also brought to my attention by the unintentional disclosure of the state agents that the environmental impact evaluation was done at a time when the communities were not yet built; meaning the evaluation conveniently ignored the interests of future land users.

On the other hand, I was intrigued that the displacees at those petition meetings completely subordinated the territorial game as homeowners. In petitioning letters as well as in those encounters, they rarely put moral pressure on the state agents by emphasising the repeated nature of their victimisation as seen in their petitioning letters or heard in their complaints during those meetings. Like state agents, they did not see the problem as an indispensable legacy of the Expo-induced *chaiqian* and

imposed a temporal limit on their own victimhood. It ran the risk of being accused of parochial interests and was defenceless against political ideology of developmentalism and nationalism.

Figure 8.20: Municipal Petitioning Office in Hospital Outpatient Design
Source: my own, Shanghai, 2012

At one petitioning meeting, I was agitated by two state agents around my age who bullied the displacees by laughing at their lack of political vocabulary and clarity in articulating their claims. Although I was surely not politically articulate either, I decided to step in to confront them about the political manipulation and betrayal, which I believe are the root of all the problems. I was not fully aware of the consequences of my actions. The question conjured up the displacees' memories of losing their homes and provoked their anger. That day, we held the state agent 'hostage' until a high-level politician came to have a meaningful dialogue with us. Although we reached nothing that day, the framing of their protest started to incorporate moral claims. I advised the displacees to play down the emphasis on environmental impacts or health concerns, both are vulnerable to the tyranny of the experts. Before I exited from the field, we worked on a new frame, anchoring less on NIMBY than on moral contract, political responsibility and the legacy of *chaiqian*. We started to push some political boundaries. However, for fear of drawing unwanted political attention to them as well as to myself, given that I was already on the radar of the Public Security Bureau, I refrained from helping them organise the apathetic or sympathetic displacees from other parts of the resettlement sites to ally with them. I was concerned about hijacking their actions. After all, I had nothing really at stake there. They however would suffer all the consequences if actions went out of control. The morale on their side was not high, either. There were disagreements amongst the leadership in terms of their political agenda. Under the pressure from their families and work, they could not afford to invest further energies.

Some leaders also lost their hope for concrete outcomes and put their new homes in the *ershoufang* (second-hand housing) market, looking to move to other places. It remains too soon to say if they would overcome the difficulty in reterritorialisation and achieve what they wanted. I consciously maintained my distance from them after I resigned from my fieldwork. Given my phone calls to my parents are occasionally tapped; I cannot imagine what consequences might bring to them simply because I wanted to follow up on a political project of research interest. But, we must still ask, how long do they have to keep suffering from the violence and repression until they succeed? After the Broadway show on the Expo site, who will remember and care about those people who made such huge sacrifices yet remain locked in a living hell?

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that the symbolic and material practices in (re)producing the resettlement space is adding further injuries to the displacees, and preventing them from healing the wounds and rebuilding a nurturing community for their own well-being. No matter what the rhetoric might wish to claim, the production of *chaiqian* housing and the governing of the resettlement communities perpetuate rather than mitigate the domicide experience. The pain is reflected in their impoverishment, their persisting longing for the lost, the crisis of identity, the alienation from communality, and the pain in coping and adapting. The injustice they suffer is infinite.

As a major life event, domicide ruptures individual and collective biographies. Domicide experience may reveal in variegated pace, intensity, duration, and sequence. It is shaping and will be shaped by later life experiences. It may be permanently suppressed and locked in personal memory. It can be triggered by (un)familiar scenes, places or faces at an unknown point in the future. It can also be transmitted to future generations through material or symbolic practises such as family inheritance or family history telling. In this sense, the domicide experience possesses a generational quality. Therefore, we should neither put a temporal limit on domicide experience nor rule domicide out from making sense of their later pain. This shall also lead us to ponder the political responsibility of remembering. Through material and symbolic practices, the bulldozer regime does not simply rob people's past but redefines it to control the present and future. Here lies the political opportunity of resistance by strategising on the domicide experience. By taking control of how the past is remembered, we shall be able to contest the domination and envisage a more progressive alternative future.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

> 'They had taken our past away and left the rubble. They had demolished our spirits and left broken bricks. They had destroyed our community and left dust and memories. And they had done all this for their own selfish and arrogant reasons. They had sought to regulate our present in order to control our future. And I asked aloud, "what men have the moral and political right to take away a people's past? How will they answer on that day when they have to account for this? For the past will not be forgotten".'
>
> *Richard Rive, in District Six*

At a seminar entitled Neoliberalism and State Capitalism in Chinese Urban Development in Amsterdam 2013, I presented the stories of two evicted families in order to question the morality of neoliberal urbanism in China and propose a radical solution to end it. To my great dismay, two established Chinese scholars based in the Europe, discredited my over emotional involvement with the displacees. They suspected that my own emotions clouded my judgement and prevented me from seeing things in a more technocratic, hence 'rational' manner. Their favoured solution was to expand universal social security system and to safeguard the sacredness of private property ownership.

I was shocked and deeply unsettled by their blindness and indifference to the extent of injustice and suffering the distant others had endured. Many questions popped to my head that day: where is our raw anger in witnessing and listening to stories about wounded life caused by the exercise of arbitrary power? Do we really know what it is about and how it feels being displaced before we utter all these 'rational' intellectual nonsense? If home matters to us because of the social values and affective bonds we attach to it rather than the exchange value in the housing market, why are we resistant to bring the emotional distress and frustration caused by the disruptions and ruptures of such bonds to our debates and to question the conduct of politics in modern China? Are we not subordinating to the symbolic violence of property discourses? Why do we conflate universal citizenship with a moral right to stay put? What corrupts our moral agency and weakens our sense of responsibility as relatively educated in a privileged social position to empathise and care about our fellow citizens?

Upon my return to Edinburgh, these questions motivated me to discard completely two draft chapters, one on the backstage dirty linen in securing the Expo bid and the other on the evolving regulatory frameworks on *chaiqian* in China and Shanghai, specifically. I mobilised all my strength to re-read the 887-page verbatim transcripts of the painful experiences of displacement and worked on this present thesis structure, which is more focused on the domicide process and consequences. This was a risky decision back then given the time and funding constraints. But the more I invested in this way of thinking and writing, the more worthwhile I feel it became. It became crystal clear how hypocritical the powerful, political and cultural elites are in making claims on public interests or diagnoses on displacement. Most of these discourses are problematic (e.g. Wu, 2004, Li and Song, 2009, Kearns and Mason, 2013). They are uttered because we simply do not have enough courage to suspend our judgement and *a priori* frames and to make ourselves more vulnerable whilst listening patiently and carefully to the stories from actual dwellers about the ways they deal with sudden disruptions to their routines and cope with the annihilation of familiar place before we deliberate on the causal chains of human suffering. They are uttered because we lost our sociological imagination to think about alternative scenarios, under which displacement may be prevented or conducted differently, that may become sources of intellectual and political support for those who might be victimised. They are uttered because we see ourselves as different from the others we research on or work with for the professional knowledge we acquired but forget that we first and foremost are humans before we label ourselves as academic professionals (Slater, 2010).

My motivation in following the analytical threads as I presented in this thesis is to document and reconstruct the violent history of the Expo-induced displacement and resettlement and the pain of those displaced. As Peter Marcuse (2010: 187) argues, 'If we do not understand and do not intuitively put ourselves in the place of those whose problems we examine, we will not understand them – either the people or the problems. If the pain of displacement is not a central component of what we are dealing with in studying gentrification – indeed, is not what brings us to the subject in the first place – we are not just missing one factor in a multi-factorial equation; we are missing the central point that needs to be addressed'. By putting people's accounts in ink, I wish to preserve an episode of history rapidly fading in the collective memory about Shanghai's transformation and remind us of the human costs behind modernist urban landscapes. If we are about to prevent nonsensical utterance, we need to know how people feel about being displaced. If we are about to make any sophisticated argument or political proposals, I hope this thesis has

supplied sufficient raw oral accounts and analysis to ponder. Most of those accounts may be read as a eulogy to the homes, places and identities that have been killed by the 'best ever' Expo. But I hope they can also serve as valid charges against the merciless elites in planning and implementing such destruction and can hold them personally as well as the structure they aim to produce accountable for the crimes and wrongs they have committed. This makes the bias of this study quite self-evident. I ally firmly with the displacees I worked with. I simply believe it is wrong to take away people's homes against their will. Equally, it is wrong to restrain or manipulate their choices and aspirations about a decent life. In the remainder of this conclusion, what I intend to do first is to tie up my arguments and lay out key contributions of this thesis. I then invest the analytical energy in how to prevent and end domicide.

The Expo-Induced Domicide

Displacement and forcible eviction are major political and moral evils. They have been an important theme in urban geography, most fruitfully in the literature on gentrification (Hartman, 1983, Hartman and Robinson, 2003, Atkinson, 2000b, 2000a, Slater, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2013, Newman and Wyly, 2006, Davidson, 2009, Lovering and Türkmen, 2011) where displacement is seen as the defining feature (Lees et al., 2010: 317). Compelling evidence was found to refute the denial of displacement as a widespread common problem and critically question the commercialisation of housing under the capitalist urban process. Yet, most of these studies focus on the causes and consequences of displacement and rarely do they offer rich accounts on the process of displacement, the way people lost their homes, and the meanings of such loss. This limitation can also be found in the limited literature specifically focusing on mega-events induced displacement (Olds, 1998, Greene, 2003). This thesis fills this huge gap in existing literature. It dwells less on the causes of displacement than on the conditions, mechanisms, tactics, contestations and consequences of displacement through an in-depth study of massive displacement caused by the Shanghai World Expo. Let me first summarise major arguments and findings of this thesis.

First, this thesis proposes to reconcile objective victimisation with subjective victimhood to complete our understanding of complicated experiences of domicide. To fulfil this agenda, chapters 4 and 8 examined the urban process under neoliberal urbanism in contemporary Chinese cities and Shanghai in particular. It looked into creative destruction and reconstruction of political institutions and regulatory frames—such as hukou system, property regime, fiscal and administrative

decentralisation, political elites' promotion mechanism—in constructing a land-centred accumulation regime that drives rapid reconfiguration of hierarchised urban spaces in Shanghai. One defining feature of this process is the pervasiveness of the party-state, which on the one hand manipulates and speculates on property development whilst on the other hand disciplines the consumer subjects and selectively accommodates or represses grassroots activism. The second feature lies in the rampant material violence and extra-legal means in dispossessing the mass, robbing of public wealth and transferring to a handful of red capitalists. In chapter 2 and chapter 8, I argued that chaiqian in China should be seen as more than a violent prelude to rapid urbanisation in China. Instead, chaiqian itself is an indispensable element of the property-led development (contra Zhang, 2010). Apart from releasing a huge parcel of land in prime locations at relatively low financial costs, large-scale displacement since the 1990s in Shanghai manufactured a huge demand on the property market and sustained the housing bubble. Two consequences are prominent. First, the new propertied class is susceptible to the ethics of the market and property regime. Of course, there is a positive side in this in the political context of China as seen in the rise of property-owner activism across China where property rights supply a legitimate weapon, although not most effective, to curb the power of the developers and the local states (Shi and Cai, 2006, Read, 2008, Zhang, 2010, Blandy and Wang, 2013). However, following Harvey (2005a), they are prime potential victims of possessive individualism (also see Shin, 2013). It is highly likely for them to subordinate to market value system and parochially focus on the preservation or improvement of the exchange value of their properties. This may discipline the consciousness and tame the agency of these new homeowners. Second, under the current chaiqian arrangement, the displacees are pushed to the housing market to find a replacement apartment, although the chaiqian companies are legally obliged to provide assistance in securing an affordable one as long as the displacees request. This manufactured demand pushes up the housing prices and locked those who suffer from housing distress permanently at the bottom of the social and housing hierarchy. It affects their perceptions of social positions, their ambivalent bonds with their lived places, and their anticipation of life chances. The external force of chaiqian and the changes it may bring, especially the improvement and liquidity of the new commercial housing, may shape the aspirations and wants of those facing the threat of chaiqian and solicit their consent to the wholesale demolition and off-site resettlement. The problem, as chapters 4 and 7 argue is that this is a restrained imagination for upward mobility. The housing regime effectively constrains and

eliminates other routes to secure affordable and decent housing, and induces willing subordination to the symbolic power of prevailing property regime.

It is against this backdrop we may start to peel back the variegated and layered experience of domicide. 'Happy' or 'supportive' movers, or those who may not experience acute domicide effects in general, are victims without noticing themselves being victimised. This may strike the chord of the controversial Marxist notion of false consciousness. In this thesis, I avoided this notion by using Bourdieu's symbolic violence instead, but the elitist tone is certainly present in making this Bourdieusian argument. However, I agree with Swartz (2013) that this is analytically justified. An intellectual distance is essential to objectify any social game. The displacees cannot play the game of *chaiqian* whilst at the same time constantly questioning the rules of the game. But over time, as chapters 5 and 8 show, the displacees were able to reflect on their past experiences and come to realise their real interests.

Second, this thesis calls for a critical study of both the temporal and spatial dimension of displacement and eviction. Displacement is about the annihilation of place. The layered meanings of place as conceived by insiders and outsiders have been at the core of existing studies on displacement (Porteous, 1989, Meyer, 2008). This thesis does not significantly deviate from this theme. In chapters 4, 5 and 7, this thesis explored the contestations of the meanings and values surrounding people's homes and communities on the Expo site. It echoes existing literature in arguing that the cause of displacement lies in the victory of exchange value over the use value, and pointing out that the failed resistance from the displacees is a result of the absence of a competing value system, powerful enough to counter the ruthless force of the market. For the dwellers, home embodies the life trajectories and personal memories, offers sources of emotional comfort and security, and stabilises basic social reproduction unit. These historical, social and emotional properties of home are cruelly replaced and dominated by its economic aspect under current economic system. As a consequence, displacement robs people's history, destroys their personal identity, disrupts their stable social networks, and severs their roots to familiar built environment. This is the root cause of emotional distress, or grief syndrome, from displacement (Fried, 1966, Qin, 2013). Findings on the spatial dimension of displacement in this thesis confirm existing literature on this point.

One major contribution of this thesis is the focus on the temporalities of displacement. This is studied from three aspects. It first looks into the past experiences of displacement and the lingering effects upon the consciousness and

agency of the displacees. For instance, chapter 4 introduces and combines the notion of displacement in place (Feldman et al., 2011: 10) and of serial displacement (Fullilove, 2014: 141) to understand the conservative impulse (Marris, 1974: 5-22) of the displacees, which engenders ambivalent and even conflicting attitudes toward change and displacement. Second, it examined the domination of the calendar time of the Expo in undermining the solidarity between the displacees and reducing the possibility of collective resistance. Chapter 5 offers many detailed accounts on the manipulation of time, through controlling the timing, duration and frequency of negotiation meetings, in labouring on anxiety, stress, uncertainty and alienation, with consequences on the political agency of the displacees. Many families I worked with could not bear such stress and moved out without a satisfactory compensation package. This effectively prevented potential neighbourhood-based collective actions. It also added pressure on those families who attempted to defend their right to stay put. Third, although I took a pre/during/after displacement approach in my writing, this thesis emphasises the continuity rather than ruptures in temporal experiences of displacement. It rejects a premature closure of the domicide impacts. In chapter 8, I argued that the wounds from displacement take time to heal and may last for generations. The fate of the displacees may inextricably relate to their place-making practices and recovering efforts in the resettlement sites.

Third, this thesis utilises the notion of exception in political geography to understand the conditions of event-induced domicide (Agamben, 1998, Ong, 2006). Primarily, I argued that the Expo, owing to its association with nationalist sentiments, creates a zone of exception (chapter 6), which mainly includes the territory of the Expo site but expands to those areas lined up for Expo-related facilities. The exceptional status of the Expo secured Shanghai's privileges in national economic geography during the preparation of the Expo as reflected in the policy preferences, additional land use quota allowances, fiscal transfers, etc. It also enabled fast-track urban decision making and legal enforcement, with adverse impacts on democratic participation and disastrous consequences for the displaced. Many displacees were forcibly evicted before they had exhausted all legal and administrative channels. However, the most appalling effect of this exceptionality lies in the revocation of moral and legal boundaries and the coordination of divided state apparatus with a shared goal of clearing the land for the Expo regardless of the human costs. It rendered the residents within the Expo zone as exceptions to the moral and political landscape. They were deprived of legal protection under normal circumstances and political opportunities for collective or individual resistances. Chapters 5 and 6 provided many accounts on the revolting tactics used by the *chaiqian* agents to coerce, repress and trick them to

comply with the displacement plan, which inflicted enormous pain on the displacees and assaulted their dignity. I argued that the exceptionality of the Expo is a critical condition for the moral corruption of the *chaiqian* agents.

Exception is also used to situate my findings in academic debates on displacement and actual existing neoliberalism in Chinese cities in general (see Liew, 2005, He and Wu, 2009). Although much of my understanding on displacement were structured by the exceptionality of the Expo and the particular context and practices of *chaiqian* in China, I argued in chapter 6 that exception is a prevailing political rationality under neoliberal capitalism that aims to secure the flow of the capital through selective manipulation of citizenship. Many tactics and mechanisms, such as territorial stigmatisation (chapter 4), legal abandonment (chapters 5 and 6) and state violence (chapters 5 and 8) can be found in other cases in different countries (Wacquant, 2008, Feldman et al., 2011). Throughout the thesis, I also argued against China exceptionalism. Chapter 2 offered a tentative synthesis on the formation of neoliberal state in China's context through the lens of the Expo-induced displacement. My observations of the underlying logics in China do not show any significant difference from Wacquant's findings (2012) based on his observation of Latin America and advanced economies. The examination of territorial stigmatisation and the impacts upon the dwellers in chapter 4 also shows similarities with findings reported from advanced economies (Wacquant, 2007). Chapter 8 further confirmed the disheartening consequences of displacement and eviction as found across the world (Young and Willmott, 1957, Gans, 1962, Marris, 1974). However, this is not to say that theories and concepts developed in western context should be uncritically embraced. Nor do I have any intention to claim that there is no substantial difference between Chinese cities and cities from other cultural contexts. I repeatedly emphasised Chinese flavour on many occasions and called for great reflexivity on theories and positionality. In chapter 2, I warned about the patronising effect of the theoretical gaze of right to the city in understanding popular grievances and grassroots activism. Similarly, I underscored the hybrid governing practises in perpetuating the injustice from displacement in chapter 8, which is a distinctive finding.

The fourth contribution perhaps lies in the development of Harvey's (2005a, 2005b) concept 'accumulation by dispossession' by adding great depth to the ethics, infrastructures and tactics of constructing a property regime that is most supportive for capital accumulation in Chinese cities. In chapter 6, I dissected the bureaucratic apparatus involved in dispossessing the land and housing through economic but most

commonly extra-economic means. My analysis there focused on both the political agents and the bureaucratic apparatus. I argued that modern bureaucracy provides fertile soil for moral corruption because of minute social and hierarchical division of labour, which narrows the moral region of the bureaucratic agents and grants them the opportunity to download personal, political responsibility (Bauman, 1989, Adams and Balfour, 1998). However, I argued that it is contentious to attribute moral corruption to floating responsibility and procedural rationality in modern bureaucracy or to psychological mechanism of denial, distanciation or splitting. Instead, I took a Bourdieusian conceptualisation of interest and charged the bureaucratic apparatus for creating structural incentives for the bureaucratic agents to transcend legal and moral boundaries and resort to tactics such as deception, violence and denial to expel people from their homes and land in order to maximise their own interest in this social game of *chaiqian*. In chapters 7 and 8, I also outlined the major changes in institutional arrangement that attempt to demarcate clearer separation of bundles of rights in property, including amongst others the division of land ownership from land use right, the difference between collective ownership in the countryside and state ownership in the city, and the separation of housing ownership and land ownership. In chapter 7, I showed how such property regime constrains the political imagination of the displacees and prevented them from building cross-class or cross-territory alliance in fighting against displacement. The most original yet disheartening finding there was the breakdown of families as an outcome of internal strife and manufactured conflicts. The root however lies in the nascent property regime, which allowed the *chaiqian* agents to manipulate the definition and interpretation of collective ownership to family properties, to provoke mutual distrust between family members and to escalate latent conflicts. The selective inclusion/exclusion of family members from negotiation meetings and compensation calculations obstructed communication and created conflicts within displaced families. Such tactics worked effectively to atomise the displacees and diminish their resources to fight collectively. This finding on the one hand challenged the intellectual romanticism of radical resistance against displacement, and on the other hand questioned the ideological tenet of individualism with familialism that underpins the accumulation regime in contemporary Chinese cities. As a result of failures in collective actions, resistance typically took atomised, bodily, rightful and boundary-expanding forms such as marriage/divorce of convenience, which powerfully exposed the indecency of contemporary Chinese society (Margalit, 1996).

Last, this thesis wrestles with the roots of domination and the mechanism of its reproduction through the lens of *chaiqian*. I did so by keeping a dialogue with

Bourdieusian, Gramscian and Scottian literature on the mechanics of power in securing as well as obscuring the exercise of power. Throughout the thesis, I avoided choosing sides and instead used them pragmatically to understand the political consciousness and agency of the displacees. I attempted to answer why some displacees willingly consented or cooperated with the destruction of their homes without putting up an effective fight. My inquiry running from chapters 4 to 7 returned with Bourdieusian evidence of symbolic violence as expressed by the rule of law project, the discourse on homeownership and property rights, the coercive ethics of competition and collective memories of state violence; with Gramscian evidence of hegemony and consent, as in the concessions in offering resettlement housing, identification with popular aspirations for housing improvement and decent life and the selective accommodation of popular grievances; and with Scottian evidence of hidden transcripts and weapons of the weak, as in discrediting the euphemism of resettlement, the profound sense of powerlessness and inevitability, and the strategic use of rhetoric and discourses of the elites in negotiating for a better compensation deal. Misrecognition, mystification and strategic compliance are all plausible explanations for prevalent acquiescence and for the absence of effective resistance during *chaiqian* process. They contribute to the production and reproduction of an oppressive spatial structure with the compliance of the displacees. Bourdieu's notion of symbolic power and symbolic violence are also used to assist my understanding of the internalisation of territorial stigma amongst some displacees (chapter 4) and the deprivation of the supportive environment for the displacees to recover from domicide effects through the planning, architectural and governing practices in the resettlement sites (chapter 8). I argued that such symbolic violence, together with other forms of domination and violence, exacerbates the vulnerabilities of the displacees and perpetuates the injustice they have to endure. Perhaps, it is in this sense that the fatalist sentiment as conveyed by the title of this thesis is justified. However, this is not to say that there is nothing we could do about it if it is fate. To say something is fate, as Mills (1959a: 21) teaches us, it has 'to with events in history that are beyond the control of any circle or groups of men *[sic]* (1) compact enough to be identifiable (2) powerful enough to decide with consequences, and (3) in a position to foresee the consequences and so to be held accountable for historical events'. The displacees' suffering cannot be attributed to fate and the injustice they wrongfully endured can be addressed. Their loss of dignity, attachment, social support, and their pain are socially produced by concrete political agents, cultural elites and economic tycoons whose coalition dominates the society and paralyses the progress toward a more democratic and decent China. It is 'sociologically realistic,

morally fair, and politically imperative to make demands upon men *[sic]* of power and to hold them responsible for specific course of events' (Mills, 1959a: 100). This is the route we should take to right the wrongs the displacees had suffered and to stop ruthless destruction of homes under the current accumulation regime in China. How to do this shall be discussed after a short reflection on research practice and theoretical reflections.

Reflections and Future Research Directions

Although much of my reflection on theories (particularly different theoretical approaches to durable domination and subordination), informed by empirical studies, was put in chapter 2, let me pause here to chart out the process of the production of chapter two and to reflect upon their implications for this finished product and future research agenda. Academic product tends to be presented in a linear process, beginning with neatly presented literature/theoretical framework and well-thought methodological design, followed by theoretically-informed empirical analysis, and concluded with polished concepts. In fact, at least for me, the process is much messier. The value of Bourdieu's political sociology was appreciated too late in my research but the magic of Bourdieu's thoughts is that, once engaged, it makes you question, think and reason in a much more complex, reflexive and spiral way. On the one hand, it results in a slight rupture in my research interest, moving from the causes to the persistence of displacement and forcible eviction, which sometimes was sustained by the displaced. This also led to my departure from David Harvey, whose masterpieces I find inadequate to capture forces outside the economic realm, particularly regarding subjective experiences and symbolic domination. Harvey's analysis on the three circuits of capital is insightful to understand the logic of land centred accumulation in China - the first break in Bourdieusian sense - yet it falls short of examining the subjective experiences of social agents and understanding how exploitative relations can be supported, consented or perpetuated by the victims of such asymmetrical power relations. Thinking with Bourdieu's conceptual tools, my thesis attempted to attend to the subjective dimension of displacement and to make the second Bourdieusian break, see the mechanisms that sustain such exploitative land-centred accumulation. This is to enrich the notion of domicide and sharpen the knife-edge of critical scholarship in the battle against displacement. Those 'willing' or 'happy' movers, under current mode of accumulation, are victims of symbolic violence, authors of their own durable subordination. Our mission tasks us to expose rather than subscribe to such symbolic violence. My characterisation of them as victims is not to stigmatise them but to utilise the potential of victimhood in

constructing a shared identity and to unite and empower the displacees to fight together against displacement.

On the other hand, my reading of Bourdieu convinced me to run intertwined analytical lines with James Scott and Gramsci (although my thesis dwells much less on Gramsci) who influenced my thinking at an earlier stage. All three authors can shed light on the mechanisms of durable inequalities and injustices and sociological question of actions with constraints, yet none of them seem to deliver a most convincing and complete explanation. Scott's work alerts me to the microphysics of power, locating radicalism and rebellion not in actions but in beliefs. Following his footsteps, it is necessary to separate insurgent consciousness and contentious actions, transcripts announced in public and radical beliefs conveyed in public. Resistance is constant and everywhere but less in open defiance than in covert forms in some power-laden contexts. In deciphering the nature and meaning of political insurgency of the powerless, we need to reconcile the dimensions of contentious beliefs and contentious repertoires that are structured by both durable mental structure and contingent assessment of political opportunities, particularly, in authoritarian context like China. In my fieldwork, I was puzzled by many displacees' deep sense of injustice and their political docility. Fighting to stay put or even to squeeze more out of the displacers were considered by many displacees as a useless act. Scott's insight on the political constraints led to my analysis of the mechanisms divided and atomised the displacees in this land war, preventing militarised, open, and organised resistance (chapter 7).

Drawing from this analysis, we may see the way the party-state maintained its domination despite significant changes that rapidly shaped many spheres of everyday life in late socialist China. The organisation of Chinese society before the reform was metaphorically compared to cells in biology (Shue, 1988), in reference to communes in rural society and *danwei* system in the city. Those collective organisations maintained dominance and effective control of the party-state in society through organised dependence, ideological indoctrination and disciplinary practices (Walder, 1986). The most significant change brought by the reform in the city is to strip off the burden of welfare provision from those *danwei*, and transform or privatise those *danwei* as corporate entities to organise their activities responsive to the market (Bray, 2005, Lu, 1989). However, my empirical analysis shows that *danwei* is not completely dead and its legacy, particularly the political function remains very much alive (Chen, 2006a). The examples of the police officer, the doctor's father and the students in chapter 7 show that zombie *danwei* can be mobilised to exploit the

embeddedness of the displacees in the political establishments and repress political actions, especially in cases where the state is fought against. In late socialist China, the state is rolling back from strict control of the economic sphere, yet the state is rolling out its political and ideological control through new means. Media and civil organisations remain under heavy censorship and regulation of the party-state (Brady, 2008, Fewsmith, 2013). The roots of the party-state, such as residents committees, are penetrating further and growing even stronger under the community building project (Read, 2012). Moreover, through selective change of political and economic institutions (e.g. land, *hukou*, housing), the state contributes to rapid stratification and formation of a hegemonic bloc comprising of private entrepreneurs (i.e. red capitalists) and upper rung of society. These changes fuel the illusion of social mobility for those on the lower rung but in reality, reinforce and solidify class boundary. Consistent ideological indoctrination and moral education (Bakken, 2000), such as nationalism, harmony, socialist morality (e.g. Eight Honors and Eight Shames), demonstrate the capacity of the state in effectively controlling and adapting to changed political circumstance and consolidate its ideological legitimacy. This of course cannot be successful without the labour of intellectuals with vested interests in either the established order or ability to identify with politically insensitive discourses, constantly mystifying the arbitrariness of established social order (new urbanism, creative class, Hayek's project, etc.)(Wang, 2003b, 2009).

Against this background, it is easier to understand the profound sense of powerlessness and uselessness of political actions amongst the displaced as well as many others on the lower rung of society. It is also easier to understand why resistances from the displacees were mostly in individualised, bodily and rightful forms. The cracks between domination ideology and social reality in breeding rebellious consciousness also offer the most *legitimate* weapon for the weak to fight back in a most *effective* way. It is also against this background that we can try to understand why political claims are mostly centring on economic rights and resistances were more in covert and elementary forms. The strong feelings of powerlessness and uselessness are also found in many 'willing' or 'voluntary' movers in this project. However, Scott's analysis falls short of explaining two issues in my fieldwork, which Bourdieu's misrecognition and symbolic violence, if I understand correctly, can shed light on. The first is to what extent the consent to displacement and perceptions of political opportunities are shaped by schemata that are more durable or a result of misrecognising the arbitrariness of the power relations in the first place? A pertinent example here is the strong identification with the state amongst the senior generation. In my thesis, I cited this as an example to show how

the geologically layered quality of Chinese families in the event of displacement laboured ambivalent attitudes and divided family members to fight against the displacement. I did not pursue further the mechanisms that foster such identification with the state that secures and obscures exploitive land regime at the same time. In Bourdieu's term, we could understand this through the discourse of *fanshen*, ideological indoctrination and more generally, through past experiences of a 'caring' state. Their past encounters with the state may be seen as disciplinary practices in producing loyal and docile political subjects. In the event of displacement, consent to displacement is secured and obscured by the representations of domicide as a project of national significance and a project in the best interest of the displaced as well (e.g. better housing), and by practices from the feminist hand of the state as in gift exchanges, righting injustices created from past regime (e.g. zhiqing, extreme poverty, housing distress, etc.). Subjective experience of a 'caring' state misrecognises the objective exploitative social relations. However, we cannot forget the dividing power of such representation and practices of domicide. They significantly undermined the basis of effective collective actions, even within a family. Return to the issue of perception of political opportunity, utilising Bourdieu's tool propels me to think to what extent such perception is shaped by the displacees' sense of their positions in society, even when the objective opening in political structure was bigger than they perceive? Is it not their perceptions of the power structure a product of mystification or misrecognition of asymmetrical power relations in the first place? The most effective exercise power is to paralyse the ability to think in a rational way. Bourdieu's work can also be used to understand the exercise of power in much more subtle ways such as through time and space. Our unconscious engagement with time-space, where symbolic domination expressed in most covert ways, already misrecognises arbitrarily power relations that dominate our life.

By keeping three theoretical lines running in my thesis, I was struggling with the question, how deep one can go to understand the mechanisms of durable inequalities and injustice. All three theorists agree upon the immanence of power in everyday life. The differences are registered in their perspectives on the depth of power in our evaluation of resistance and acquiescence in power-laden social situations. Bourdieu goes too deep, focusing on habitus predisposing social agents to act in a certain way and leaving an impression that resistance or change is barely possible. Scott on the other hand is too loose, instilling hope that resistance and change is always there and emerging, but inadequate to explain how mystification and durable beliefs reinforce each other and make constant resistance an overly optimistic theoretical construct.

Gramsci's middle ground on the level of ideology and ideological struggle allows greater flexibility yet this also makes him vulnerable to critiques from both Bourdiesusian and Scottian perspectives. Instead of trying to defend the superiority of one approach over the other, it perhaps, at least my empirical data suggests so, is more fruitful to derive inspirations from all of them to understand a much more complex social reality.

This short reflection on theories can also contribute to recent discussion on the insurgency of property rights activism from the 'new middle class'. But, let me first briefly summarise the implications of this middle class upon Chinese society and displacement. My research touched upon several implications of this social group upon domicide. But, I did not pursue enough this line due to my empirical focus on the domicidees from the resettlement sites whose continued perception of their homes as dwelling space led to my distinction of them from the middle class who are socially and economically much more mobile (after Allen, 2008). My analysis of the construction of housing and land market in chapters 4 and 8 can be seen as a component of the state-led production of new middle class in Chinese cities. The privatisation and redistribution of state assets in the consumer revolution created a huge number of private homeowners, crucial members of the middle class[1] (Tomba, 2004). Most of them were formerly privileged members of political establishment and *danwei* system, reproducing social inequalities established under socialist era (Wu and Li, 2005). The construction of the land-centred accumulation allowed these members to benefit from their command of political capital to 'capture' material capital (after Bridge, 2001b). With vested interests in this land-centred accumulation, this new middle class are likely to support and protect the accumulation regime from collapsing. Politically, as existing literature suggests, they might be conservative or moderate (Tomba, 2004, Cai, 2005). Their command of material capital can also be easily converted into or used to 'capture' cultural capital to distinguish themselves further from other social groups (Tomba, 2004, Zhang, 2010). Their tastes in housing, affected by the market, may in turn lead to further diversification of the housing market with variegated sensitivity to existing built environment (Zhang, 2010). One visible consequence of this can already be found in Shanghai's landscape where fancy gates and walls have become an effective marker of social distinction and spatial boundaries, segregating different social groups (Pow and Kong, 2007). In a way, the demand from them may sustain and reinforce the spatial order, keeping the wheels of gentrification running and sanctioning displacement of those residents that

[1] As of 2000s, 82 per cent public housing sales went to public employees in Shanghai (Du and Qiu in Cai (2005)).

are deemed as ‘out of place’. In chapter 4, the thesis has discussed how negative symbolic capital of a place – stigma - can be appropriated to serve the interest of speculative development, eroding the dwellers’ perception of their positions in the world and manipulating the desires of these dwellers through the circulation and demonstration of middle class values, lifestyles and consumption patterns. The consolation prize of new private properties with modern facades in planned communities may fix the displacees on those resettlement neighbourhoods, and cultivate their dependence on the current land regime to avoid their interest from being significantly undermined. The inclusion of the relegated population in this system may foster their consent or subordination to the new rule of game.

Two directions I hope I can explore in further research are the mechanism of social distanciation in Bourdieusian spirit and a contingent assessment of the political conservativenss of the middle class through Scottian perspective. Citing my reading of *Dwelling Narrowness* and my conversation with my ‘middle class’ friends in chapter 4, I pointed out the issue of distanciation in contributing to the symbolic appropriation of *xiaozhijiao* and the impacts on the displacees. It seems worthwhile to explore the positional understanding of housing of the middle class, particularly in relation to risks, uncertainties, dominant values and tastes. This shall lead to further insight into their durable cognitive structure and their sense of self in the world. It may also yield fruitful results to see how the differences lead to social distanciation rather than empathetic understanding. By looking into the mental structure of the middle class, particularly their sense of limits in relation to perception and engagement with the state power, we may also contribute to the discussion on whether this group is a progressive agent to push forward democratisation in China. By incorporating with Scottian literature along this line, we may have a nuanced understanding of the ‘conservativeness’ of the middle class or their property-based activism. Strategic appearances may not correspond to their progressive minds (Scott, 1985). In doing this, we can also tease out the way durable cognitive structure, preventing from effective progressive actions and consciousness, is reinforced by their encounter with state power and fostering their ‘conservativeness’. We can also wrestle with the tension between their durable beliefs and strategic performances, the latter of which can be informed by their cautious manoeuvre of political opportunities in different social contexts.

There are a few other avenues to pursue in future research. First, researchers may want to avoid the temporal rupture and follow up on the whole domicide process to observe the mechanics of power in real time and space. This may lead to more

nuanced understanding of the experiences of domicide, particularly the political interactions between the domicide operatives and the domicidees. It would also reveal a much more complicated picture of claims making and resistance tactics in this process. Second, this thesis missed and was denied the opportunity to involve the displacers in the research process. I relied primarily on secondary resources, particularly the textual products published by the domiciders and the recollections of important episodes from the displacees. A political ethnography of the domiciders would further add complexity and depth to the politics and morality of domicide I have painted in this thesis. This may involve a careful examination of the ways that tension between personal and professional ethics is negotiated and the roles of those domicide operatives in translating and exercising state power. This exercise will also further enrich our understanding about the exceptionality of the Expo and the capacity of the Chinese state in contemporary times. The Expo-induced displacement is 'exceptional' in the sense that the demolition and construction of this space in such a condensed time and without meaningful protests to a great extent must be attributed to the mobilisation of the entire state apparatus, which temporarily suspended the tensions and conflicts within the bureaucratic field (i.e. between the central government and the local government, between feminist hand and masculine hands of the state on different levels, between Shanghai and other regions). Such exceptionality also created enabling conditions to suspend legal protections and to exonerate the responsibilities of bulldozer crews to pursue any means possible and necessary to fulfil their task and pursue their personal interests without overly worrying about transgressing legal or moral boundaries. Existing studies on displacement outside the context of mega-events have shown that the central-local tension and the conflicts between different government agencies can be used effectively for political actions to resist or challenge the land-centred accumulation regime (O'Brien, 1996, Hsing, 2010a, McGregor, 2012). In such cases, the fragmentation and conflicts within the state are more visible. The microphysics of power and macro power structure may show some differences from what I have attempted to capture here (Zhang, 2001, Ho, 2013a, 2013b, Wei, 2013). However, the disturbing logic that displacement is facilitated by the state's selective suspension of law and manipulation of citizenship through its monopoly of violence and legitimate power to serve the interest of capital accumulation are the same, and I suspect it will show categorical differences from the underlying logics as examined from western context (Schinkel and van den Berg, 2011, Gray and Porter, 2014). The process may unfold in different ways due to diverse political, cultural and regulatory contexts. These differences can be attributed to the capacity of the state, particularly

the strong central government, in mobilising the entire apparatus, the structure of the bureaucratic field (i.e. the dictatorship of a Leninist Party and the legacy of *danwei* system) and the weakness of the legal system, all conductive to create exceptional spaces. But the logic underpinning the neoliberal growth from my point of view is the same: activation of state power to manufacture subjectivities and manipulate citizenship to serve the interest of capitalistic accumulation. In this sense, the Expo is nothing but ordinary and routine in our time. However, this observation may need further research to confirm.

End Mega-events Induced Domicide

The first step to end mega-events induced domicide is to question the rationalities of mega-events and the necessity for their continued existence in modern society. They were created to promulgate the values and cultures of the ruling elites in order to consolidate their political legitimacy. Till this day, they are still invested to perform such ideological and political function. They have become the most helpful maidens to global financial capitalism, destroying institutional and geographical frictions for the flow of capital. We need to interrogate more closely the rationales underlying the bids for those events, and particularly, the production of such rationalities, in order to restrain the speculative impulse of the growth machine and pursue a more viable and sustainable development path. Our challenge to the legitimacy of mega-events should also extend to the international bodies that govern them. Despite that the events they govern have become major violators of human rights, those institutions until this day remain unwilling to accept human rights protection as their organisational ethics and refuse to shoulder the political responsibility to safeguard human rights protection in their capacity. What makes it more contentious is that these international bodies claim no accountability to any sovereignty states yet have the power to make a decision affecting millions of people for a prolonged time. A more unsettling issue arises from the corrupted politics inside those institutions, such as bribes, kickbacks, gift-giving, vote-in-exchange-for-investment, conducted by undemocratically elected business, political and cultural elites in the global arena (Lenskyj, 2000).We need to deliberate more thoroughly if we need those events at all given the unsatisfactory financial performance of those events and the enormous risks and uncertainties we have to bear. Also, we need to arrive at an answer whether we want to surrender the future of our cities to the dictatorship of a few global elites with remote care for our well-being other than their business interest?

Of course, global mega-events are only one cause of domicide under neoliberal capitalism. To end everyday domicide in other circumstances, we need to stop putting a price tag on a basic human need and a basic human right. We must take full account of the social, historical and affective dimensions of homes and communities before we make any decision that may lead to the destruction of those structures. Indeed, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect the buildings we dwell in be constructed to last forever. But I concur with Porteous and Smith (2001) that the decision to demolish them must always come from the dwellers, free from any kind of coercion, threat or pressure. It is morally wrong to impose a legal or political order and force existing users to give away their homes. Under certain circumstances, especially when a dwelling becomes physically dangerous and unhealthy for continued residence, displacement may become an option but this must fulfil three conditions: (1) physical deterioration is not an outcome of long-term disinvestment in an area; (2) the dwellers genuinely consent to an improvement in their housing, are fully informed about the land use changes after they move out and given the opportunity to capture the surplus value; (3) the dwellers are offered a wide range of options to choose where to live and how they wish to be resettled. The first rules out structural injustice; the second in place is to defeat sugar-coated gentrification or redevelopment; and the third is to democratise further the process and ensure that the displaced can make a choice based on their own needs. The intention is that there must be a democratic discussion on the necessity of displacement before a decision is made.

When plans involving displacement do occur, we need to put displacement and relocation as a priority rather than secondary to the development plan, and we must treat the displaced as a person with dignity and respect (Gans, 1968). What I have in mind is a moral agent, reflexive enough of their social and political conducts and responsible enough for intended or unintended consequences of their political actions. In talking and working with the displacees, they need to put the housing needs of those families at heart and treat them as fellow citizens rather than consumers or worse, political subjects. This is not a call for strategic manipulation of emotions through workshops, consultations or counselling to talk through anger, frustration and loss. I had a fair taste of this when I was evicted from my office. I appreciate the value of such effort. I must make it clear that such professional effort should never be used to induce consent from the dwellers or as a reactive response to deal with harms done by arbitrary eviction. In the former circumstance, it is a gross violation of professional ethics. In the latter, although necessary for psychological well-being of the displaced, it willingly subordinates to the authoritarian ‘react-and-cure’ model

(Porteous and Smith, 2001: 210) of political undertakings and further insults the dignity of the victims. Professional therapeutic support should always be limited to help the displacees cope with loss, grief and emotional distress from losing their homes and communities. By making displacement a priority, we need to plan carefully the process, the impacts upon the displaced and the available resources to mitigate such impacts. This requires a democratisation of this overall process. The principle of all-affected must apply: all affected residents must be involved in the planning of displacement and resettlement at all stages (Barnett and Bridge, 2013: 1025). Such participation cannot stay as tokenism, which I am referring to in the hearing and feedback model of political decision making as in Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation. It must allow the displaced to take control with the assistance from planning, legal and other professionals when necessary. They must be given as much time and financial resources they may need to deliberate carefully on the consequences, gather information and evidence, consult third parties, etc. A detailed displacement and relocation plan must be developed in partnership with the displaced and implemented with great care and reflexivity. Task forces must be established to supervise the overall process and deal with emerging problems. The impacts upon the relocated families must also be regularly monitored to avoid gradual impoverishment or decline of quality of life for the displaced families. Given that family is the basic unit of displacement, all family members must be consulted in this process and any impact assessment must take into account the generational quality. To this agenda, we need to perform two tasks: first, an impact assessment must consult all generations and second, the impact assessment must last for at least two or three generations (Porteous and Smith, 2001).

In China, to end domicide, we will also need a more effective system to reign in the power of the party-state. If rule of law is to be taken seriously, then the party-state should no longer stay outside the cage (Lubman, 1999) and should be disciplined and punished first by the law of the society rather than the law of the party. This however is far from adequate, as this thesis, following Marxist tradition, has repeatedly argued against blind faith in law. Law historically has been used as a tool by the ruling elites to materialise their interests (Thompson, 1975). It is more imperative to bring ideological debates back to the centre of politics, particularly China's pathways to modernisation and the relations between the nation, the state and the party in the political sphere. This entails a challenge to the historical writing of the Communist Party, particularly the state-led nationalism, which may undermine the political legitimacy of the party and create more political openings for democratisation. It also involves a systematic interrogation of current land-centred accumulation regime.

Particularly, we might want to start to rethink the ownership of land. We need to reacquire popular control of the land. Any land use changes can only be made after public debates rather than remotely by some bureaucratic technocrats in marriage with the business elites. We might also want to modify the current cadre promotion system. The new one should prioritise the social well-being of the citizens rather than the economic performance or political stability. In the case of *chaiqian*, rather than punishing the ruling elites based on the registered number of political complaints, which frequently leads to violent oppression, it is perhaps not a bad idea to tie aforementioned impact assessments with the career prospects of related state agents. Moreover, we may make efforts to abolish the demeaning *hukou* system, unjustly restraining the life chances and forcing people to capitalise on their bodies for a better livelihood.

The political project to end domicide will not succeed without effective resistance from potential victims. The task here first is to identify the domiciders and hold them accountable to the suffering of the displacees. Calvino (1978: 165) nicely puts this point, 'there are two ways to escape suffering it [the inferno]. The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and becomes such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to recognise who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, give them space'. To do so, we will also need to identify the political differences and obstacles that prevent and suppress popular uprisings and organised collective actions. This is not to support the effort to impose a romanticised political imagination to the domicide victims. What I am arguing is that the displaced need better knowledge about their common interests and shared problems under the disguise of dominant values and ideologies[2] (Shin, 2013). This should serve as a starting point to organise their interests, mobilise support and prepare for effective collective actions. In choosing repertoires, we need to strategically utilise and expand the political openings, push the political boundaries and in a more practical sense, make the best out of the worst situation. For most people facing the threat of domicide, they have already been under many sources of domination. It is unrealistic and perhaps unethical to hijack their activism against domicide, which impacts their livelihood, for our own radical political plan. For those displaced by the Expo, a contentious but practical political solution to improve

[2] In chapter 7, I have shown that the displacees were immersed in their own microcosms and constructed many differences between 'us' and 'them', which undermined the potential for collective resistance against the bulldozer regime. Some differences were expressions of *doxic* submission to dominant values, discourses and rules, such as property regime, *hukou* institutions, etc.

their current conditions is to take control of the empty apartments in their neighbourhoods, either using them as senior centres and small community libraries for instance, or simply squatting in them given that many families remain homeless. In fact, a few displaced have already taken this strategy and had some success in seizing their fate in their own hands.

This project will also need contributions from academics who occupy a privileged position in the society given the institutional support we receive to produce and critically examine the production of knowledge. We must live up to the institutional responsibility entrusted by the society to make positive changes in the world. To this agenda, we need to remain constantly vigilant to the symbolic power exercised in the academic site and in the political circle in producing, legitimating and contributing to ideological mystification and symbolic violence. This entails a reflexive gaze to our own positions in the society as well as the discipline we practice in. In working with people we aim to identify with, we need to stop thinking of ourselves as professionals in/from the academic community, but instead first and foremost as a human being with knowledge that we wish to share (Slater, 2010, Marcuse, 2010). For Chinese social scientists, perhaps it is about time to think about our motivations to work in academia in the first place. Is it because we love the frequent exchange of ideas and heated debates on political ideals, or is it because of the fame, the political prospect in the party-state, or the opportunities promised by the market force? What we also need to do is to transcend the artificial temporal boundaries of our writing and become more politically and spontaneously engaged in various moments of our academic practices and scholarly activism (Routledge, 1996, 2008).

On a final note, given that mega-events induced domicide or domicide in general is a global phenomenon, there is a potential to build connections between protesting actions in different places and scale up local resistances. As the challenge to domicide is a challenge to the distribution of power and to the prevailing value system in defining our social existence, it is easier to locate a common ground with collective actions or movements with other progressive agendas and to grow power through political alliances. This is exactly the politics David Harvey (2000) envisions. It is politically imperative to translate local militant particularism to a more progressive universal politics against neoliberal capitalism in order to put a halt on the running wheels of bulldozers.

Although my thesis ends here, the political project against domicide and the ruling elites are still on in Shanghai. It will never end until the ruling elites admit their wrongs and address popular grievances. It will never end until home ceases to be

treated as a commodity but a place of memory and attachment and a part of our identity. It will never end until ethics and morality become guiding principles of political conducts. It will never end until the displacees are treated as people in flesh and blood who deserve care and respect. A final message to the displaced: domicide victims, united!

Appendix I: Sample Interview Guide with Displacees

Sample Interview Guide [Displacees]

[Description]

Interview: Time, place (public/private), language (Shanghai dialect/Mandarin)

Interviewee: emotional state

Part A: Pre-displacement

1. Migration History
    a. When and from where did you move to your old place? How long had you lived in your old place?
    b. Where were you initially from? Would you call yourself Shanghai citizens? Place of origin?
2. Biography:
    a. What was your job? Where do you work? Describe your job? Commuting hours? Means of transport? Nature of your work unit (danwei)? When did you retire?
    b. Family: family structure (partner, siblings or offspring; age; education); family relationship;
3. Housing history
    a. Housing: describe your initial housing. Property ownership? Housing conditions? Any reparations or renovations? Floor area? Facilities? How many people lived there? Renting? Rented to whom? Do you know anything about the renters? Where did they come from? What were they doing in Shanghai? How do you think of their life? Property value?
    b. Meaning of homes: What does your previous home mean to you?
4. Place History: Describe your previous neighbourhood.
    a. What is the history of the place?
    b. The first words that come to your mind when you are describing the place?
    c. What makes that neighbourhood special?
    d. How was your relationship with your neighbours? How was the relationship between neighbours in general?
    e. Who did you normally come to for help if you were in trouble?
    f. What did you do in your spare time in that place? Leisure activities and leisure place?
    g. Were there any changes in the neighbourhood when you lived there? Government funding to improve the housing conditions? If not, what do you think are the major reasons?

h. Your community compared with surrounding new development? Contrast?
i. What does this place mean to you?

Ask if they have any pictures of their old places. Or took any photos. Or show them the pictures from the two books. Ask, do you recognise your home from those photos or pictures?

Part B: Displacement Process

5. Process
    a. Information about displacement? From where? Who? First reactions? Any preparations?
    b. Negotiating meetings: who? How many times? Talk about what? Disagreements? How to handle conflicts? Family conflicts? Trust? How do you feel? Describe one or two typical incidents?
    c. What are the first words that come to your mind related to *Chaiqian*? What did you feel when the red circle was drawn on your house?
    d. Knowledge?
        i. Policy
        ii. Law?
        iii. Rights?
    e. Overall process
        i. Length
        ii. Strategies?
        iii. Transition housing? Who and where? Why? Any help?
        iv. Happy about compensation? Why accept the offer?
        v. Knowledge of any harassment?
    f. Comments on *chaiqian* in general
        i. Fair? Justice?
        ii. Yangguang dongqian? How do you feel? What do you think?
        iii. Political connections? → Do you think you may be treated differently if you or your family members have a higher education background, work in state-owned enterprises, or be a party member? Please explain.
        iv. Forcible evictions: Do you know any forcible evictions or any families reluctant to move? What do you think are the major reasons? Are their claims reasonable? Were there any conflicts between displacers and those families?

Part C: After Displacement

6. Resettlement
    a. Why choose here?
    b. Other options?
    c. Moving-in costs?
    d. Ownership structure? Private ownership as main reason for accepting offer?

7. Major changes in family
    a. Living arrangement
    b. Work arrangement
8. Social contacts:
    a. Making new friends? Relations with others? Ask them for help?
    b. Relations with old friends? Still close-by?
    c. How spend free time?
9. Feelings about displacement?
    a. Feelings about demolished homes.
        i. How often do you think about your former neighbourhood?
        ii. Regular visits? Feelings about the changes?
10. Identification
    a. Do you consider your new home as part of the 'city centre' or 'rural villages' (*xiangxia*)?
    b. Do you feel you belong here?
11. Have you experienced any difficulties after displacement? What are your difficulties and why? Do you still have those now?
12. How do you feel about this neighbourhood? How would you introduce it to strangers or your relatives? Compared with your previous residency, what are the major advantages and disadvantages of this neighbourhood?
13. Are you involved in the planning of this new neighbourhood? Did the planning firm talk to you with regard to your needs? How were the major facilities and public infrastructures when you first moved in? Were there any changes made over the years? Was it through your community's appeal or public planning and investment?
14. How would you compare your displacement experience with others in the inner city or with those being displaced before you? Do you think you are better compensated than they were?

Other Questions

15. Political participation: what's your job title? Work unit? Member of any political organisations? Any rewards?
16. What do you think constitutes a good life? How do you interpret the theme of Shanghai Expo?
17. How do you think the government can manage *chaiqian* better?
18. If you were the mayor of Shanghai now, where would you like to locate Expo site? Do you want to demolish your neighbourhood? If so, where would you relocate the neighbourhood? Do you believe that the Expo strategy was an effective tool to regenerate your inner city and stimulate new round of economic boom in Shanghai?
19. Do you have any knowledge of forcible displacement in your neighbourhood back in 2005 and 2006? What were the conflicts?

Appendix II: Sample Interview Guide with Artists

Sample Interview Guide (Artists)

[Opening]

Introduce my research project and research objectives

Ask permission for recording;

[Interview Questions]

1. What is your motivation in producing a sketch of the Expo site before the demolition?
2. Who commissioned your research? To what extent did they have the power to decide the direction of your project? Was the final publication your own idea or were there some politics involved?
3. Why choose this book title? Who chose it? Why?
4. Could you please tell me some stories of your project?
5. I noticed that a lot of your work is about the everyday life of the people who lived there rather than pure architecture, what is your purpose in doing so?
6. On many occasions, I sense your ambivalent attitude toward the housing quality and the peaceful life of the displacees, why do you have such mixed feelings?
7. What do you think of that place while you worked there? How was the generous atmosphere in the neighbourhood before the displacement and during the displacement?
8. What attracts you the most to those places? Pudong and Puxi respectively? What are the differences between Pudong and Puxi?
9. A lot of your work is about documenting the old Shanghai in its authentic form before it vanishes under the rapid urban gentrification/regeneration, would you compare yourself to Ai Weiwei considering your work as some sort of activism? In documenting the 'old' Shanghai, what do you think in general about what we are losing, forgetting and missing? What do you think is at stake now? What is the relationship between old and new, between developmentalism and conservation?
10. What do you think about the Expo-induced displacement? From your point of view, what are the impacts upon the displacees, their homes and their communities?

[Closing]

Thank the interviewee. If possible, ask for contact information for further inquiries.

Appendix III: Sample Interview Guide with Planning Officers

Sample Interview Guide (Planning Officer)

1. The interviewee and his main responsibilities

1.1 May I know exactly your job description?

1.2 There was an administrative merger with the land management bureau a few years ago, so what exactly is the municipal planning bureau in charge of now? Is it only a bureau with two distinctive divisions or is there actually re-organisation within the bureau?

1.3 How big is this Bureau before the merger and now? What are its major responsibilities for the development of the city? And the planners?

1.4 Any conflicts between the two divisions bureaucratically, financially and professionally?

1.5 I noticed that the Expo Bureau serves as a coordinator for anything that relates to the Expo. But in terms of planning, what are the relations between your department and the Expo bureau? Particularly, what is the relationship with the Expo Land Reserve Centre? What are the roles of your department in each stage of preparation and construction of the expo site?

1.6 What is your involvement with the Expo-related planning issues?

2. On the Expo Project

2.1 There are numerous papers and documentaries that traces Shanghai's and China's link with the Expo, also huge amounts about the background regarding Shanghai's decision to bid for this project. But why choose the Expo? Could it be any other major events or projects? Were there any alternatives back then?

2.2 Did the decision to bid for the Expo come from the municipality or the central government?

2.3 There has been some unofficial information going around that the Party gave Shanghai the Expo because Beijing already got the Olympics. Were there any tensions between Beijing and Shanghai back then? Was the choice of Shanghai out of the Party's decision to balance the power of regional development centre?

2.4 What does Shanghai or the central government want to achieve through this project?

2.5 Hosting the Expo is a huge undertaking. Where does the money come from, especially for the investment of the major infrastructures?

2.6 Were there any downsizing of the original Expo project and why?

3. On the Expo, Planning and Shanghai's development

3.1 How does the Expo project fit in Shanghai's master plan and Shanghai's overall transformation toward the four international centres?

3.2 How does the Expo project contribute to the overall waterfront redevelopment of Huangpu River? The key rationales behind the Huangpu River Waterfront redevelopment plan? The cross-river links between Puxi section and Pudong section?

3.3 The event supporters always quote from Mayor Wang Daohan that the Expo was going to make long lasting impacts upon Shanghai's development for at least 50 years. Do you agree? What do you think are the major impacts to Shanghai? Are you still convinced that such impacts are going to last for 50 years?

3.4 Were there any projects delayed or cancelled because of the shift of priorities since most resources have been diverted to the Expo?

3.5 The expo is themed on city and city life. And it explicitly expresses its strong interest to demonstrate and promote best practices for a better city and better life. Could you please give me an example that Shanghai offered to the world?

3.6 Back to the theme, what do you think contributes to a good life exactly? Such good life is for whom?

3.7 We both are clear that the English translation of the Expo theme does not correspond to the Chinese theme at all. My question is which version came up first? And, why, as the Chinese theme indicates, cities make life better? Isn't it bizarre that the last sub-theme focuses upon the urban-rural integration whilst the theme contains a discriminative element against the countryside and promotes further urban-rural divide? How do you interpret the theme of the Shanghai World Expo?

3.8 Expo has not only facilitated the transformation of the space at the Expo site, but also other huge parts of the city, especially inner city of Shanghai –which is labelled as *Penghuqu* or *Weipengjianwu*? Why did those parts that are unrelated to the Expo have to be demolished as well if not for the project at all? Why cannot slow the pace of redevelopment?

4. ON EXPO-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT

4.1 Why choose the current site for hosing the Expo? Were there any other options available back then? If yes, who evaluated those options? The decision is based on what criteria? When was the final site chosen? Who made the decision or which department? Collective wisdom and party boss's will?

4.2 Were there any different voices in regard to the choice of Expo site from different sides, government, academics, activists, the citizens and more importantly people who lived on the Expo site? Why were they rejected?

4.3 I noticed a term, 'Planning Coordination Zone' from the Expo Planning Document. May I know if it is a new creation? Were they purely residential? Based on what criteria were they chosen? Was it all about economic reasons to reduce the costs of relocation? Regarding the architecture within such planning coordination zones, were all the changes surgical, as 'modernising' the facade?

With whose investment? To your knowledge, were there any collective actions that were able to influence/change the expo planning and enlist their residential blocks to such zones? Also, to what extent do the residents have a say in terms of the changes to their homes and communities?

4.4 I heard that there was considerable preparatory research for the Expo planning. I am wondering if those documents were ever made public. Why and why not? At what stage was the general public involved?

4.5 A related question is about the residents and the business owners who used to live on the Expo site, i.e. the displacees. Did they participate in the Expo planning and in terms of what? Did your department conduct any social surveys researching their attitude about the development and consequential displacement conducted or outsourced by the planning department? If not, who is in charge of that? Was it all about a sound living condition? What about their community ties and social bonds?

4.6 From The Land Use Map in the compiled planning document of the Expo, I noticed some categorisations of the land, will you please explain the difference between the second category, the third category and the fourth for residential land? Based on what criteria?

4.7 Also, it seems that a large portion was labelled or generalised as *Penghuqu* or *Weipengjianhu*, will you please explain how *Pendhuqu* is defined in the profession of planning?

4.8 Why were Sanlin and Pujiang chosen as major sites to resettle the Expo-induced displacees? How are these two resettlement towns related to Shanghai's master plan? How do they fit in Shanghai's 'One City and Nine Towns' strategy and the "1966" Plan? How was the land acquired from the farmers? Are these two resettlement projects intended to be developed as demonstration case for better life? Also, what does 'Expo' really mean to those resettlement projects?

A SIDE QUESTION WOULD BE THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE CHANGE FROM THE FORMER TO THE LATTER?

Relevant question: 1. Is there a physical geographical boundary of Shanghai's city centre versus Shanghai's countryside?

2. The metro lines: Line 8 and Line 6: I learnt from my respondents in Pujiang that Line 8 was planned long before their displacement. When exactly was it planned? Also, comparatively, Line 8 is closer to the resettlement project in Pujiang whilst Line 6 in Sanlin is quite far, why is there such a difference for the displacees? Was it a purely technical decision? Does it have something to do with Pujiang's status as one of the pilot projects of Shanghai's One City Nine Towns project?

4.9 What is the role of the municipal planning for the planning and design of those two new resettlement projects? ASKING FOR REFERENCE TO BOTH PLANNERS IF POSSIBLE!

4.10 Return to the question of displacement, a large portion of the land used to be of industrial use. There were two major factories in the Expo site, i.e. the Jiangnan Shipyard and the Shanghai Steel Manufacturing companies. Before the Expo, were there any plans from the bureau to relocate these two factories since they were claimed to be a major source of pollution? Did those plans fail? Why or why not? And why was the Expo able to facilitate this process?

4.11 The Expo is now over. A critical issue would be the evaluation of the post-Expo impact. And many scholars have brought up the issue of Expo legacies. What do you think are the legacies? Do you think these legacies could justify the cost in hosting it?

4.12 With regard to the post-Expo planning, could you please elaborate a bit more on how the land was going to be re-developed? Were there any changes from the initial plan included in the bidding book or the planning book? Was the general public aware of such plan? Why would the Urban Exhibition Hall charge entrance fee to go inside and check out the plans for the future development of the post-Expo planning? Were there any plans for affordable housing?

4.13 For the two resettlement housing projects, what are the future plans to improve the community there?

5. **ON POLITICS**

5.1 There was political turbulence during the Expo. The former Mayor, Chen Liangyu, was arrested because of embezzlement of public social security funds although rumours around that he was pushed out from office because of the political struggles within the party in Beijing. My interest is how does his stepping down from office influence the development of the Expo? Pujiang and Sanlin? And Shanghai in general? Did it create any shock to the planning department?

ASKING FOR REFERENCE TO ACCESS

1. Minhang District Planning Bureau—Pujiang Town
2. Pudong New District Planning Department—Sanlin Town
3. Huangpu River Waterfront Redevelopment Office
4. Other contacts he knows might answer some questions I have raised?

Appendix IV: Sample Interview Guide with Residents Committee Staff

Interview Guide (Residents Committee)

1. On Residents Committee:
    a. When was the residents committee set up? Through what channel, election or appointment? Re-election?
    b. What are the major responsibilities of the residents committee? Who usually comes to the committee meetings? Why? Ask for an example?
    c. The structure of the residents committee. And the relations with the Party?
    d. The personnel of the committee? Their demographic characteristics (esp. their party membership; education; employment status before working in this organisation)
    e. The administrative ties with the residents committee or *jiedao* where the displacees come from?
    f. The administrative relations with Sanlin Township government/Pujiang Township government, and with the property management companies?
    g. The Expo tie: as a resource or brand, has it been used in any activity in community management or liaisons, or bargaining for support?

2. On the population profile and the community
    a. Asking the interviewee to introduce the community. E.g. What makes this place special? If possible, ask the interviewee briefly to introduce the history of this place? Any particular moments or events in this place (symbolic visits from officials of the Expo Bureau or Shanghai municipality, etc.)?
    b. The population profile of this community.
        i. How many households currently live in this place? Empty flats?
        ii. The general profile of the displacees: age group; gender; employment; education; etc.
        iii. Renters?
        iv. *Hukou* status; and the consequential issue of how to manage those people who haven't updated their *hukou* status at this place?
3. On the community environment/facilities
    a. What is the responsibility of the residents committees in maintaining the facilities?
4. On the community management
    a. The conflicts with the property management company. Vegetable planting in the public space; parking; pets raising; chicken keeping; death rituals;
    b. The population management: (if possible, asking the respondents to provide concrete examples):
        i. Relief-providing?

        ii. Community organisations: association of the seniors; the youth; the kids;
        iii. Community activities; (esp. Expo-related)
        iv. Other activities or organisations that aim to reconfigure the community bonds;
    c. Community safety;
    d. Community management: programmes; difficulties;
    e. Property owners association;
5. The role of RC in the situation of conflicts:
    a. Within-household conflicts?
    b. Conflicts between neighbours? How do they intervene and based on what principles?
    c. Conflicts or tensions between residents with the up-level authorities?
    d. For The No.1 committee only: the issue of the high voltage power towers
    e. Maintaining social stability; (letters and visits from the residents)

NB: if the respondents have worked in their original neighbourhoods where they were displaced, then ask them about the displacement experience and their role in mobilising the rest.

Appendix V: Survey [Chinese Version]

世博动迁居民对世博动迁及动迁对生活质量影响感知的调查问卷

背景介绍

尊敬的先生/女士：

您好。我们是英国爱丁堡大学与上海师范大学中欧城市比较研究中心《世博动迁对居民生活质量影响》课题研究的调研员，正在贵小区开展问卷调查。我们希望通过本次问卷调查，了解您对世博动迁的看法和世博动迁对您以及您的家庭所造成的影响，并通过学术途径、媒体途径真实客观地反映调研的结果，希望对未来的政策制定提供参考。我们将严格遵守科研伦理道德规范，您所提供的资料将会严格保密，除了用于学术用途之外，绝对不会透露给第三方，而您的个人信息在任何情况下都不会泄露。问卷首页的编码将仅用于问卷统计。完成此份问卷大约需要40分钟。您可以选择自填问卷，亦可由我们的调研员协助您填写。填写完成之后，您会收到一个环保袋作为我们对您的感谢。在此，我们向您对我们研究工作的支持致以衷心的谢意。

日期	
时间	
地点	
问卷编号	

A. **受访者基本信息**

A1a. 您是否是户主？

□ 是 □ 否

A1b. 您家何时搬入此地？_____年

A2. 您的最高学历：

□ 研究生及以上

□ 本科

□ 高中

□ 初中

□小学或以下

□文盲

A3a. 动迁前职业：

□ 政府机关雇员 □国企雇员

□ 其他企业雇员 □ 自由职业

□ 退休 □ 农民

□ 下岗、失业

□ 其他，请说明_____

AB1 和 AB2 仅请失业、下岗、退休人员作答。

AB1: 您何时失业、下岗或者退休_____年

AB2: 您失业、下岗、退休的原因

□ 单位倒闭 □ 单位合并

□ 单位重组 □ 单位转制

□ 被解雇 □ 主动离职

□ 提前退休 □ 法定年龄退休

□ 病假 □ 其他，请说明 _____

AB3-AB5 仅请动迁之前农民作答。

AB3.您是否从事第二职业？

□ 是➔ 请继续回答 AB10

□ 否➔请跳至 AB11

AB4. 您的第二职业是 _____

AB5. 农活是否是您的主要生产活动？

□ 是 □ 否

B. 动迁后家庭基本情况

B1a. 您是否变更了您的户口登记?

□ 是➔请跳至 C

□ 否➔请继续回答 B1b

B1b. 如果您没有更改您的户口，原因是：

□ 想要继续享有户口所在地的福利待遇；

□ 为子女的教育考虑，想进入老房子所在区域的高质量学校；

□ 感觉迁了户口有种正式成为乡下人的感觉

□ 我依然觉得自己属于自己老房子那里

□ 大家都没有迁，所以我也就不迁了

□ 其他，请注明_____

C. 动迁前后家庭居住条件

C1. 动迁前，您家老房子属于哪个区?

□ 黄浦区

□ 浦东新区

□ 卢湾区

□ 闵行区

□ 其他，_____

C2.动迁前，您在老房子住了多久?

_____年

C3. 房屋建造的时间：

□ 1949 年以前 □ 50 年代

□ 60 年代 □ 70 年代

□ 80 年代 □ 90 年代

□ 2000 年以后 □ 不清楚

C4. 房屋结构：

□ 多层楼房 □ 洋房、别墅

□ 多层农民住宅 □ 农民平方

□ 棚户、危棚简屋 □ 石库门

C5. 您的老房子是否有以下设施?

1=有 2=没有

C5a	阳台	
C5b	独立厨房	
C5c	独立厕所	
C6d	淋浴设备	
C6e	管道煤气	

C6. 您的老房子是否邻近您或者您的配偶的工作单位?

□ 是 □ 否

C7. 以下哪个单位负责管理您的老房子?

□ 工作单位

□ 市房管局及下属房管所

□ 物业管理公司

□ 里委或者街道

□ 私房，自行管理

C8. 是否是租赁住房?

□ 是➔请继续作答 C9 至 C11

□ 否➔请继续作答 C12a 至 C13

C9 至 C11 仅请租赁住房家庭回答。

C9 您从何处租得老房子?

□ 工作单位 □ 房管局

□ 市场交易 □ 亲戚或朋友

C10. 房租价格?_____元

C11. 为何没有自行购房并迁出?

□ 房价过高 □ 首付太多

□ 房贷还不起 □ 租金低廉

□ 观望 □ 单位住房，未曾出售

□工作不稳定，随时可能调动

□知晓动迁计划，等待动迁换大面积房屋

□其他，请说明_____

C12a. 您以前老房子的类型：

□ 商品房 □ 自建房

□ 动迁安置房 □ 单位房改房

□ 经济适用房、廉租房等

□ 其他，请说明_____

C12b. 您房屋的所有权：

a. 家庭成员及配偶所有_____%

b. 单位拥有_____%

c. 亲友所有_____%

d. 国家所有_____%

C13: 购房投资:_____元

C14. 动迁前的 10 年中，您的住房条件是否有任何变化?

□ 非常大的改善➔请继续作答 CC1

□ 改善不大➔请继续作答 CC1

□ 没有变化➔ 请跳至 C15

□ 有些恶化了➔ 请跳至 C15

□ 严重退化了→请跳至 C15

CC1. 哪个部门促成了这一变化？
□ 街道 □ 里委 □ 单位
□ 房管部门 □ 个人 □ 邻里集体行动
□ 其他，请说明_____
C15. 动迁前的 10 年中，您所在小区、里弄、村落的社区环境、设施是否有所变化？
□ 非常大的改善➔ 请继续作答 CC2
□ 改善不大➔请继续作答 CC2
□ 没有变化➔ 请跳至 D1
□ 有些恶化了➔ 请跳至 D1
□ 严重退化了→请跳至 D1
CC2. 哪个部门促成了这一变化？
□ 街道 □ 里委 □ 单位
□ 邻里集体自发行动 □ 开发商
□ 其他，请说明_____

D. 动迁及安置过程

D1. 您从何处得知您所居住的地方要动迁？
□ 电视、网络及其他媒体
□ 小区大会
□ 小区内动迁时张贴的通知
□ 其他，请说明_____
D2. 您何时得知您所居住的地方要动迁？
□ 申博期间
□ 2005-2006 年世博动迁工作正式开展
D2a. 至正式动迁前，您是否有为争取动迁能够得到较好安置去了解政策？
□ 有 □ 没有
D2b. 至正式动迁前，您是否有为争取得到更好安置去改善老房子的居住条件？
□ 有 □ 没有
D3. 当时，您对下列文件是否了解？
□ 2001 年《城市房屋拆迁管理条例》
□ 2001 年《上海市城市房屋拆迁管理实施细则》
□ 《中国 2010 年上海世博会场址房屋拆迁若干规定》
□ 您所在区级政府世博动迁口径
□ 中华人民共和国土地法
□ 其他，请注明_____
D4. 如果您知晓上述法律，请问您对具体内容的了解程度？
□ 我一点也不了解 □ 我知道一些
□ 我非常了解
D5a. 您通过何种渠道了解上述法律、法规、政策？
□ 政府宣传
□ 网络、报纸、杂志及其他媒体
□ 邻居、朋友、亲友
□ 动迁公司
□ 居委会
□ 律师、法援人员
□ 社工、志愿者
□ 其他，请说明_____
D5b. 您是否利用了或者试图利用法律武器来保护自己的权利、权益不守侵犯？
□ 是➔请跳至 D6
□ 否➔请继续作答 D5c
D5c. 请问您不想用法律武器的原因？
□ 成本太高
□ 求助无门，不知道怎么找好律师
□ 官官相护，打官司也没用
□ 律师不一定敢接
□ 其他，请说明_____
D6. 您如何看待当时的动迁政策：
□ 我觉得动迁政策很阳光，很公开、公平、公正
□ 不够透明
□ 不够公开
□ 政策变动太快、太大，难以及时掌握
□ 政策太复杂，条文语言晦涩，难懂
□ 政策有互相矛盾之处
□ 我怀疑政策是否能够严格有效地执行
□ 动迁政策的获取途径有限，内部信息太多
□ 我不感兴趣
□ 其他，请说明_____
D7. 动迁时，当时给您提供的补偿方案包括
□ 按人头补偿，以优惠价在安置基地购房
□按房屋面积补偿，以优惠价在安置基地购房
□货币补偿，以优惠价在市中心邻近区域购房
□ 其他，请说明_____
D8. 您在动迁过程中是否遭遇以下情况？
□ 1. 给您或者您家里人施加压力
□ 2. 通过雇佣社会闲杂人员恐吓、殴打
□ 3. 破坏小区居住环境，以至于无法居住，如断水、断电、断路、断通讯，外来务工人员破坏房屋等；
□ 4. 强拆
□5. 给您或者您家人的工作单位施压
□ 6. 其他，请说明_____

D9. 上述情况，您虽未亲身经历，您是否知道身边的邻居遭受过这些事？
□ 有，请说明：_____
□ 没有

D10a. 下列哪些部门参与了您家的动迁过程？
□ 政府机关（区政府、街道、镇政府）
□ 单位
□ 动迁公司
□ 居委会、村委会
□ 律师、社工
□ 其他，请说明_____

D10b. 请说明您对上述机构的满意程度。

政府机关		1. 非常不满 2. 不满 3. 一般 4. 满意 5. 非常满意 6. 不适用
单位		
动迁公司		
居委会、村委会		
律师、社工		
其他（若有）		

D11a. 您在过渡房里住了多久？____月

D11b.过渡房离下列哪个地点比较近？
□ 动迁安置房 □老房子

D11c.动迁补助的过渡费是否足够支付房租？
□ 能够 □ 不能够

D11d. 过渡房是否容易租到？
□ 容易 □ 不容易

D11e. 您新家的装修时间是否包含在了过渡费补助的月份中？
□ 是 □ 否

D11f. 政府是否提供了搬场服务？
□ 有，计_____次
□ 没有

D12a. 动迁谈判时，是否有样板房供您参观、检查、体验？
□ 有
□ 没有

D12b. 您是否可以自行在安置小区参观？
□ 可以
□ 不可以

D12c. 您是否能够进入样板房内部检查房屋？
□ 能
□ 不能

D13. 如果您未能进入房屋内部检查，你当时是否觉得不确定、犹豫或者担心？
□ 是
□ 不是

D14. 除了用于以优惠价购得安置房源并用于装修，添置必要电器、家具之外，动迁安置款是否仍有剩余？
□ 是，大概_____%
□ 基本没有剩余

D15a. 动迁谈判过程中，您是否知道您的邻居的补偿安置情况？
□ 知道 □ 不知道

D15b. 动迁谈判过程中，您是否向您的邻居透露过您家的补偿安置情况？
□ 有 □ 没有

D15c. 动迁谈判过程中，动迁经办人员是否暗示或者威胁您不要对外泄露您家庭的补偿安置情况？
□ 有 □ 没有

D16a. 在介绍安置房源时，动迁经办人员是否曾向您展示安置房型图？
□ 有 □ 没有

D16b. 在介绍安置房源时，动迁经办人员是否曾向您展示安置小区图？
□ 有 □ 没有

D16c. 您的房型、小区图样与您实际居住的房型、小区图样的差别有多大？
□ 非常大➔ 请继续作答 16d
□ 微小改变➔继续作答 16d
□没有改变，完全一样➔ 请跳至 D17

D16d. 您认为这些改变是否能够接受？
□ 能够 □ 不能

D17. 与同等条件的邻居相比，您觉得您所得到的安置
□ 非常不公平
□ 不公平
□ 还说得过去
□ 公平
□ 非常公平

D18 与您自己的期望相比，您觉得您得到的安置
□ 非常不公平
□ 不公平
□ 尚可
□ 公平
□ 非常公平

问题 D19 至 D20g 仅请农民动迁户作答。

D19. 世博动迁在征收您的宅基地的时候是如何补偿您的？

□ 基于有证建筑面积与房屋质量评估的货币补偿

□ 基于家庭人口的补偿

□ 其他，请说明_____

D20. 请问您或者您的家人是否得到下述补偿？

□ 青苗费

□ 集体土地上附着物补偿

□ 劳动力安置补偿➔请继续作答 D20a

□ 农村居民养老项目、镇保➔请继续作答 D20b

□ 小城镇医疗保险➔ 请继续作答 D20c

□ 最低生活保障➔请继续作答 D20d

□ 再就业、就业培训➔请继续作答 D20e

□ 粮食补贴➔ 请继续作答 D20f and D20g

□ 其他，请说明 _____

D20a. 如果您接受了一次性买断，那么政府提供的补偿金为 _____元直到_____岁。

D20b. 征地时，补偿为_____元\月，现在为_____元\月。

D20c. 每个医保年度我的医保免费金额为_____元，需自付_____元，之后按_____%支付医疗费用。

D20d. 我每月领取最低生活保障_____元\月。

D20e. 如果政府为您安排了就业岗位，该岗位是_____，工资为_____，交纳_____金。

D20g. 如果为您提供了职业培训，该培训是否能够有效地帮您在就业市场找到工作？

□ 非常无效 □ 无效

□ 一般性 □ 有效

□ 非常有效

F. **对住房条件与小区的满意度**

结合您对世博动迁安置的期望，与您在老房子的住房体验相比，您对本次动迁在下列方面对您的影响如何看待？

1=非常不满意

2=不满意

3=一般

4=满意

5=非常满意

因素	看法
E1. 室内空间大小的改变	
E2. 室内房型设计的改变	
E3. 水、电、煤的提供	
E4. 有线电视、网络的供给	
E5. 公共空间设施维护	
E6. 卫生条件的改变	
E7. 房屋质量的改变	
E8. 消防设施	
E9. 安全感	
E10. 噪音、隔音	

结合您对世博动迁安置的期望，与您在老房子的住房体验相比，您对本次动迁在下列方面对您的影响如何看待？

1=非常不满意

2=不满意

3=一般

4=满意

5=非常满意

服务、设施	看法
E11. 休憩场所	
E12. 康乐设施 （健身、玩耍）	
E13. 停车管理 (自行车、轿车)	
E14. 景观设计（含绿化）	
E15. 建筑外观设计	
E16: 小区卫生环境	
E17: 小区保安	
E18: 物业	
E19: 医疗	
E20: 公共交通	
E21.学校	
E22. 购物	
E23: 老人活动中心	
E24: 周边总体情况	

E25. 公共设施、服务的使用情况

E25a. 医院	□ 基本上在本地就医 □ 偶尔在本地就医 □ 基本不在本地就医，一般都去_____的医院，原因是 ____
E25b 教育（幼儿园、小学、中学）	□ 本地就读 □ 不在本地就读，去_____去的学校读书，原因是 _____
E25c 公共交通	□基本使用本地交通 □ 基本不用，原因是 _____

请选择您不使用本地服务、设施的原因。
1 本地服务无法提供
2 质量差
3. 价钱贵
4.户口没有迁过来
5. 习惯了其他地区的服务
6. 本地不方便
7. 自己有其他途径
8. 其他，说明_____

E. 动迁前后邻里关系与社区发展

F1a. 动迁前和动迁后您都与下列那些对象有接触？

	动迁前	动迁后
F1a. 邻居		
F1b. 朋友		
F1c. 亲戚		
F1d. 同事		
F1e. 通过社会活动认识的朋友		
F1f. 家人		
F1g. 网友		
F1h. 老乡		
F1i. 我与他人没什么交往		

F1b. 您动迁后平均一天跟多少位邻居有面对面的接触（包括闲谈、点头、打招呼等）？
____位，与之前比
□ 增加了
□ 减少了
□ 差不多

F2a. 动迁前您平时交往的对象和您住在一个地方吗？
□ 全部住在一个地方
□ 大多数住在一个地方
□ 少部分人住在一个地方
□ 没有人和我住在一个地方

F2b. 现在您平时交往的对象是否和您住在同一小区？
□ 全部都住在一个小区或世博家园
□ 大多数人住在一个小区或世博家园
□ 少部分人住在一个小区或世博家园
□ 没人住在一个小区或世博家园

F2c. 您对您的人际、邻里交往关系的改变怎么看？
□ 我觉得很开心。
□ 和以前的交往对象失去联系，我感到很难过。
□ 我有一种被孤立的感觉。
□ 我非常想念以前的交往对象。
□ 这一改变对我没有什么影响。

F2d. 动迁后，您觉得您的交往圈子与以前相比_____
□ 缩小了
□ 扩大了
□ 没有改变

F3. 动迁前与动迁后您与邻居交往的频繁程度？
1=经常； 2=偶尔； 3=很少； 4=从不
5=不适用

交往方式	动迁前	动迁后
F3a. 串门		
F3b. 外面碰到了打招呼		
F3c. 一块吃饭、打牌、娱乐		
F3d. 一起运动		
F3e. 打电话或发短信		
F3f. 网络		
F3g. 参加里委组织的活动		
F3h. 参加邻里自发组织的活动		
F3i: 互相帮助（照看老人、小孩、病人、安全）		

F4a. 您如何评价动迁前您所居住的社区人际关系如何？

彼此不友好	1	2	3	4	5	彼此友好
各管各的	1	2	3	4	5	互相照顾
互相猜疑	1	2	3	4	5	互相信赖
彼此陌生	1	2	3	4	5	彼此熟识

F4b. 您如何评价动迁后您所居住的小区人际关系的变化？

不再友好	1	2	3	4	5	更加友好
不再支持	1	2	3	4	5	更加支持
不再信任	1	2	3	4	5	更加信任
不再熟识	1	2	3	4	5	更加熟识

F5a.如果说，“我对我以前居住的小区很有归属感（感觉自己属于那个地方）”，您对它的同意程度？

□ 完全赞成 □ 赞成
□ 一般 □ 不赞成
□ 完全不赞成

F5b. 您对您现在居住的世博家园还有这样的归属感吗？

□ 一点也没有
□ 也许有一点
□ 不太清楚
□ 有很强的归属感

F6.您现在在住房、小区或者生活上遇到问题，您找以下单位的频繁程度？

1=经常 2=有时 3=很少 4=从不 5=不适用

机构	频繁程度
a. 物业	
b. 开发商	
c. 户口所在地的里委	
d.世博家园的里委	
e. 业委会	
f. 媒体	
g. 浦江镇政府或三林镇政府	
h.户口所在地街道、区政府	
i. 其他政府机关	
j. 其他业主	

F6b.您对贵小区居委会工作的评价

□ 非常不满意 □ 不满意
□ 一般 □满意
□ 非常满意

F6c. 您所在小区是否已经成立业委会？

□ 已经成立
□ 尚未成立，原因是_____
□ 不清楚

G. 通勤

G1. 您日常活动，如买菜、购物、工作、访友、休闲等，需要花在路上多长时间？

□ 不到 30 分钟 □ 30-45 分钟之间
□ 45-1 个小时之间 □ 超过一个小时

G2. 你的主要交通工具是

□ 步行 □ 公共租赁自行车
□ 公交车
□ 自己的自行车、电动自行车、摩托车
□ 私家车 □ 地铁

G3-G5 仅供动迁前非农民作答。

G3: 您还经常去你老房子哪里吗？_____ 次/月

G4: 您还会常常想起老房子哪里吗？_____ 次/月

G5. 您回到老房子或者想念老房子那里的原因是_____

□ 习惯哪里了，情不自禁地跑回去
□ 怀旧
□ 对那里比较熟悉
□ 那边东西多，质量好，价格公道
□ 觉得自己的根就在那里
□ 其他，请注明_____

H. 其他

H1.您觉得您的老房子有必要被拆掉吗？

□ 有➔请继续回答 H2
□ 没有➔ 请跳至 H3

H2. 若有可能，您希望被安置在哪里？

□ 原地 □ 原老房子所在辖区
□ 离老房子越近越好 □郊区 □ 无所谓

H3. 如果不是为了世博腾地，政府有意改善您当时的住房，您是否愿意支付一定的费用？

□ 愿意➔请继续作答 H4
□ 不愿意➔请跳至 H5

H4. 您愿意支付的上限是总成本的_____%

H5. 您不愿意支付的原因是 _____

□ 房屋质量尚可，不需要改善
□ 害怕政府拆迁
□ 房屋产权归属不明确
□ 不喜欢住在那个地方，计划搬出
□ 不打算在那里常住
□ 其他，请说明_____

H6. 世博动迁时是否有提供回搬或者搬迁至邻近老房子区域的补偿方案？

□ 没有 □有

H7. 如果有可能，您是否愿意回搬？

□ 非常愿意 □ 愿意 □ 无所谓 □ 不愿意

H8. 总体来说，您对本次世博动迁是否满意？
□ 非常不满意　□ 不满意
□ 一般　□ 满意
□ 非常满意

H9.世博动迁时，您是否被告知世博会后您老房子所在土地的未来规划？
□ 知道　□ 不知道

H10. 世博地块目前正在进行二次开发，您觉得按照公共利益动迁您的家庭，是否公平？
□ 公平
□ 不公平

H11. 您觉得本次动迁对您生活质量的影响？
□ 大大降低了生活质量
□ 降低了生活质量
□ 没有改变
□ 改善了生活质量
□ 大大改善了生活质量

H12a. 请描述下您当时动迁的感受？
很高兴　1　2　3　4　5　很难过

H12b.请描述您对安置的感受？
很满足　1　2　3　4　5　很失望

如果您希望我们的调查员与您联系做深入访谈，了解您家庭本次世博动迁的经历，请与我们的调查员索取项目负责人的名片，并请留下您的联络方式。如果您希望将来收到本研究的调研报告，请在此留下您的联系方式。

□ 电子版，邮箱:_____

□ 纸质版，收件人:_____

地址:_____，邮编：_____

我们在此再次对您的支持表示感谢！

Appendix VI: Survey [English Translation]

Questionnaire on Expo-Induced Displacement and the Impact upon the Displacees' Quality of Life

INTRODUCTION

We are survey researchers from the University of Edinburgh and Sino-European Comparative Urban Research Centre of Shanghai Normal University. We are collecting surveys on your perceptions of Expo-induced displacement and the changes in your life as well as you and your family's basic socio-economic background. We would like to study the impacts of Shanghai Expo upon your families. We aim to bring the issues of expo-induced displacement to public deliberation so as to provide references for policy designs or future urban planning practices and urban development strategies. We will strictly follow relevant regulations and all the survey data will only be used for research and publication purposes. We will keep your information confidential; the code on this page is only for data coding purposes. The survey will take approximately 30-40 minutes. Upon completion of this survey, you will receive a reusable bag as our appreciation for your input. Thanks for your valuable time and support.

Date	
Time	
Place	
Questionnaire Coding	

A. **BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT**

A1a. Are you the head of the household?
□ Yes □ No
A1b. When did your family move to this place?
A2. Your Highest Education:
□ Postgraduate and above
□ Undergraduate □ Senior high school
□ Junior high school □ Primary school
□ Illiterate

A3a. Before the displacement, your occupation:
□ Staff at government agencies
□ State-owned enterprises employees
□ Employed by enterprises of non-state nature
□ Self-employed
□ Retired □ Farmer
□Other, please specify:_____

The following part is for the retiree/unemployed/laid-off only.

AB1: When did you retire, get laid off or become unemployed?

Year

AB2: The reason for your retirement, unemployment, or laid-off:

□ Work unit bankrupt

□ Enterprise merged

□ Employees re-configured

□ Work unit transformation

□ Fired

□ Quit

□ Early retirement

□ Legal age to retire

□ Other, specify _____

The following part is for farmers only

AB3: Do you have a second job?

□ Yes➔ continue to AA10

□ No➔skip to AA11

AB4. What is/was your second job?

AB5: Was farming your major activity?

□ Yes □ No

B. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD AFTER THE DISPLACEMENT

AFTER DISPLACEMENT

B1. Did you update your household registration to this new residency?

□ Yes➔ Skip to C □ No➔continue to B1b

B1b. If not, please indicate the reason:

□ To remain entitled to the welfare benefits of my previous residency district;

□ For education purpose, i.e. to get enrolled in high quality schools in original places;

□ I feel like *xiangxiaren* (countryside men) if I changed my household registration here;

□ I am still attached to my original places.

□ I am following the majority's practice.

□ other, please specify_____

C. YOUR HOUSING CONDITION BEFORE THE DISPLACEMENT

C1. Before Displacement, which district did you live in?

□ Huangpu District □ Pudong New District

□ Luwan District □ Minhang District

□ other

C2. How long have you lived in your previous home? _____

C3. Year Built

□ Before 1949 □ the 1950s

□ the 1960s □ the 1970s

□ the 1980s □ the 1990s

□ 2000 or later □ unknown

C4. Type of Structure

□ Apartment of various stories

□ Villa

□ Peasant building with two or more stories

□ Peasant building with one story

□ Penghu

□ Shikumen

C5. Please indicate if your previous residency has the following facilities?

1=YES 2=NO

C5a	Balcony	
C5b	Independent kitchen	
C5c	Independent bathroom	
C5d	Shower facilities	
C5e	Piped gas	

C6. Is your residence located in the work unit place of yours or your spouse's?

□ Yes □ No

C7. Which institution is responsible for managing the housing?

□ Work unit

□ City housing bureau

□ Property management company

□ Liwei or Jiedao

□ Private house, self-maintenance

C8. Was it rented?

□ Yes➔Continue to C9 to C11

□ No➔Continue to C12a to C13

C9 to C11 is for the renters only.

C9 From whom did you rent your housing?
□ Work unit
□ Housing Management Bureau
□ Private market
□ Family or relatives

C10. How much was the rent: ____RMB
C10a: Was the rent stable? □ Yes □ No

C11. Why did not you purchase private housing and move out?
□ The housing price was too high
□ Cannot afford the down payment
□ The mortgage payment was too high
□ The rent was low
□ Wait and see
□ The work unit does not sell housing
□ The job is unstable, could move at any time
□ Knowing future displacement
□ Other, please specify

C12a. The Type of your previous housing
□ Commercial housing with full ownership
□ Self-built housing
□ Resettlement housing
□ Privatised work unit housing
□ Privatised city housing bureau housing
□ Other, please specify_____

C12b. The Ownership Arrangement of your property
□ Family members and spouses: _____%
□ Danwei _____%
□ Relatives _____%
□ State _____%

C13: investment: RMB

C14. In the 10 years before the displacement, how would you describe the changes in housing conditions or community conditions of your previous residence
□ Significant➔ Continue to CC1
□ A little➔continue to CC1
□ Nothing➔ Skip to C15
□ Deteriorated➔ Skip to C15
□ Severely dilapidated→Skip to C15

CC1. Whose efforts contribute to the changes?
□ Street-office
□ Liwei (residents committees)
□ Danwei
□ Housing management authorities
□ Personal
□ Neighbourhood collective efforts
□ other, specify_____

C15. In the 10 years before the displacement, how would you describe the changes in your previous neighbourhood?
□ Significant➔ Continue to CC2
□ A little➔continue to CC2
□ Nothing➔ Skip to D1
□ Deteriorated➔ Skip to D1
□ Severely dilapidated→Skip to D1

CC1. Whose efforts contribute to the changes?
□ Street-office
□ Liwei (residents committees)
□ Danwei
□ Neighbourhood collective efforts
□ Private investors
□ Other, specify_____

D. DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT PROCESS

D1. Where did you get the information regarding displacement of your neighbourhood?
□ TV, internet and other media
□ Community meeting
□ Final Chaiqian Announcement
□ Other, please specify_____

D2. When did you learn that your home is going to be demolished?
□ During the Expo Bid
□ Around 2005-2006 when the final notice came from the government

D2a. Before final chaiqian, did you make any efforts to study the regulatory frameworks?
□ Yes □ No

D2b. Before final chaiqian, did you make any efforts to improve housing conditions to increase your compensation?
□ Yes □No

D3. Were you aware of the following regulations in place regarding displacement at that time?
□ 2001 Chaiqian Management Regulations (National)
□ 2001 Shanghai Chaiqian Management Regulations Bylaw
□ Expo-induced Displacement Regulation by Shanghai Municipality
□ Expo Induced Chaiqian Policy Guidelines by the district government of your residency
□ The Land Law of People's Republic of China
□ Other, please specify

D4. If you were aware of above regulations, how would you describe your knowledge of these regulations?
□ I don't know at all □ I know a little
□ I know it/them well

D5a. What are the major channels for you to learn these regulations?
□ Government publicity
□ Internet, books, magazines, newspapers and other media
□ Neighbours, friends and family relatives
□ The Chaiqian company
□ Residents Committee
□ Lawyers and legal experts
□ Volunteers
□ Other, please specify

D5b.Did you use or try to use the law to protect your interests and rights?
□ Yes→Please skip to D6
□ No→please go to D5c

D5c. Why you did not use the law?
□ The cost is too much
□ Do not know how to find a good lawyer
□ law is useless because it protects officials
□ lawyers would not dare to take the case
□ Other, please specify

D6. What do you think are the major obstacles hindering the communication of chaiqian policy? (multiple choice)
□ Lack of transparency □ Insufficient publicity
□ The policy changes frequently and it's hard to figure out which to apply
□ The policy is too complicated to understand
□ The policies contradict with each other
□ I doubt whether these policies would be implemented effectively and strictly
□ I don't know where to get relevant information regarding displacement
□ I am not interested
□ Other, please specify _____

D7. What kinds of compensation options were you offered at that time?
□ Cash compensation
□ Allocated Resettlement Housing Projects in Pujiang, Sanlin, Nanping, Yongtai and Hangtou
□ Allocated resettlement housing projects in the inner city but I have to contribute some money
□ Others, please specify_____

D8. Were you experience the following during the displacement of your family?
□ 1. Harassment of family members
□ 2. Threatened or attacked by thugs associated with chaiqian companies
□ 3. Making the neighbourhood difficult to have a normal living, e.g. cutting off the supply of water and electricity occasionally, hiring migrant workers to break the windows, disturbing the sleep, hiring thugs to threaten you with verbal or physical violence, etc.
□ 4. Brutal eviction
□ 5. Threaten your job security
□ 6. Other, please specify

D9. If you never experienced these, have you witnessed your neighbours or others who went through any of above?
□ Yes, please specify numbers_____
□ No

D10a which agency/agencies was/were involved in your chaiqian?
□ Government authorities (Jiedao/ district/ municipal)
□ Danwei □ Chaiqian companies
□ Juweihui/cunweihui □ Lawyers/social workers
□ Other, specify

D10b. How would rate your satisfaction with the following agencies?

Juweihui/cunweihui		1. Very dissatisfied 2. Dissatisfied 3. Yiban 4. Satisfied 5. Very satisfied
Danwei		
Government authorities		
Chaiqian Company		
Lawyers and social workers		
Others if any		

D11a. How long did you stay in transitory housing? Months

D11b.Which location is the transitory housing closest to?
□ resettlement house □ old house

D11c.Was the compensation package able to cover the rent during transition?
□ Yes □ No
D11d. Was it difficult to rent transitory housing?
□ Yes □ No
D11e: Were you able to stay in the transitory housing after the full interior decoration of the resettlement housing had finished without paying out of your own savings?
□ Yes □ No
D11f. Did the government offer any relocation services?
□ Yes, ____times
□ No
D12a. Were you able to visit any exemplary resettlement flats during the negotiation?
□ Yes
□ No
D12b. Were you able to walk around the resettlement projects during the visit?
□ Yes □ No
D12c. Were you able to inspect inside an exemplary flat similar to what you were going to be compensated with?
□ Yes □No
D13. Did you feel problematic, uncertain or hesitant since you were not able to inspect the flat or the place?
□ Yes □ No
D14. Were you able to save any money from the compensation package after purchasing the resettlement housing at subsidised price?
□ Yes, about % □ No
D15a. Did you know your neighbour's compensation package?
□ Yes □ No
D15b. Did you ever disclose your compensation package to your neighbours?
□ Yes □ No
D15c. Did you receive any hint or threats from the Chaiqian agents that your contract would invalidate if you discussed your compensation with your neighbours?
□ Yes □No
D16a. In offering you the choice of resettlement housing purchase, did they show you the floor plan of the flat?
□ Yes □ No
D16b. Did they show you the plan of the Xiaoqu?
□ Yes □ No
D16c. Were there any changes from what you have seen after you resettled in?
□ Yes, drastically➔ Continue to 16d
□ Yes, minor change➔Continue to 16d
□ No, exactly the same➔ skip to D17
D16d. If yes, do you consider those changes acceptable?
□ Yes □ No
D17. What do you think of your compensation compared with others similar to your household situation?
□ Very unfair
□ Unfair
□ Acceptable
□ Fair
□ Very fair
D18. Compared with your own expectation, what do you think of your compensation package?
□ Very unfair
□ Unfair
□ Acceptable
□ Fair
□ Very fair
Question D19 to D20g is for the farmers only.
D19. In acquiring your zhaijidi (land for personal housing), how are you compensated?
□ Monetary compensation based on evaluation of floor size and building quality
□ Registered Hukou
□ other, please specify
D20. Did you and your family receive the share of the following as your compensation package?
□ Qingmiao Fee (un-harvested farm food)
□ Equipment, construction and other things on collectively owned land
□ Labour power compensation➔Continue to D20a
□ Rural Residents Pension Scheme➔Continue to D20b
□ Township Health Care Insurance➔ Continue to D20c
□ Minimum Living Allowance Scheme➔Continue to D20d
□ Job/job training➔ Continue to D20e
□ Food subsidies➔ Continue to D20f and D20g
□ Other, please specify _____
D20a. If you are offered a once-off cash compensation, at _____RMB before _____ years old
D20b. How much did you receive in the year of land acquisition? _____RMB and now is _____RMB.

D20c. I have to pay _____RMB fully per administrative year and then at _____% if exceeds the money debited in my account.
D20d. I receive RMB per month.
D20e. If you are offered a job, please indicate your job ; Salary
D20g. if you are offered training, please indicate the effectiveness of the training in helping you obtain a job?
□ Very ineffective □ Ineffective □ yiban
□ Effective □ Very effective

E. SATISFACTION WITH THE CHANGES IN HOUSING AND COMMUNITY

According to your own expectations and compared with your previous housing and community conditions, please rate your experience in this new neighbourhood using a scale of 1 to 5.

Factors	1=Very unsatisfied 2=Unsatisfied 3=Yiban 4=Satisfied 5=Very satisfied
E1. Housing size	
E2. Housing layout	
E3. Provision of basic utilities water, electricity, piped gas	
E4. Provision of basic services, e.g. cable TV, internet	
E5. Public facilities maintenance	
E6. Sanitary conditions	
E7. Housing quality	
E8. Fire control	
E9. Sense of safety	
E10. Sound proofing and noise control	

According to your own expectations and compared with your previous housing and community conditions, please rate your experience in this new neighbourhood using a scale of 1 to 5.

Services/facilities	1=Very unsatisfied 2=Unsatisfied 3=Yiban 4=Satisfied 5=Very satisfied
E11. Leisure and Amenities	
E12. Exercise facilities and kid's playground	
E13. Parking management	
E14. Landscaping	
E15. Architectural design	
E16. Community cleaning services	
E17. Neighbourhood security management	
E18. Property management service	
E19. Medical services	
E20 Public transport	
E21. Education establishment	
E22. Shopping	
E23: Senior centre	
E24: Overall ambience of the neighbourhood	

E25. The use of public service facilities

E25a. Hospital	□ Yes □ Seldom □ No, go to _____district, the reason is ____
E25b Education (from kindergarten to senior high school)	□ Yes □ No, go to _____ District, the reason is _____
E25c Transport (public rental bikes or buses)	□ Yes, □ No, use _____the reason is____

Please specify your reason:

1. The service is not available here
2. The quality of the services here is poor
3. The pricing is too high
4. Hukou is not registered here
5. Used to services in other places
6. It's not convenient here
7. I have other sources
8. Other, please specify_____

F. COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BEFORE AND AFTER DISPLACEMENT

F1. Whom do you normally have contact with before the displacement and after the displacement?

	Before	After
F1a. Neighbours		
F1b. Friends		
F1c. Relatives		
F1d. Colleagues		
F1e. People met from social activities		
F1f. Families		
F1g. Online friends		
F1h. People who come from same place		

F2a. Were your contacts living in the same place before the displacement?
□ all of them □ most of them
□ a few of them □ none of them

F2b. Are your acquaintances living in the same Xiaoqu now?
□ all of them □ most of them
□ a few of them □ none of them

F2c. How do you feel about the change?
□ I feel happy
□ I feel sorry for reduced contacts with them.
□ I feel like I am isolated.
□ I miss them a lot.
□ It does not affect me at all.

F2d. Compared with your previous circle of contacts, what do you think of your current one?
□ shrank □ no change □ expanded

F3. How do you mainly communicate with your neighbours before the displacement?

1= often 2=sometimes 3=seldom 4=never 5=N/A	Before	After
F3a. Visiting		
F3b. Say hello or chat when meeting outside		
F3c.Have meals or entertainment together		
F3d. Sport or gym together		
F3e. Call each other or text		
F3f. Internet		
F3g. Activities organised by Juwei		
F3h. Other spontaneous activities among neighbours		
F3i: Help each other (baby sitting or neighbour watch)		

F4a. How do you evaluate the interpersonal relationship in your community BEFORE the displacement?

Not friendly to each other	1	2	3	4	5	friendly to each other
Minding one's own business	1	2	3	4	5	looking after each other
Suspicious of each other	1	2	3	4	5	Trustful of each other
Very strange to each other	1	2	3	4	5	very familiar with each other

F4b. After the displacement, how do you see the change in interpersonal relationship?

loss of friendliness	1	2	3	4	5	improvement of friendliness
loss of support	1	2	3	4	5	improvement of support
loss of trust	1	2	3	4	5	improvement of trust
loss of familiarity	1	2	3	4	5	Improvement of familiarity

F5a. How do you agree with the statement that "I am very attached to my previous community?

□ totally agree □ agree □ yiban
□ disagree □ totally disagree

F5b. Do you feel the same about your current residence?

□ Absolutely not □ maybe a little □ I don't know
□ absolutely yes

F6a.Do you contact the following institutions in regard of any problems you have about the housing or the community?

Institutions	1=often 2=sometimes; 3=seldom; 4=never; 5=N/A
a. Property management company	
b. Developer	
c. Liwei where my hukou registered	
d. current liwei in Expo resettlement site	
e. Property owners committee	
f. Media	
g. Sanlin or Pujiang government agencies	
h. government agencies where hukou is registered	
i. Other government agencies	
j. other home owners	

F6b. what do you think of the work of your residents committees?

□ very dissatisfied □ dissatisfied
□ neutral □ satisfied
□ very satisfied

F6c. have your community established property owners committee?

□ Yes
□ No, specify reason _____
□ Not sure

G. COMMUTING AND MIGRATION INTENTIONS

G1. How much time do you spent on commuting within the radius of your major activities from your current residency, these might include work, leisure, visiting friends, shopping food, banking, etc?

□ Less than 30 minutes
□ 30- 45 minutes
□ 45- 60 minutes
□ more than an hour

G2. Your means of transport

□ walk
□ public rental bike
□ bus
□ own bike including electric
□ private car
□ metro

G3-G5: for residents from Expo Site only.
G3: How often do you visit your previous home?
Times/Month
G4: How often do you think of your previous home? ____times/month
G7. The major reasons are _____
□ Inertia
□ nostalgia
□ more familiar with that place
□ there are better services and products
□ my roots are there
□ others, please specify_____

H. GENERAL PERCEPTIONS

H1. Do you think that your previous residency really needs to be demolished and rebuilt?
□ Yes→continue to H2
□ No→ skip to H3
H2. Where would you like to resettle?
□ Original place
□ Same district
□ The closer to the original place, the better
□ Suburbia
□ I don't care
H3. If not for the Expo and the government offers plan to upgrade the place, are you willing to contribute financially to the upgrading?
□ Yes→ please answer H4
□ No→skip to H5
H4. How much would you like to contribute as in percentage of the overall cost? _____%
H5. The reason is _____
□ the quality of the housing is decent
□ for fear of displacement
□ insecure ownership
□ dislike the place
□ do not intend to live long
□ others, please specify
H6. Were you offered the choice of resettling somewhere close to your original place?
□ Yes □No
H7. If possible, do you want the option of moving back?
□ very strongly □ strongly
□ not interested □ not interested at all
H8. In general to what extent are you satisfied with the displacement process?
□ very dissatisfied □ dissatisfied
□ yiban □ satisfied
□ very satisfied
H9. Were you informed of post-Expo land development at the time of chaiqian?
□ Yes
□ No
H10. The Expo site is now planned for second-round development; do you think it is fair to displace your family in the name of public interest?
□ Yes
□ No
H11. What do you think of the impacts of Expo-induced displacement upon your life?
□ significantly deteriorated
□ deteriorated
□ no change;
□ improved
□ significantly improved
H12a. Please choose from the scale to describe your feelings on being displaced
Happy to move 1 2 3 4 5 Sad to move
H12b. Please choose from the scale to describe your feelings of resettlement
Happy with resettlement 1 2 3 4 5 disappointed with resettlement

We would like to thank you again for your help. If you wish to receive a copy of the research findings, please leave your contact information below.
Email:
Or photocopy:
Address:
Postcode:

Appendix VII: Extracts of Interview Transcripts and Coding Sample



YZ：你原来老房子是哪里的啊？

[redacted]

YZ：那边也是因为世博动迁啊？

A：[redacted]以前在那里可以享受低保啊，身体不好也可以享受啊，提个申请他们就给你来个补助啊什么的，不是我要补助啊，就是逢年过节上来慰问一下，问问你现在身体好不好啊，最近怎么样，反正总归在马路上停下来也会问你一声，就是你买菜去啊，总归会停下来问你一下，现在这些人都不理你，住在这里，里委干部也看不见，来问候的人也没有，就是温暖太少，就是好像这种冷落的感觉。房子是住得好了，就是没有人情关系了，就是这种感觉。

YZ：现在这个地方你们也叫它是里委咯？

A：居委会。叫居委会，上海人喜欢叫里委。

YZ：这个居委会工作的都是老阿姨咯。

A：我们居委会也有年纪轻的，也有年纪大的，大概 50 多，60 岁的，反正好像他们说话那个脾气很大，架子很大，就是这种感觉，就是眼睛朝天看的，不是那种温文尔雅的，那种贴心人的感觉，没有，没有，没有。

YZ：你们认识他们吧？

A：不认识，我们一个都不认识这个居委干部。[redacted]给他们不是一个居委。这是我个人看见的东西哦，他们居委会他们这里搞什么活动啊，去玩啊什么啊，搞什么活动就是一个免费游啊什么的，我们都要大家掏钱的，他们不掏钱的，陪我们去玩，他们都有好处拿的，经常去居委会看。他们都有什么东西发啊什么的，从来没有我们老百姓的，他们都有什么好处拿的，什么洗洁精啊，洗头液啊，毛巾啊什么的，他们居委会干部都有这些东西分的，经常有这些东西分的，觉得他们的福利好像太多了。以前我们在老的居委会的时候经常有这些东西发发的，又是搞什么小活动啊，发给我们居民的，现在他们这些小活动都没有，他们都有拿这个东西，可能就是这些小活动他们就不搞了，这些上面发下来的东西他们自己就分掉了，我觉得就是这个样子。别看这些东西是小东西，其实没有多少钱的东西，但是就是感觉现在越拉越远了。以前在居委会里面，发个被单啊，发个毛巾啊，发块香肥皂啊，就这些小东西，经常给你发东西，发个牙膏啊，过来拿啊，就可以说上几句话了，就这种感觉是不是。现在你这些东西不发了，不是要这个东西，现在就是有些东西你万不得已了才跑到居委会去跟他们说。所以你假如说发什么小牙膏啊，小毛巾啊什么的，搞个小活动啊，碰到居委会的，有些事情想起来就可以跟他们坐下来谈谈啊什么的，沟通沟通啊，没有这种机会的。你现在跑过去，跑到他们那里去也是这个开会了，那个开会了，谁知道他们是在开会啊，谁知道他们是在家里啊，是不是啊，有的在，有的是年轻的，他们说不是我管的，所以说有些事情很着急的，找他们，他们人都不在。经常说开会了，谁知道？

YZ：就是现在的居委？



访谈记录 6

A：对，就是这种感觉。跑进去经常就是只有一两个人值班，不想以前，人都在，都坐在里面一起办公。问到哪里，哦，是谁管的，是谁管的，要么就是他不在，我跟你写张纸条留给他，我明天告诉他，你的事情就要耽搁一天。你要是有个万不得已的事情怎么耽搁呢？意思是，就是感觉不舒服现在，不可以马上给你解决的。像老的居委会，你一叫，万一他到街道去开会，他一个电话就打过去了，你负责这个地块谁谁谁，家里面发生什么事情了哦，你快回来哦，就这种感觉。他们这里没有。什么事都要让你等。你要是这家里有个孤老，感到很孤独的时候，你去找居委会，他们有的不是管片的，是搞卫生的什么的，一个居委会总归有男的吧，有个事情，他们就说我们一起去，一起去帮帮他忙，他急呢，他有什么事情呢，跟他一起弄一弄，现在都不行，非要你们邻里之间打起来了，吵起来了他们才管。太官僚了。房子住的舒服了，这种暖气劲没有了。冷暖之间，关心太少。他们拿着工资，整天捧着茶，人又看不见，跑到居委会又看不见他们人，就一两个人值班，我觉得他们好像在轮流休息，今天你来值两天班，明天他来值两天班。

YZ：你们现在居委组织你们居民活动伐？

A：有啥活动啊，没有啥活动呀。我现在退休了，天天在家里，没有事情做，[redacted]那边也没有什么凉亭啊什么，给我们坐坐玩玩的，都没有，连椅子都是烂的，这个凉棚都没有，是吧，你搞个地方给居民坐一下，聊聊是吧？整天在家里么，要么就是看电视，是吧，就是这种感觉，老百姓的这种苦处他们都不知道。他们可能有家里的人关心吧，白天他拿着工资，不知道我们这些人，退休了，【开始哭】无聊的寂寞，不知道的，不知道的，不关心我们这些老百姓的。

YZ：你们以前在上海的居委经常把你们组织起来啊？

A：对，有时候有讲什么卫生课啊，有讲什么心血管病啊，心脑病，因为我们那个时候离医院比较近么，老年人又比较多，我那个时候还没有退休，他们经常会叫我家里人去听讲座。老人有的老人么，像我家里面，我婆婆啊，我妈妈啊，都不行的话就叫你小辈去，你有空你就代他去开会，有时候查个血糖啊，量个血压啊，每个星期都有一次，就是通过这些小活动么，沟通一下，家里发生什么事情啊，家里跟子女有什么不开心的啊，就问一下情况呢，就大致这样了解了以后，你照顾人家谁谁谁谁。他不是管你这块的人，他会跟别的人说，我今天碰到谁了，他们家里发生什么事情了，他会把这个反映到他哪里去的。现在都没有的。

YZ：大家正好借着这些小活动熟悉下。

A：对，就跟同事一样的，不是我管的，但是他马上会跟你讲，因为是你管的那一块，反正你不说，也有别的人跟他讲。然后你碰到他之后，他会跟你说，哦，我知道了，你们家里昨天发生了什么事情，我知道了，我们已经跟你办理了，你一去，事情基本上就跟你办好了，什么填表格啊，事情都给你办理好了。就觉得满贴心的这种感觉，就像你家里又个老大一样的给你罩着。这边好像就是没有人关心的，感觉就像一个养老院，关在幼儿园的小孩一样，必要的东西就给你了，组织上规定的要活动的东西，他就在喇叭上给你叫一下，就这么一回事，你参加就参加，不参加就算。

YZ：喇叭叫啊？

A：喇叭叫啊，假如说是三八妇女节哦，喇叭八点半以后，每天什么火烛要小心啊，门窗要关好啊，什么的，喇叭啦上就叫的，然后叫说现在里委里面在搞什么活动啊，大家去参加啊，就这样叫一下，就好了。蛮重要的事情就在你门上，那个大门上贴一张纸，贴个告示，什么什么事情，就是这么一回事。像我们以前那个居委会就是，有什么事情就是，关于你的事情，就会打电话，说这里有个什么事情，你马上来一下啊，这边没有的。就没有的。

YZ：你现在会经常去居委会吧？

Appendix VIII Overview of Interviewees

Artists

Mr. Jie Lu	Photographer	Interview 02/2012
Mr. Xingping Chen	Artist	Interview 03/2012
Mr. Zhifeng Xu	Artist, filmmaker	Interview 07/2012

Planners

Mr. Harry Den Hartog	Planner, writer	Interview 06/2012 and also 07/2012

Human Rights Activists

Activist 1	Lawyer/International/activist	Interview 02/2012
Activist 2	Lawyer /Chinese	Interview 07/2012

Government Authorities

Pudong District Government	Telephone Inquiry 06/2012
Shanghai Municipal Planning Bureau	Interview 07/2012
Shanghai Environmental Science Research Institute	Telephone Inquiry 05/2012

Experts

Dr. Xiang Feng	Interview 04/2012 and 07/2012
Professor Chen Yingfang	Interview 03/2012

Mr. Chen	Retired Electricity Grid Engineer	Interview 04/2012

Displacees (as in Recorded and Transcribed Conversations and Interviews)

Notes:

To protect the identity of some displacees, some information are removed (dates of the interviews; especially in the event of group interviews); CD is short for cannot disclosed; D indicates the displacees were displaced from Pudong and X indicates that displacees were displaced from Puxi.

Number	Gender	Age Group	Profession	Date of Interview	Remarks
D1	Female	60s	Retired	08/03/2012	Individual
D2	Female	50s	Retired	08/03/2012	D2 and D3 are a couple; met D2 frequently in public afterwards; D4 joined in the middle
D3	Male	60s	Freelance		
D4	Female	60s	Retired		
D5	Male	80s	Retired	09/03/2012	Individual
D6	Female	80s	Retired	09/03/2012	Mother and Son; son joined later
D7	Male	50s	Pedicab driver	09/03/2012	
D8	Female	70s	Retired	09/03/2012	Individual
D9	Female	60s	Retired	09/03/2012	D10 joined in the middle and D9 quit soon
D10	Female	50s	Retired	09/03/2012	
D11	Female	50s	Early retirement	09/03/2012	Individual
D12	Female	50s	Retired	03/2012	Individual
D13	Female	40s	CD	03/2012	Group; follow-up visits were made to D14, D15, D17, D19 and D20 from April to July;
D14	female	50s	CD		
D15	Female	40s	CD		
D16	Female	60s	CD		

D17	Female	60s	CD		repeatedly consulted D13 throughout the fieldwork;
D18	Female	40s	CD		
D19	Male	30s	CD		
D20	Male	50s	CD		
D21	Male	40s	CD		
D22	Male	50s	Barber	10/03/2012	Individual
D23	Female	50s	Unknown	10/03/2012	Group, D23 quit soon, D24 and D25 are mother-daughter
D24	Female	40s	unemployed		
D25	Female	70s	Farmer		
D26	Male	60s	CD	03/2012	Individual
D27	Male	40s	worker	11/03/2012	Individual
D28	Female	40s	unemployed	11/03/2012	Individual
D29	Male	60s	Retired	12/03/2012	Individual
D30	Male	60s	Self-employed	03/2012	D31 joined in the middle; follow-up to D31 in April and June
D31	Male	60s	Retired		
D32	Female	80s	Retired	12/03/2012	D33 joined in the middle
D33	Female	30s	Cleaner	12/03/2012	
D34	Male	70s	Retired	15/03/2012	D35, D36, D37, D38, D39 and D40 joined later
D35	Male	50s	Unknown		
D36	Female	60s	Unknown		
D37	Female	50s	Unknown		
D38	Female	50s	Unknown		
D39	Female	40s	Unknown		
D40	Male	60s	unknown		
D41	Male	70s	Pensioner	03/2012	D41 quit after

D42	Male	60s	Retired	03/2012	D42 joined; Follow-up to D42 in April
D43	Male	60s	Retired	03/2012	Individual
D44	Male	60s	Retired	03/2012	Couple
D45	Female	60s	Retired	03/2012	
D46	Male	60s	CD	03/2012	Individual
D47	Male	CD	Party organ	03/2012	Individual
D48	Male	50s	CD	19/03/2012	Limited input from D49; D49, D50 and D51 joined in the middle; D48 was followed up in April and June
D49	Male	70s	Retired teacher		
D50	Male	50s	CD		
D51	Male	40s	CD		
D52	Female	50s	unknown	21/03/2012	Individual
D53	Female	70s	retired	21/03/2012	Group; D56 quit soon
D54	Male	60s	Unknown		
D55	Male	80s	Retired		
D56	Female	40s	Unemployed		
D57	Female	60s	Retired		
D58	Male	60s	unknown		
D59	Female	70s	unknown	22/03/2012	Group
D60	Female	80s	unknown		
D61	Female	40s	unemployed	03/2012	Naturally emerged Group; D64 was followed up in April; D65 was followed in July
D62	Female	40s	unemployed		
D63	Female	40s	Unemployed		
D64	Male	60s	Retired		
D65	Female	40s	Unemployed		

D66	Female	60s	Retired		
D67	Female	40s	unemployed		
D68	Male	CD	Policeman	25/03/2012	Individual
D69	Female	70s	Retired	25/03/2012	Group; D72 is the son of D71 (D72 joined later)
D70	Female	80s	Retired		
D71	Female	70s	Retired		
D72	Male	40s	unknown		
D73	Male	70s	Retired	26/03/2012	Individual
D74	Male	50s	unknown	26/03/2012	Group
D75	Female	50s	Retired		
D76	Female	40s	Unknown	28/03/2012	Group； D80 was consulted frequently informally
D77	Female	50s	Unknown		
D78	Female	60s	Unknown		
D79	Female	70s	Unknown		
D80	Male	60s	Retired		
D81	Male	50s	Early Retirement	31/03/2012	Individual
D82	Female	60s	Retired	31/03/2012	D81 joined later
D83	Male	80s	Retired teacher	31/03/2012	Individual
D84	Male	60s	CD	31/03/2012	Individual; followed up on 04/05/2012
D85	Male	50s	CD	01/04/2012	D85 quit in the middle; D86 joined after D85 quit
D86	Female	60s	Retired	01/04/2012	
D87	Male	60s	CD	01/04/2012	
D88	Female	60s	unknown	16/03/2012	Naturally emerged group; only D91,D97,
D89	Female	60s	unknown		

D90	Female	70s	unknown		D98, and D99 stayed until the end; D97 was revisited for follow-up;
D91	Male	50s	CD		
D92	Female	60s	unknown		
D93	Male	60s	retired		
D94	Male	60s	Shop owner		
D95	Female	60s	retired		
D96	Female	70s	unknown		
D97	Female	50s	CD		
D98	Female	60s	CD		
D99	Male	50s	CD		
D100	Female	20s	CD	20/04/2012	With D97
D101	Male	60s	Retired	18/04/2012	Individual
D102	Female	70s	Retired	18/04/2012	D101 joined later
D103	Female	50s	Sick retirement	20/04/2012	Individual
D104	Male	60s	Retired	12/04/2012	D105 joined in the middle
D105	Male	50s	unknown		
D106	Female	CD	CD	12/04/2012	Individual
D107	Male	50s	CD	04/2012	Individual; followed up in July
D108	Female	80s	CD	05/2012	Individual
D109	Female	CD	CD	06/2012	D110 joined later
D110	Male	CD	CD		
D111	Female	CD	CD	06/2012	Group; D111 was followed up three times from June to July;
D112	Female	CD	CD	06/2012	
D113	Male	CD	CD	06/2012	

D114	Female	CD	CD	06/2012	with D111
D115	Female	60s	CD	07/2012	Individual
D116	Male	60s	Demobilised Solider	07/2012	Individual
D117	Female	50s	CD	04/2012-07/2012	Case approach
X1	Male	60s	Retired	28/04/2012	Individual
X2	Female	30s	Teacher	29/04/2012	Group (mother-daughter)
X3	Female	50s	Retired		
X4	Male	60s	Retired policemen	01/05/2012	X4 and X5 joined after X6 decided to quit
X5	Female	70s	retired		
X6	Male	80s	Retired		
X7	Male	30s	CD	03/05/2012	Individual
X8	Male	70s	Retired	02/05/2012	Group; X11 was consulted twice in June and July
X9	Male	70s	Retired		
X10	Male	60s	Retired		
X11	Male	50s	CD		
X12	Male	60s	Retired		
X13	Male	50s	Retired		
X14	Female	50s	unknown		
X15	Male	50s	SOE worker		
X16	Male	40s	SOE worker		
X17	Male	40s	SOE worker		
X18	Male	70s	Retired	04/05/2012	Individual
X19	Female	70s	Retired	04/05/2012	Individual
X20	Male	20s	student	04/05/2012	Individual

X21	Female	70s	Retired	04/05/2012	X22 joined in the middle
X22	Female	60s	Retired		
X23	Male	50s	unknown	05/05/2012	Individual
X24	Male	50s	sick retirement	05/05/2012	Individual
X25	Male	50s	CD	07/05/2012	Individual
X26	Male	50s	unemployed	07/05/2012	Individual
X27	Female	50s	CD	08/05/2012	Group
X28	Female	60s	CD		
X29	Female	40s	CD		
X30	Female	50s	unknown	09/05/2012	X31 joined later
X31	Male	60s	CD		
X32	Male	70s	Retired	10/05/2012	Individual
X33	Female	60s	Retired	12/05/2012	Group
X34	Female	70s	Retired		
X35	Female	60s	Retired		
X36	Female	70s	Retired CCP		
X37	Male	50s	Early retirement	15/05/2012	X38, X39, and X40 one after another; X40 was called to quit by her neighbour;
X38	Female	40s	Unknown		
X39	Female	60s	Unknown		
X40	Female	80s	Unknown		
X41	Female	50s	CD	16/05/2012	Individual
X42	Female	60s	Retired	05/2012	Individual; a follow-up in July
X43	Male	60s	Retired	21/05/2012	X44 and X45 joined in the middle, X43
X44	Male	60s	Unknown		

X45	Female	60s	Retired		quit soon;
X46	Male	60s	Retired	27/04/2012	X47 joined around the end of the interview
X47	Female	60s	Retired		
X48	Female	80s	Retired	29/05/2012	Individual
X49	Female	70s	Retired	29/05/2012	Group
X50	Female	40s	Unknown		
X51	Male	40s	Unknown		
X52	Male	80s	Retired		
X53	Female	50s	Retired	19/05/2012	Group
X54	Male	60s	Retired		
X55	Male	60s	Unknown		
X56	Female	40s	Unknown		
X57	Female	50s	unknown		
X58	Male	50s	unknown		
X59	Male	70s	Retired	06/06/2012	Individual
X60	Female	60s	Retired	06/06/2012	Individual
X61	Female	70s	Retired	06/2012	Individual
X62	Female	40s	unemployed	06/2012	Individual
X63	Female	50s	CD	16/06/2012	Couple
X64	Male	50s	Self-employed		
X65	Male	50s	Sick retirement	05/07/2012	Individual
X66	Female	40s	CD	09/07/2012	Individual
X67	Female	50s	Unemployed	15/07/2012	individual

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